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Preface 
I first observed Papua New Guinea (PNG) nationals crossing the border with 
Australia and entering the Torres Strait Islands in 1997, when I was on Saibai island 
to facilitate community planning for improvements to their water supply, sewerage 
and housing. My working life at that time was divided between developing 
countries in Asia and remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in 
Australia. As I stood on the foreshore, watching small groups cross the short 
distance by dinghy, I was struck by the clashing of two very different worlds. I knew 
that many of the visitors were related to the Saibai islanders and that the conditions 
of their entry was limited to traditional exchanges under a treaty. But I observed an 
air of supplication among the Papuans that I recognised from the poorest parts of 
developing countries I had worked in. I knew how disadvantaged the Torres Strait 
Islanders were compared to the rest of Australia, but clearly in this context the 
Papuans were much more disadvantaged again. I was struck by a mixture of 
surprise and trepidation. I remember not knowing which way to look. 
It was a sight and a feeling that stuck with me, but it would be years before I 
had the chance to explore what was happening on the other side of the border. Later, 
I would discover that Garrick Hitchcock (author of chapter 9) was already doing his 
PhD on the political ecology in the South Fly District along PNG’s border with 
Indonesia, and Kevin Murphy (chapter 2) would soon be starting his PhD analysing 
social relations along the border with Australia. 
Around then I started a conversation that would last many years with Geoff 
Miller (chapter 6), who went on to take a placement as a health adviser with the 
Australian aid program in Daru. All the while I kept a close eye on the related 
research coming out of Torres Strait, especially the work of Bill Arthur and Will 
Sanders at the Australian National University. 
After I joined the University of Queensland in 2013, I met Jennifer Corrin 
(chapter 3), who already had strong ties with the South Pacific as a legal practitioner 
and researcher. I would also meet Jodie Curth-Bibb (co-editor of this book and co-
author of chapters 1, 5 and 8) and Peter Chaudhry (chapter 4), who both worked 
with me at the Institute for Social Science Research, along with research assistants 
Tsarie Duthie and Laura Simpson Reeves. By 2015 we had a sufficiently strong team 
to apply for a competitive ARC Discovery grant, which we won to commence in 
2016. 
Doug Porter from the World Bank and Bryant Alan from ANU encouraged us 
through the application, then advised us throughout the project’s duration. We also 
learnt of the long-standing and locally respected work by CSIRO in fisheries, with 
James Butler and Sara Busilacchi approaching us in an uncommon spirit of open 
collaboration (chapters 7 and 8). 
As fieldwork commenced on the PNG side, we were encouraged by 
widespread support from PNG government stakeholders at village, district, 
provincial and national levels. We were especially well received by the village 
  
leaders and households in the South Fly villages we visited in the course of four field 
trips. Much of our travel was by shallow-draft banana boats, visiting coastal villages 
and following the river systems to inland villages, and extending west to PNG’s 
border with Indonesia. Skilled operators such as Sapi Yo kept us safe along the 
weather coast. 
We also did two field trips to the Torres Strait. We found strong support 
among the Torres Strait leadership, who shared their concern for their close 
neighbours while maintaining the need to protect the limited resources on their 
islands. 
Simply put, we set out to understand a little-known part of the world and to 
recommend improvements. We collected socioeconomic data, attended community 
meetings and, crucially, interviewed community leaders and households. Interviews 
typically went for more than an hour, as people explained detailed and (for us) 
unexpected aspects of their lives. 
Together we wrote this book as a means to raise awareness of a little-known 
but strategically important borderland. The people living on the PNG side want 
people living in Australia and other countries, and in Port Moresby and other PNG 
cities, to understand their situation, which is quite unlike anywhere else in PNG and 
the world. Compared to the Australian side, they experience a marked level of 
relative inequality and a disparity in public funding and services. They want 
assistance, but in ways that are appropriate to the unique constraints and 
opportunities they face. 
We believe it is in Australia’s national interest to understand the border from 
the perspective of the PNG nationals living there, and that their ‘security’ and 
development ultimately determines the ‘security’ of the Australian border. We think 
that many of the people working for the Australian and Queensland government 
authorities at a personal level believe this too, if allowed to shed the official line. 
The other authors and I would like to thank our partners and families for their 
love, patience and support during the research and writing of this book. 
We are also very grateful for the goodwill and openness extended to us by the 
many people who accommodated us and gave us their time for the interviews. An 
incredible exchange of learning occurred between the project team and the people 
who participated. We were continually surprised by the capabilities that exist within 
South Fly villages and the struggles they face with a lack of transportation, market 
penetration, funding and services. We hope that this book will encourage 
stakeholders to approach development of the region in ways that take advantage of 
its unique strengths as a borderland. 
Mark Moran 
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1 
Introduction 
Mark Moran and Jodie Curth-Bibb 
Less than five kilometres from Australia’s northernmost island lies the southern 
coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG) (figure 1.1).1 Just 15 to 20 minutes in a dinghy 
(depending on the weather) and you are there. This geographical proximity is 
matched by a cultural closeness, as the people on either side of this passage of water 
have a long history of reciprocal relationships and shared identity. Despite this 
closeness, these peoples face a starkly different future, and they could hardly be 
further apart in terms of quality of life, well-being and access to opportunity. 
<Figure 1.1 near here> 
Map of the South Fly–Torres Strait region (J.R.A. Butler, S. Busilacchi and T. Skewes, ‘How 
resilient is the Torres Strait Treaty (Australia and Papua New Guinea) to global change? A 
fisheries governance perspective’, Environmental Science and Policy, vol. 91, 2019, pp. 17–
26, p. 19) 
The villagers on the PNG side of the border experience acute disadvantage. 
They rely on water tanks (which are often poorly maintained) or are forced to walk 
long distances to get fresh water; transport by dinghy is extremely expensive and at 
times dangerous; there is no electricity; the few health facilities that exist are often ill-
equipped and unstaffed; and students often need to travel long distances to get to a 
primary school. Houses are made of bush materials and are not mosquito-proof. 
Villagers either use a pit latrine, if the household has one, or they use the beach or 
the bush for a toilet. There is limited access to markets and no employment 
opportunities close to home. 
South Fly District of PNG can be seen as something alike to a triangle, defined 
by three powerful external influences: the Torres Strait Islands of Australia, the 
Merauke Regency of Indonesia and the Fly River Corridor, with the mining benefits 
and environmental impacts flowing from the Ok Tedi mine. In understanding the 
context, we have utilised a spatial conceptual tool that draws on the notion of a 
‘borderland’, which extends beyond the district’s administrative boundaries into 
Australia, Indonesia and the Fly River Corridor. 
This borderland sits at the periphery of the PNG state. It receives very little in 
the way of public expenditure or service delivery from its government. But 
perversely, the prices for basic commodities are comparable to those in Torres Strait 
(table 1.1),2 due to the high transportation costs, and macroeconomic distortions, due 
to the high levels of foreign direct investment in the PNG economy, predominantly 
from mining. Given the relative poverty experienced by those on the PNG side of the 
border, the elevated cost of goods is an enormous obstacle to development. 
  
Although many can rely on subsistence crops rather than purchasing store goods, 
there is no avoiding the barrier of high-cost fuel in the South Fly. Fuel is essential for 
basic transportation to markets and health services, but the cost of a single litre of 
fuel can reportedly be as high as 10 kina (approximately A$4). The cost of fuel is 
significantly cheaper in outer islands of the Torres Strait (A$2), and even more so 
across the border in Indonesia due to a state fuel subsidy.3 
<table 1.1 near here> 
Table 1.1: Median basic commodity prices in the South Fly and Torres Strait Islands 
[blank cell] Fuel (cost/litre) (A$) Flour (cost/kg) (A$) Rice (cost/kg) (A$)
 Sugar (cost/kg) (A$) Salt (cost/kg) (A$) 
Torres Strait Islands 1.95 1.71 3.96 2.05 1.53 
South Fly 3.33 (K8) 3.12 (K7.5) 3.02 (K7.25) 3.12 (K7.5) 0.83 (K2) 
Note: K in the South Fly row means kina. 
Source: borderlands research data 
Despite these difficulties, the people maintain strong families and social bonds 
within their village communities. For those villages with gardens, subsistence 
activities provide people with sufficient food and daily exercise, although they 
remain vulnerable to drought. People in these villages are already well engaged with 
the global cash economy and with the advantages and problems it brings. Many 
villages are becoming increasingly dependent on processed, store-bought foods like 
rice, flour and sugar, which are contributing to an increase in ‘lifestyle diseases’ such 
as diabetes. 
When PNG was still a colony of Australia, the people in the South Fly and 
Torres Strait Islands enjoyed close relationships that fostered mutual benefits for 
both parties. This began to transform after PNG gained independence in 1975. 
Signed in 1978 and ratified in 1985, the Torres Strait Treaty then defined the border 
between Papua New Guinea and Australia. The benefits that flowed to Torres Strait 
Islanders as Australian citizens have steadily increased ever since, lifting their living 
standards. Meanwhile, the people living in the South Fly have received limited 
support from their government and aid agencies, and their living standards have 
deteriorated. Environmental damage caused by the Ok Tedi mine has spoiled the 
marine environment on which many of them depend, especially those villagers near 
the mouth of the Fly River. 
In recent years, the management of the Australian border and the Torres Strait 
Treaty has increasingly hardened. By limiting traditional visits to 14 villages, there is 
now another divide: Treaty villagers, who benefit from the treaty, and those in non-
Treaty villages, who do not. Many non-Treaty villagers now have to sell their 
produce and crafts to Treaty villagers, who then on-sell those products to Torres 
Strait Islanders, some of whom then themselves on-sell into mainland Australia. 
South Fly villagers must carve out a livelihood in the border region to raise 
cash for various things, including costs associated with their children’s schooling. 
Many still depend on productive cross-border relationships in Torres Strait. They 
  
travel across the border to work as domestic help; access health services; engage in 
traditional activities; and sell arts, crafts and other goods. But these cross-border 
interactions are stifled by the vague and variably enforced regulations in place, 
which allow only for ‘traditional’ activities across the border. Work for PNG 
nationals in Torres Strait is fraught. Many are paid with food and second-hand 
clothes, or with meagre sums, so that their activities are deemed by Australian 
border authorities to qualify as traditional. 
Although people of Torres Strait also experience disadvantage relative to non-
Indigenous Australia, there is a sharp divide when looking across the border into 
PNG. Household incomes in the South Fly District are significantly lower: while 
Torres Strait Islanders reliably earn their income from work or welfare payments, 
South Fly residents’ income is intermittent and diverse, from opportunistically 
selling crafts, gardening, hunting, fishing and, for a few, whatever remittances their 
relatives can manage. Torres Strait Islanders are concerned about the plight of 
people living in the South Fly, but they are also concerned by the pressure visitors 
place on their limited island resources, especially their water supply, health services 
and housing. 
Health services for PNG nationals are extremely limited. When transport can 
be organised, patients make their own way to the hospital in Daru. But over-
crowding in Daru’s limited housing has made it difficult to control the epidemic of 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) and other disease outbreaks. Many South 
Fly residents access Australian health services for emergency care, putting pressure 
on Queensland Health clinics on the outer Torres Strait Islands. The precarious 
health context highlights the need for aid programs to take a population health 
approach that encompasses both sides of the border. 
The problems of underdevelopment of the South Fly and the difficulties this 
has caused for border security have long been known. Consistent with 
Recommendation 25 of the 2010 Senate inquiry, Torres Strait: Bridge and Border,4 we 
set out to understand the development context of the South Fly borderland, with 
particular attention to the external effects of the Australian and Indonesian borders 
and the mining-affected Fly River Corridor. We then explored how international aid 
assistance and improved border management could ameliorate this 
underdevelopment. 
The state of the borderlands 
The Torres Strait Treaty defines a Protected Zone, control over which is divided 
between Australia and PNG, to preserve the traditional way of life of traditional 
inhabitants and the marine environment. This interacts with a number of other 
jurisdiction boundaries including Fisheries, Internal Waters, Coastal Waters, 
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone Limit, and Exclusive Economic Zone.5 
The treaty also defines the cross-border passage of 14 PNG Treaty villages6 and 
14 Torres Strait communities.7 The population affected by the border extends beyond 
these nominated villages and island communities, to include the greater Torres Strait 
  
Region of Australia (to Thursday Island and the tip of Cape York), as well as much 
of the South Fly District of the Western Province of PNG.8 Although it is technically 
a maritime border, crossings are made daily in small dinghies. According to 2019 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Inquiry, more than 27 000 PNG nationals 
crossed the border in 2017–18.9 
Those deemed to be ‘traditional inhabitants’ are subject to provisions under the 
Treaty, which allows them to cross the international border into the Torres Strait. 
Although initially there was no real enforcement of an official definition of 
‘traditional inhabitants’, in 2000 formal notes were exchanged between PNG and 
Australia restricting the definition to the 14 Treaty villages. 
The Torres Strait Treaty has been recognised for its innovation in international 
law and support for customary activity.10 It was designed to accommodate existing 
cultural ties and traditional ways of life and the associated travel between islands 
and across the international border. But as Kevin Murphy outlines (chapter 2), the 
social construction of the borderlands does not map easily onto the border and 
corresponding Treaty arrangements. There is a history of mobility to accommodate 
relationships, cultural exchanges, marriage, trade and resource extraction, as well as 
warfare and consequent internal migration inside this borderland. As some groups 
have permanently settled in new territories, they have pushed out and displaced 
others who still have claims to such lands today. The consequences of these 
movements continue to evolve and drive social tensions. 
The existence and placement of the border under the treaty, and the 
administrative interpretations that have operationalised its management, has 
resulted in a range of asymmetries. At odds with a cultural ethos of reciprocity that 
borderlanders once shared, the current regime of border management instead fuels 
resentment that exacerbates pre-existing social tensions, with potentially 
destabilising effects. On the Australian side of the border, Torres Strait Islanders 
have access to the services and benefits of the Australian welfare state,11 whereas on 
the PNG side people of the South Fly experience high levels of poverty and 
deprivation and a near-complete failure of public infrastructure, services and 
governance. 
Within living memory, there was a time when living standards on either side of 
the border were similar. It is illuminating to compare a typical response to key 
questions from one side of the border to the other, to comprehend the enormity of 
the divide.12 For instance, a qualitatively typical male respondent living in the South 
Fly in his fifties who has ten years of education will have living conditions starkly 
different from those of a comparable male residing in the Torres Strait, as table 1.2 
indicates. 
<table 1.2 near here> 
  
  
Table 1.2: A comparison of several lifestyle indicators of two adult males of similar age and 
years of education from the South Fly and Torres Strait Islands 
[blank cell] South Fly village Torres Strait Islands 
community 
Household 
income in the 
last month 
A$199 A$2840 
Sources of 
income 
Crafts, garden produce, 
hunted meat 
Paid employment—via 
Community Development 
Employment Projects 
scheme (CDEP); spouse 
employed 
Type of toilet Pit latrine Flush toilet 
Water piped to 
house? 
No (rainwater tank or river) Yes 
Note: CDEP is a Commonwealth Government program designed to provide an 
income for participants to undertake work that is deemed to be in the 
community interest. See M. Moran, D. Porter and J. Curth-Bibb, Funding 
Indigenous Organisations: Improving Governance Performance Through Innovations 
in Public Finance Management in Remote Australia, Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, 2014, pp. 1–63, www.aihw.gov.au/reports/indigenous-
australians/funding-indigenous-organisations 
Source: borderlands research data, 2018 
  
  
We used the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) to assess the level of 
poverty in the South Fly.13 The MPI measures ‘deprivations’ at the household and 
individual level across health, education and livelihood and living conditions. Each 
person making up the household is classified then as poor or non-poor, depending 
on the weighted number of deprivations. Following the work of John Burton, we 
made some adaptations to the MPI methodology so that it was appropriate for rural 
PNG.14 
The villages in the South Fly recorded a multidimensional poverty index of 
0.35.15 Our calculations of MPI were completed at a subnational district level, so they 
can be compared only with similar subnational estimates.16 The level of poverty in 
the South Fly is commensurate with that experienced in rural districts on 
Afghanistan and Sudan.17 It is also significantly worse than what is experienced in 
Papua Province of Indonesia (0.21).18 What this means in reality is that people are 
experiencing poverty that causes significant stress for many people of this 
borderland region. 
Much of this poverty is understood by borderlanders as a failure of governance 
by the PNG state. We detail the sentiment on the ground in the South Fly regarding 
the governance mechanisms available to people, and we describe three forms of 
governance failure that local informants themselves have articulated to us: 
1 the PNG Government’s inability to get resources to the ground, associated with 
high levels of perceived corruption 
2 the current inability of aid interventions to reach the people on the ground and 
their feelings of being disconnected from aid decisions and being powerless to 
hold aid to account, and 
3 the effects of policy and associated governance surrounding the Australia’s 
enforcement of the border. 
Like borders elsewhere internationally, the border of Australia and PNG is not 
a natural objective thing, but rather the consequence of political manoeuvring and 
historical geopolitics. In exploring its historical evolution we illustrate its mismatch 
with the cultural geography that pre-dated it. We detail the failures in public service 
provision and governance and the related levels of poverty experienced by people 
living on the PNG side. We examine the administration of the border and its effects 
on people’s daily struggle for survival on the PNG side. We unpack the current 
interpretation of the Treaty and ask: what are the options for contesting its 
application? 
We demonstrate the asymmetrical effects of the border and the stark 
differences in opportunity and outcomes for those on the PNG side compared to 
those on the Australian side and those seemingly somewhere in the middle, 
including PNG nationals living in Treaty villages, and Papuan Australians who are 
now citizens of Australia living in the Torres Strait. We demonstrate how the 
application of the treaty has resulted in a tiered economy with mounting tensions 
arising between the haves and have-nots. We consider how the treaty produces a 
fourfold hierarchy of identities: Australian Torres Strait Islanders, Papuan 
  
Australian citizens, PNG Treaty villagers and, finally, PNG non-Treaty villages. 
These identities were once shared but are now increasingly divided. Divisions have 
been exacerbated by the Australian state in the way it privileges certain groups over 
others, and how those thus privileged have worked hard to protect those privileges. 
We argue that the recent hardening of the border is undermining the prior 
success of the treaty. The focus on border enforcement, rather than building 
capacities across the border, exacerbates difference and inequality and fuels local 
resentments and tensions, which arguably destabilises the border. We therefore offer 
an alternative lens, using systems understandings to place-based governance that 
treats this region as a borderlands or border zone for public policy, trade and 
resource management. In doing so we centre our attention on people and on their 
experience. We show that Australia’s attempt at securing the border is inescapably 
intertwined with the ‘security’ of people living on the PNG side, and that their well-
being and goodwill is in Australia’s national interest. 
A borderlands theoretical framework 
The borderland has always been a contested space, yet there have been recent and 
profound shifts in the discourse surrounding the Australian border and the 
management of it.19 Politicians have taken advantage of fears of drug-resistant 
tuberculosis, asylum seekers and people smugglers. In 2013 the treaty was described 
in the Queensland Parliament as ‘one of the most lax border arrangements in the 
world’20 and as a major national risk to Australia’s ‘health security’.21 In the same 
year, in response to the federal government’s payment of $18 million to Queensland 
Health to compensate for the cost of PNG nationals accessing the Queensland health 
system, the then Queensland Health Minister claimed that the payment was 
‘recognition that the Commonwealth Government cannot secure the Queensland–
PNG border’.22 He went on to say that people crossing from PNG into Australia 
could be ‘going anywhere’ and that the border is ‘open to people smugglers to 
continue their illegal trafficking of humans through a different route’. The border is, 
he said, ‘as porous as a spaghetti colander’.23 
The notion of a porous border is not new and is certainly not unique to the 
PNG–Australia borderlands. The fluidity that is understood to characterise many 
border regions has resulted in a dedicated field of study. As early as 1916, Holdich 
and Lyde questioned how boundaries could be ‘good or bad’ depending on ‘their 
intrinsic merit in fostering or limiting tensions’, including wars between states.24 
Samuel Whittemore Boggs also questioned the universal and timeless ‘good’ of 
boundaries when he noted that the function of boundaries was specific to a certain 
time and space and that interaction across boundaries might be required to lessen 
tensions. Boggs asks: ‘what tensions are created by the lines in such a case; and what 
devices may be used to relieve those tensions?’25 Importantly, boundaries are 
continuously pushed and spaces reconfigured through essential movement of 
people and the maintenance of relationships in the ‘everyday practices of survival 
and regulation’.26 
  
The development of border studies, or borderlands studies, is generally 
understood to have its origins in the key works of Prescott and Minghi in the 1960s,27 
and the classic texts of ‘boundary scholarship’ they produced in the following two 
decades. When borderlands studies first emerged, its largely ‘state-centric’ analysis 
appealed to ‘sound boundary management as a fundamental aspect of 
“international” peace and order’.28 This then advanced to understanding 
borderlands as unique socioeconomic geographies that are lived and dynamic 
spaces, with populations that take on unique borderland identities.29 The early 
suggestion by Prescott in ‘studying the attitude of borderlanders’ was furthered by 
Minghi calling for research ‘focusing on people within border zones as opposed to 
the boundaries themselves’.30 This is critical to our understanding of this borderland 
region as we explore the manner in which this borderland has been historically 
constructed and socially constituted (chapter 2). 
In his seminal work in attempting to theorise borders and borderlands, Brunet-
Jailly proposes a holistic framework for exploring borderlands in a systematic way.31 
In an attempt to synthesise the range of lenses that have been used in empirical 
studies on individual borderlands, Brunet-Jailly draws these approaches together to 
suggest four ‘equally important analytical lenses’: (1) market forces and trade flows; 
(2) policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders; (3) the 
particular political clout of borderland communities; and (4) the specific culture of 
borderland communities.32 
<Figure 1.2 near order> 
A theory of borderland studies (E. Brunet-Jailly, ‘Theorizing borders: An interdisciplinary 
perspective’, Geopolitics, vol. 10, 2005, p. 645) 
The Brunet-Jailly Framework (figure 1.2) clearly resonates with our analysis of 
the PNG borderlands. We will demonstrate that the push and pull across these four 
factors at once brings borderlanders together and pulls them apart. Moreover, we 
question the relative ‘goodness’ of the border by drawing on August Lösch’s classic 
text, The Economics of Location,33 which points out the economic cost of borders and 
the reduction in efficiencies due to the barriers they erect for the flow of trade, goods 
and labour.34 This description well describes the obstruction to trade in the PNG–
Australia borderland, which affects most harshly those with the least. 
Despite more than a century of scholarly interest in boundary studies and more 
than 60 years of interest in the concept of borderlands, there is very limited applied 
research in the PNG borderlands that draws upon a borderlands framework. W.S. 
Arthur is one notable exception, with his analysis Autonomy and Identity in Torres 
Strait: A Borderline Case?,35 in which he argued that the ‘Treaty and the associated 
Protected Zone have helped create a “borderland” with its own unique social, 
economic and political characteristics’, and where the residents have come to 
identify as ‘borderlanders’.36 
Given our emphasis on how people experience the border, we attempt to 
provide ‘a view of governance from the perspective of those who are living it’,37 to 
observe the ‘throwntogetherness’ of governance.38 This allows us to sidestep the state 
  
as the ‘methodological unit of analysis’,39 and to use the borderland as the centre in 
which to observe the governance relationships that weave in and out of it in the 
interests of optimising service delivery, public finance and local-level accountability. 
What emerges then is a bricolage of informal and formal institutions at the periphery 
of the PNG state, in what has been described as an ‘Area of Limited Statehood’ 
(ALS).40 
ALS scholars use what is understood as a ‘spatial grammar’ and the analysis of 
sociospatial relations.41 Like Brunet-Jailly’s ‘four factors’, areas of limited statehood 
are understood not as ungoverned but as ‘differently governed’ spaces in a way that 
recognises institutional (formal and informal) and jurisdictional (including external 
jurisdictions) layering and contestation. When Risse puts forward a definition of 
ALS, he makes the point that they are avoiding the Eurocentric perspective of what 
has been normatively classified as ‘fragile states’, with its preoccupation with 
democratic ‘good’ governance. Instead they are focused on ‘those parts of a country 
in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce 
rules’.42 In the case of the PNG borderland, we are interested in spaces whereby the 
authority of the state does not reach partly because it is unable to service its 
population in a way that would engender recognition, legitimacy and loyalty from 
the ‘periphery’ to the centre.43 
When we take a place-based approach to governance and service delivery, we 
are better able to understand the complex intersections between policy arenas; the 
relationships between disparate sectors and disciplines can be traced as their 
complex intersections weave through this place. We see how poverty, income, 
livelihoods, fishing and marine resources, water, hygiene and sanitation, nutrition, 
health and environmental conservation are all heavily interdependent. Transport, 
infrastructure, education, and law and order intersect in ways that are mutually 
constituting or destabilising, affecting each other in ways that inextricably shape 
outcomes in other sectors. Governance, policy and service delivery responses that 
become greater than the sum of their parts. We argue that a borderlands, place-based 
systems analysis offers more sustainable policy solutions both to poverty and 
deprivation on the PNG side and to security and border protection on the Australian 
side. 
The research 
The project operationalises aspects of borderland studies and the ALS literature to 
understand the underdevelopment and potential for aid assistance, centred on the 
South Fly District. It is based on research that was completed with support from an 
Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grant, over a four-year period from 
2016 to 2019, jointly led by two chief investigators from the University of 
Queensland: Professors Mark Moran and Jennifer Corrin. It drew on a range of 
literature, primary source material and documentary analysis, as well as the 
combined experience of the authors, three of whom—Kevin Murphy, Geoff Miller 
and Garrick Hitchcock—had been working in the South Fly for many years before 
  
the project began. University of Queensland researchers Jodie Curth-Bibb and Peter 
Chaudhry brought important comparative experience from other parts of PNG and 
the bordering Solomon Islands, and from Vietnam’s borderland with Laos and 
China, respectively. The chief investigators brought their experience of working in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs in Australia: Mark Moran, and law 
reform and development in plural legal contexts in the Pacific and PNG: Jennifer 
Corrin. The project was also greatly enhanced by the contribution of two 
researchers—Sara Busilacchi and James Butler—from the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), who drew on their previous studies 
in this region, separate from the ARC project. 
The research took a mixed method approach, combining unstructured 
interviews with officials, local leaders and aid workers; semi-structured interviews 
with community leaders in PNG and Torres Strait Islands; focus group discussions 
with community members in the borderlands region; observations in the villages 
visited; and, significantly, the completion of community-level and household-level 
surveys. All interviews were preceded by a community meeting, to explain the 
research and the sampling strategy. Informants were selected on the basis of advice 
from the community Village Recorder (or accountant), according to a stratified 
sample, based on age, gender and household composition. 
The household-level survey collected data on health, education, livelihoods, 
living conditions and, importantly, cross-border mobility. It was divided into 
sections on household and individual respondent characteristics, including levels of 
schooling, religion, type of housing, household assets and access to water; 
livelihoods, including sources of income and the nature of existing cross-border 
income streams; health and access to health, including any access to cross-border 
health facilities; and cross-border interactions in general—whether and why 
respondents cross the border, where they go and how they get there. The 
predominantly multiple-choice survey ended with two open-ended questions: ‘What 
is the one thing that you would like to see change that would improve your life?’ 
and ‘What is the biggest change in this village that has occurred over the past five 
years?’ 
The community-level survey captured data on infrastructure, governance and 
services. It was designed to be conducted with one or more community leader and to 
be triangulated with observations made of housing, infrastructure and other aspects 
of community life. It covered a broad range of community-level characteristics: 
including population, religion and languages spoken; public infrastructure, 
including roads, wharves, water sources, community infrastructure; commodities 
and prices of supermarket staples; the presence of governance actors and law and 
justice services; health issues, services and infrastructure; education and the levels of 
schooling offered; and connectivity in the community: the mobile phone coverage or 
access to two-way radios. 
<Figure 1.3 near here> 
  
Borderlands project field trip map. The researchers visited coastal and inland villages in the 
South Fly over four years. 
In total, 273 household interviews in 35 villages were included in the study. 
Figure 1.3 depicts the villages visited over the four-year period.44 The fieldwork 
occurred over five field trips. During the first trip in late 2016, the research team 
spent close to a month visiting five Treaty villages along the South Fly coast (Buzi, 
Bula, Mabuduan, Mari and Tais), and eight villages to the west of the South Fly 
District, closer to the PNG–Indonesian border (Balamuk, Bondobol, Indorodoro, 
Kiriwo, Korombo, Wando, Weam and Wereave). The second trip was in September 
and October 2017, during which researchers focused on the Treaty villages (Ber, Bula 
and Mabuduan again, Jarai, Old Mawatta, Parama, Sigabaduru and Sui). They also 
briefly crossed the border into Australia via Horn Island, visiting two of the outer 
Torres Strait Islands (Saibai and Boigu islands). In June 2018, the researchers 
returned to the South Fly for the third field trip, surveying villagers in non-Treaty 
villages to the east (Ume, Masingara and the Treaty village, Kadawa), then up a 
number of river systems, including the Oriomo (Abam, Dorogori, Mur Lagoon, 
Upaire and Wuroi), the Pahoturi (Dug, Kibuli, Kodoro, Ngao, Ardamroang and 
Wamorong), and the Mai Kussa (Dimiri and Sibidiri). The fourth field trip was to the 
Torres Strait only. A smaller team returned in October 2018 to the two outer Torres 
Strait Islands visited earlier, then to three islands with close associations to the South 
Fly villages (Badu, Darnley and Iama islands), with a version of the survey modified 
to fit a Torres Strait context. Finally, in August 2019, the researchers returned to the 
South Fly for the fifth and final field trip, to villages already visited to disseminate 
findings and seek input on the research recommendations. 
We faced a few limitations with the research. The lack of administrative data 
provided by the Queensland and Australian government authorities hindered the 
work. In particular, Queensland Health (outpatient and inpatient presentations to 
outer Island clinics and medevacs) and the Border Force (immigration visits) hold 
data that would have greatly strengthened the research. Conversely in PNG we 
found the data to be forthcoming but unreliable.45 As a result, almost all of the 
research is based on data that have been collected by the authors. 
The survey instrument was adapted for each field visit as researchers gained a 
deeper insight into the situation in the South Fly. Improvements were made to the 
community and household survey on return trips, which reflected lessons learned. 
We also added additional questions in 2018, which allowed researchers to calculate 
the MPI of the region. However, these changes made comparisons between different 
years of data collection more difficult, with participants in earlier years not offered 
certain options. Additionally, there were instances of non-response or unrecorded 
responses throughout the collected surveys, which reduced sample sizes for some 
questions. For each response we have reported here, we have clearly stated the 
number of respondents asked the question so as to accurately reflect the data 
available for each question. 
  
The CSIRO team has been working in the South Fly since 2011. During this 
period the team has conducted several projects focusing on small-scale fisheries and 
their multifaceted role for people in the region.46 The first project in 2011–13 was 
funded by the PNG National Fisheries Authority (NFA) and the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority (AFMA). It assessed the status of small-scale fisheries and 
their role in livelihood and food security.47 This project was followed by two 
workshops in Cairns (October 2014) and Daru (June 2015) jointly funded by AFMA, 
NFA and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), driven by 
the interest of stakeholders in the Treaty Zone and beyond to better understand the 
causes of asymmetrical development in the borderland region and how to address 
them.48 This was followed in 2017–18 by a project that explored the legal and illegal 
value chains of some of the most valuable marine products harvested in the South 
Fly, funded by the NFA in partnership with the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR).49 Both projects employed a mixed-methods research 
approach, applying both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect data and 
information. This material was integrated with participant observation and informal 
conversations carried out by Busilacchi during her visits to Daru, Port Moresby, the 
Treaty villages and Jakarta. 
The political economy investigation of cross-border marine resources and the 
flow-on effects of the Ok Tedi mine disaster on marine resources in the borderland 
waters of the Torres Strait are based on information collected by key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions and the market survey in 2011–13 and 2017–18. 
Data collected during a CSIRO–AusAID project in the coastal area of the Western 
Province in 199550 and during a CRC Reef–JCU study of the subsistence reef fisheries 
of the eastern Torres Strait communities in 2004 were used as a baseline.51 All data 
from CSIRO projects are referred to as such, and all remaining data are from ARC 
Discovery Grant borderlands research unless otherwise stipulated. 
Conclusion 
In search of solutions for these seemingly intractable problems, we take a 
transdisciplinary, systems approach that is anchored in place and informed by 
borderlands theory. From this position we examine the border from an 
anthropological, legal, governance, inequality and welfare, health systems, marine 
resource and conservation lens to better understand the interconnections and 
intricacies of public policy and development in this place. 
Applying both a humanitarian and a security lens brings us to the same 
conclusion, which is that the South Fly is too close for Australia to ignore the poverty 
and increasing frustration and consequent tensions prevalent in the region. We 
argue that this problem is being exacerbated by a combination of a hardening border 
protection, compartmentalised policy prescriptions and partial solutions to complex 
problems. We suggest that a more place-based solution would look very different. 
Drawing on Brunet-Jailly’s borderlands framework, we explore four factors: local 
cross-border culture; the policy activities of multiple levels of government; market 
  
forces and trade flows (and associated resource management); and local cross-border 
political clout. 
If we can sidestep the state as a unilateral methodological unit of analysis and 
instead explore the ‘throwntogetherness’ of the borderlands region, we can see that 
relationships run through this borderlands place in a way that illuminates other 
possibilities. We look to new policy prescriptions that will improve Australia’s 
border management. We also look to how Australia’s aid assistance to the South Fly 
can better take into account the effects of the border. Clearly, the borderland is a 
unique development context unlike anywhere else in in the region. Importantly, for 
the same reason it offers great opportunities. 
We also describe how increasing securitisation of the border is driving 
inefficiencies and ultimately exacerbating underdevelopment on the PNG side, 
which is then perversely undermining border security. Border management ought to 
take account of the tensions and asymmetries it creates among the people of the 
borderland and the potential for destabilising the border. Ultimately the most 
effective way to take pressure off the border is to draw on the positive experience of 
cross-border arrangements under the Treaty and to leverage existing cross-border 
relationships to improve people’s lives and reduce inequalities rather than 
exacerbate them. Ultimately, we contend that the best way to keep Australia’s 
border safe is to ensure that those people who reside in the borderland are afforded 
greater opportunity for development and dignity to alleviate the injustice they feel. 
Notes 
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2 
The sociohistorical context of the 
borderlands 
Kevin Murphy 
This chapter describes and analyses the borderland region as a social field, defined 
by reference to the intersection of Papua New Guinea’s borders with Australia in the 
south and Indonesia in the west. The borders establish a matrix of asymmetrical 
relationships, deriving from the facts that they are the means of geographical 
distinction between disparate nation states and that they are a focus of the exercise 
of state enforcement regimes. I argue that the asymmetrical structuring of 
relationships as they relate to the PNG–Australia border results in social tension 
across the border and exacerbates pre-existing social tensions within PNG. There is a 
wealth differential across the PNG–Indonesia border, but it is not as great as that 
across the PNG–Australia border. The Australian border administration has become 
progressively more restrictive in recent years as to who is allowed to cross the 
border and what they are permitted to do when they do cross under the ‘traditional 
inhabitant’ provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty. The state enforcement regime at 
the Indonesia border is in some respects more flexible than that at the Australia 
border, and it has become increasingly attractive for the trading opportunities it 
affords for people from South Fly District. 
The people of the borderlands before colonisation 
Defining social groupings on criteria of linguistic, social and cultural variation is 
always problematic. There are exceptions to generalisations; there is overlap at the 
margins, and the possibility of reifying groups where they might not exist as such. 
Nevertheless there are distinctions throughout the borderlands region in language, 
social organisation, ritual, ontology, economy and other sociocultural characteristics 
that correspond sufficiently for some general patterns to be evident. The people now 
living in this region maintain richly detailed oral histories that continue to inform 
their own understanding of similarity and difference among themselves, and there is 
some ethnographic information available from the publications of European 
missionaries, explorers, colonial government officers and anthropologists. These 
combined sources allow for a representation of patterns of linguistic, social and 
cultural variation, group definition and intergroup relations as they were before the 
commencement of colonialism in the 19th century. 
  
The region of the New Guinea mainland directly to the north of Torres Strait is 
commonly known in the ethnographic literature as the ‘Trans-Fly’ after F.E. 
Williams’s ethnography, Papuans of the Trans-Fly.1 A more commonly used 
geographical descriptor in Papua New Guinea today is the term ‘South Fly’, after the 
name of the electoral district; however, these two terms are not strictly equivalent. 
‘Trans-Fly’ in Williams’s usage (and in that of others who followed him, including 
Knauft2) refers to a congeries of small groupings that inhabit most of the South Fly 
District but also extend a short distance westwards into what is now the Indonesian 
province of Papua. There are other, non-Trans-Fly groups who also live in South Fly 
District, these being the Kiwai in the east and the Suki in the north. 
At the eastern end of this region is the Fly River Estuary, and to the north and 
north-east are the lower reaches of the Fly River. The Fly Estuary and several 
hundred kilometres further east are inhabited by people speaking numerous dialects 
of the Kiwai language group. The lagoons along the southern side of the Fly River, 
along the northern edge of South Fly District, are inhabited by people speaking the 
Suki language, and to their east, in Middle Fly District, are the people of the closely 
related Gogodala language group. 
There is no distinct geographical marker between the western parts of the 
Trans-Fly culture area and their western neighbours. Speakers of dialects in the 
Marind language group inhabit the region centred on the Bian River, extending 
along the coast east of the Merauke River, almost as far as the Bensbach River, but 
inland there are some Trans-Fly groups west of the Indonesian border. 
There is considerable diversity within the culture area designated as Trans-Fly, 
but nevertheless Williams was justified in his classification of the assortment of 
Trans-Fly groups together. It includes all of the other groups within the South Fly 
District besides the Suki and Kiwai, with the Marind neighbouring to the west 
beyond the PNG–Indonesia border. Among the pre-colonial sociocultural features 
common throughout the Trans-Fly grouping, and contrasting with adjacent 
neighbours the Suki, Kiwai and Marind, were the very small scale of residential 
groups, their wide dispersal across the land, and lack of occasions for large-scale 
social gatherings. Further, by comparison with other culture areas along the south 
coast of New Guinea, including immediate neighbours to east and west, the people 
of the Trans-Fly have been characterised as ‘introverted’ and ‘culturally 
conservative’,3 with strong separation of gender roles and low status of women. 
Relations of domination were directed inwards by men over women and boys, just 
as Trans-Fly men themselves were dominated by aggressive neighbouring groups. 
The Trans-Fly region was, and still remains, a difficult place for people to live. 
There are environmental constraints on human habitation, including climate, 
topography, generally poor soils, lack of fresh water in the dry season and extensive 
flooding in the wet season. In addition to the harsh environment in which they lived, 
before colonial pacification the Trans-Fly people were predated upon by 
neighbouring groups of headhunters, and they were also engaged in internecine 
raiding among themselves. These factors resulted in relatively low population 
  
density compared to neighbouring groups at the time of colonisation in the late 19th 
century. 
The islands to the south of the South Fly region are inhabited by people who 
refer to themselves collectively as Torres Strait Islanders; they have commonly been 
classified as comprising a distinct culture area but could equally be classified as two 
subgroups of the Trans-Fly grouping. The language of the Eastern Islands is a dialect 
of the Eastern Trans-Fly language family, while the language of the Central and 
Western Islands comprises four dialects closely related to each other but distinct 
from the Eastern group, genetically related to Australian Aboriginal languages to the 
south but strongly influenced by Papuan languages to the north.4 
Over several decades before the commencement of colonial administration, 
Kiwai people from the Fly River Estuary had progressively been establishing 
permanent settlements westward along the coast, and had forged relationships with 
the people of the eastern and north-western islands of Torres Strait. In some 
instances they achieved this by making alliances with Trans-Fly groups in the 
context of their internecine raiding, then stayed on to establish a village, from which 
they further expanded over time. In doing so, over the course of a few generations 
they effectively displaced some eastern Trans-Fly groups from their occupation of 
the land near the coast,5 and inserted themselves as middlemen in trade between 
eastern Trans-Fly people and Torres Strait Islanders. 
The impact of colonialism occurred first on the islands of Torres Strait, 
beginning in the mid-1800s and intensifying from the 1860s. When colonial influence 
extended to the adjacent south coast of mainland New Guinea, from the 1880s, it was 
Coastal Kiwai people from villages located along the coast between the Binaturi 
River and the Fly River, who first engaged with the new regime. They were then 
well placed to act as agents and intermediaries for the British colonial officers in 
bringing the inland Trans-Fly peoples under control of the colonial government.6 
Through the early colonial period coastal Kiwai people continued to expand 
westward along the coast at the expense of Trans-Fly groups, and they enjoyed a 
higher status within the new colonial order.7 
On the western side of the Trans-Fly region, the border between British and 
Dutch colonial territories was established at the mouth of the Bensbach River. 
Headhunting raids by Marind people, who had been raiding from the west into the 
Trans-Fly region and north-western Torres Strait Islands, were effectively stopped 
by colonial authorities in the late 19th century.8 Unlike the Kiwai people further east, 
the Marind-Anim (i.e. Marind people) did not establish permanent settlements on 
the land where they had been raiding for heads east of the Bensbach River. As a 
result, at the time of colonial intervention there were no permanent settlements on 
the coastline between the British–Dutch border at the Bensbach River and the Kiwai 
village now known as Old Mawatta at the mouth of the Binaturi River.9 
The Trans-Fly peoples were and are internally diverse in many respects, but on 
a large-scale ‘areal configuration’ analysis,10 they can be contrasted as a group with 
neighbouring culture areas. A defining characteristic of relations between the 
  
various Trans-Fly groups and their neighbours on all sides was the fact that the 
neighbouring groups all practised headhunting and all raided the Trans-Fly groups; 
however, in all cases the situation was more complex than simple hostility and 
predation, as trade was also a significant feature of intergroup relations. 
As coastal Kiwai people were expanding westward, consolidating their 
position on the coast and their relationships with Torres Strait Islanders, in the early 
colonial period remnant Trans-Fly groups west of the Pahoturi River moved to 
establish new villages on the coast. There had been interaction and movement 
between Trans-Fly people from near the coast and the hinterland since before the 
arrival of colonialism, but the new colonial order induced many people to migrate 
permanently from inland to the coast, and others to aggregate and settle in larger 
inland villages than had previously been their practice. Some of these were on the 
banks of rivers to facilitate easier access. 
By the time of the establishment of the colonial regime in the 1880s, coastal 
Kiwai people had a village as far west as Old Mawatta at the mouth of the Binaturi 
River, and the people living at Old Mawatta claimed ownership of the land where a 
government station was briefly established further west at Mabuduan, a village 
centre on the coast of Papua New Guinea’s South Fly district. Kiwai people at Old 
Mawatta and Tureture formed alliances with some Bine (Trans-Fly) groups engaged 
in internecine warfare with other Bine groups, and through these alliances were 
given land to occupy where they established villages. 
West of the Bensbach River, in what was Dutch New Guinea and is now Papua 
Province of Indonesia, were the Marind-Anim, known in the early colonial and 
ethnographic literature as Tugeri. Parties numbering in the hundreds travelled 
annually along the coast and up the rivers in canoes without outriggers on 
headhunting raids, and they annihilated many of the southern Trans-Fly groups as 
far east as the Pahoturi River.11 These raids were ended with the intervention of the 
colonial government in the late 1890s, but it is likely that Marind raiding to the east 
were at the time a relatively recent phenomenon.12 Torres Strait Islanders living on 
islands closest to the coast occasionally raided the Trans-Fly groups to their north for 
heads, sometimes in parties with allied Kiwai groups. Raids by Kiwai people from 
the east and Marind-Anim from the west were also made on the north-western 
Torres Strait islands of Saibai, Dauan and Boigu.13 
Thus the patterns of settlement and movement of people along the coast, 
between hinterland and coast, and between islands and mainland, had been 
dynamic for at least several decades before colonial annexation. Changes to the 
spatial distribution of the various groups continued into the early colonial period. 
Following the suppression of Marind headhunting, Torres Strait Islanders from 
Boigu induced people who had occupied the hinterland to the west to establish 
villages on and near the coast; people from the villages of Bula, Jarai and Mari 
recount stories of how their forebears moved to the coast at the bidding of Torres 
Strait Islanders, the explicit reason being to facilitate trade, particularly of foodstuffs 
from the mainland, in exchange for commodity items from Boigu. 
  
Oral and written accounts of the history of migration and occupation of land, 
particularly on and near the coast, are vehemently contested between groups in this 
area in the present day; however, when the varying versions are considered 
together, and the recorded observations of European missionaries, colonial officials 
and other visitors to the area are taken into account, the situation is reasonably 
comprehensible. To generalise: from the east, there was an expansion of Kiwai 
people along the coast, eradicating some Torres Strait Islander and Trans-Fly groups 
and displacing others, forming alliances and trading relationships with yet other 
Trans-Fly and Torres Strait Islander groups; while headhunting raids from the west 
by the Marind-Anim similarly depopulated and displaced Trans-Fly and Torres 
Strait Islander groups. The details of these population movements and group 
dynamics are disputed by those with parochial interests, as they are pertinent to the 
issues of land ownership, and administration of the ‘traditional inhabitant’ 
provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty, as discussed below. 
The establishment of colonial borders 
The location of Papua New Guinea’s international borders derives from the 
historical process of colonisation. To the west, the Spanish and Portuguese had been 
vying over the trade out of the ‘Spice Islands’ of Moluccas and Banda from the early 
1500s. By the early 1600s, however, the Dutch had seized control and eventually 
colonised all of what is now Indonesia; they first formally laid claim to the western 
half of New Guinea, as far east as the 141st meridian, in 1828.14 To the south, the 
British asserted imperial authority over the eastern half of the Australian continent 
in 1788, but it was not until the 1870s that the British colony of Queensland 
incorporated the islands of Torres Strait. This occurred in two stages: the islands 
within 60 miles of the Australian mainland were annexed to Queensland in 1872, the 
remainder in 1879.15 
The eastern half of New Guinea was formally unclaimed by imperial powers 
until 1884, when the British and Germans agreed to divide it between themselves, 
with the Germans in the north and the British in the south (figure 2.1).16 Being the 
last part of New Guinea to be colonised, the area comprised what was left over after 
the previous annexations, and the boundary of Queensland taking in all of the 
islands of Torres Strait was very close to the New Guinea mainland (figure 2.2). 
<figure 2.1 near here> 
An extract of a map of Australia and New Guinea displaying the British and German 
annexations in 1885. (G. Hammond, map of Australia and New Guinea, showing British and 
German annexations, 1885 [cartographic material]. State Library Victoria, Melbourne) 
<figure 2.2 near here> 
An extract of a map of Torres Strait and the adjacent New Guinea mainland in 1892. 
(Surveyor General’s Office, Queensland, National Library of Australia, nla.obj-232288376) 
The main considerations in the decisions to annex the islands of Torres Strait to 
Queensland were a desire to regulate the activities of the bêche-de-mer (processed 
sea cucumber) and pearl fisheries and to control lawlessness in Torres Strait,17 and 
  
fear that an imperial power other than Britain might be able to take advantage of 
unclaimed territory and potentially threaten Queensland.18 Similar reasoning lay 
behind the extension of British colonial control over the south-eastern part of New 
Guinea, as the activities of explorers, prospectors, timber-cutters, traders and labour 
recruiters were affecting village life;19 and, as noted, the Dutch had already claimed 
the western part of the island and the Germans were establishing themselves in the 
north-east. 
The southern border with Australia 
Once the Protectorate of British New Guinea had been proclaimed, the reasons for 
the 1879 northward expansion of Queensland’s borders no longer applied. To some 
colonial administrators there seemed good reasons for the border to be moved 
southwards: practical difficulties of administering the outer islands from Thursday 
Island; cultural similarities between the Torres Strait Islanders and people of coastal 
New Guinea; a need for subjects in British New Guinea to have access to fishing 
grounds for both subsistence and commercial exploitation; and a desire for coastal 
waters along the south coast of New Guinea of sufficient breadth to allow boats to 
travel along the coast without having to leave the waters of the jurisdiction of British 
New Guinea and travel through Queensland waters were among them.20 
From as early as 1885 proposals were put forward to move the border between 
Queensland and British New Guinea southwards, and by 1898 agreement between 
the two administrations had been reached by which the northern half of the Warrior 
Reefs would go to British New Guinea, as well as the three north-western islands of 
Saibai, Dauan and Boigu. However, the agreement required the approval of the 
Queensland Parliament before it would become effective, but it was not submitted to 
parliament before the Federation of Australian colonies in 1901, and this introduced 
a further complication to the process. The new Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth required that for any state to cede any of its territory the approval of 
the Commonwealth Parliament, the parliament of the relevant state, and a majority 
of voters in a referendum in the relevant state all had to agree to the proposal. The 
Lieutenant-Governor of British New Guinea at the time, George Le Hunte, remarked 
that ‘the long unfulfilled promise of the Queensland Government’ had not come to 
pass, and he regarded the issue as ‘an inequitable, arbitrary and purely unnecessary 
injustice to the Possession’.21 Despite the new constitutional requirements, the matter 
was raised for discussion several times again up to 1925, but ultimately no change 
was made and the 1879 border remained in place.22 
As the prospect of national independence came to be seriously contemplated 
by Papua New Guinean leaders in the late 1960s, many of the same concerns and 
arguments about the location of the border with Australia that had been raised in the 
early colonial period surfaced again. Members of the House of Assembly of Papua 
and New Guinea argued that the border should be moved southwards so that some 
of the islands of Torres Strait would come within the soon-to-be independent State of 
Papua New Guinea.23 Such suggestions were resisted from the outset by Torres Strait 
  
Islanders.24 The Australian Government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was 
initially agreeable to relocating the border to align with 10° latitude; however, Torres 
Strait Islanders were supported in their resistance to the proposal by the Queensland 
Government of Joh Bjelke-Petersen. 
Formal negotiations over a treaty, which would define the border, commenced 
in 1972, but agreement had not been reached by the time of Papua New Guinea’s 
independence in 1975. Following three more years of negotiation, a compromise was 
struck, which involved splitting of the border into separate fisheries and seabed 
jurisdiction lines, and creation of a ‘protected zone’ spanning an area on both sides 
of the border that was to be subject to special provisions. 
One of the consequences of this agreement is that the international border does 
not consist of a single line. The treaty defines a fisheries jurisdiction line and a 
seabed jurisdiction line, and over most of their length they follow an identical 
course, approximately halfway between the adjacent mainlands (figure 1.1). As they 
pass through Torres Strait they diverge, with the fisheries line making a sharp turn 
to the north, looping around Saibai, Dauan and Boigu then coming back south to join 
the seabed line. The result is that there is an area of split jurisdiction, commonly 
known as the ‘top hat’, where PNG has jurisdiction in matters relating to the seabed 
(such as sedentary fisheries, minerals and petroleum), but in the water above 
Australia has fisheries jurisdiction (but not including sedentary species). Within the 
top hat area there are three inhabited islands (Saibai, Dauan and Boigu) and one 
uninhabited island in which Australia has jurisdiction over the islands and a small 
surrounding area of territorial seas. There are other areas where PNG has seabed 
and fisheries jurisdiction, but isolated within this area there are some islands (each 
with a small area of territorial seas surrounding it) in which Australia has both 
fisheries and seabed jurisdiction. The ultimate effect of the jurisdiction lines agreed 
in the treaty was that, with the exception of three small, uninhabited islands very 
close to the New Guinea mainland (Kawa, Mata Kawa and Kussar), all of the Torres 
Strait Islands remained in Queensland and Australia. 
Included in the provisions for regulation of the border are articles that establish 
a ‘protected zone’, which overlaps both seabed and fisheries jurisdiction lines, 
covering most of Torres Strait but not extending quite as far south as the main 
administrative centre of Thursday Island. The ‘principal purpose’ of the ‘protected 
zone’ is stated as being to ‘protect the traditional way of life and livelihood of the 
traditional inhabitants’ while a ‘further purpose’ is ‘to protect and preserve the 
marine environment and indigenous fauna and flora’.25 
The means for protection of the traditional way of life and livelihood of the 
traditional inhabitants is set out in Article 11 of the treaty, which states that, ‘subject 
to the other provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall continue to permit free 
movement and the performance of lawful traditional activities in and in the vicinity 
of the Protected Zone by the traditional inhabitants of the other party’. The other 
provisions that limit the right of free movement allow for laws relating to 
immigration, customs, biosecurity, health and criminal activities. 
  
Some of the terms used in the treaty are given explicit, although vague, 
definition in Article 1: 
1 (a) ‘adjacent coastal area’ means … in relation to Papua New Guinea, the 
coastal area of the Papua New Guinea mainland, and the Papua New 
Guinea islands, near the Protected zone … 
(d) ‘free movement’ means movement by the traditional inhabitants for or 
in the course of traditional activities … 
(k) ‘traditional activities’ means activities performed by the traditional 
inhabitants in accordance with local tradition, and includes, when so 
performed— 
(i) activities on land, including gardening, collection of food and 
hunting; 
(ii) activities on water, including traditional fishing; 
(iii) religious and secular ceremonies or gatherings for social 
purposes, for example, marriage celebrations and settlement 
of disputes; and 
(iv) barter and market trade. 
In the application of this definition, except in relation to activities of a 
commercial nature, ‘traditional’ shall be interpreted liberally and in the 
light of prevailing custom … 
(m) ‘traditional inhabitants’ means, in relation to Australia, persons 
who— 
(i) are Torres Strait Islanders who live in the Protected Zone or the 
adjacent coastal area of Australia, 
(ii) are citizens of Australia, and 
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or 
features in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation 
to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or 
religious activities; and in relation to Papua New Guinea, 
persons who— 
(i) live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of 
Papua New Guinea, 
(ii) are citizens of Papua New Guinea, and 
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or 
features in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in 
relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, 
cultural or religious activities … 
  
3 In this Treaty, the expression ‘in and in the vicinity of the Protected 
Zone’ describes an area the outer limits of which may vary according to 
the context in which the expression is used. 
Although the Torres Strait Treaty was signed in 1978, the various measures that 
were agreed had to be legislated by the parliaments of both countries for its 
provisions to come into effect, and it was not until 1985 that the treaty was ratified. 
During PNG’s colonial period, up to the time the treaty was signed and 
ratified, the material conditions of living on either side of the border were not so far 
apart, and particularly for those islands relatively close to the New Guinea 
mainland, there was a degree of economic interdependence. Torres Strait Islanders 
were better placed in relation to the colonial and then post-colonial market economy, 
but they had need of many things that they could obtain only from mainland New 
Guinea, such as building materials, canoe hulls and, especially for the north-western 
islands, quite often also food and land on which to grow food. By way of trade, they 
provided Papuans with commodities including clothes, domestic and garden 
implements, and luxury foods such as tea, sugar, rice and flour. 
Papuans had been engaged as labourers in the Torres Strait marine industries 
in substantial numbers from the 1890s to 1938, when the Queensland and Australian 
governments introduced restrictions on their recruitment.26 The people from the 
coastal Kiwai villages were the first recruited to work in Torres Strait, but there were 
also people from the hinterland and Fly River Estuary who were later also involved. 
Throughout the same period there were also some boats that were owned and 
operated by the people of some of the coastal villages in the Territory of Papua, 
including Old Mawatta, Parama, Katatai and Tureture, which worked the waters of 
Torres Strait for pearl shell and trochus.27 As described by Shug in some detail, 
particularly in relation to the coastal villages, ‘the act of earning a livelihood in the 
marine industry is regarded by present-day residents as an integral part of their 
heritage’.28 
The Torres Strait marine industries were suspended through World War II, as 
most of the boats that had been working there when war broke out were 
commandeered by the Royal Australian Navy. More than 300 Papuans were 
recruited to serve on approximately 50 of those vessels;29 Torres Strait Islanders were 
also recruited to serve on the same boats. Following the war, some coastal villages 
were able to acquire luggers and continued to work the waters of Torres Strait for a 
few years, but there was apparently no recruitment of Papuans to work on 
Australian boats in Torres Strait until the mid-1960s.30 Through the 1950s the pearl 
shell industry was in decline, unable to compete with plastics for the main use of 
pearl shell as clothing buttons, but with the introduction of cultured pearl farming in 
the 1960s there was a revival in the diving industry as live shell was sought for use 
in pearl farms. 
There was a shortage of available and willing labour on the Torres Strait 
Islands, as the prohibition on the migration of Islanders to mainland Australia were 
  
progressively lifted, and many Islanders moved looking for better work 
opportunities, particularly in railway construction gangs. In this context the 
restrictions on Papuans working in Torres Strait were lifted, and during the decade 
from 1965 to 1975 they came to make up the majority of the Torres Strait marine 
industry workforce.31 As was the case up to the imposition of restrictions on 
recruitment of Papuan labour in Torres Strait in 1938, the workers came not only 
from villages on the coast but also from villages in the hinterland, particularly from 
the Pahoturi River villages. 
In the lead-up to the signing of the Torres Strait Treaty in 1978, the Australian 
Department of Immigration set about finding Papuans who were resident in Torres 
Strait, technically illegally, and repatriating them to PNG. Those who had been 
resident for more than five years were given amnesty and allowed to stay, and were 
given permanent residency, and later many of them became Australian citizens; 
however, more than a hundred people were sent back to PNG.32 
The difference in the economic conditions on opposite sides of the Australia–
PNG border that has emerged since the late 1980s is now palpable. In the Torres 
Strait Islands, on the Australian side, the residents have full access to the benefits 
provided by the Australian welfare state, including what their PNG neighbours 
describe as payments of ‘free money’ every fortnight. Although the rate of welfare 
dependency in Torres Strait is high, there are a number of salaried positions with 
government agencies on each island, and some people earn relatively large amounts 
of money by diving for crayfish. Since the treaty was ratified there has also been a 
dramatic improvement in infrastructure on the islands, with construction of sealed 
airstrips, modern health centres, high-tech communications facilities, reticulated 
water, sewerage and electricity, schools, modern housing and so on. 
In the villages on the PNG side they have very few of these things. Their 
houses are made of bush materials and, for those fortunate enough to be able to 
obtain them, scraps of second-hand corrugated iron sheets, often salvaged from the 
Torres Strait Islands. There is no transport infrastructure and no electricity. There are 
only minimal medical services and poorly resourced education facilities. Despite the 
installation by AusAID of a few rainwater catchment structures with storage tanks in 
some of the coastal villages in 2002, a lack of drinking water during the annual dry 
season is common in many villages. 
There is no welfare system that provides ‘free money’ in PNG, but there are a 
few opportunities to earn some money, particularly for those villages on or near the 
coast close to the township of Daru. There, crayfishing is a relatively lucrative source 
of income. Others are able to sell fish, turtle and dugong meat in Daru, and some 
inland villagers come to the Daru market to sell pig and deer meat and garden 
produce. As discussed further below, there is also an increasing trade, particularly of 
dried marine products, with Indonesia. 
Until recently, some people have had access to another source of money, and 
the things that money can buy (as discussed further below, in recent years there 
have been increasing restrictions on the access that Papuan traditional inhabitants 
  
have to the cash economy in Torres Strait). These are people who are allowed to 
cross the international border and enter the islands of Torres Strait by virtue of the 
‘traditional inhabitant’ provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty. The amounts of money 
circulating on the islands and the availability of commodity goods that are difficult 
or impossible to find in Daru—let alone in the villages—has made access to the 
Torres Strait Islands highly desirable. The international border, which side of it one 
is from, and whether or not, if you are from the PNG side, you are allowed to cross 
the border under the Treaty, are significant—even defining—features of social life in 
this region. As Chaudhry discusses in chapter 4, it is not merely the access to the 
economic opportunities provided by status as a Torres Strait Treaty traditional 
inhabitant that is important here; the very act of recognition by the Australian state 
is significant in itself. 
As noted above, the treaty contains no specific provisions for border control; 
rather it provides a broad framework by which the governments of Australia and 
PNG agreed to construct compatible administrative procedures to regulate cross-
border activities. In 1984 the two governments formally agreed on interpretations of 
the phrases ‘in the vicinity of the Protected Zone’ and ‘adjacent coastal area’ for the 
purpose of administration of the Treaty. In relation to the PNG side of the border, 
this interpretation was ‘adjacent coastal area’ for the purpose of assisting in 
determining the traditional inhabitants of each country (Art. 1 (m) of the treaty). In 
relation to PNG, the area would be that part of PNG south of the parallel of latitude 
9°S and west of the meridian of longitude 143°30’E together with the whole of the 
remainder of Parama Island and the villages of Sui and Sewerimabu, subject to the 
possibility of further areas being included as indicated below at para 5. 
‘in the vicinity of the Protected Zone’ 
In relation to Papua New Guinea, the ‘vicinity’ would be the area of Papua New 
Guinea jurisdiction outside the Protected Zone and south of the parallel of latitude 
9°S and west of the meridian of longitude 144°E together with the whole of the 
remainder of Parama Island and the villages of Sui and Sewerimabu, subject to the 
possibility of further areas being included, as indicated below.33 
Subsequently the Australian Government seems to have gained the impression 
that there was also a list of Treaty villages created at that time. From the time the 
treaty was ratified in 1985 until 2000, however, there was little if any enforcement of 
any official definition of the category ‘traditional inhabitant’. 
What happened to the 1984 list of villages, if it was ever actually created, is 
something of a mystery. According to a report from DFAT to the foreign ministers of 
Australia and Papua New Guinea in 2001, ‘in the intervening years it seemed that 
neither country appeared to have that list on file’.34 In 1999 the two governments 
decided to prescribe a new list of villages, ‘to eliminate the likelihood of confusion or 
conflict over which villages are covered by the Treaty’.35 A list of villages that were 
to be classified as Treaty villages was compiled by the PNG Government and 
provided to the Australian Government. In 2000 formal notes were exchanged 
  
between the two governments restricting the definition of traditional inhabitants to 
people from one of the following 14 villages: Sui, Parama, Katatai, Kadawa, 
Tureture, Mawatta, Mabuduan, Sigabaduru, Buzi, Ber, Tais, Mari, Jarai and Bula. It 
also stated that ‘the identification of these villages should not exclude the application 
of free movement provisions to traditional inhabitants of additional villages, if at 
some point in the future their inclusion is deemed appropriate by the traditional 
inhabitants of Australia and Papua New Guinea’.36 
The effect of the new list, once implemented, was quite the opposite of its 
stated intention. The obscure process by which it was compiled, and the fact that it 
restricts traditional inhabitant status along lines that those who are excluded 
perceive to have an ethnic basis, led to considerable confusion and conflict over 
which villages are covered by the treaty and which villages should be included. 
The new list of Treaty villages was enforced by Australian government officials 
from 2000. Traditional inhabitants coming across from PNG to the Australian Torres 
Strait Islands henceforth had to have their name on a ‘pass’, which is a form carried 
by the dinghy operator with names of all passengers, signed by an authorised person 
from a Treaty village (in most villages this is the local-level government Ward 
Member plus one other person from the village approved by the PNG Department of 
Foreign Affairs) stating that each of the passengers is from the Treaty village. In 
addition, people visiting islands other than Saibai, Dauan and Boigu on day trips 
have to have a prior invitation from the family that will host them while they are on 
the island, and this has to be approved through the councillor of that island. 
When the new list of Treaty villages was introduced and enforced in 2000, 
people from numerous villages who had previously been allowed to visit the Torres 
Strait Islands were no longer permitted to do so. They were unhappy about this, and 
many of them began making representations to the relevant authorities both in PNG 
and Australia requesting that the villages they came from be classified as Treaty 
villages. 
The 2003 Joint Advisory Council (JAC) meeting resolved to review their status 
and determine whether any more villages should be added to the list.37 At that time I 
was conducting doctoral fieldwork, based at the treaty village of Buzi, and I was 
contracted on an arrangement between both governments to produce a report 
describing the basis of the assertions that were being made by people from non-
Treaty villages for inclusion as Treaty villages. 
The purpose of the report that I was contracted to provide, as I understood it at 
the time, was to assist the bureaucrats involved in the process to understand and 
assess the claims being made by people who were insisting they should be included 
in the list of Treaty villages. I provided my report and the following year the JAC 
met, but I do not know how the issue of excluded villages was dealt with as the JAC 
does not publish the content of its deliberations. Subsequent inquiries of DFAT 
about the issue has elicited the consistent response that the Australian Government 
would respond to a formal request to reconsider the list of Treaty villages if it were 
to come from the PNG Government, but it had not received such a request. 
  
There is no formal review mechanism built into the treaty. After an initial spate 
of accounts of the negotiations that led to the eventual agreement,38 and analyses of 
its legal implications,39 with a few exceptions the terms of the Treaty and the 
situation of the border have attracted little public attention.40 
In 1991 the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade conducted an inquiry into ‘Australia’s relations with Papua New 
Guinea’, which included visits to receive submissions from people in Torres Strait in 
relation to ‘Border Issues’. The committee’s report noted that the free movement 
provisions of the treaty were stridently criticised by Torres Strait Islanders at the 
time, quoting from a submission by the Island Co-ordinating Council: 
… the Island Co-ordinating Council was initially supportive of traditional 
movements but have since become disillusioned with the whole concept 
of traditional visits by the traditional inhabitants of Papua New Guinea 
within Torres Strait. The problem stems from the fact that traditional 
movement appears to be mono-directional; that is the movement of Papua 
New Guineans south seeking better facilities and employment.41 
The committee received evidence from the ICC that ‘since the 1980 moratorium on 
illegal immigration when many Papuans gained resident status, the numbers have 
increased. Most visits now are to contact these “new” Torres Strait Islanders’.42 
Noting numerous concerns expressed by Torres Strait Islander witnesses, the 
committee’s report concluded: 
At the official level the Torres Strait Treaty appears to have worked well 
in practice. Nevertheless, the Committee is strongly of the view that more 
account will need to be taken of the views of Torres Strait Islanders in the 
future, otherwise there is a real danger that the situation could deteriorate 
into an irritant in the bilateral relationship and an embarrassment 
internationally.43 
No specific recommendations were made to the government on the management of 
traditional inhabitant issues at the border, although the committee recommended 
that ‘steps be taken to discuss the problems of the Torres Strait with the Papua New 
Guinea Government and to put to the Papua New Guinea Government any 
modifications to the Treaty that are perceived to be necessary’.44 
In 2009 the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade held an inquiry into matters relating to the Torres Strait region, including 
in its terms of reference the provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty. The committee 
received submissions from an array of Australian government departments and 
statutory authorities. Almost all of these speak of ‘challenges’ but give assurances 
that there is great cooperation between departments and with their counterparts in 
the PNG Government in managing the challenges. None recommend any significant 
change to the then current arrangements. 
  
The submissions from Australian government departments and agencies and 
the committee’s report give the overwhelming impression that the Australian 
Government was content with the treaty as it then operated. Despite some 
difficulties posed by the physical environment and the social and economic 
circumstances of the region, the various departments’ submissions all stated that 
they were able to manage within the terms of the treaty to their satisfaction. 
Although the treaty creates a complex jumble of jurisdiction lines, the terms by 
which the free movement provisions allowing traditional inhabitants of PNG to 
cross to Australian islands are subject to a range of other considerations, and the 
traditional inhabitant provisions are worded in such a vague manner as to require 
substantial interpretation to be implemented. Although there are consultation 
processes through the annual Traditional Inhabitants Meetings (TIM), in my analysis 
it is the Australian government bureaucrats who have effectively imposed their 
interpretation of the treaty in the development of the ‘Guidelines for Traditional 
Visitors’ by which the treaty is managed.45 It was not surprising therefore that their 
submissions to the Senate Inquiry recommended a light touch. 
The vast majority of cross-border movements under the treaty are by Papua 
New Guineans visiting the Australian Torres Strait Islands. Almost all of the border 
enforcement activity is done by Australian authorities to monitor and protect the 
Australian side of the border. Furthermore, given that the ‘traditional inhabitant’ 
provisions are subject to restrictions arising from laws relating to such matters as 
immigration, customs, biosecurity and fisheries management, the treaty allows 
sufficient scope for Australian authorities to regulate and limit the activities of the 
Papua New Guineans who cross under the treaty provisions. The PNG Government 
has shown little interest in representing the interests of its citizens in the border 
region, and the public servants and police who are involved in cross-border 
monitoring and regulation generally rely on financial assistance from their 
Australian counterparts to enable them to participate in joint exercises and meetings. 
Those PNG citizens who are not content with the way the border operates have not 
been effective in their efforts to press for change. 
The Senate Committee did not receive any submissions from PNG government 
departments, but there were several from disaffected PNG citizens who do not come 
from Treaty villages but believe that they should be classified as traditional 
inhabitants. The committee’s final report states: 
The committee understands that a number of villages along the coast 
adjacent to the Torres Strait maintain that they should be included as 
Treaty villages and are able to produce evidence that establishes their 
traditional connection to the Torres Strait. It understands that the 2000 
exchange of notes contemplated that at some future stage additional 
villages may wish to be included as Treaty villages. The Australian 
Government has indicated that it is prepared to receive and discuss any 
such request from the PNG Government. Even though the committee 
  
believes that any changes to the status of Treaty villages should be 
initiated by the PNG Government, it is of the view that the Australian 
Government should be aware of the views of these villages on the Treaty 
and their rights.46 
The committee’s report made a range of limited recommendations for improving the 
way the treaty operates but did not consider that any substantial changes were 
required. It made no recommendations therefore in relation to whether or how the 
issue raised by people excluded from status as traditional inhabitants could or 
should be addressed. 
By the time I wrote the report on the claims being made by people who were 
excluded from the 2000 Treaty village list, I had been living at Buzi for well over a 
year and had visited several other villages, both Treaty villages and inland villages 
that had been excluded. The issue of their exclusion irked them, and they wanted to 
tell me why they thought it was wrong. It was made clear to me that the issue of the 
treaty was only one aspect of a much broader set of disputes between the people of 
the coastal Kiwai villages and the Trans-Fly groups who lived in villages that were 
mostly inland (although there are a few that are on or very near the coast). I made a 
trip specifically to research the questions that I had to address in my treaty report, 
going by dinghy along the coast from Bula in the west to Parama at the mouth of the 
Fly River, and up the Wassi Kussa, Mai Kussa, Pahoturi and Binaturi Rivers and 
Kura Creek, to visit people living in inland villages. People came from numerous 
other villages (not on the banks of one of these rivers) to meet me on this trip. I also 
spent a couple of weeks at Daru, where I met mainly with people who originally 
came from villages in the Fly River Estuary. I spent another year at Buzi after writing 
my report on the treaty, during which I made another trip to many more inland 
villages, where these same issues came up for discussion on numerous occasions. 
The fact that I had done the consultancy work on the treaty was important in 
defining the context in which people told me their stories; hence I was told, without 
ever prompting, many stories that stressed connection and relationships with Torres 
Strait and the Torres Strait Islanders. 
People from the excluded Trans-Fly villages were keen to tell me stories that 
demonstrated their relationship to Torres Strait. Equally or more importantly, they 
wanted me to understand the history of how the coastal Kiwai people had migrated 
in relatively recent times along the coast. In the Trans-Fly accounts, the coastal Kiwai 
migration caused physical displacement of Trans-Fly groups that had previously 
occupied the coast, but also resulted in coastal Kiwai people forming relationships 
with Torres Strait Islanders that, to some extent, displaced the relationships that the 
Trans-Fly groups previously had. They saw this pattern continuing with the 
introduction of the new Treaty village list. 
According to the accounts that I was told by numerous people from excluded 
villages, when the request for a list of Treaty villages was made by the Australian 
Government to the PNG Government, the PNG Border Liaison Officer at Daru was a 
  
man whose mother was from the coastal Kiwai village of Mabuduan. They saw a 
direct connection between this fact and the list that eventuated, which at first 
restricted Treaty village status to the coastal Kiwai villages of Sui, Parama, Katatai, 
Kadawa, Tureture, Old Mawatta and Mabuduan, plus the three Agob-language 
villages located on the coast: Sigabaduru, Ber and Buzi. Later the four far-western 
villages of Tais, Mari, Jarai and Bula were added. The people from villages that had 
been excluded said they were not consulted about the list before it was introduced 
and that the coastal Kiwai people had effectively managed to capture the decision-
making process and exclude them. 
Some aspects of this interpretation were confirmed in discussions I had with 
several of the people who had held elected leadership positions in the coastal Kiwai 
villages at the time. When people from the western villages learned that they were to 
be excluded and made representations for inclusion, the perception (and possibly 
the reality) of the coastal Kiwai leaders was that their agreement to include them 
was the reason they were eventually included. They explained to me that they did 
not really consider them to have ‘traditional’ relationships with Torres Strait, but 
they ‘felt sorry’ for them because they are remote. In recent generations they have 
cultivated relationships with Torres Strait Islanders, and furthermore they live on (or 
very near) the coast. (The basis of this reasoning is disputed both by the people of 
the western coastal villages and by others from inland, as discussed further below.) 
Before colonial annexation in the 1880s, coastal Kiwai people had displaced 
several Trans-Fly groups who were living on and near the coast. The arrival of 
missionaries and colonial government officers in this region in the 1870s and 1880s 
occurred after the bêche-de-mer and pearl shell fisheries had been established in 
Torres Strait. coastal Kiwai people, particularly those living at Old Mawatta (then 
known as Katau), had been engaged in intensive interactions with European and 
Pacific Islander commercial fishermen before colonial annexation. Many coastal 
Kiwai men were recruited to work in the new colonial regime, and they were also 
the first to receive missionaries and be recruited as missionaries themselves. As 
policemen and missionaries, coastal Kiwai people were involved in the efforts of the 
colonial regime to induce the inland Trans-Fly peoples to settle in villages and to 
subjugate them to the law. Today there are many coastal Kiwai people who assert 
moral superiority to the Trans-Fly peoples, and those Trans-Fly people most directly 
affected by the coastal Kiwai expansion along the coast onto lands that they claim as 
their own continue to resent this. These Trans-Fly people attempt to claim the moral 
high ground themselves by asserting that they are the landowners and that the 
coastal Kiwai are recent immigrants. 
Mabuduan was established as a government station in the early colonial days 
but was soon abandoned. It was relocated to Daru in 1895. Before the establishment 
of the government station Mabuduan was uninhabited, and after it was abandoned 
by government the coastal Kiwai who had been employed there as labourers and 
police also left. It was established as a ‘model village’ at the instigation of the 
colonial government in 1919 by coastal Kiwai people who were induced to move 
  
from Mawatta.47 It is noteworthy that Acting Resident Magistrate Flint, who had 
proposed the move to the Mawatta people and made the land officially available to 
them, wrote at the time that there was a ‘danger of trouble arising between the 
immigrants and their neighbours, who would treat them as interlopers’.48 
However, the coastal Kiwai who settled at Mabuduan regarded themselves as 
the rightful landowners of the place. Although their village of Mawatta was some 
way to the east, they regarded themselves as the owners of the entire coastal area, 
having explored as far as the mouth of the Mai Kussa River, and were utilising 
fishing camps and garden sites in the vicinity of Mabuduan. In a similar manner to 
the claims of ownership of the Trans-Fly people, the coastal Kiwai claim to have 
taken possession of the land by virtue of being the first to explore, name and occupy 
it. They distinguish their claims by asserting that their ancestors were human and 
that their stories are true history, in contrast with the Trans-Fly stories, which the 
Mabuduan people argue involve mythical beings and should not be regarded as 
historically accurate. 
The annual reports of the colonial government and various other documentary 
records from the time are clear on which villages were established before annexation 
and which after, and on where the first missionaries were posted. Nevertheless 
people from the coastal Kiwai villages and those of their nearby Trans-Fly 
neighbours dispute the history of these migrations and the circumstances in which 
the new villages were established. The disputes are multifaceted; they include a 
dimension in which ownership of land and marine resources are contested, but they 
also involve conflicts in which social status is a central concern. 
The report that I wrote on this issue for the departments and agencies from 
both governments outlined the conflicting histories, noted that violent conflicts over 
issues of land ownership and colonial history had erupted on occasions, and 
suggested that the issue of status as traditional inhabitants was now implicated in 
the same complex of disputes. (My report was provided on a confidential basis to the 
government agencies that had engaged me, and remained so for several years, but a 
copy was released by the PNG Government to one of the respondent parties in the 
context of native title litigation in Australia in 2009.) I concluded that violent conflict 
over the issue of inclusion and exclusion from traditional inhabitant status was a 
distinct possibility, but I did not expect it to happen quite as soon as it did. 
In 2004 there was a raid by people from the non-Treaty village of Masingara on 
the nearby treaty village of Old Mawatta in which almost all of the houses and other 
buildings were set on fire, and one old man was reportedly killed. This led to 
reprisal attacks on some Masingara people in Daru, and the people who were living 
in Masingara fled to the bush for many months in fear of further reprisals. The main 
protagonists of the violence and arson were brought to court and sentenced, and 
compensation for the damage caused was ordered and most has now been paid. Old 
Mawatta has been rebuilt and the people of the two villages coexist relatively 
peacefully now, but the issues that underlie the tensions between the two still 
remain. 
  
This was not the first instance of conflict between these two villages (although 
it was the most extreme). The issues of contention are not limited the inclusion of 
one and exclusion of the other from treaty traditional inhabitant status. Disputes 
over land ownership, access to fishing grounds, and contradictory histories 
concerning the arrival of the first missionaries and various other aspects of the early 
colonial period also figure. 
Similarly structured social tensions between treaty and non-treaty villages also 
exist in relation to Kadawa and Dorogori, Tureture and Kunini, and Kulalae and 
Mabuduan. Numerous other non-Treaty villages also continue to seek ways and 
means of pressing their case for inclusion. 
As noted above, the Australian Government position on the issue has 
consistently been that it would consider any proposal put to it by the government of 
PNG, but it has received no such proposal. The relatively large numbers of people 
who come across to the islands, by comparison with the resident Torres Strait 
Islander population, places a burden on the people and facilities on the islands, and 
many Torres Strait Islanders would prefer the number of Papuan visitors to be 
reduced rather than increased. There is therefore no pressure on the Australian 
Government from the Torres Strait Islanders to allow more people to come across 
under the treaty; rather the reverse is the case. 
Representatives of the existing Treaty villages attend the annual Traditional 
Inhabitants Meetings established under the treaty, and this is the body that 
government officials are supposed to consult in assessing whether changes should 
be made to the practical arrangements regulating the border and how they should be 
introduced. The coastal Kiwai villages, from Sui in the east to Mabuduan in the west, 
collectively comprise a majority of the existing Treaty villages. These are the same 
people who have manifold disputes with the Trans-Fly groups who believe they 
should be included in the treaty provisions. As noted above, the formal note that 
defined the current list of Treaty villages did not preclude the hypothetical 
possibility of inclusion of further villages on the list, but the condition on which that 
could occur is important; it will only occur ‘if at some point in the future their 
inclusion is deemed appropriate by the traditional inhabitants of Australia and 
Papua New Guinea’. 
Given the burden already faced by Australian traditional inhabitants in 
accommodating the existing number of visitors and their consequent reluctance to 
increase numbers, and the political context of the current PNG Treaty villages, it 
appears unlikely that there will be any change to the current definition of who is 
recognised as coming within the category of traditional inhabitant until such time as 
there is a move by one or the other government to review the terms of the treaty. The 
wording of the treaty is vague and requires substantive interpretation in order for 
the categories that it establishes to function to exclude as well as include. The 
interpretations currently applied exclude people not on the basis of whether they 
meet the criteria of the treaty, but rather as a result of some deft political 
manoeuvring at the time the list of Treaty villages was introduced. Given the 
  
broader political and socioeconomic context spanning the border, the terms of the 
treaty are arguably anachronistic. 
As noted above, at the time the treaty was signed, in 1978, people who 
originated from PNG but had been living in the Torres Strait Islands for five years or 
more were allowed to choose whether to return to PNG or remain in Australia; those 
who remained were granted permanent residence. Most of them have since become 
Australian citizens, and their Australian-born children are automatically Australian 
citizens—but they are not recognised as Torres Strait Islanders, rather they are 
regarded by Torres Strait Islanders as Papuans. The stipulation in the treaty that 
traditional inhabitants who are Australian citizens must also be Torres Strait 
Islanders therefore means that, according to a strict application of the treaty, these 
people are excluded from the traditional inhabitant category. 
Despite this, the existing practical arrangements do permit people who came 
originally from a Treaty village but are now Australian citizens to visit PNG 
ostensibly under the treaty, as the ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ state: ‘PNG 
nationals from Treaty villages who become Australian citizens or permanent 
Australian residents and live in the Protected Zone can still make traditional visits to 
the PNG Treaty villages.’49 
The status of former PNG nationals who originally came from a village that is 
not on the list of Treaty villages is more problematic. There are some families living 
at Badu who originally came from the non-Treaty village of Kulalae; according to 
their accounts, they are prohibited from returning home for a visit under the treaty, 
and are required to travel on passports with visas. 
Until recently there was no special provision for favouring PNG Treaty villages 
as part of Australia’s international development aid program; however, since 2015 
there has been a ‘ranger’ project, which started first at six Treaty villages, then 
expanded to include all of them, which is funded by the Australian Government and 
run by Australian contractors. There is also a new small hospital being built at 
Mabuduan through an ADB project partly funded by Australian development aid. 
Although this is not based on it being a Treaty village, and is intended to serve the 
people of all of the nearby villages regardless of their status in relation to the treaty, 
there is a common perception among people from Mabuduan and from other nearby 
non-Treaty villages that it is related to the fact that Mabuduan is a treaty village. 
Further, there is a widespread misperception that money originating from the PNG 
Department of the Prime Minister that has been allocated to the local-level 
government (LLG) members of the Treaty villages actually derived from the 
Australian Aid program to provide development assistance to Treaty villages, and 
has been used on various things including purchase of community dinghies and 
engines, freezers for commercial fishing, sheets of roofing iron and walkabout 
sawmills (see chapter 4 for further details). 
Until the 2019 LLG elections, the current treaty villages from Buzi east to Sui 
were part of the Kiwai LLG while those from Tais west to Bula were within the 
Morehead LLG area. Following that election, a new LLG government was created, 
  
and the Treaty villages now comprise their own LLG, known as the Forecoast Kiwai 
LLG. 
The increasing exclusivity of the treaty villages, and their successful efforts to 
capture benefits for themselves by leveraging their position in relation to the border, 
are likely to lead to further resentment by those who are excluded but believe that 
they should be included. People from non-Treaty villages commonly state a view 
that it would be preferable for the border to be closed altogether rather than the 
current situation, which they regard as unfair and unjust, be allowed to continue. 
While the people of the Treaty villages have been somewhat successful in 
attracting special treatment in the form of development assistance in recent years, at 
the same time the activities they are permitted to engage in when they cross the 
border into Torres Strait have been progressively narrowed. 
The stipulation that free movement of traditional inhabitants is to be subject to 
the other provisions of this treaty has significant consequences for the way in which 
the treaty operates in practice. These other provisions include measures for 
environmental protection, biosecurity, customs, health and law enforcement. A 
consequence of this is that laws introduced by a state relating to any of these things 
effectively override the possibility of actual free movement for citizens of the other 
state, as their movement and their activities are restricted by the laws relating to 
these other provisions. 
When a dinghy from PNG arrives at one of the Torres Strait Islands, it must 
land at a designated landing place, and all of the passengers must wait in the dinghy 
until a movement monitoring officer (MMO), employed by the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), arrives to attend to them. 
Most MMOs are Torres Strait Islanders, and most of them come from the island 
where they are employed; there are also some who are Australian-citizen Papuans. 
When travelling to Saibai, Dauan or Boigu on a day trip, the PNG visitors must have 
a ‘pass’, which is a photocopied form on which the names of all the passengers in 
their dinghy or canoe are written, signed by the village councillor or another person 
authorised by PNG Department of Foreign Affairs. The authorised person’s 
signature is supposed to provide an assurance that all of the passengers come from a 
Treaty village, and a person from one Treaty village is supposed to have the 
signature of the authorised person only from their own village. 
Once the MMO has checked their pass, counted the names and matched them 
against the number in the dinghy, a biosecurity officer (like the MMOs, the 
biosecurity officers employed on all of the islands are Torres Strait Islanders) checks 
the cargo that the Papuans have brought. If they have mats or baskets or other 
woven materials, these are unpacked and checked for insects. The dinghy may be 
(and often is) checked for contraband (such as alcohol and drugs), and the 
passengers may be (and often are) told to empty their pockets for the same reason. 
Border Force officers from Thursday Island and Cairns frequently visit some of the 
islands, especially Saibai and Boigu, and they sometimes participate in the checking 
of cargo and paperwork. If everything is in order, the Papuan visitors are allowed to 
  
move about the island. At Saibai and Boigu, there is a designated market area, near 
the designated landing place, and some Papuans set up their goods for trade, while 
others might have been requested to bring particular objects by somebody and will 
go to deliver their goods. 
People travelling to other islands, and those who intend to stay for longer than 
one day at Boigu, Saibai and Dauan, are required to have a ‘prior advice notice’, 
which shows that they have been invited and have a place to stay on the island. It 
must be signed off by the island councillor before they arrive. At Boigu, Saibai and 
Dauan, this is usually done while on a day-trip, and the visitor must return home 
before coming back with the approved prior advice notice for a multi-day visit. 
Each island council has some autonomy in the conditions that are imposed on 
Papuan visitors. All impose a time limit on the length of stay permitted, and on most 
islands this is two weeks, although in some circumstances, such as bad weather, 
people are allowed to stay longer. Occasionally all visits are prohibited, either to a 
particular island, if for example they have a water shortage, or to all islands, usually 
in the event of an outbreak of disease on the PNG side. Since 2019 strict limits have 
been placed on visitors from Mabuduan and Sigabaduru to Saibai. They had 
previously been frequent day-trippers, and many also often stayed on for several 
days, but from January 2019 they were permitted to travel only on Wednesdays, and 
only 30 people from each village was allowed on any given Wednesday. According 
to the former ward member for Mabuduan, there was then a total ban on people 
from his village visiting Saibai for the month of March. He and the ward member for 
Sigabaduru were then placed in an invidious position—they were made responsible 
for enforcing what they regarded as arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions imposed 
unilaterally by the Saibai councillor, and under pressure from the many more than 
30 people from their villages who wanted to travel across each week. As at August 
2019, a total and indefinite ban has been placed on visitors from Mabuduan to Saibai. 
It is not clear what the legal basis for such a ban is. In November 2019 the ban was 
lifted, but there remain strict limits on the number and frequency of visits. 
The regulation of what is acceptable as ‘barter and market trade’ as a permitted 
traditional activity is ambiguous. The Treaty states that, ‘in the application of [the 
definition of traditional activities], except in relation to activities of a commercial 
nature, “traditional” shall be interpreted liberally and in the light of prevailing 
custom’.50 Papuans who visit the islands with goods to trade usually hope to engage 
in cash transactions and to use the money from the things they sell to purchase 
goods from the stores on the island; similarly, when working for Torres Strait 
Islanders they prefer to be paid in cash. However, there are some Torres Strait 
Islanders who insist that ‘barter and market trade’ should be interpreted as 
prohibiting cash transactions, and rather than pay for labour or goods with cash, 
they provide store goods to barter. 
The ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ referred to above contains several 
statements interpreting the treaty, including statements about what is considered not 
to be a traditional activity: 
  
Traditional visits do not include activities that are not traditional. Visits 
for health treatment, attending court cases, shopping at the store, picking 
up deliveries from the barge, baby sitting, working or accessing money 
from the ATM are not considered traditional activities … 
Traditional visitors can only travel by dinghy or canoe, not by 
aircraft. 
The Treaty bans commercial activity, business dealings and working 
for money during traditional visits (e.g. cray fishing from a licensed 
Australian cray boat, selling artefacts or crabs to commercial operators, 
paid domestic assistance). Selling goods to non-traditional inhabitants is 
not permitted under the Treaty. Selling goods in the knowledge that they 
may on-sold [sic] is also not permitted under the Treaty.51 
There is also an explicit reference to ‘tradition and custom’ in the following 
restriction on who may and may not come (discussed further above): ‘Consistent 
with local tradition and custom, wives from non-Treaty villages can make traditional 
visits with their husbands if the man is from a Treaty village. Husbands from non-
Treaty villages cannot make traditional visits if they are married to a woman from a 
Treaty village.’52 
However, while the guidelines refer to ‘tradition’ in relation to some 
regulations, there are others for which no such rationalisation is given, such as 
where they state: 
Traditional Inhabitants must get a prior advice notice requesting a visit 
signed by the registered signatory (i.e. the village chairman in the case of 
PNG, and the elected representative in the case of Australia). The 
registered signatory from one village cannot sign a pass for someone from 
another village. The signed prior advice notice requesting permission to 
visit must be sent to the relevant community before visiting. Do not travel 
until you receive approval (signed pass) back from the community you 
wish to visit.53 
Similarly, there is no concern with ‘tradition’ in the requirement that ‘children must 
travel with their parents or legal guardians’, or the advice to: 
Make sure you have enough petrol to travel back home. Always travel in 
daylight hours for your own safety. Make sure you carry safety gear on 
your boat (EPIRB, marine radio, flares, V-Sheet, Personal Flotation 
Devices—PFD Type 1, fire fighting devices, navigation equipment, bilge 
pump for boats over 5m, bucket for bailing water, anchor, oars or paddles, 
drinking water).54 
The guidelines define certain activities as not traditional and therefore not 
permitted under the treaty, but they are not consistently enforced, and several of the 
  
activities that are prohibited are common practice—and a major reason for visiting 
the islands. Working as domestic labour for Torres Strait Islanders is a way to earn 
money, and goods sold to non-Torres Strait Islanders usually fetch higher prices 
than when sold to Torres Strait Islanders. Going to the store with money obtained 
from such work and from selling goods that have been brought across to trade is the 
main reason for visiting the islands. The statement in the guidelines that ‘the Treaty 
bans commercial activity’ directly contradicts the definition contained in the treaty 
that ‘barter and market trade’ are traditional activities. 
The net effect of the ambiguous wording of the treaty is that those who are 
permitted to travel from PNG to the Torres Strait Islands are subject to arbitrary 
enforcement of regulations that represent the Australian Government’s 
interpretation of the treaty. When people of the borderland region travel west into 
Indonesia, the situation is markedly different. 
The western border with Indonesia 
Although the western half of New Guinea was claimed as a Dutch possession from 
1828, there was no colonial administrative presence in the vicinity of the border at 
141°E on the south coast at the time the Protectorate of British New Guinea was 
proclaimed in 1884. The headquarters of the Western District of British New Guinea 
were first established at Mabuduan in 1890, then moved to Daru in 189355—also a 
considerable distance from the Dutch border. Marind headhunting raiders from the 
west had been of concern to the new British colonial administration since shortly 
after it commenced, and expeditions to intercept them were led by Lieutenant 
Governor William MacGregor in the early 1890s. MacGregor was frustrated in his 
pursuit by not being able to determine where the border was. In order to create an 
easily visible marker, in 1895 agreement was reached between the British and Dutch 
to adjust the border slightly westwards, so that on the south coast it was aligned 
with the centre of the mouth of the Bensbach River, which was calculated as being at 
140°1’47.9’E, and extended northwards at this longitude until it meets the Fly River.56 
The pattern of interaction across the Dutch–British colonial border, and later 
the Indonesian–New Guinea border, has been quite different from that between 
Queensland and British New Guinea/Papua New Guinea. As noted above, an early 
concern of both the British and Dutch was to suppress the Marind headhunting 
raids, which was accomplished in the late 1890s and early 1900s. Once peace was 
established between the Marind and their eastern neighbours, local trade increased, 
and there was some intermarriage between people across the border. The area on 
both sides of the border was remote from centres of power and commerce, and 
relatively isolated by comparison with villages closer to Daru and Torres Strait. 
Merauke developed as a centre of commerce in the birds of paradise trade for a 
period before World War II. An Australian military base was established at Merauke 
during the war, but it appears to have had relatively little effect on the people from 
the border area. Following World War II, Indonesia became an independent nation 
state in 1949, but it did not incorporate the former Dutch New Guinea until 1969. 
  
In anticipation of PNG independence, a survey of the border area was 
conducted. Eventually it resulted in a treaty that was agreed by Australia and 
Indonesia in February 1973 affirming the location of the border at the mouth of the 
Bensbach River but calculated as being at 141°01’10’E. 
A further treaty was agreed in November 1973 between the government of 
Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the government of Papua New 
Guinea) and the government of Indonesia in which provision was made for ‘Border 
crossing for Traditional and Customary purposes’. Article 3 of that treaty provides 
that: 
The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who reside in a 
border area and are citizens of the country concerned, of crossing the 
border for traditional activities such as social contacts and ceremonies 
including marriage, gardening and other land usage, collecting, hunting, 
fishing and other usage of waters, and traditional barter trade are 
recognised and shall continue to be respected. 
Article 4 allows that: 
The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country, who reside 
in its border area, in relation to land in the border area of the other 
country and for purposes such as fishing and other usage of the seas or 
waters in or in the vicinity of the border area of the other country, shall be 
respected and the other country shall permit them to exercise those rights 
on the same conditions as apply to its own citizens. 
Article 5 agrees that both governments would ‘discourage the construction of 
villages or other permanent housing within a two kilometre zone on each side of the 
border’. 
The ‘border area’ is not defined in the treaty, but it was agreed that it would be 
defined at a future date. An agreement between the governments of Indonesia and 
PNG in 1984 defined the border area as the census divisions that abut the border (on 
the coast, this was the Bensbach census division).57 The 1984 agreement provided for 
‘Border crossing for traditional and customary purposes’ in similar but not exactly 
the same terms as the second 1973 treaty: 
Each country shall continue to recognize and permit movement across the 
Border by the traditional inhabitants of the other country who reside the 
Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned for traditional 
activities within the Border Area such as social contacts and ceremonies 
including marriage, gardening, hunting, collecting and other land usage, 
fishing and other usage of waters, customary border trade. 
Thus ‘traditional barter trade’ was replaced with ‘customary border trade’. 
  
After the 1963 occupation of the former Dutch New Guinea by Indonesia, but 
before the 1969 United Nations sponsored vote for its incorporation within the 
Indonesian state, a number of people from the former Dutch side of the border 
crossed into what was at the time the Australian Territory of Papua and sought 
refuge there. They lived at Old Mawatta for several years, before moving on to Daru, 
where most of them lived at the time I first went to Daru in 2001. This group was 
known colloquially as Kondo-Marind, Kondo being the name of a village that some 
of them originated from and Marind being their language and ‘tribal’ name. 
Some of the Kondo-Marind who moved to PNG married within the group, but 
there were also several marriages with Papua New Guineans. A whole generation 
had been born and grown up in PNG by the time I encountered them. My estimate 
of their number at the time of my main fieldwork (commencing late 2002) was 
approximately 250. Some of those who had married Papua New Guineans were 
living at Daru, and others in the villages of their spouse, including at Old Mawatta, 
Mabuduan, Kadawa, Sigabaduru, Bula, Tati and likely several other villages. There 
were also two living at Buzi for some of the time that I lived there, although neither 
of them were married to local women. 
Some of them had also moved to establish a village at Kunji, on the beachfront 
near Bula. At that time the PNG–Indonesia border area was actively patrolled by a 
group identified with the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM; Free Papua Movement), 
led by a man named Joseph Makunamu. He had recruited a group of young men, 
some originating from the Indonesian side of the border, others from villages in the 
western part of South Fly District. They frequently moved camp, roving the country 
on both sides of the border, occasionally making attacks on Indonesian military 
facilities, but generally evading both Indonesian police and military, as well as the 
minimal police presence on the PNG side of the border (which consisted of a single 
police officer stationed at Weam). 
The Kondo-Marind refugees living at Daru were assisted by the Catholic 
Church in acquiring a small area of land on which to build their settlement, but they 
struggled to make a livelihood. Some of them went fishing and sold their catch at 
Daru market, some found occasional day-labouring work, but, along with the people 
who had migrated from the Bamu River region of Middle Fly District,58 collectively 
they were the poorest social group in a generally impoverished town. 
Over a period of a few years beginning in approximately 2003, the Indonesian 
government sought to induce them to return to Indonesia; it began by supplying 
shipments of food to them in Daru, and promised that those who returned would be 
given land and assistance to start a new life back in Merauke. In 2004 about half of 
the Daru Kondo-Marind took up the Indonesian offer and went back, and about a 
year later most of the rest of them followed, so there is no longer a Kondo-Marind 
settlement in Daru. Some of those who had married a PNG spouse took their spouse 
to Merauke, while some stayed on in the village of their spouse. One of the 
consequences of the movement of the Kondo-Marind group into PNG, their 
  
residence there for forty years and then return, is that there is now a network of kin 
relations between people from several villages, and Daru, with Merauke. 
Over the decades since Indonesian occupation of what is now known as Papua 
Province, the town of Merauke has expanded significantly, and it is now a city of 
almost 100 000 people. A substantial proportion of these moved from other parts of 
Indonesia under the transmigrasi program. Data from the 2010 Indonesian census 
have a population of 87 634 for Merauke, of whom 40 578 had migrated from other 
provinces of Indonesia; this latter figure does not include children of transmigrants.59 
The population of Merauke Regency as counted in the same census was 195 716, of 
whom 76 943 had migrated from other provinces.60 
There was a former Dutch Catholic mission at Sota, which was developed into 
a small town populated with a significant proportion of transmigrants in the 1970s. 
Sota is at the border, on the Indonesian side, and just a few kilometres from the PNG 
village of Wereave. There has been extensive intermarriage between the people on 
either side of the border since a time before the border was created, so many people 
from the adjacent villages have family connections across it. 
A group of people who originated from an area spanning the border, west of 
Weam, moved into Weam in the 1960s. Following some disputes over marriage 
exchanges, which spilled over into disputes over ownership of and access to land, 
they left Weam and moved back to establish a new village on their own land, at 
Tepam. According to accounts from people at Weam, this village was on the PNG 
side of the border but very close to the border. The PNG Defence Force then 
reportedly went and destroyed their village and told them to move back to Weam, 
outside the buffer zone along the border that the PNG and Indonesian governments 
had agreed to discouraging the establishment of new villages. According to accounts 
of the PNG soldiers involved, they merely told them to move but they refused. 
Instead they moved further west, across the border into Indonesia. But instead of 
destroying their new village of Yokwa (Iakijoe) the Indonesians have reportedly 
established a small military outpost there. 
Although the treaty arrangements between Indonesia and PNG formally 
restrict ‘traditional border crossers’ to people who originate from the adjacent census 
districts, in practice people from inland PNG villages much further afield are 
permitted to cross at Sota to trade, and many travel on from there to Merauke. 
Similarly, people who cross the border along the coast are not in practice restricted 
to those from the adjacent census district. 
There is an Indonesian border post at the mouth of the Bensbach River, staffed 
by military personnel, and another at Sota staffed by both military and civilian 
officials. People from PNG wanting to cross the border must obtain a pass from an 
authorised person, one of whom lives at Bula, another at Weam. When crossing the 
border on the coast, they have to report to the soldiers at the border post before 
going on to Merauke, where they present their pass to civilian officials at the port in 
Merauke; when crossing at Sota they present it to the officials there. Accounts of 
border-crossing activities by Papua New Guineans are consistent in describing how 
  
relatively straightforward the processes are. The social relationships that exist across 
the border—many of them deriving from the connections established by the Kondo-
Marind former refugees—facilitate increasing travel, mainly for trading purposes, 
across the Indonesian border. 
While the 1984 PNG–Indonesia treaty provides for ‘traditional border-crossers’ 
to engage in ‘customary border trade’, it does not permit crossing by traders who 
have no ancestral connections to the area adjacent to the border. For Papua New 
Guineans crossing to Indonesia, the practicalities of crossing the border are such that 
there is no effective restriction on where in PNG they originate from, and people 
from villages far distant from the border (but generally within South Fly District) 
commonly make visits to Sota and Merauke. 
Going the other way, Indonesian traders who are not ethnically Papuan 
commonly and frequently travel along the coast well beyond the area adjacent to the 
border, reportedly as far east as Kerema in Gulf Province. They are generally 
engaged in trading for highly profitable dried marine products and are reputed to 
make substantial profits from their activities (chapter 7). It is widely reported by 
villagers in South Fly District that as a consequence of their activities being illegal 
they have to pay bribes to carry on their business. They generally travel in modified 
banana boats with two and sometimes three outboard motors,61 in order to evade 
PNG law enforcement officers. 
Since 2005, the extent of trading activity into Indonesia has increased 
substantially in my observation. It is particularly noteworthy that people from the 
western coastal villages which are Australian Treaty villages—Tais, Mari, Jarai and 
Bula—now commonly report that, apart from a few individuals, they generally 
travel to Boigu in Torres Strait only to avail themselves of medical facilities in an 
emergency; they have ‘given up’ on going there to trade, as they now have better 
trading opportunities with Indonesia. 
Conclusion 
The locations of the borders separating PNG from its neighbours west and south 
derive from the happenstance of the historical process by which European colonial 
powers extended the domain of their geographical control across the world in the 
19th century. The differential encompassment of the indigenous peoples of what 
became the borderland region into three separate colonial regimes—later three 
nation states—has led to the development of distinct social identities that derive 
directly from their respective colonial and post-colonial histories. 
The categorical definition of people deriving from the placement of the borders 
goes beyond their citizenship of one or another of the respective nation states; 
particularly in relation to the PNG–Australia border, the creation of a category of 
people as ‘traditional inhabitants’ has exacerbated the asymmetric effects of the 
border, creating and exaggerating inequalities and a hierarchy of identity and 
corresponding privileges. These effects are at odds with an ethos of reciprocity that 
  
universally informs social action in the region, and arguably contributes to a politics 
of envy and resentment that underlies tensions at the Australia–PNG border. 
In seeking to bolster border security by imposing greater restrictions at the 
PNG–Australia border, the Australian state has, in this analysis, instead made the 
border less secure. In 1989, a long-time observer of Torres Strait with lived 
experience as a schoolteacher at both Saibai and Daru, John Singe, suggested that the 
treaty was then ‘widely recognised as unworkable’ due to the lack of development 
on the PNG side of the border.62 The Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1991 inquiry recommended that ‘action be taken 
to address the root cause of the problem—the depressed economic conditions and 
lack of health facilities in the Papua New Guinea coastal villages’.63 
Since that time the ‘root cause of the problems’ has evidently become worse, not 
better. In my opinion, the recommendation of the committee for action by the 
Australian Government to address the vast socioeconomic disparity remains sound 
but has not been effectively acted upon. 
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3 
The Torres Strait Treaty 
Jennifer Corrin 
The Torres Strait is a passage and international shipping strait, 150 kilometres wide, 
between the far north of Australia and the south coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
It comprises hundreds of islands, islets, coral reefs and cays, 17 of which are 
inhabited.1 Most islands have only one or two villages, with populations ranging 
from about 80 to a thousand.2 The area is governed by the Torres Strait Treaty 
between Australia and PNG.3 The treaty establishes a Protected Zone4 and a system 
of free movement for traditional inhabitants of certain islands in the strait and of 
some PNG coastal villages adjacent to it (‘Treaty villages’).5 This area is sometimes 
collectively referred to as the borderlands.6 Traditional inhabitants may travel across 
the border between Australia and PNG to carry out traditional activities within the 
Protected Zone and nearby areas.7 Once across the border, traditional inhabitants are 
subject to the law of the country they are visiting,8 administered by foreign 
institutions with which they are unlikely to be familiar. Domestic laws and the legal 
systems that surround them differ dramatically from one side of the border to the 
other. This includes not only substantive differences in the law but also different 
options for dealing with disputes that arise about the law, including the treaty 
provisions and surrounding legislation. 
Many aspects of the treaty are contentious, which is hardly surprising given 
what is at stake for traditional inhabitants reliant on fishing and trade with other 
communities. Some treaty provisions are vague, in some cases perhaps deliberately 
so, and are open to different interpretations. The remoteness of the small, scattered 
communities, which are often without access to legal advice or other services, poses 
challenges for resolution of the problems that arise in the implementation of the 
treaty. 
This chapter commences with an overview of the laws operating in the 
borderlands, to illustrate the complexities of the laws that affect the treaty 
arrangements. It proceeds to consider the limited avenues for traditional inhabitants 
and other communities in the vicinity of the borderlands to obtain advice on these 
laws if they wish to challenge the way in which the treaty is being implemented, or 
are faced with a criminal charge or involved in a civil dispute. It then reviews the 
options for the resolution of disputes relating to the treaty, both for the parties and 
for local bodies and individuals who contest its interpretation and application. This 
includes options provided by the state, such as court proceedings, and other 
pathways for dispute resolution on both sides of the border. It then examines more 
  
specific areas of dispute that have arisen from the operation of the treaty, and 
considers whether there are adequate means of resolving them. The chapter draws 
on a small number of interviews conducted by the author on Saibai Island, Thursday 
Island and Horn Island in November 2017 and further survey work undertaken by 
members of the research team between 2016 and 2018. 
Torres Strait 
Torres Strait stretches for 90 nautical miles between Australia and PNG and 
constitutes a major international shipping route. It has been designated as a 
‘Particularly Sensitive [environmental] Area’ by the International Maritime 
Organization,9 and provides a source of livelihood for the many distinct 
communities living in the area. The Torres Strait Islands are within the Australian 
state of Queensland and, as explained in chapter 1, fall into four geographical 
groups. The north-western islands, Saibai, Dauan and Boigu Islands, are part of 
Australia,10 even though they lie north of the seabed jurisdictional borderline.11 A 
few small islands off the coast of PNG, including Daru, the capital of Western 
Province, are part of PNG. 
The law 
Traditional inhabitants are told in the ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’,12 issued 
by the Australian Government, that they must ‘obey national laws and local laws 
and customs’.13 This section of the chapter outlines the sources of law with which 
traditional inhabitants have to contend. Unravelling applicable laws is a complex 
task. Both countries have a plural legal system, in the sense that there is more than 
one system in operation, but the sources of law and their content is different. There 
is a degree of asymmetry, as the traditional inhabitants from PNG are subject to a 
hierarchy of laws that puts customary laws above the common law. For Australian 
citizens, on the other hand, customary laws are not a general source of law and, as 
discussed below, will generally be enforced by state courts only if they have been 
endorsed by legislation. In Australia, the position is complicated by the federal 
system, which means that both Commonwealth and Queensland state laws apply. 
The degree of recognition of international laws may form another level of difference 
between the two countries’ legal systems. 
International law 
Australia and PNG (the ‘parties’) are dualist states, which means that treaties have to 
be encapsulated in national legislation before they become part of domestic law.14 
The most important agreement is the treaty itself, which was signed in December 
1978 after negotiations lasting some five years,15 and thus became part of 
international law. The necessary local legislation in both Australian and PNG was 
not passed until 1984.16 This legislation effectively domesticated the treaty, making it 
a part of Australia and PNG law, and with that the treaty finally entered into force in 
February 1985. 
  
It is a unique arrangement in that it defines the border zones between Australia 
and PNG differently, depending on the purpose. It sets a Seabed Jurisdiction Line, 
with Australia having rights to all things on or below the seabed south of the line 
and PNG having the same rights north of the line. However, the following islands, 
which lie north of the Seabed Jurisdiction Line, remain part of Australia: Anchor 
Cay, Aubusi Island, Black Rocks, Boigu Island, Bramble Cay, Dauan Island, 
Deliverance Island, East Cay, Kaumag Island, Kerr Islet, Moimi Island, Pearce Cay, 
Saibai Island, Turnagain Island and Turu Cay. These Australian islands north of the 
Seabed Jurisdiction Line also have their own territorial seas of three nautical miles 
unless otherwise specified in the treaty. The second main boundary is the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Line, which follows part of the seabed line but deviates to create an area 
described as the ‘top hat’. Australia has rights over swimming fish south of the 
Fisheries Line, and PNG has the same rights north of the line. Subsidiary 
management arrangements for commercial fisheries in the zone have also been put 
in place under the treaty. These allow the countries to work together in licensing and 
policing, and arranging for the sharing of the commercial catch. It also provides for 
preservation, protection and management of fisheries, with a view to making sure 
that commercial fishing is in harmony with traditional fishing. 
As mentioned above, the treaty establishes a Protected Zone, and allows Torres 
Strait Islanders and the coastal people of PNG who come within the definition of 
traditional inhabitants to move freely (without passports or visas) to conduct 
traditional activities in and in the vicinity of the Protected Zone. While the treaty 
allows for free movement in both directions (i.e. by both Australian and PNG 
nationals), Australian government data show that more than 98 per cent of 
traditional movements are made by PNG citizens.17 As noted in the 2010 Senate 
Inquiry, The Torres Strait: Bridge and Border (the ‘Senate Inquiry’), this ‘suggests that 
some visits by PNG nationals may be prompted by the ability to trade and access 
services (such as medical centres and shops) in the island communities which are not 
readily accessible in PNG’.18 In practice, the free movement provisions are restricted 
by the guidelines, which are discussed later in this chapter. 
There are a number of other treaties that influence the arrangements in the 
Torres Strait, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is 
relevant to dispute resolution mechanisms in the treaty, which are discussed further 
below. Customary international law is also relevant in the borderlands and is 
capable of applying whether or not it has been incorporated into domestic law. It has 
been accepted by regional courts as a source of law, particularly with reference to 
maritime zones.19 
Australian law 
Constitutions and legislation 
As Australia is a federal state, the national laws include both Commonwealth and 
Queensland state laws. The Australian Constitution is the supreme law in 
  
Australia;20 it empowers the Commonwealth Parliament to make national laws on 
certain matters that are of interest to the nation as a whole. At the state level, subject 
to the overriding power of the Commonwealth, the Constitution of Queensland is 
the supreme law.21 Beneath the constitutions in the legal hierarchy lies statutory law, 
at both Commonwealth and state level.22 The Australian Constitution outlines the 
Commonwealth Parliament’s legislative power, with residual power being reserved 
for the states.23 
In addition to Acts implementing the treaty, there are a large number of 
Commonwealth and Queensland Acts that are relevant to the Torres Strait. These 
include the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 (Cwlth),24 the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth), 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth), the Fisheries 
Administration Act 1991 (Cwlth) and the Customs Act 1901 (Cwlth). Relevant state 
legislation includes the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities (Justice, 
Biosecurity) Regulation 2016 (Qld), the Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 (Qld) and the 
Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 (Qld). There are also a number of shipping laws at 
both Commonwealth and state level. 
Local laws 
The outer islands of the Torres Strait fall within the Local Government Area (LGA) 
of the Torres Shire Council.25 Within the LGA, they are represented by the Torres 
Strait Island Regional Council (TSIRC), which is empowered to make laws to 
regulate ‘good rule and local government of its local government area’.26 Such laws 
are commonly concerned with local administration and with community health and 
safety, for example, Local Law No. 1 (Administration) 2013 and Local Law No. 3 
(Community and Environmental Management) 2014.27 
Common law 
The common law—that is, the law derived from the English common law, as 
developed by Australian courts—is also a relevant source of law in the Torres Strait. 
In Australia, the common law is regarded by the state as inferior to legislation but 
superior to customary laws. One of the most significant common law decisions is 
Akiba v. Commonwealth.28 In that case, 13 island communities in the Torres Strait 
applied to the Federal Court of Australia for a determination of native title over part 
of the waters of the strait under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth).29 The High Court 
confirmed the existence of native title over the waters. This included a non-exclusive 
group right of access to resources and to take resources in the native title areas for 
any purpose in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the native title 
holders and the laws of the state of Queensland and the Commonwealth, including 
the common law.30 
Customary laws 
Customary laws are not formally recognised as a general source of law in Australia.31 
However, there are some legislative schemes that recognise specific customary laws 
  
and require them to be taken into account in certain matters concerning particular 
persons.32 Queensland examples are bail applications under the Bail Act33 and 
sentencing hearings under the Penalties and Sentences Act.34 
Although they are not recognised across the board, customary laws are still 
strong among indigenous peoples in the Torres Strait. Principles of traditional law 
common to Torres Strait Islanders were discussed at length in Akiba v. Queensland 
(No. 2).35 It was accepted by the court that, across the Torres Strait Islands, elders 
were the authorities who, where necessary, would interpret, apply and give effect to 
the laws and customs of their communities.36 It was also noted by the court that 
communities are generally patrilineal37 and that this provides indigenous inhabitants 
with: 
(a) an island or community identity 
(b) a place in the social organization of that community (such as by reference to 
lineages, family and clans), and 
(c) a basis upon which to acquire native title rights and interests.38 
Traditional beliefs are centred on a notion of ‘balance’ between this world and 
the Kibukuth,39 and this has a strong influence on customary laws. Of particular 
relevance to justice are the principles of reciprocity and exchange, which underpin 
traditional law and inform particular laws and customs. Expert evidence in Akiba 
suggested that the Torres Strait Islanders enjoy a web of ‘numerous and vibrant 
exchange relationships between individuals, clans and communities that were the 
lifeblood of [their] society’: 
Much of the trade involved the necessities of life, such as food items or the 
implements to obtain food, like the dugong harpoon. Some items changed 
hands as gifts, and other exchanges had specific ceremonial and social 
purposes. Trading voyages also provided the opportunity for courtship 
and entering into marriage arrangements, to ‘show off new dances and 
songs’ and for the spread of news, ‘new ideas and innovation’.40 
Reciprocity and exchange manifest specifically in the following elements of 
traditional law: 
(a) the common practice of adoption of children 
(b) kinship, which may be understood as the principle underpinning social roles, 
duties and privileges 
(c) friendships and trading relationships.41 
At one time reciprocity was also manifested in ‘sister exchange’ whereby, if a 
man from one family married a woman from another family, one of his female 
relatives had to marry a man from his wife’s family in order to maintain balance.42 It 
appears that this tradition is no longer practised within the borderland area. 
  
The law of Papua New Guinea 
Constitution and legislation 
The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (in this section, the 
‘Constitution’)43 and the Organic Laws constitute the supreme law of PNG.44 These 
laws prevail to the extent of any inconsistency with any other act, whether 
legislative, executive or judicial.45 Between themselves, the Constitution takes 
precedence and Organic Laws must be read and construed subject to the 
Constitution.46 Acts of Parliament are next in the hierarchy of laws,47 followed by 
other written laws. These include the provincial laws and ‘subordinate legislative 
enactments’.48 Subordinate legislation encompasses local-level government laws.49 
Written laws also include ‘laws made under or adopted by or under the 
Constitution’. This brings into the legal system a range of laws set out in Schedule 2 
of the Constitution, including a number of specified pre-independence Acts of 
Australia50 and England.51 Subordinate legislative enactments under those laws and 
in force in PNG immediately before Independence Day were also saved. 
Provincial laws and local laws 
The Treaty and non-Treaty villages that lie within South Fly District were formerly 
divided into four local-level government areas: Daru Urban, Kiwai Rural, Morehead 
Rural and Oriomo-Bituri Rural. Before the 2019 elections, Kiwai rural was divided 
into the Forecoast Kiwai and Fly Kiwai Rural LLG areas. The scope of the provincial 
and local law-making powers is set out in the Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local-level Governments 1997.52 This provides that the provincial legislature may, 
subject to the Constitution and the Organic Law, make laws on a range of matters 
including village and urban or community courts (but not their jurisdiction);53 
mediation and arbitration (but not in respect of disputes between different levels of 
government or jurisdiction).54 
Subject to the Constitution, the Organic Law and provincial government laws, 
local governments may make laws on matters including maintaining peace, good 
order and law through consultation, mediation, arbitration and community forums; 
dispute settlement; village communities; and the traditional barter system. The 
power to make laws on these matters is exclusive, unless the matter is of national 
interest, when the national parliament may legislate after the relevant minister has 
consulted with the government concerned.55 However, provincial and local laws 
require the approval of the minister.56 Provincial governments also have certain 
limited powers to raise revenue, including the right, subject to certain conditions, to 
impose sales and services tax. Unfortunately, there is no electronic access to 
Provincial or Local laws. The minister’s approval is posted in the national gazette, 
but these are difficult to access, and only certain years are available on line. 
  
The underlying law 
The next source of law set out in the Constitution is the underlying law.57 This is a 
unique type of law declared by state courts and derived from customary laws and 
common law58 in force in England.59 If there is a relevant provision of the 
Constitution or a statute governing the issues before the court, then the underlying 
law does not come into play.60 However, if there is no written law, then the court 
must apply the underlying law, as formulated in previous cases. If there is no 
written law and the courts have not yet declared any relevant underlying law, then 
the court must apply customary law.61 If none of these sources apply to the issues in 
the proceedings, ‘the court shall consider applying the common law’.62 
Customary laws 
As discussed, relevant customary laws are drawn on to form the underlying law. 
This gives tacit recognition to the existence and validity of customary laws within 
the state system. However, they will apply only if it is consistent with the 
Constitution and legislation. Apart from state recognition, customary laws have their 
own source of authority derived from the fact that they are regarded as binding by 
those who are part of the relevant customary group. Custom is defined in the 
Constitution in the following terms:63 ‘“[C]ustom” means the customs and usages of 
indigenous inhabitants of the country existing in relation to the matter in question at 
the time when and the place in relation to which the matter arises, regardless of 
whether the custom or usage has existed from time immemorial.’ This definition is 
important in the interpretation of the terms of the treaty, which refer to custom and 
tradition, as it emphasises that customary laws are not a static concept,64 but rather a 
living law, capable of changing over time. 
It is hard to be specific about customary laws as they are unwritten and differ 
from place to place. Knauft states that, in the late pre-colonial and early colonial era, 
the people of the south coast of New Guinea shared cultural preoccupations 
summarised as including ‘fervent mythic-cosmological beliefs in the need for fertility 
regenerating, and the close articulation of fertility’ with elaborate rituals; elaborate 
rejuvenation rites; feasts; and warfare.65 However, within those broad themes, there 
were crucial divergences in the way they were articulated along the New Guinea 
coastline.66 Over time, there has been large-scale movement of communities in the 
area, for example, some eastern Trans-Fly Groups have been displaced by Kiwai 
people.67 These societal changes, together with the imposition of jurisdictional 
borders during and after the colonial period, have accentuated cultural differences 
between coastal dwellers themselves and between coastal dwellers and Torres Strait 
Islanders.68 
PNG is one of the few countries to have provided the common law courts with 
direction as to how to find and apply customary laws. The Underlying Law Act 2000 
provides that it is to be treated as law, not fact, and allows the courts to refer to 
cases, books, treaties, reports and other reference works on the relevant customary 
law and to statements of customary law made by local government authorities.69 
  
Common law 
As in Australia, the common law is a source of law, but a significant difference lies in 
PNG in the fact that, as a component of the underlying law, it is inferior to 
customary laws. The doctrine of stare decisis is prescribed in the Constitution, 
whereby rules of law laid down in court decisions are binding on future courts, at 
least, if they are lower in the court hierarchy.70 The Supreme Court and the National 
Court may depart from their own previous decisions but will approach such change 
with great caution.71 
Obtaining legal advice and representation 
The avenues for private individuals living in the borderlands to obtain legal advice 
are extremely limited, particularly on the PNG side of the border. There are no 
private lawyers on any island in the Torres Strait or in any of the South Fly villages. 
Nor are there any private lawyers on Thursday Island or in Daru. Where defendants 
or litigants have sufficient funds to pay, they may obtain legal advice from a private 
firm of lawyers in Cairns, Port Moresby or further afield. 
On the Australian side of the border, the position is improved by occasional 
visits of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services (ATSILS). The 
ATSILS office is on Thursday Island, but their lawyers travel to other Torres Strait 
Islands when the Magistrates Court is sitting on circuit. The ATSILS brief is to 
provide advice and representation in criminal, family and civil matters. In practice, it 
has a limited capacity to deal with civil matters due to lack of resources.72 Further, 
the service is available only for ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’,73 
which is an issue for traditional visitors from PNG appearing on criminal charges in 
Australia. In theory, it may also be an issue for PNG citizens who have migrated to 
Australia as they are not ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ in the 
narrow sense. In practice a broad approach is taken, and they are treated as falling 
within the ATSILS remit. 
Since about mid-2018, Legal Aid Queensland (LAQ)74 has been sending a 
lawyer from the Cairns office to represent parties in criminal cases coming before the 
Magistrates Court on circuit in the Torres Strait, to assist where the ATSIL lawyer 
has a conflict of interest. 
Although, in theory, monthly legal advice sessions on non-criminal issues are 
provided by LAQ,75 in practice this does not occur,76 and the northernmost office of 
LAQ is in Cairns. The Youth Justice Services are also intended to visit communities 
every month to assist young people under 17 years of age who are subject to court 
orders.77 In practice, these officers visit only quarterly from Cairns, when the 
Magistrates Court is on circuit. The same appears to be true of the probation and 
parole services provided by the Department of Corrective Services, based on 
Thursday Island.78 
In PNG, free legal advice is available from the office of the Public Solicitor, 
which is established under the Constitution ‘to provide legal advice and assistance 
to impecunious persons in all fields of laws’.79 However, resources are limited, and 
  
assistance is focused on criminal proceedings and, in particular, assistance to those 
charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment for more than two years.80 In 
theory, legal assistance is available in civil cases, but this is a lower priority than 
criminal cases. Moreover, the Public Solicitor’s Office is based in Port Moresby. It has 
been requested by the government of PNG to set up fully-fledged branch offices in 
all provinces.81 However, there is no office in the Western Province and, although 
Public Solicitor’s Desks have been established in some districts, this has not yet 
happened in the South Fly.82 The most accessible office for villagers in the South Fly 
would appear to be in Port Moresby, which is some 450 kilometres away. Public 
Solicitor’s officers travel to Daru in advance of National Court sittings to give advice 
and to provide representation in serious cases.83 Court staff also assist individuals to 
prepare summonses and affidavits.84 
Dispute resolution options 
This section of the chapter outlines the options available for settling disputes 
concerning the treaty not only for the parties but also for local bodies and 
individuals who contest its interpretation and application. This includes options 
provided by the state, such as court proceedings, and other pathways for dispute 
resolution on both sides of the border. 
Mechanisms in the treaty 
The treaty does not establish a dispute resolution forum or refer disputes to a state 
court on either side of the border. Instead, it provides that any dispute between the 
parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation of the treaty must be 
settled by consultation or negotiation.85 It goes on to provide that a party must 
consult on any matters relating to the treaty, at the request of the other party.86 
The treaty provides opportunities for ongoing consultation in the form of 
liaison arrangements. Each party must designate a representative, known as the 
Treaty Liaison Officer, to facilitate the implementation at the local level of the 
provisions of the treaty.87 The treaty states that the Australia representative will be 
based at Thursday Island and the PNG representative at Daru unless ‘a different 
location is required by the circumstances’.88 In practice, the PNG representative 
appears to be based mainly in Port Moresby. The Treaty Liaison Officers are tasked 
with consulting on the practical operation of the treaty; keeping the local 
arrangements for free movement under review; and making appropriate 
recommendations on any problems that cannot be resolved locally.89 In the exercise 
of these functions, the Treaty Liaison Officers must consult with representatives of 
the traditional inhabitants in their country, particularly in relation to problems 
relating to free movement, traditional activities and the exercise of traditional 
customary rights, and convey their views to their government. They must also 
maintain close liaison with national, state, provincial and local authorities of their 
country. 
  
The other mechanism for consultation provided by the treaty is the Torres 
Strait Joint Advisory Council (JAC).90 This consists of nine members from each party, 
including at least two national representatives; one member representing the 
government of Queensland and one representing the Fly River (Western) Provincial 
Government; and at least three members representing the traditional inhabitants.91 
The functions of the JAC include making recommendations to the parties on any 
developments that might affect the traditional way of life and livelihood of the 
traditional inhabitants, their free movement, performance of traditional activities 
and exercise of traditional customary rights as provided for in the treaty; and any 
matters relevant to the implementation of the treaty.92 
Apart from having traditional inhabitants as members, the JAC is required to 
consult traditional inhabitants and to give them the opportunity to comment on 
matters of concern and to convey their views to the foreign ministers of both 
countries.93 The other avenue for consultation with traditional inhabitants is the 
Traditional Inhabitants’ Meetings (TIMS), which are said to be ‘a forum for 
traditional inhabitants of both countries to discuss issues and activity in the region, 
and report concerns to government through their Treaty Liaison Officer’.94 However, 
due to the restricted interpretation of traditional inhabitants, which is discussed in 
more detail below, membership is limited to those from the treaty villages and 
Torres Strait islands named in the guidelines. 
After consideration of the JAC’s reports and recommendations by the parties, 
consultations may be arranged to attempt to resolve any matters raised by the JAC.95 
The JAC meets at the request of either party. Meetings are chaired alternately by a 
representative of Australia and a representative of PNG, and held alternately in 
Australia and PNG,96 or as otherwise arranged. The JAC held its 26th meeting in Port 
Moresby in February 2018. In practice, the costs associated with meetings are always 
met by Australia, even when held in Port Moresby. 
Further guidance on disputes arising under the treaty can be found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,97 which is widely regarded as the 
authoritative guide to the formation, interpretation and effect of treaties. Australia is 
a party and is therefore bound under international law.98 While PNG is not a party, 
the treaty may be regarded as international customary law and, as mentioned above, 
is thus binding irrespective of the fact that it has not been ratified.99 In PNG, it is at 
least persuasive and is often discussed as if it were part of PNG’s law.100 The 
Preamble affirms ‘that disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, 
should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law’. Apart from the general provisions on the application and 
interpretation of treaties, the convention lays out a procedure for dealing with 
disputes about the validity of a treaty or the existence of grounds for its termination 
or suspension. The first recourse laid down is for the parties to seek a solution 
through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
provides that parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, must first ‘seek a solution by 
  
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’.101 
Article 66 of the Vienna Convention provides that if this means of resolution is not 
successful within 12 months, the following procedures should be followed: 
(a) any one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application or the 
interpretation of article 53 [Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of 
general international law] or 64 [Emergence of a new peremptory norm of 
general international law] may, by a written application, submit it to the 
International Court of Justice for a decision unless the parties by common 
consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration; 
(b) any one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application or the 
interpretation of any of the other articles in Part V [invalidity, termination 
and suspension of the operation of treaties] of the present Convention 
may set in motion the procedure specified in the Annex to the Convention 
by submitting a request to that effect to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.102 
The Annex to the Vienna Convention sets out a procedure for resolving disputes by 
conciliation. Conciliators are drawn from a list of qualified jurists drawn up by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations from nominations submitted by UN 
member states. The conciliation commission consists of two members appointed by 
each party and a fifth member appointed by all four conciliators as chair. 
The ‘Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Papua New 
Guinea and Australia’ also contains a provision on dispute resolution, stating: 
‘Disputes between the two Governments will be settled peacefully through 
consultation, negotiation, or such other means as may be agreed and are consistent 
with the United Nations Charter.’103 
National forums—Australia 
Queensland’s common law court hierarchy consists of the Magistrates Court, the 
District Court, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. The main tribunals for 
Queensland have been amalgamated in the Queensland Civil Administrative 
Tribunal.104 Theoretically, these institutions extend to the Torres Strait Islands, but in 
practice the position is quite different from that in the rest of Queensland. 
Magistrates Courts may sit only in places designated by the Governor in 
Council.105 Some Torres Strait islands have been appointed as places to hold courts,106 
but only Thursday Island has a permanent court building, and it is currently without 
a resident magistrate. Instead, the ‘Outer Island Court Circuit’ has been devised, 
whereby a magistrate from Cairns visits designated islands on circuit, sitting about 
four times a year on circuit and about once a month on Thursday Island.107 
Magistrates have an extensive jurisdiction. In criminal cases, they may deal with a 
range of offences including not only traffic infringements and minor offences, such 
  
as shoplifting or disorderly behaviour, but also more serious offences, such as 
burglary, assault, fraud and drugs.108 Magistrates on circuit may commit serious 
offenders for sentence or trial in the District Court or the Supreme Court.109 
Magistrates may also deal with civil cases if the amount in dispute is $150 000 or 
less.110 
The Treaty islands designated as places for Magistrates Court sittings are Badu, 
Boigu, Erub, Mabuiag, Mer, Moa, Saibai, Warraber, Yam and Masig.111 The court, 
known locally as the ‘visiting Magistrates Court’, aims to ‘create a link between it 
and the … Island Community’,112 facilitated by the requirement that they consider 
relevant submissions from local Community Justice Groups, including elders and 
respected persons when sentencing Torres Strait Islander offenders. Further, the 
court aims to reduce the need for Torres Strait Islanders to travel to Thursday Island 
to appear in the Magistrates Court and intends to be ‘an effective mechanism for 
increasing participation and ownership by the community in the criminal justice 
process’.113 
Visiting magistrates have a commission as a member of QCAT, so they may 
deal with tribunal matters when they visit Torres Strait Islands.114 The Magistrates 
Court sits more regularly on Thursday Island,115 and serious offenders are sent there 
or to Cairns for trial, depending on the seriousness of the matter. The District Court 
does not visit regularly on circuit, but it does sit about once a year on Thursday 
Island. It also sits on Palm Island and in Bamaga, at the tip of Cape York, from time 
to time.116 None of the other courts sit any closer than Cairns. 
In 1984, provision was made for establishment of an ‘Island Court’ on each of 
the Torres Strait Islands, constituted by two justices of the peace who are Torres 
Strait Islander residents.117 Island Courts were empowered to deal with breaches of 
island by-laws; disputes concerning any matter accepted by the community resident 
to be a matter rightly governed by the usages and customs of the community; and 
matters committed to its jurisdiction by regulation.118 However, Island Courts were 
abolished in 2007.119 In theory the gap was filled by the pre-existing Justices of the 
Peace (Magistrates Courts),120 constituted by two or more justices of the peace 
specially trained and appointed as Justices of the Peace (Magistrates Court) and 
empowered to impose penalties in relation to minor offences. Both the Island Courts 
and the Justices of the Peace (Magistrates Courts) were intended to be a local 
alternative to mainstream justice.121 However, there are no current Justices of the 
Peace (Magistrates Courts)122 on Torres Strait Islands,123 and the nearest one is at 
Bamaga. 
As Australia is a federation, the federal courts have jurisdiction throughout the 
country, including in the Torres Strait.124 Generally, these courts do not travel on 
circuit to the Torres Strait, and the nearest resident judge and filing registry is in 
Cairns.125 However, there is an exception in the case of native title claims, which the 
Federal Court hears from time to time on Torres Strait Islands.126 
  
National forums—Papua New Guinea 
As on the Australian side of the border, in theory the state court hierarchy extends to 
South Fly villages. The state courts, in descending order, depending on the extent of 
their jurisdiction, consist of: the Supreme Court,127 the National Court,128 District 
Courts,129 and Village Courts.130 There are also certain specialised courts,131 and a 
number of tribunals,132 none of which sit in the South Fly villages. 
The nearest National and District courts are in Daru.133 There is a resident 
senior magistrate who sits about once a week to hear between 15 and 20 cases.134 He 
also sits as a principal magistrate,135 which means that he may hear civil cases 
involving up to K10 000136 and try indictable offences triable summarily or commit a 
person to stand trial in the National Court for offences falling under Schedule 2 of 
the Criminal Code.137 He may also hear appeals from Land Court decisions.138 In 
theory, there is a resident judge, but in early 2018 he was still based in Port Moresby, 
as his residence was not complete. For the time being, the National Court sits on 
circuit from Port Moresby about twice a year, and parties from South Fly are 
required to make their own way to Daru for the hearings, which are listed for a 
period of about three weeks.139 There is a District Court registry and a court clerk in 
Daru. There is also a subregistry of the National Court and, according to the Annual 
Court Calendar, this was to be converted into a full registry in 2018.140 
Only the Village Courts sit in the vicinity of South Fly villages. They are 
established by the minister by notice in the National Gazette in and for the area 
specified in the notice,141 which does not always correspond with a village in the 
strict sense, but may extend over a number of villages or settlement groups.142 In 
theory, all villages in the South Fly have access to a Village Court.143 However, six 
out of the 35 villages surveyed in the South Fly reported that they did not have a 
Village Court magistrate. In the 12 Treaty villages included in the survey, only one 
reported not having a magistrate.144 It appears that some Village Court magistrates 
have not been paid for some time and are not currently sitting.145 Only 50 per cent of 
the interviewees in South Fly villages said that the Village Court had sat within the 
previous six months; about 21 per cent said it had been six months to a year and 30 
per cent said it had been more than a year.146 
Their primary function is to ensure peace and harmony in the area for which 
they are established by mediating in disputes and endeavouring to obtain just and 
amicable settlements of disputes.147 The court has jurisdiction where the dispute 
arose within its area, where the subject matter of the dispute is within the area, or all 
the parties are normally resident within its area,148 with intervillage disputes being 
dealt with by joint sittings.149 Most commonly, disputes in Treaty villages relate to 
family matters, including adultery, divorce and marriage exchange. These are 
followed by land disputes, then assault, fighting and domestic violence. Other issues 
are community disputes and sorcery.150 
A Village Court is constituted by at least three village magistrates,151 although, 
where custom provides for a system of chiefs or chieftainship, the minister may 
  
declare that a village magistrate sitting alone will constitute that Village Court.152 It is 
unclear whether such a declaration has been made in relation of any of the Treaty 
villages. The mediatory jurisdiction may be exercised by a single village 
magistrate.153 Village magistrates are appointed by the minister from a list of names 
provided by the head of the Village Courts Secretariat (the secretary), drawn up after 
consultation with any local-level government or, if there is none in the area where 
the Village Court is situated, the provincial government; and such others as he or the 
minister thinks it desirable to consult.154 Each village court has a District Court 
magistrate assigned to it as principal supervising magistrate,155 and it appears that 
the senior magistrate in Daru fulfils this role. Each court also has a Village Court 
clerk assigned to it,156 but it is unclear whether this is happening in practice. 
In theory, the jurisdiction is divided into civil and criminal,157 but these 
categories are Western constructs, and in practice the distinction is blurred.158 In civil 
cases, the Village Court may make orders for repayment of debts, compensation or 
damages up to K1000. The amount is unlimited if the claim relates to bride price, the 
custody of children, or death.159 It may make custody and guardianship orders if the 
parents are not married or married under customary law. A Village Court has no 
jurisdiction to make orders concerning the ownership of land (although it may make 
an interim order pending a decision by the Land Court)160 or to decide civil disputes 
involving the driving of a vehicle. A Village Court has criminal jurisdiction in 
respect of certain prescribed offences and contravention of local-level government 
laws or provincial legislation.161 It may impose a fine of up to K200, which may be 
ordered to be paid in goods instead of cash,162 or, in default, a term of imprisonment 
of up to six months.163 As an alternative, it may make an order for community 
service for a period not exceeding eight hours a day, up to six days a week, for a 
total period of up to six months.164 Similar orders may be made in civil cases for 
work to be done for the benefit of an injured or aggrieved party.165 A Village Court 
may also make preventative orders if it considers that a dispute may cause a breach 
of the peace.166 
An important role in the work of the Village Court is played by the Village 
peace officer. This person may be appointed by the head of the Village Courts 
Secretariat167 or by the Provincial Legislature.168 The research team surveyed 18 
villages in the South Fly about the presence of peace officers. Fifteen out of 18 
villages reported having at least one peace officer, with six villages reporting more 
than one officer.169 In recent times, land mediators have also been appointed to 
mediate land disputes in South Fly villages.170 
Points of contention 
The practical application of the treaty has resulted in a number of problems for the 
inhabitants of Torres Strait Islands and Treaty villages. Many of these issues have 
arisen from the guidelines. These are what is often referred to as ‘soft law’, meaning 
that they are ‘rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but 
which nevertheless may have practical effects’.171 Those ‘practical effects’ are very 
  
evident here, and although the guidelines are not law in the strict sense, they are 
more influential in the practical application of the treaty than the hard law. The 
guidelines were introduced in 2009 and revised in 2011. The Senate Inquiry states 
that the guidelines were an initiative of the Traditional Inhabitants Meeting (TIM) 
and that they were ‘created by and for the traditional inhabitants and subsequently 
endorsed by the JAC’.172 This section of the chapter looks at five particular instances 
of dispute or difficulty that have arisen from the operation of the treaty and 
considers whether there are adequate means for dealing with them. 
Exclusion of villages from the treaty arrangements 
A particular point of contention that has arisen in relation to the treaty is the 
meaning of ‘traditional inhabitants’. The treaty lays down three pre-conditions for 
qualification as a traditional inhabitant. In relation to Australia, ‘traditional 
inhabitants’ is stated to mean persons who:173 
(i) are Torres Strait Islanders who live in the Protected Zone or the 
adjacent coastal area of Australia, 
(ii) are citizens of Australia, and 
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or features in 
or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or 
livelihood or social, cultural or religious activities … 
In relation to PNG, it means persons who: 
(i) live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of Papua New 
Guinea, 
(ii) are citizens of Papua New Guinea, and 
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or features in 
or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or 
livelihood or social, cultural or religious activities. 
This legislative definition is deceptively difficult to apply and capable of 
different interpretations. In particular, there is no definition of ‘Torres Strait 
Islander’, and definitions in other Australian legislation conflict,174 so presumably 
interpretation rests in the three-way convention of establishing descent, self-
identification and recognition by a community.175 Nor does the treaty define the term 
‘traditional’, although it is used frequently throughout the document.176 Nor does it 
define ‘customary associations’.177 However, the part of the definition that has 
perhaps caused the most controversy is the meaning of ‘adjacent coastal area’. This 
term is defined in the treaty as meaning ‘in relation to PNG, the coastal area of the 
PNG mainland, and the PNG islands, near the Protected Zone; and, in relation to 
Australia, the coastal area of the Australian mainland, and the Australian islands, 
near the Protected Zone’. In the Agreed Note of 1984,178 the term was clarified by 
reference to degrees of longitude and latitude, rather than by reference to places, 
  
although the island of Parama and the villages of Sui and Sewerimabu were said to 
be included. A formal Exchange of Notes between Australia and PNG in 2000 was 
much more prescriptive.179 It limited free movement by Papua New Guineans to 
traditional inhabitants from the list of Treaty PNG villages (chapter 2). This list was 
included in the guidelines, which also restricted Australian traditional inhabitants to 
people from a list of 13 Torres Strait Islands. 
The question of extending the application of the free movement provisions to 
additional villages was left open in the Agreed Note of 1984 and in the Exchange of 
Notes in 2000.180 Since then the matter has been raised on several occasions. In 
particular, the Senate Inquiry noted that it had 
received submissions from a number of villages from the neighbouring 
region in PNG claiming that they have, and continue to have, legitimate 
rights in the Treaty area: that they were engaged in traditional cross-
border movements long before PNG’s independence. They produced 
detailed accounts of their strong and long-standing links to the Strait.181 
However, the committee considered that ‘any changes to the status of Treaty villages 
should be initiated by the PNG Government’, and considered it sufficient to make 
the Australian Government aware of the fact that some villages maintained that they 
should be included and had evidence to support this.182 
Attempts were also made to raise this issue before the Federal Court of 
Australia in Akiba v. Queensland (No. 2).183 Although residents from PNG villages that 
were originally accepted as within the treaty arrangements were allowed (after an 
appeal) to pursue their rights in the claim area that might be affected by the 
proceedings, they were not allowed to use the case to argue for reinstatement of their 
villages as Treaty villages.184 
The dispute as to the appropriate villages to be included could be raised before 
the JAC, but, given that the representatives of the traditional inhabitants are from 
villages that are already included and the likely impact of extension on available 
resources, they are unlikely to act as advocates for this cause. The same goes for the 
TIM. In the absence of any likelihood of action by either party to the treaty, the 
question arises whether there is any course for individuals to take action to enforce 
their claims to be within the definition of traditional inhabitants. The normal way in 
which rights, benefits and obligations would be conferred on individuals would be 
through a provision in the treaty, which in turn would be incorporated in the 
domestic legislation implementing the treaty.185 However, neither the treaty nor the 
domestic legislation in question on either side of the border confers such a right 
expressly. 
Nevertheless, if government actions do not correspond with the treaty and/or 
the legislation incorporating it into domestic law (which repeats the treaty definition 
of traditional inhabitants),186 this could be grounds for an application for judicial 
review. Similarly, where such actions do not comply with other legislation that 
  
incorporates the treaty definition either directly,187 or by reference to other 
legislation,188 judicial review may be an avenue for redress. This is an administrative 
law avenue for challenging breaches of natural justice and errors of fact or reasoning 
employed by public decision-makers in reaching a decision.189 In PNG, such 
applications may be heard by the Supreme Court or the National Court.190 The 
distinctive features of administrative law in PNG may make it particularly amenable 
as a method of reviewing the position of villagers who were originally accepted as 
traditional inhabitants under the treaty and their descendants. The Constitution 
provides for ‘the development of a system of principles of natural justice and of 
administrative law specifically designed for PNG, taking special account of the 
National Goals and Directive Principles and of the Basic Social Obligations, and also 
of typically Papua New Guinean procedures and forms of organization’.191 
Some support for this approach can be found for this in Australian case law 
interpreting a bilateral treaty between Australia and New Zealand. In Project Blue 
Sky Inc. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority,192 the Australian Broadcasting Authority 
(ABA) implemented a local content standard, which ensured that television would 
have a minimum percentage of shows produced in Australia, as it was empowered 
to do under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cwlth).193 Project Blue Sky, a New 
Zealand company, challenged the validity of the standard on the basis that the ABA 
had not performed its obligations under a trade protocol, which provided that New 
Zealand producers would not be treated in a manner less favourable than Australian 
producers. Although on the facts the standard was held not to be invalid, the High 
Court held that the standard was in breach of the protocol. Accordingly, the case is 
authority in Australia for the power of the courts to ensure that the actions of 
government agencies correspond with international obligations. It is also persuasive 
authority in PNG,194 where courts tend to follow the High Court of Australia. The 
likelihood of success of an application for judicial review is still far from certain, yet 
an application would have the benefit of airing these concerns and putting pressure 
on the parties to the treaty to put an end to the current limitations, which is a 
simmering source of discontent among those who are excluded from the 
arrangements. 
An additional avenue of complaint is provided by the Ombudsman. Both PNG 
and the Commonwealth and states in Australia have such an officer. The 
Commonwealth and Queensland Ombudsmen’s Offices are independent complaints 
investigation agencies. They investigate complaints from people who believe they 
have been treated unfairly or unreasonably by a government department or 
agency.195 In the case of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, this includes 
complaints about the immigration functions of the Department of Home Affairs and 
about the Australian Border Force.196 This avenue is open to non-citizens, and 
accordingly Treaty villagers could lodge a complaint. However, the Ombudsman 
cannot override the decisions of government agencies, nor issue directions to their 
staff. However, they can attempt to resolve disputes through consultation and 
  
negotiation and, if necessary, by making formal recommendations to senior levels of 
government.197 
Treaty villagers could also lodge a complaint with the Papua New Guinean 
Ombudsman Commission, which is established by the Constitution,198 supplemented 
by the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission. The Ombudsman may 
investigate on its own initiative, or on complaint by a person affected by the conduct 
of state bodies or officers.199 The commission is primarily a recommendation body. 
However, it can publish the results of any investigation by forwarding it to specified 
government officials.200 The commission can also require the results of an 
investigation to be tabled in the parliament.201 It may also refer a leader to the Public 
Prosecutor if satisfied that a leader is guilty of misconduct.202 Like the courts 
exercising their power of judicial review, the commission must take the National 
Goals and Directive Principles fully into account in all cases as appropriate.203 A 
further advantage in this avenue is that the constitutional provision that the National 
Goals and Directive Principles are non-justiciable does not apply to the jurisdiction 
of the Ombudsman Commission. 
The meaning of ‘traditional activities’ 
One of the principal issues arising from the practical application of the treaty has 
been the narrow definition of ‘traditional activities’ in the guidelines and by 
enforcement officers. The treaty defines ‘traditional activities’ inclusively, rather 
than exhaustively, to mean: 
activities performed by the traditional inhabitants in accordance with 
local tradition, and includes, when so performed— 
(i) Activities on land, including gardening, collection of food and hunting; 
(ii) Activities on water, including traditional fishing; 
(iii) Religious and secular ceremonies or gatherings for social purposes, 
for example, marriage celebrations and settlement of disputes; and 
(iv) Barter and market trade.204 
Problems have arisen as to the boundaries of these categories. A particular 
issue is whether ‘barter and market trade’ incudes sale of goods for cash. In the 
section headed ‘Free Movement and Traditional Activities’, the guidelines begin by 
paraphrasing the definition from the treaty, stating: ‘Traditional activities include 
gardening, collection of food, hunting, traditional fishing, religious and secular 
ceremonies or gatherings for social purposes (for example, marriage celebrations and 
settlement of disputes), and barter and market trade.’ However, the guidelines go on 
to set out what is not included in traditional activities, including the following 
statement: 
The Treaty bans commercial activity, business dealings and working for 
money during traditional visits (e.g. cray fishing from a licensed 
Australian cray boat, selling artifacts [sic] to commercial operators, paid 
  
domestic assistance). Selling goods to non-traditional inhabitants is not 
permitted under the Treaty. Selling goods in the knowledge that they may 
[be] on-sold is also not permitted under the Treaty. 
These details do not appear in the treaty, and the guidelines’ ban on 
‘commercial activity’ could be said to unduly restrict, if not conflict with, the words 
‘barter and market trade’ in the treaty definition of traditional activities.205 As ‘soft’ 
law, the guidelines cannot override the treaty and in cases of conflict must, in theory, 
give way. Persuasive authority for a broader interpretation of ‘barter and market 
trade’ can be found in Akiba,206 where it was expressly affirmed that indigenous 
native title holders have a non-exclusive right to take fish for commercial purposes 
in the Torres Strait.207 The narrow view is also contrary to the approach taken by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission in relation to native title. The commission 
recommended that the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth) should be amended to make it 
clear that native title rights ‘may comprise a right that may be exercised for any 
purpose, including commercial or non-commercial purposes; and … may include, 
but are not limited to, hunting, gathering, fishing, and trading rights and interests’.208 
Some Torres Strait Islanders and government officials consider that cash 
transactions amount to ‘commercial activity’ and that ‘barter and market trade’ is 
restricted to a process of exchange and does not include cash transactions. The 
guidelines have been relied on to prevent visitors from Treaty villages from selling 
food and artefacts for cash in the Torres Strait Islands. This has been a particular 
problem in Saibai, which has the largest number of visitors of any of the Torres Strait 
Islands within the protected zone, numbering about 15 000 in 2010.209 PNG visitors 
used to come almost daily to sell their handcrafted goods and artefacts and use the 
cash to buy goods from the store, until recently, when they were restricted to one 
day per week. At times, cash is prohibited from changing hands and from being 
spent by PNG visitors at local stores. Traditional inhabitants try various ways to 
sidestep the system (chapter 5). On Boigu, traditional visitors have also been 
prevented from withdrawing cash through the ATM, which, as mentioned below, is 
specifically outlawed by the guidelines, and have been forced to rely on relatives 
and friends to use the machine for them.210 
The definition of ‘traditional activity’ in the treaty is followed by a guide to 
interpretation: ‘In the application of this definition, except in relation to activities of a 
commercial nature, “traditional” shall be interpreted liberally and in the light of 
prevailing custom.’211 While this demands a liberal interpretation of the definition, 
and one that takes into account prevailing custom, activities of a commercial nature 
are expressly excluded from its operation, so it gives little support to the argument 
that barter and market trade should be interpreted to include cash sales. However, 
that does not mean that the phrase does not extend to cash transactions on the basis 
of the ordinary meaning of the words. 
The narrow interpretation of ‘barter and market trade’ might be argued to be in 
line with what is ‘traditional’, a word that explicitly qualifies the activities that are 
  
allowed. However, this assumes a positivist view of ‘tradition’, as being handed 
down from generation to generation in an unchanging form.212 This is as opposed to 
the idea of tradition as a dynamic and living concept, which although based in the 
past will develop in line with changing circumstances.213 Interpreting ‘tradition’ in a 
more flexible way is supported by the definition of the related concept of custom in 
the Constitution of Papua New Guinea,214 which is set out above, and refers to 
‘customs and usages of indigenous inhabitants … existing … when … the matter 
arises, regardless of whether the custom or usage has existed from time 
immemorial’. 
It is interesting to note that, in relation to the phrase ‘traditional fishing’, it has 
been considered necessary to take legislative action to restrict this phrase from 
including some aspects of modern technology. This has been particularly the case 
where restriction is seen as necessary to protect an endangered species. For example, 
notices issued under the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 (Cwlth)215 provide that 
dugong could be taken only with a traditional harpoon, called a wap.216 However, 
this does not justify the broader reluctance to take a more flexible approach to 
‘traditional’ practices in response to changing circumstances217 and the poverty of 
villagers in the South Fly. The Senate Inquiry noted that the committee was ‘unclear 
about the extent to which modern equipment and means of transport are allowed’.218 
It is certainly arguable that whether something is traditional should be judged on the 
basis of ‘intent and purpose’ of the activity rather than how it is carried out.219 
Neither the treaty nor the related domestic legislation confers a specific avenue 
via which individuals may challenge the interpretation of traditional activities 
represented in the guidelines or the way in which they are enforced by the 
Australian Border Force. However, as discussed in relation to the exclusion of 
villages from the treaty arrangements, if government authorities have misapplied 
the treaty, this may be grounds for an application for judicial review. It would also 
give grounds for complaint to the Ombudsman. 
Attendance at court by traditional inhabitants 
Another problem arising from the application of the treaty arises when a traditional 
visitor from PNG to a Torres Strait Island commits an offence. Under the treaty 
arrangements, offences other than illegal fishing are dealt with under Australian 
law.220 The practice is for the PNG offender to be charged and ordered or bailed to 
appear at the next sitting of the Magistrates Court, when it comes on circuit. This is 
the case in all but the most serious cases (where Queensland Police Service officers 
will arrive to take the offender into custody and transport them to Horn Island or 
Cairns), even though many of these offenders would be detained in situ in custody in 
less remote Australian locations. However, when that PNG person is required to 
return to a Torres Strait Island for the sittings, he or she does not qualify as a 
traditional visitor as the visit is not for the purposes of a traditional activity. In fact, 
the guidelines specifically provide that ‘[t]raditional visits do not include … 
attending court cases’.221 
  
On the mainland, a foreigner without a visa would be detained222 and, if he or 
she were required to attend court to answer a criminal charge, a Criminal Justice 
Stay Visa (‘justice visa’) would be issued.223 However, there is no way of processing 
such a visa on any Torres Strait Island. The nearest place for the issue of a justice visa 
would appear to be Brisbane.224 
In practice, Papua New Guineans arriving to attend a court hearing are 
escorted to the court by a member of the Border Force. However, as they do not have 
a visa and do not qualify as traditional inhabitants, they are being forced into a 
position where they are unlawfully in the country. This could be argued to be an 
abuse of process, a point that has been argued by ATSILS before the Magistrates 
Court, but not determined.225 The position of the court itself when faced with a 
defendant who has appeared (even though he or she does not have a visa) seems to 
be that they have a duty to deal with those coming before the court. This could be 
justified by analogy with an ‘appearance gratis’ (which occurs under the common 
law, in civil proceedings, where a person who has not been properly served with the 
documents files an answer or appears at the hearing anyway).226 
As in the case of the two other points of contention, discussed above, the 
practice of issuing Notices to Appear, and in effect taking alleged offenders into 
custody when they arrive to answer the notice, may constitute grounds for an 
application for judicial review and for complaint to the Ombudsman. 
The narrow approach to the definition of ‘traditional fishing’ discussed above 
has led recently to prosecutions and confiscation of boats on the basis that PNG 
traditional inhabitants are taking fish and crustaceans for commercial use.227 The 
treaty provides that such offences are to be dealt with by the authorities of the party 
whose nationality is borne by the vessel or the persons alleged to have committed 
the offence, and not by the party in whose waters the offence occurred.228 In practice 
it is usually the Australian authorities who apprehend illegal fishers,229 and the 
treaty permits the authorities to detain them for as long as is required to conduct an 
investigation into the offence.230 
After the investigation, traditional inhabitants are handed over to Papua New 
Guinean officials. Indictments are prepared by Australian authorities and sent to 
prosecutors in PNG and the defendants are taken before the District Court in 
Daru.231 The process may take many months and, in the meantime, the accused are 
deprived of their livelihood. In cases where the alleged illegality rests on the fact that 
the fishing was for commercial purposes, if it can be established that the catch was 
within the bounds permitted by custom, this could be raised as a defence before the 
District Court. However, while the Public Solicitor may send an officer to present a 
defence at trial, there is little opportunity for advice before the hearing and the 
tendency is for the accused to plead guilty. 
Authority to ban visitors 
Another means of dealing with offences by PNG visitors has been the issue of 
banning orders by Island Councils. These orders prevent the alleged offender from 
  
visiting under the traditional visitors’ scheme. However, controversy has arisen as to 
the power of the council to issue such orders. The Australian state, represented by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, may obviously issue banning orders. 
The treaty provides that ‘each party reserves its right to limit free movement to the 
extent necessary to control abuses involving illegal entry or evasion of justice’,232 but 
does not say who may impose those limits. A party also reserves the right to take 
such measures as it sees fit to deal with ‘problems which may arise’. This includes 
limiting freedom of movement in the case of an epidemic.233 In doing so, the state 
must act in accordance with Article 16(2), which states that in the administration of 
laws and policies relating to the movement of persons and goods in the Protected 
Zone, each party shall act ‘in a spirit of mutual friendship and good 
neighbourliness’, but bearing in mind the importance of discouraging the occurrence 
of illegal entry and practices prejudicial to effective immigration, customs, health 
and biosecurity control, ‘under the guise of free movement or performance of 
traditional activities’.234 
The guidelines are more specific about bans and provide that: 
Traditional movement can be restricted for disease outbreaks, resource 
limitations (for example water shortages), security or quarantine concerns 
(Article 16 of the Treaty). Bans will only operate if required and 
reasonable. If you think a ban is not fair or reasonable, contact the Border 
Liaison Officer (BLO) in Daru and/or the Treaty Liaison Officer (TLO) in 
Thursday Island. 
They also state that ‘[p]eople who do not follow Australian laws, customs or Treaty 
procedures, or who otherwise may be undesirable, can be banned from travelling 
under the Treaty’ and that a person ‘will be turned away and prevented from 
entering Australia if you … travel with a person banned from making traditional 
visits’. These guidelines rely on Article 16 as their authority, so, again, it would 
appear that this power lies with the state. 
In practice, it is clear that island councillors do issue bans and that this power is 
endorsed by the Treaty Liaison Officer and the Border Force.235 It could therefore be 
seen as a delegated authority from the state. Alternatively, it could be seen as an 
incident of the pass system. On the outer islands of Saibai, Boigu and Dauan, daily 
passes are obtained on arrival.236 For overnight stays, a person wishing to visit from 
PNG must obtain a signed Prior Advice Notice on invitation from a Torres Strait 
Islander who will host their visit. It is then approved by the island councillor, and 
signed off by DFAT and the Australian Border Force. In practice, the process of 
applying for and granting permission to visit varies from island to island. However, 
it remains the case that a councillor who wishes to ban a visitor for misconduct may 
refuse to issue a pass.237 This includes blanket bans on entire South Fly villages, as 
was in place mid-2019 for Mabuduan village to visit Saibai Island, due to problems 
with overstayers. 
  
With regard to breaches, disputes and criminal offences, prevention is no doubt 
a better response than cure. The 2010 Senate Inquiry suggested that the most 
effective solution would be more rigorous monitoring of entrants to ensure that they 
fall within the requirements of the Torres Strait Treaty. Clearly, local leaders are in a 
much better position than the Australian Border Force to know whether a person 
qualifies to visit. However, the authority that individual councillors have to issue 
bans is not clear. Councillors appear to be exerting their landowner rights over the 
treaty, in keeping with powers to limit entry under the local government 
legislation,238 and under their native title determination.239 But the treaty was 
otherwise domesticated by Commonwealth legislation issued in 1984, so it is 
ambiguous as to what domestic legislation prevails. Regardless of the legalities, in 
practice DFAT gives the councillor the administrative power to refuse a pass to 
potential visitors, and without this they are not entitled to enter, which the Border 
Force enforces. 
There is also a possibility of issuing individuals with permanent travel bans 
under the Migration Act 1958 (Cwlth).240 However, this power must be exercised by 
the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration. 
Overstayers 
Traditional visitors are permitted to remain in the place they are visiting only as long 
as the period specified on their pass.241 The guidelines state: 
If you stay longer than the approved period on your pass without the 
approval of the community then you become an ‘overstayer’ and you 
might be asked to leave or you might be forcibly removed. Overstaying 
puts lots of pressure and stress on communities. If you regularly overstay 
your visit, you might be banned from making future visits. 
The research team did not gather data on overstayers, due to the risks this might 
involve for them. In its submission to the 2010 Senate Inquiry, TSIRC reported that 
‘Immigration turns a “blind eye” to overstayers’, which ‘makes a mockery of the 
Treaty’. It was said to be ‘common knowledge that nothing will happen if you 
overstay your permit’.242 
The position of overstayers is a contentious and ongoing problem.243 Many 
Papua New Guineans who arrive on Torres Strait islands as traditional visitors seek 
to stay. These include children left with relatives in order to make use of the school 
or health facilities. Overstayers also include visitors who are married to, or in a 
relationship with, Torres Strait Islanders or Papua New Guineans who have become 
Australian citizens or permanent residents and wish to become permanent residents 
themselves. The cost of applying for permanent residency is in the region of $7000, 
and successful applicants most leave Australia and re-enter using their visa. This is a 
formidable barrier for many Papua New Guineans. While the Senate Inquiry noted 
that there was ‘sympathy towards PNG nationals overstaying their permit due to 
  
poverty’,244 the research team observed the efforts taken by some councillors to limit 
visitors overstaying with their partners or relatives, citing the drain on limited 
resources (e.g. housing, water supply). One councillor described the difficulty of 
finding overstayers who were hidden in private residences, due to the difficulty in 
obtaining search warrants.245 
Another category of overstayers is women seeking refugee status because of 
domestic violence. There is a possibility of applying for a Protection Visa (refugee 
status). However, this is a complex area of refugee law and depends on being able to 
show membership of a ‘particular social group’.246 There is no advice available in the 
Torres Strait to assist Papua New Guinean women fleeing violence. They have to 
seek help in Cairns or Brisbane. Brisbane has the only specialised, not-for-profit, 
refugee advice centre (‘RAILS’) in Queensland. Contact is made by telephone, and 
language is often a problem. Applications for refugee status often take about 18 
months to two years to process. During that time, applicants often have no income, 
and it would appear that they are not entitled to apply for any Centrelink payments, 
as they are unlawful non-citizens under the Migration Act.247 That Act provides that 
refugees who are deemed ‘unlawful non-citizens’ may be detained248 or removed249 
from Australia, notwithstanding Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under 
international law.250 However, the surveys did not reveal any instances of this 
occurring. 
Bridging the gap 
In the light of the absence of state courts and lawyers, the question arises whether 
alternative avenues of dispute resolution have developed. The following section 
considers first whether any traditional practices exist or have been revived 
independently of the state. It then moves to look at other existing options. 
Traditional means 
One of the functions of the PNG Village Courts is to ‘[e]ncourage parties in dispute 
to use local conflict resolution processes such as the “Local Chieftain System” or 
“Community of Elders”’.251 Of the 21 villages surveyed in the South Fly, nine 
respondents from nine different non-Treaty villages reported that disputes were 
resolved by community leaders.252 
Unlike the PNG side of the border, where customary laws and authority are 
still strong, on Torres Strait islands the influence of the state appears to have led to a 
diminution of traditional practices. There were no formal traditional resolution 
forums on any of the Torres Strait islands visited by the survey team. 
Notwithstanding, many issues are resolved informally within the extended family in 
accordance with ailan pasin (island fashion). Moreover, there is some evidence that 
traditional practices are still in place to resolve matters in accordance with the 
cultural notions of balance in relationships. Elu describes this aspect of Torres Strait 
culture in the following terms: 
  
It is also important to maintain the social balance within interpersonal 
relationships. Confrontation must be avoided. If an individual has a 
complaint about another person, it is not good to confront that person—a 
go-between must be appointed, who will then mediate. By this means, 
personal hurt and loss of face are avoided, and society can maintain 
harmony; when personal hurt and loss of face occur, serious rifts may 
develop, disrupting the social harmony.253 
Traditional, non-violent means of resolving disputes may also be used in 
disputes between the Torres Strait Islanders and inhabitants of Treaty villages. A 
recent case example from Boigu Island occurred after a fight had broken out between 
two rival groups of youths from Boigu and the Treaty village of Buzi. There are 
various versions of the cause of the dispute, one being that it broke out on Boigu 
while the two groups were watching a State of Origin football game. After the fight, 
the Buzi youths returned to Boigu armed with bush knives and bows and arrows, 
terrorising community members, but without inflicting any physical injury. As a 
result of these actions, the Buzi youths appear to have been banned from travelling 
over the border for a year.254 After the year was up the question arose as to whether 
the PNG youths would be allowed to visit Boigu again. To decide this matter a 
community meeting was held between those involved and the traditional leaders. A 
large feast was arranged, accompanied by the exchange of traditional gifts. It was 
then agreed that the youths would be allowed to travel again. 
While this is cited locally as an example of traditional dispute resolution, the 
state police were also involved and a Boigu man was charged with assault.255 SBS 
reported that local police, local council and federal agencies were working with 
community leaders on both sides of the border to resolve the dispute, so it is 
doubtful whether the process can be classified as purely traditional, but rather, it 
constitutes a hybrid between state and traditional processes. What is perhaps most 
telling is that this was the only example of traditional dispute resolution that was 
recited to the author during her survey work in November 2017. 
Other initiatives to fill the gap 
Community Justice Groups 
Community Justice Groups (CJG) have been established on Torres Strait islands. 
They are funded by the Queensland Department of Justice and the Attorney-
General.256 While their primary functions do not include resolution of disputes,257 in 
practice, the main work of the CJG consists of assisting the visiting Magistrates 
Court. Also, offenders may be referred to the CJG for cultural counselling and 
mediation.258 Members of the CJG work closely with a number of justice agencies 
including the Queensland Magistrates Court, Department of Corrective Services, 
Queensland Police Service and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal 
Service. The CJG works to support the community’s understanding of and access to 
the justice system by working in conjunction with TSIRC by-laws and victim support 
  
agencies.259 The CJG also assists courts in managing community-based offences and 
provides a network to implement crime prevention initiatives 
The CJG is currently not operating on all islands. For example, there are 
currently no CJGs on Dauan,260 Mabuiag,261 Poruma,262 Saibai Island (although steps 
are being taken to re-establish the group)263 or Ugar.264 
Churches 
Canon law sits outside the formal hierarchy of laws in both Australia and PNG. 
However, it is allowed to operate if it is not in conflict with state law, and is 
regarded as binding on devout members of a church. Churches are a powerful force 
in the region,265 and religious activities are an accepted reason for traditional visits. 
PNG’s churches exert wide influence across the country, and given the 
dysfunctionality of government service provision, they often play an important role 
in providing essential health, education and transport services.266 
However, these services do not extend to the South Fly, and although the PNG 
Department of Justice and Attorney-General’s web site lists the Catholic Church, 
Western Province as a source of justice-related programs,267 these do not extend to 
the South Fly villages. During interviews in villages in the South Fly, seven 
participants,268 coming from six different villages, said that disputes were resolved 
informally by the church.269 In some places, principles of canon law and practice 
have been syncretised with the customary laws of communities.270 Although a 
detailed discussion of church dispute resolution processes is outside the scope of this 
chapter, it is clear that, on both sides of the border, minor disputes and matrimonial 
matters are often settled by church officials.271 
Conclusion 
From the preceding discussion it seems clear that there are grounds for revisiting the 
treaty to clarify its terms and to ensure that it fulfils its original objective of 
protecting the way of life of traditional inhabitants within the borderland. More 
urgently, the guidelines are in need of revision, as the practical application of the 
treaty has become out of step with the lived reality of inhabitants of the borderland. 
The interpretation of tradition as a relic of the past freezes community practices in 
time, rather than accepting the existence of living laws and culture.272 The guidelines 
were said to be an initiative of the TIM, endorsed by the JAC,273 so there is no reason 
why they could not be revised at that level, without the need for amendment of the 
treaty or formal court proceedings. However, this would require the political will for 
change on the part of the meeting participants. 
In the absence of revision at that level, options for challenging current practices 
include application for judicial review or referral to the Ombudsman. To date, 
neither of these options has been pursued as a pathway for challenging the 
restrictive meaning given to ‘traditional activities’, the practice of issuing notices to 
appear, or the exclusion of certain villages from the treaty provisions. Apart from the 
expense of court proceedings, the likelihood of success of an application for judicial 
  
review is far from certain. However, it would have the benefit or airing these 
concerns and putting pressure on the parties to the treaty to introduce change. An 
investigation by the Ombudsman is a less expensive option, but would not directly 
alter the position. However, again, it would highlight the problems and have the 
potential to influence future policy. 
With regard to the more specific issue of access to justice, it is clear that legal 
advice is not readily available for PNG nationals without the financial resources to 
seek assistance from an urban centre. The lack of access to legal advice and forums to 
air grievances makes villagers in the South Fly vulnerable to human rights abuses 
and is a serious cause for concern. The position on the Australian side is rather better 
with the quarterly visits by ATSILS lawyers to give advice to and represent Torres 
Strait Islanders and to advise and act for non-Torres Strait Islanders on LAQ’s 
behalf. However, in between these times the only access to legal advice is by 
telephone, a luxury limited to those with access to a telephone and the required 
language skills. 
With respect to traditional dispute resolution forums, the position is arguably 
reversed, with most PNG Treaty villages having access to a Village Court, with 
magistrates and peace officers drawn from the community. On the Australian side of 
the border, the position has been ameliorated by the quarterly sittings of the visiting 
Magistrates Court. However, it is unfortunate that the Justices of the Peace 
(Magistrates Courts)274 scheme has not been pursued and the Community Justice 
Groups are either inoperative or restricted to assisting the visiting Magistrates Court. 
While the expansion of the state system in the Torres Strait Islands is in many ways 
desirable, reliance on social benefits and services has undermined traditional dispute 
resolution processes. Ironically, the result appears to be that on Torres Strait Islands, 
there can be less opportunity to resolve disputes locally than on the other side of the 
border, where local leaders are still frequently called on to settle disputes informally. 
It is a long way from the South Fly to Port Moresby and from the Torres Strait 
Islands to Brisbane, and it seems that the borderlands may be ‘out of sight and out of 
mind’. On both sides of the border the chances of speedy resolution of disputes is 
slim. If justice delayed is truly justice denied, then it is high time for both countries 
to improve access to justice for their citizens in the borderland. 
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The politics of distribution 
Peter Chaudhry 
‘In Australia, they have everything there.’ 
Participant at a community meeting in Tureture village, October 2017 
The helicopter rose above the dusty ground, scattering the remaining plastic chairs 
and sending the uninitiated who had remained too close, scampering for cover. 
Children squealed, elders muttered into the rags they clutched over their mouths 
and turned their backs, and the women responsible for overseeing the departing 
dignitaries’ lunch rushed to cover the remaining plates with white linen tablecloths. 
As the helicopter disappeared over the trees and was lost in the midday sun, a 
silence settled over the centre of the village, which only minutes before had been 
alive with dancing, music and song. 
It was October 2017. The occasion was the ground-breaking ceremony for a 
new 12-bed mini-hospital at Mabuduan, a village centre on the coast of Papua New 
Guinea’s South Fly district. Mabuduan is only a few kilometres from the northern 
Torres Strait island of Saibai, which is Australian territory. The village is a Treaty 
village, enjoying special privileges under the agreement signed between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1978.1 The new hospital was funded by the 
Australian Government, and the Australian High Commissioner had flown from 
Port Moresby that morning to preside over the ceremony. He was joined by the 
Minister of Borders and Immigration from the PNG Government and a host of other 
minor dignitaries. 
The occasion had proceeded smoothly, with traditional dance performances at 
both the site of the new hospital just outside the village and in the village centre. The 
officials sat under a canvas shade while villagers performed in traditional costumes 
and small children took turns sitting in the red helicopter perched in the centre of the 
parched village square (figure 4.1). Speeches were made in which passing reference 
was made to the difficulties over negotiating compensation for the land between 
neighbouring villages, which had substantially delayed the project to date. The 
assembled villagers were exhorted by the dignitaries from Port Moresby to put aside 
their particular claims and grievances in the wider interests of ‘development’ in the 
region. 
<Figure 4.1 near here> 
The ceremony to celebrate the start of work for a new Australian-funded, 12-bed hospital in 
Mabuduan (Research team, 2017) 
  
Also in attendance that day were a number of regional and local-level officials 
and politicians who had travelled to Mabuduan from the district centre of Daru 
Island that morning via the Australian-funded medical boat, the Medics Queen. This 
included the Member of Parliament for the South Fly, the Deputy Regional Governor 
for Western Province and the District Administrator. In the stilled aftermath of the 
helicopter’s departure, these dignitaries quickly assembled and began to make their 
way back to the beach to reboard the Medics Queen for the slow journey back to 
Daru. Local villagers, however, had other ideas. For them, the departure of the 
helicopter marked the end of the official ceremony, a ritual of state they observed 
but could not influence. But with the local officials in attendance they seized the 
opportunity to air their grievances and hold their local representatives and officials 
to account. The dignitaries protested half-heartedly that the journey back to Daru 
was long and that they had to set off, but local people were not to be denied and 
hastily pulled up chairs for them in the shade under the large covered roof of the 
water-harvesting shed. They formed a horseshoe arrangement in front of the 
dignitaries, with elders of the village to the fore, ready to take their turns to speak. 
The local dignitaries spoke first. The South Fly MP’s speech stressed the wider 
benefits of the portfolio of projects he was championing: that ‘development is a way 
forward’ and that ‘we reach out to communities to develop them’. The District 
Administrator stressed how the new hospital was intended for all of the residents of 
the South Fly and not just the Treaty villages: ‘It’s not just for you, it’s for everyone,’ 
he chided. He urged the people assembled there to get behind the project: ‘Don’t 
frustrate development.’ The Deputy Governor for the province stressed how the 
provincial government had earmarked Mabuduan as a growth centre and that 
consequently lots of new services would be coming soon, including a high school 
and police post. But ‘real true development takes time, it goes stages by stages’. 
When it was their turn to speak, the response from the assembled villagers was 
extraordinary. Time and again local people stood up to eloquently castigate the 
assembled officials on the lack of infrastructure and services available in the South 
Fly; on the lack of opportunities for education, training and income-earning; on 
corruption and the widely held perception that money earmarked for the South Fly 
never made it through the multiple layers of regional and local administration. 
These are common themes echoed in all villages in the South Fly. As one village 
elder succinctly stated: 
Our reputation as a province is down here [pointing to the ground]. 
People in the rural areas have suffered enough. We need village 
electrification, we need water and sanitation, we need IT services and 
social media. The public service machinery is not functional. Money 
doesn’t flow out by itself. 
In addition to the general discourse of discontent in the South Fly, the Treaty 
villagers aired additional grievances. Under the Torres Strait Island Treaty, villagers 
  
from 13 villages along the South Fly coast have the right to travel to the Torres Strait 
Islands for ‘traditional purposes’ and receive support from an Australian 
government-funded rangers program. These privileges are a powerful material and 
symbolic tie to Australia for Treaty villagers and an important marker that validates 
their perception that they are special and different from other mainland Papuans, 
and that they enjoy a particular privileged status in relation to the former colonial 
power. 
Villagers also expressed a powerful and vivid desire for an alternative 
development future, where young people had the opportunity to study, to fish freely 
in the fertile waters of the Straits, where local people could benefit from a ‘free trade 
zone’ with Australia, and where infrastructure investment could be made in new 
highways to the west, ‘to open up markets to Asia’. They called for an airstrip to be 
built so they could transport their precious marine commodities quickly and 
efficiently: ‘crayfish and barramundi fillets to Australia’. They called for support for 
women’s small enterprises and for vocational training opportunities for their young 
people. 
That long day in Mabuduan brought together in one place the principal actors 
and prevailing narratives that shape politics in the South Fly today. National 
government representatives championing the long-standing, slow-moving projects 
of nation-building and national development; Australian government 
representatives embodying the enduring vestiges of colonial association and a 
tantalising external pathway to a better material future; local politicians expressing 
their frustration with what they perceive to be local people’s narrow self-interest 
while lauding their own attempts to deliver services and infrastructure; and local 
people themselves, vocal and forthright in expressing their intense disaffection with 
their lot, lamenting perceived corruption and the post-colonial compact that they feel 
has served them poorly. 
The border between Australia and the South Fly region of PNG creates a state 
effect that results in inequality, disaffection and a potent and intense form of 
distributional politics. Over time there has been a shift from a ‘soft’ to a much harder 
border, which reflects a change from mutual dependence at the end of the colonial 
era, to a time now where people of the South Fly can be described in Tania Murray 
Li’s terms as a population ‘surplus’ to the needs of capital.2 Today, the stark 
inequalities across the short spatial divide of the border exacerbate and fuel 
distributional politics in the South Fly. The border effects are made manifest in the 
local through a host of petty rules and regulations, locally enforced and often locally 
derived, that govern interactions between Papuan mainlanders and Torres Strait 
Islanders. Treaty villagers are now engaged in forms of distributional politics that 
embody a search for ‘legibility’: a legibility to the Australian state that would render 
them connected and thus able to establish forms of ‘dependence’ similar to those of 
Torres Strait Islanders. This dependence, I argue in this chapter, is not a choice but a 
biopolitical imperative. In conclusion I consider prospects for ‘development’ as 
mainland Papuans seek what Ferguson has theorised as a ‘rightful share’.3 
  
The Torres Strait border in historical perspective 
‘Why is the border so close to PNG and so far from Australia’?4 
PNG secured independence from Australia in 1975. The demarcation of the 
boundary between the new state of PNG and Australia through the Torres Straits 
was intensively negotiated and it was not until December 1978 that a treaty was 
signed. The Treaty entered into force in February 1985 and defines the maritime 
boundaries of the two states through two lines, a Seabed Jurisdiction Line and a 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Line. Fifteen Australian islands lie north of the Seabed 
Jurisdiction Line, with their own territorial seas stretching three miles around. This 
has significant repercussions for South Fly villages closest to the islands of Saibai 
and Boigu, which lie just off the South Fly coast (figure 1.1). 
The Treaty establishes joint liaison mechanisms through which the treaty is 
implemented and monitored, including Treaty Liaison Officers on both sides of the 
border, Traditional Inhabitants Meetings and a Joint Advisory Council. The Torres 
Strait Treaty also establishes a Torres Strait Protected Zone (TSPZ). This zone was 
established to enable Torres Strait Islanders and people from the adjacent coastal 
area in Papua New Guinea to carry out their ‘traditional’ way of life. Under the 
Treaty they can move freely (without passports or visas) in and near the Protected 
Zone, which encompasses the outer islands of Torres Strait, including Boigu and 
Saibai. The interpretation of what constitutes traditional activities is the source of 
much debate in the region and drives everyday political contestation, as we shall see. 
Borders are not natural or self-evident ‘facts’. Rather, they are artificial 
constructs, dividing lines imposed in often arbitrary ways that segment populations, 
social systems and landscapes. As such, borders are effects of power and the state 
systems that impose them. Borders have their own histories, and border effects may 
well wax and wane over time in response to changes in governmental intent and 
associated regulatory regimes (chapter 1: Introduction). These effects are particularly 
notable either side of the Torres Strait border. This is partly because the border was 
imposed relatively recently and has seen quite profound changes in the short time it 
has been in operation, largely in relation to developments on the Australian side. 
Villagers in the Treaty and non-Treaty villages along the mainland coast (mainland 
Papuans) are intensely aware of the role the border plays in shaping their lives and 
livelihood opportunities. They are keenly aware of the promises they feel were made 
at the time of independence and which they believe were subsequently never 
fulfilled. For villagers in the east of the South Fly, their discontent is exacerbated by 
the environmental impacts of the Ok Tedi mine in the headlands of the Fly River, 
which has significantly affected river flows, resulting in sedimentation and 
contamination that has fundamentally changed the ecosystem of the fisheries upon 
which their livelihoods depend (chapter 7). 
The populations living on both sides of today’s border were closely bound 
together in the colonial economy and have had a long and intimate association over 
centuries. These ties and connections did not simply stop at independence. Papuans 
  
were employed as divers on the pearl luggers that plied the Torres Straits, and were 
known for their diving prowess. They were later employed on fishing boats as 
crayfish divers and worked closely with Torres Strait Islanders. This employment 
continued in the immediate post-colonial period after the border had been drawn, in 
the period before the Treaty came into force and the border became more formalised 
from 1985. Older residents of the South Fly villages reminisce fondly of those times 
both for the income they earned and for the camaraderie they enjoyed working 
closely with Torres Strait neighbours, although they also reported that some of the 
Torres Strait Islanders who skippered the boats looked down on them even then.5 
One older interviewee on Boigu who had worked closely with Papuan mainlanders 
on the pearl luggers acknowledged that the success of the pearling industry in the 
straits was built on the hard work and skills of these Papuan mainlanders: ‘They 
were pearl divers, not deck hands, they had skills and were well respected. They 
alternated the families that were recruited, so everyone from there got a chance.’ He 
remembered fondly a time of much greater interaction and acknowledged candidly: 
‘The border has changed all that. If we don’t have Centrelink, we’d still be sharing 
garden food.’ 
Older residents of the Treaty villages recall this period too as a time when 
Torres Strait Island standards of living were very similar to their own: a time of 
much greater mutual dependence and less formally governed exchanges. During a 
discussion in Mabuduan, older village members recounted how in the past Torres 
Strait Islanders would come across to the mainland regularly to tend gardens for 
food and they themselves could travel across to Torres Strait Islands freely to sell 
yams and sago. They also talked about how, in the past, Torres Strait Islanders 
would come across to get water when they had shortages. The situation is reversed 
now, and they are instead forced to beg for water: ‘When we have no water we take 
our water containers across to Saibai and tell them we have a water shortage.’ The 
free bartering of goods that took place in the past was confirmed in discussions with 
residents of Saibai, who recounted how they would exchange clothes with Papuan 
mainlanders for sweet potatoes, yam, sago and fruits like mango and coconut. They 
also described travelling to the mainland to barter in Mabuduan and further into the 
interior. 
This earlier era of mutual dependence and interaction changed dramatically 
from the mid-1980s as the treaty came into force. In Sigabaduru, a large village lying 
directly across the water from Saibai, one interviewee observed: 
We’re living today in the same condition as our grandparents, nothing 
has changed. They [Torres Strait Islanders] used to live like us but when 
my sixth child came [1984] over there the changes came. 
Government investment in Saibai and Boigu from the 1990s meant that Torres Strait 
Islanders were no longer reliant upon the mainland for growing food, acquiring 
building materials and canoes, and for water during times of scarcity. The Australian 
  
state invested in clean water processing facilities, housing, education and social 
welfare to guarantee payments to sustain the population in a quite different way 
from the past. 
While state investment in the Torres Strait Islands has accelerated, the Papuan 
side of the border has seen only stagnation. Investment by the PNG Government has 
been minimal, and the South Fly region remains one of the poorest in the country. 
This is keenly felt among a population that previously enjoyed considerable support 
from Australia, as colonial power, in the lead-up to independence.6 Tania Murray Li 
has vividly described the situation of populations at the margins of capitalist 
development as being ‘relative surplus populations’.7 Li argues that these 
populations have nothing of value to global capital—their labour is not required for 
production, and their meagre income means they are not important consumers of 
capitalist output.8 In the South Fly ‘surplus population’ status can be understood as a 
direct effect of the international border. South Fly labour had been important to 
colonial capitalism as a ready, cheap pool of labour within a wider colonial economic 
sphere, but this is no longer the case. Papuan labour today is not critical to the Torres 
Strait Islands economy, and Papuan mainlanders have no stake in the wider regional 
economy of northern Australia. 
Inequality in the borderlands today 
‘Island people have no resources but live lives of luxury; we have 
resources but live in poverty.’9 
The border regime governing interactions across the Torres Straits has become more 
formalised over time, which has restricted mobility and opportunities for interaction 
between the two neighbouring populaces. Where once the relationship was marked 
by mutual interaction and interdependence, opportunities to travel and interact 
across the border are increasingly regulated, restricted and bureaucratised. This shift 
from a soft to a hard border has occurred over just three decades. While residents of 
the two nearest islands to the mainland, Saibai and Boigu, have been drawn closer 
into the Australian state nexus, Papuan mainlanders have been pushed further 
away. This estrangement and severing of ties has been keenly felt. 
Inequalities between the Torres Strait Islands and the South Fly 
Material differences across the short space of the Torres Strait are stark. They are 
exacerbated by the close proximity of the Papuan mainland to the Torres Strait 
Islands: it is only five kilometres between Saibai and the Papuan village of 
Sigabaduru. The Telstra mobile phone tower on Saibai is clearly visible from 
Sigabaduru and, for someone standing on the beach at night, the lights of the island 
glitter across the water while the coast of the Papuan mainland is shrouded in 
darkness. 
Indeed, there are few places in the world where such stark inequality exists 
between two places that are so close. On the one hand Torres Strait Islanders enjoy 
  
material conditions and levels of public service provision comparable to mainland 
Australia. Housing is publicly provided, there are fully equipped and expertly 
staffed health clinics, a clean water supply (including desalination plants), sanitation 
facilities and the Australian system of social security payments, which encompasses 
all households in Torres Strait Islands. Just across the border, villages in the South 
Fly have seen very limited investment by the PNG Government since independence. 
They face government corruption, crippling water shortages, a lack of basic 
infrastructure and services, and limited employment and livelihood opportunities. 
Disparities are readily apparent to Treaty villagers because of their frequent 
trips across to Saibai and Boigu, where they can see livelihoods and community 
facilities quite different from their own. As one interviewee in the eastern village of 
Sui observed: ‘I’m still living in a biri [leaf] house while the Torres Strait people live 
in luxury houses.’ (See figure 4.2.) Inequalities are most apparent perhaps in terms of 
the infrastructure divide between Torres Strait Islands and the South Fly. Table 4.1 
illustrates what is available on Saibai, in comparison to Sigabaduru, the closest South 
Fly village to Torres Strait Islands. Sigabaduru has a significantly larger population 
but a stark deficit in terms of social and physical infrastructure. 
<Figure 4.2 near here> 
A house in a village in the South Fly region of PNG (left) and a house on the island of Saibai 
in the Torres Strait Islands (Research team, 2017) 
<table 4.1 near here> 
  
  
Table 4.1: Comparison of infrastructure provision in Saibai and Sigabaduru 
 
Infrastructure on Saibai (Torres Strait 
Islands) 
Infrastructure on Sigabaduru (PNG) 
Council office 
Council staff houses and guest houses 
Dongas for contractor accommodation 
Fuel bowser 
Water storage lagoons 
Water filtration centre 
Sewerage treatment works 
Cemetery 
Airstrip 
Helipad 
Seawall  
Health clinic 
Nurses’ houses  
IBIS store 
School 
Teachers’ houses 
Powerhouse generator and fuel tanks 
Border force and biosecurity office on 
waterfront 
Rangers workshop 
Waste dump 
Telecom tower 
Wharf and ramp 
Channel beacons 
Communal water collection tanks (50 
per cent broken) 
Health clinic is derelict 
Community meeting house 
School 
 
Source: inventory made by research team, September–October 2017 
  
  
Throughout the South Fly, poor housing, chronic water shortages and limited 
livelihood opportunities are the norm. South Fly communities are also increasingly 
susceptible to climate change and to the devastation caused by the Ok Tedi mine, 
which has deposited contaminated mine sediment along the Fly River and in the 
Gulf of Papua, affecting the marine environment upon which many South Fly 
residents depend. The Torres Strait Treaty also restricts the access of South Fly 
villagers to the wider marine fisheries of the Torres Strait, shutting off a significant 
livelihood and food resource (chapter 8). An elder from the village of Buzi observed: 
‘We have lost sea rights and have been badly affected by the treaty. The sea is where 
our people make money.’ He went on to argue that the border is ‘really unfair and 
inhuman’ in denying them full rights to fish in the sea: ‘We share the border, there’s 
the line, but we’re not sharing the resource.’ ‘The sea is our supermarket,’ remarked 
another interviewee. The extent of material deprivation and limited livelihood 
opportunities in the South Fly is apparent in the data collected from household and 
community surveys conducted in both Treaty and non-Treaty villages during three 
field visits to the South Fly in 2016, 2017 and 2018.10 
Services and livelihoods in the South Fly 
In response to the question ‘How would you describe the condition of your house?’ 
(figure 4.3) the most frequent response (103 of 270) was ‘poor’. A further 17 
respondents answered ‘very poor’. With no electricity network in the South Fly 
villages, households are dependent upon a generator or solar power, but very few of 
the survey respondents reported having a functioning generator (48 out of 265) and 
less than half had solar power. Solar power for most households in the South Fly 
means a small solar cell able to charge a mobile phone but nothing else. 
<Figure 4.3 near here> 
South Fly villagers describe the condition of their houses (Research data) 
South Fly villages have rudimentary school buildings that often lack basic 
furniture and learning materials. Nevertheless, survey respondents reported a high 
level of school attendance by their children, reflecting the importance South Fly 
residents place on education. The primary reasons given for children not attending 
school were teacher absenteeism and children being engaged in livelihood activities 
(see table 4.2). Other difficulties included no money for school supplies and having 
no food to eat in the house. One interviewee in the village of Sigabaduru explained: 
I don’t send them to school if I’ve got nothing, if the kitchen is empty. 
They get weak. If they don’t eat, they don’t go because they can’t do much 
work. 
For children seeking to go to school beyond the elementary level, transport 
difficulties were a significant barrier, because many villages only have an elementary 
school. 
<table 4.2 near here> 
  
  
  
Table 4.2: Responses to the multiple choice question ‘If your children do not attend school 
often, why not?’ 
Reasons for not attending 
school 
No. of 
responses 
Percentage 
of responses 
Percentage 
of cases 
Poor facilities/equipment 7 6 8 
Teacher absenteeism 27 22 31 
School not 
relevant/appropriate 
13 11 15 
Sickness and/or disability 9 7 10 
Children engaged in livelihood 
activities 
22 18 25 
Transport difficulties/cost 12 10 14 
Other 33 27 38 
Total 123 100  
Note: Other reasons for not attending school included no interest, school 
charges/costs too high, different church, no food to eat/no water to 
wash/clothes too dirty, and school maintenance underway. 
  
  
<figure 4.4 near here> 
South Fly villagers indicate where they first go when they or a family member are sick. In 
some cases, researchers recorded additional responses to this survey question to reflect the 
experiences of the respondents (Research data) 
As with education, the level of health care available in the South Fly is basic. In 
response to the question ‘where do you usually go first when you or a member of 
your family are sick?’, 63 per cent of respondents (159 of 251) reported that they 
visited a village aid post (figure 4.4). More than 80 per cent of respondents (203 of 
247) affirmed that they face problems in attending the nearest aid post or other 
medical facility (see table 4.3), with the biggest problems listed being a lack of 
medicine, no staff, the cost of transport and the nearest functioning facility being too 
far away (see table 4.4). Many of the village aid posts are semi-derelict, and staff 
often spend months in the district capital Daru for various reasons, including 
awaiting their pay. Only 57 respondents reported visiting Daru General Hospital, 
which is a long boat trip away for most villagers (figure 4.4). Many cannot afford the 
cost of fuel or the fare to get there. Only a very few respondents (7 of 251) reported 
visiting an Australian facility in Torres Strait Islands when they first become sick. 
<table 4.3 near here> 
  
  
Table 4.3: Responses to the question ‘Do you face problems when attending the nearest 
health facility?’ 
 
 
No. of 
responses 
No 44 
Yes 203 
Total 247 
  
  
<table 4.4 near here> 
Table 4.4: Responses to the multiple choice question ‘What are the problems encountered at 
the nearest health facility?’ 
 
Problems 
encountered 
No. of 
responses 
No medicine 88 
No staff 63 
Cost of transport 59 
Other 55 
Too far away 41 
Cost of treatment 24 
Not open 12 
Unwelcoming 8 
Better service 
elsewhere 
3 
Not allowed 1 
Total 354 
Note: The options provided for this multiple-choice interview question changed to 
reflect responses from prior years. Reasons given for ‘Other’ include 
community health worker not being paid, in-fighting between communities 
blocking access to community health workers, lack of knowledge/appropriate 
supplies at the health facility, no radio, no accommodation and no lighting. 
  
  
The health problems and diseases most commonly identified by survey 
respondents included cancer, diabetes, diarrhoea and malaria; cases of leprosy, 
cholera and HIV/AIDS are also reported (see table 4.5). The South Fly has been 
identified as a region of significant concern in relation to multi-drug resistant 
tuberculosis (MDR-TB); many international health agencies are working through 
Daru hospital to address MDR-TB. Many of these agencies are attempting to 
establish the scale of the problem in the South Fly villages, particularly those villages 
closer to Daru where there is a high level of mobility of villagers back and forth to 
Daru.11 Responses to the community survey reported in figure 4.5 (question: Are 
there any people with tuberculosis in the village?) appear to show a higher reported 
incidence of TB in non-Treaty villages compared with Treaty villages, although there 
are problems with people self-reporting the incidence of TB, particularly where it is 
unlikely to have been properly diagnosed.12 
<figure 4.5 near here> 
4.5 South Fly community survey respondents indicate whether there are people with 
tuberculosis in the village (Research data) 
<table 4.5 near here> 
  
  
Table 4.5: Responses to the multiple-choice question ‘What are the main health problems in 
the village?’ 
 
 No. of responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
Percentage of cases 
Malaria 18 20 100 
Cholera 7 8 39 
Diarrhoea 17 19 94 
Leprosy 5 6 28 
HIV/AIDS 0 0 0 
Diabetes 3 3 17 
Cancer 7 8 39 
TB 17 19 94 
Other 16 18 89 
Total 90 100  
Note: Community surveys recorded the responses to this question from 18 villages. 
The responses listed for ‘Other’ included asthma, pain, injury, dental problems, 
eye problems and disability. 
  
  
South Fly villagers have severely restricted livelihood opportunities, 
particularly for formal, long-term employment. In response to the question ‘Have 
you ever had a paid job?’, half of respondents confirmed that they had (see table 4.6). 
However, the vast majority of these jobs were casual and short term in nature. For 
Treaty villagers, this often meant working casually in Saibai or Boigu, doing kitchen 
or garden work for Torres Strait Islanders. This kind of employment would 
generally be intermittent or for a few days only. The few people who reported more 
long-term employment invariably had spent time working in Port Moresby or were 
older respondents who had worked on the fishing or pearling boats during the 
colonial and immediate post-colonial era. Only 57 of 928 responses to the question 
‘What are your primary sources of income?’ listed paid employment as a primary 
income source (see figure 4.6). All other income sources came from the private sale 
of fish, mussels and crabs, garden produce, game meat or handicrafts, and 
remittances. 
<table 4.6 near here> 
  
  
Table 4.6: Responses to the question ‘Have you ever had a paid job?’ 
Have you ever had a 
paid job? 
No. of 
responses 
No 128 
Yes 127 
Total 255 
 
  
  
<figure 4.6 near here> 
South Fly villagers indicate their primary sources of income. The data collection for this 
survey question varied over the three field trips. In 2016 and 2017, respondents were 
allowed to record multiple responses with no limit, whereas in 2018 respondents were 
limited to three. Although the question asked for only a primary source of income, the vast 
number of responses per respondent reflects the necessity of the many and varied income 
streams South Fly villagers must maintain. ‘Church’ and ‘Cross-border trade’ were options in 
the multiple-choice question only in 2016. (Research data) 
Treaty and non-Treaty village differences 
Inequality between Torres Strait Islanders and mainland residents is not the only 
inequality fault line in the borderlands. The Torres Strait Treaty, as interpreted in the 
‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’, gives residents of the 13 Treaty villages in the 
South Fly the right to travel freely to Torres Strait Islands, a privilege not open to 
non-Treaty villagers. Treaty villages comprise less than 10 per cent of the district’s 
total population, and the advantages they enjoy generates political friction and 
discontent among non-Treaty village inhabitants.13 Treaty villagers have the right to 
cross to the Torres Strait Islands to trade and barter, to make family visits and to 
engage in traditional activities. They also receive financial investment from the 
Australian state, notably through the Treaty Village Resilience Programme run by 
the Reef and Rainforest Research Centre (RRRC), which provides employment 
opportunities for Treaty villagers as rangers and makes limited investment in Treaty 
villages for basic infrastructure. Treaty villagers have also used funds to buy boats 
and most recently to purchase refrigerators in an attempt to kick-start seafood 
businesses in their villages. Treaty village representatives participate in cross-border 
governmental forums with their Torres Strait Islands and Australian government 
counterparts and are recognised by the Australian authorities as having a set of 
rights and privileges beyond those of other South Fly villages. 
<figure 4.7 near here> 
South Fly villagers indicate the main reason they travel to Torres Strait Islands. The most 
common reason for non-Treaty villagers to visit Torres Strait Islands is for access to health 
care, whereas the most common reason for Treaty villagers to visit Torres Strait Islands is 
for trade. (Research data) 
In response to the question ‘Do you travel to Torres Strait Islands?’, just under 
90 per cent of Treaty village respondents confirmed that they do (see table 4.7). 
Surprisingly, however, just under half of non-Treaty villagers in the survey also 
reported that they travel to Torres Strait Islands. This is overwhelmingly for medical 
treatment at the clinics in Saibai and Boigu, as figure 4.7 shows. Under Queensland 
Health protocols, emergency cases from the South Fly should be accepted in Torres 
Strait Islands irrespective of the Treaty village status of patients (although this 
process is fraught with difficulties, as we shall discuss in the next section). For Treaty 
villagers, visiting the health clinic for emergencies is important, but they go for a 
range of other reasons too: for trade, to shop at the store, to visit family, to 
participate in customary celebrations and to work. Differences between Treaty and 
  
non-Treaty villages in terms of their primary sources of income can be seen in figure 
4.6. Twice as many Treaty villagers listed cross-border trade as their primary source 
of income, while non-Treaty villagers were more likely to engage in selling meat, 
garden produce or fish, mussels and crabs. There was little difference between 
Treaty and non-Treaty villagers in engaging in private business or paid 
employment, although private business in the survey excluded cross-border trade. 
<table 4.7 near here> 
  
  
Table 4.7: Responses to the question ‘Do you cross into Torres Strait Islands?’ 
 Non-Treaty Treaty Total 
No 73 12 85 
Yes 69 100 169 
Total 142 112 254 
 
  
  
Treaty villagers (primarily Australian citizen Papuans) are more likely to have 
and maintain relations with relatives on the islands and reap benefits from these 
connections too. As one interviewee in Mabuduan noted: 
Haves are the people who got a generator from their relatives in Torres 
Strait Islands, so haves are people who have relatives and connections 
over there. 
Hierarchies of privilege and opportunity in the borderlands 
What operates in the borderlands in practice, then, is a four-tier system of privilege, 
with Torres Strait Islander residents at the top, followed by Australian citizen 
Papuans in Torres Strait Islands next, then Treaty villagers, and non-Treaty villagers 
at the bottom. Torres Strait Islanders and Treaty villagers guard their privileges 
carefully, even while complaining that they are excluded from opportunities that 
others enjoy. The new hospital at Mabuduan is a clear example, with Treaty villagers 
complaining about how poorly they compare to Torres Strait Islanders, but also 
stating their view that the new hospital should be for their exclusive use and not for 
non-Treaty villagers.14 Treaty villagers in Parama further to the east stated similar 
views about the Daru hospital, arguing: ‘Those of us from the Treaty villages should 
get free treatment as the money for the hospital is our money.’ 
The staggered and hierarchical nature of privilege and opportunity in the 
borderlands is clearly visible too in trading relations for traditional handicrafts 
across the Torres Straits. Crafts that make their way to Thursday Island (the regional 
centre) or Cairns for sale are often products that have been made by non-Treaty, 
inland villagers of the South Fly. There is an active market for the sale of handicrafts 
in the bigger Treaty villages, like Sigabaduru and Mabuduan; non-Treaty villagers 
being unable to go across to the Torres Strait Islands and therefore required to sell to 
those Treaty villagers who can. Treaty villagers in turn sell handicrafts to Torres 
Strait Islanders on Saibai and Boigu, who in turn have access to mainland Australia 
or to middle-men traders who come to buy handicrafts in bulk. Each stage of the 
market chain involves considerable mark-up, and the ability to ‘trade up’ is purely 
dependent upon citizenship status and the right to traverse borders in order to 
access wider market opportunities. These particular configurations of access and 
privilege determine livelihood opportunities in the borderlands and shape well-
being outcomes and opportunities. They are a direct result, or effect, of the border 
and the particular provisions of the Torres Strait Island Treaty. These dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion inevitably breed disaffection and discontent among the 
respective groups and fuel borderland political conflict. 
Practices of exclusion in the everyday construction of 
the border 
‘They’re building a wall around the islands.’15 
  
The differences across the Torres Straits, between Papuan villages of the South Fly 
and the islands of Dauan, Saibai and Boigu, result from the overarching regulatory 
regime and border control policies of Australian state agencies. These reflect an 
intent on the part of the Australian state to ensure that the border is secure. 
However, the translation of policies and regulatory intent takes place through the 
actions of local officials and powerholders in Torres Strait Islands: the elected council 
representatives and delegated officeholders on the islands, and the local employees 
of the state border force and immigration agencies. Border effects are made manifest 
in the local, through the interpretation and action of local island people in their day-
to-day engagement with Papuan mainlanders. A host of petty rules and regulations 
bureaucratise social interactions and opportunities for travel across the strait and 
envelop residents on both sides of the border in systems and narratives of regulation 
and control. These ultimately shape the social lives of all borderland residents. 
For the Australian state and politicians, securitisation of the border is a pre-
eminent concern.16 The initial spur for investment in the Torres Strait Islands 
coincided with the rise of the movement for Indigenous rights in Australia in the 
1980s, consolidated and accelerated in the 1990s, then took a turn towards a greater 
focus on security from the 2000s, as Western states reacted to both the real and 
perceived threat of international terrorism and related fears of the consequences of 
transnational migration and open borders. Papua New Guinea’s perceived weak 
governance regime and consequent inability to secure a long and porous border 
against transnational migrant flows meant that the Torres Strait Islands were seen as 
a frontline defence against the threat of undesirable migration. Torres Strait 
Islanders and Papuan mainlanders concur that the border regime has hardened 
considerably over time: population movement for mainland visitors has become 
tightly regulated and controlled, and this is an ongoing process. 
At the ground-breaking ceremony for the new Mabuduan hospital, the PNG 
Minister for Immigration and Border Control on several occasions described the 
Treaty villages as the ‘last defensive line’ for Australia. During fieldwork 
conversations and public gatherings, Treaty villagers would use this narrative too, 
often describing themselves as fulfilling an important security role in policing the 
border and making it safe for Australia against the unknown. Villagers in Sui, a 
Treaty village, wryly noted that Torres Strait Islander leaders have been successful in 
leveraging support from the Australian Government with threats that they will let 
people in, emphasising that they act as the security buffer for the Australian 
mainland. But villagers in Sui were quick to utilise this narrative too, emphasising 
that the South Fly is also a buffer. One village leader in Bula, in the west of the 
country, stated theatrically: ‘PNG is the gateway for terrorism into Australia.’ Others 
at the meeting went on to say, ‘We’re monitoring the border for Australia. We pick 
up when strangers come through.’17 
Treaty villagers are severely affected by the tightening border regime on the 
islands. They are subject to increasing restrictions and controls on movement, and 
what they can and cannot do when they visit the islands. This is a source of intense 
  
frustration, with one Sigabaduru interviewee observing: ‘We’re sharing the border. I 
understand their security needs, but I need money to survive. If we have the things 
they have, over there, then security will be OK’, while another villager remarked, 
‘We’re not sharing the border; they’re just enforcing the border. That’s not sharing.’ 
For Papuan mainlanders, the tightening border regime is restricting their ability to 
pursue a livelihood: ‘The border is not secure because I’m not secure. I need to 
survive.’ Another interviewee remarked, ‘We’ll be forced to do things to survive. 
We’re human beings like them—I understand the law but they have to understand 
our struggle.’ 
Papuan mainlanders are most aggrieved by what they consider to be 
inconsistency and partiality in the interpretation of Treaty rules. Villagers in Parama 
related how officials placed restrictions even on activities that are clearly traditional 
in nature. Parama residents have close familial ties with York Island and are 
occasionally invited to tombstone openings, an important cultural occasion to mark 
the passing of community members. These occasions can involve 600–700 people 
who want to travel, but they complain that Australian officials often put limits on 
the number of people they will allow, which devalues the occasion for both 
communities. Papuan mainlanders recognise that much of the interpretation of 
regulations is in the hands of local officials. As one interviewee noted, ‘Security is me 
and the person on the other side, before the government.’ 
For Torres Strait Island powerholders, narratives and practice of regulation and 
control reflect a concern to manufacture and assert essential differences between 
themselves and their Papuan neighbours. Despite the shared history and strong 
cultural and familial ties that mark relations across the strait, Torres Strait Islanders 
are often adamant that they are essentially different from their Papuan neighbours 
and that Papuan culture and genealogies are quite separate from their own. Their 
status as Australian citizens and residents of Australian territory trumps, in these 
narratives, any past associations or possible familial, cultural or ethnic associations 
with Papuan mainlanders.18 Sigmund Freud famously framed this as ‘the narcissism 
of minor difference’, arguing in his essay ‘The Taboo of Virginity’ (1917) that ‘it is 
precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis 
of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them’.19 
Some Torres Strait Islanders’ perceptions of difference to Papuans are applied 
through the application of a host of petty rules and regulations. These stem from the 
overarching border policies made by the Australian Government but crucially are 
locally interpreted and enforced. Island officials (who are themselves Torres Strait 
Islanders) can interpret the border treaty provisions in quite specific and often 
exclusionary ways, to make the border real. Four arenas are discussed below in 
which the terms of Papuan mainlanders’ interactions with Torres Strait Islanders, the 
island economy and Australian services are set. They are borderland spaces of 
conflict in which Papuan mainlanders’ frustrations and desires crystallise. 
  
Access to health care 
Both Boigu and Saibai have well-staffed and resourced health clinics that provide 
island residents with a quality of care comparable with similar facilities on the 
Australian mainland. In comparison, villages in the South Fly have no comparable 
clinics and a very rudimentary system of health care. Daru General Hospital has 
received significant investment in recent years from the Australian Government, for 
the treatment of MDR-TB in particular. Nevertheless, the level of care available at 
Daru hospital is in no way comparable to the Torres Strait Islands. It is in any case a 
long boat journey away for most Papuans in the South Fly, in comparison with the 
Torres Strait Islands facilities at Saibai and Boigu. Not surprisingly, then, many 
Papuans not only choose but also are compelled to travel to Torres Strait to receive 
medical treatment, particularly when the need is urgent. 
South Fly residents recount how, in the recent past, access to the clinic was 
relatively straightforward, with medical staff there ready to treat any patient who 
presented, regardless of whether or not they were from the mainland. They believe 
this has changed over recent years, with Queensland Health funding a position for a 
Papuan doctor to be co-located at Saibai, to liaise with Daru hospital for the transfer 
of non-emergency cases that present at Torres Strait Island back to Daru. While 
everyone who presents on Saibai or Boigu is assessed, the practice now is for only 
extreme, life-threatening cases to be treated on Torres Strait Islands, usually where a 
medical evacuation to Thursday Island or Cairns is required. For other cases deemed 
not to be life threatening, patients are referred to Daru hospital or back to their 
community aid post for treatment. One interviewee from Sigabaduru observed, 
‘Nowadays, when we try and access health services across the Straits they don’t 
accept us, only if we’re about to die.’ 
The Australian state’s investment in Daru hospital has been significant, and it 
is understandable that Australian officials wish to see South Fly residents using the 
district facilities instead of travelling to Torres Strait Island. However, 
communication with Daru hospital is difficult, and no regular boat transport is 
available. Mainland patients are required to find and pay for boat transport to Daru 
themselves and, as one elderly resident of Sigabaduru remarked, ‘People without 
transport are the people who suffer.’ 
This lack of available transport can sometimes have tragic consequences. Ber 
village is only a short distance across the straits from Boigu, but, as a villager 
observed, ‘Sometimes when health workers refer people to Boigu they refer them 
back to Daru and we lose the person.’ During fieldwork in 2017, the story of an 
elementary school teacher from Ber was recounted to us by a number of separate 
interviewees. The teacher had visited Boigu three times and had been sent back each 
time, and eventually died in the clinic at Boigu in September. Villagers speculated 
that if the teacher had been treated on any of the previous trips, the outcome might 
have been different. Another young man from Sigabaduru we met during fieldwork 
had been badly burnt in an accident at home and travelled to Saibai for treatment.20 
  
He received dressings and medication for five days and was told to go to Daru for 
further treatment. However, he had no means of travelling to Daru, which is three 
hours away by boat, and despite being told transport would be arranged for him to 
get to Daru from Sigabaduru, the boat never came. At the time of the interview he 
had been waiting more than two weeks and had run out of clean dressings and 
medicine, and his burns were clearly festering badly. He was no longer able to stand 
and spent his days lying in an outdoor cot under a mosquito net. Decisions made on 
whether or not to treat patients at Torres Strait facilities can have serious, sometimes 
life or death, implications for Papuan mainlanders. 
Opportunities for trade 
Papuans rely heavily upon trading petty goods, handicrafts and fresh seafood on the 
islands of Saibai and Boigu. At the boat landing ramp on both islands Papuans from 
the Treaty villages hang up or lay out their wares for sale. This includes traditional 
items such as woven baskets, headdresses and skirts, hunting spears and traditional 
drums. They also sell store goods from Daru, such as boiled sweets and other 
confectionery. However, local biosecurity officers on the islands apply sets of rules 
in terms of what can be brought for sale, how much in terms of quantity, and how 
long they can stay in order to try to sell their wares.21 Mainland Papuans complain 
that these rules are becoming increasingly restrictive and that they often differ from 
week to week. For instance, they are no longer allowed to bring spearbox to sell 
(cheap Papuan tobacco, which is popular with people on both sides of the border but 
only available to buy in PNG). They are told ‘No shop things, no garden food’. They 
have even been told that they cannot bring crab from PNG, only from Torres Strait 
Island waters, but Papuan mainlanders joked, ‘How can they tell where the crab is 
from?!’ 
In fact, Papuans observe that Torres Strait Islanders with interests in trading 
crabs and other seafood use the notion of ‘traditional activities’ under the treaty to 
restrict the number of crabs Papuans can bring to trade and to determine the price. 
During fieldwork in 2017, biosecurity officers on the islands had set a limit of ten 
crabs per person as the maximum anyone could bring under the barter and exchange 
clause of the treaty. Torres Strait Islander middlemen involved in trading crabs 
maintained that only they could deal with outside dealers and that mainland 
Papuans had to sell to them in order for these middlemen then to sell on to traders at 
an inflated price. As a district official in Daru observed, ‘Whatever is required on the 
islands we produce, but it is very complicated now. Treaty villagers are the 
middlemen.’ There is a strong feeling among Papuan mainlanders that Torres Strait 
Islanders use the treaty language to try to exploit them.22 One Torres Strait Islander 
from Boigu who is sympathetic to the plight of Papuan mainlanders observed how 
there is insufficient volume of crabs to keep large-scale buyers interested but that 
they also stop Papuan mainlanders bringing across the crabs that could be sold. 
‘They restrict the opportunities for business so there is no enterprise on this island.’ 
  
Papuan mainlanders complained that they never knew whether they would be 
allowed to bring confectionery and store goods to sell, because sometimes the 
biosecurity officers at the boat landing ramp said these items were excluded under 
the barter and exchange clause of the treaty as not being ‘traditional’ commodities. 
They also complain that local enforcement officers interpret the treaty barter clause 
in a way that precludes exchange for money and insist instead that Papuans can only 
engage in barter exchange relationships, as their forefathers might have done. ‘What 
does it really mean, “commercial”?’ complained a Buzi villager. ‘If I’m selling 
between Buzi and the islands, is that commercial?’ Another remarked, ‘They’re 
playing the law over there, that’s how they treat us.’23 
Papuan mainlanders insist that the narrow interpretation of barter and market 
trade does not recognise the prevalence of money in today’s economy and their need 
for cash in order to pay for all kinds of necessary goods and services in daily life, 
such as school charges and medical fees. The world has changed, they contend, and 
treaty arrangements are outdated. ‘Now money is everything. For our fathers it was 
different; they were illiterate.’ 
One village elder in Bula complained, ‘Boigu people say: “That’s the 
commercial price, not the trade and barter price.” They’ll try and barter, a bag of 
flour or rice for a crab. It’s ridiculous.’ He went on to say, ‘We can go to Merauke 
[the Indonesian border town] and buy what we want at cheaper prices.’ In fact, 
villagers in Bula, the westernmost coastal village in the South Fly, remarked upon 
the decreasing level of trade with Torres Strait Islanders. ‘We only go that way [east 
to Torres Strait Islands] for a health emergency or to sell crabs or shells.’ All other 
trade goes west now, to Indonesia. He added: 
My generation used to trade with Torres Strait Islanders but the younger 
generation don’t do that so much any more. It’s harder to sell artefacts, 
drums, grass skirts in Torres Strait Islands as people have them already. 
There is no novelty. 
Labour and money 
As with the trade in commodities, local officials on Saibai and Boigu take a keen 
interest in the labour economy of the islands. Casual work on Torres Strait Islands is 
a critical livelihood strategy for many Treaty village households, and Papuan labour 
is integral to the operation of household economies on Saibai and Boigu too, with 
many Torres Strait Islanders employing Papuan mainlanders in their homes at some 
point. This labour is for domestic service (cooking and cleaning) and for doing 
gardening around Torres Strait Islanders’ homes, as well as other ad hoc labouring 
tasks throughout the year. Remuneration for these tasks differs widely and is often 
dependent upon the relationship between Papuans and their employers.24 Some 
receive money for their labour at what Papuan mainlanders consider a reasonable 
rate (A$10–A$20 a day), some receive a little cash and some household goods, while 
others receive only household commodities such as flour and rice. In these instances, 
  
Papuans would complain that Torres Strait Islanders claimed they were not allowed 
to pay them in cash, because the treaty makes provisions for traditional exchange 
only. This is often the position of local officials, with immigration officers informing 
visiting Papuans that their rights extend to visits for traditional activities only and 
precludes labour for cash. One Torres Strait Islander store operator interviewed in 
October 2017 revealed he had been pressured by local officials when he employed 
Papuan mainlanders and paid them in cash. He was told he should pay in kind only. 
A local-level government (LLG) member from one of the Treaty villages expressed 
his indignation at the practice of households paying only in store goods for labour, 
saying, ‘I said to the Boigu people, “You were dependent on the mainland before 
you got developed. How can you do that to your own people?”’ 
Regulating love 
A final arena in which local officials make real the differences between Torres Strait 
Islanders and Papuan mainlanders is in the regulation of relationships between 
young people. A number of young women on Boigu are in relationships with young 
men from the mainland, in some instances having children by them. The men seek to 
stay with their partners on Boigu, but during fieldwork in 2017 these couples 
recounted stories of the barriers that the local island immigration officials placed on 
their visiting across the border. 
One couple interviewed on Boigu had been together for more than a decade: 
she is from Boigu, he is from a Papuan mainland village. He is able to visit for two 
weeks and must then go back again for two weeks and apply for another pass before 
he can return. They had been told recently by border control officials that they could 
no longer continue as ‘boyfriend and girlfriend’ from the end of that year. The male 
partner was told that he would have to stay somewhere else on the island if he 
wanted to visit. The couple were in the process of securing papers to be able to 
marry, but this is not an easy process, requiring trips to the capital Port Moresby to 
get a passport, then to navigate an expensive process to secure a visa with the 
Australian authorities in Cairns. The visa fee of several thousand dollars is 
prohibitive and the couple felt that they should be allowed to stay together on the 
island for three months so that the male partner could work and save the money for 
the fee. 
There were eleven or twelve couples on Boigu who faced the same restrictions 
and dilemmas, and all the partners from the mainland had recently been told that 
they would no longer be able to come over regularly to continue the relationship. 
When they apply for a pass to go either way, they must put down as the reason for 
travel as something other than their relationship, or else it would be refused, they 
claimed. Boigu women who want to take their children across to visit their fathers on 
the mainland must put down a wedding or funeral ceremony as a reason for travel, 
rather than a holiday with their father’s family. The tightening of regulations is, they 
believe, the initiative of the local border officials and town authorities, but there is 
little they can do, as they require a signature from these officials on their pass before 
  
they can travel. When they have complained, they have been told, ‘The law is just 
here and that is how it is.’ 
Petty restrictions on Papuan mainlanders operate in other ways too: ‘We’ve 
been told we can’t give alcohol to PNG nationals, not even at a birthday party.’ A 
number of interviewees from both sides of the border observed that Papuan 
mainlanders are also prevented from using the ATM to withdraw cash in the store 
on Boigu. Some Torres Strait Islanders felt that the access of Papuan mainlanders to 
shops and services on Saibai and Boigu should also be restricted; otherwise there 
would not be enough goods left for Torres Strait Islanders themselves. Store 
operators discounted this, however, noting that in fact the business generated by 
mainlanders visiting and buying staple foods such as flour and rice is what has kept 
the store afloat and makes the business viable. ‘I always keep a spare pallet of the 
essentials in the back in any case, so we would never run out.’ Again, it is perceived 
that these petty rules and regulations are imposed by local officials and 
powerholders and that they choose to interpret border and treaty regulations in a 
very narrow and prohibitive way. ‘These laws are just man-made laws,’ complained 
one Papuan mainlander. 
The regulatory regime that Papuans face in their daily interactions on Saibai 
and Boigu and their perception of intense inequalities across the border fuel a 
fervent politics of both frustration and desire for ‘development’. This is expressed 
through deep mistrust and disappointment towards the PNG state for the failed 
promise of post-independence development. But the focus of Treaty villagers’ ire is 
also directed towards Australia and takes the form of a narrative of Australia’s 
moral responsibility to look after and nurture the Treaty villages after 1975. The 
narrative is framed around failed promises and evidenced through their perception 
that the Treaty villages have been left behind in comparison to the Torres Strait 
Islands. Post-colonial promises have not been honoured, they feel, and the 
tantalising promise of development has consequently gone unfulfilled. It is to these 
beliefs and the political narratives through which they are expressed that I now turn. 
Disaffection, desire and the politics of distribution 
The way they are benefiting, we should be benefiting.25 
It was midday in Parama village, the only settlement on the island of Parama, which 
lies just off the South Fly coast, about 25 kilometres east of Daru Island. Parama 
guards the turbulent waters of the South Fly River estuary, and villagers who had 
gathered to talk were reflecting on the changes they had seen since colonial times, 
and the effects of the Ok Tedi mine upon the local fisheries. One of the village elders 
shared his reflections: 
At independence in 1975 the Australian Government was taking care of 
us. Departments were there and functioning. They had been providing us 
fridges, cash crops and things to help us. [At independence] promises 
  
were made, lots of promises, and these didn’t arrive. After independence 
PNG didn’t assist us properly, and then there was the Ok Tedi mine in 
1982, 1984. Before that time, there were lots of fish, dugong, crayfish. 
After the mine started a lot of infection and the fisheries were badly 
affected. There was sand coming down from Ok Tedi that covered the 
reef. We are asking the government of PNG for assistance. A little comes 
but it doesn’t make much difference. King tides cover the island, destroy 
the gardens. Ok Tedi has already ruined the sea so there are few 
alternatives. 
This is a familiar narrative throughout the South Fly Treaty villages, and it 
encapsulates the frustrations of local people both with their own government and 
with the government of Australia. For the residents of Parama village that day, the 
solution was clear, and it lay just across the water. 
Most of our lives are dependent on the marine resources, and when the 
water is damaged and the conditions are bad, we can’t go out to sustain 
our lives. But in Torres Strait Islands, after 14 days they collect their 
money and do nothing. Though we share the same border, we don’t share 
the same life. We are right at the bottom in life situations. But we’re 
supposed to be the same as them. We should get the same treatment, the 
same payments as the [Torres Strait] Islanders. 
In village after village across the South Fly, residents invoked powerful 
narratives of having been left behind by Australia at independence.26 Notions of 
moral responsibility and promises unfulfilled manifest in very particular demands 
and a vision for how Treaty villagers should be able to live their lives. Desire centres 
on the trappings of state that Treaty villagers see their neighbours across the water 
in Torres Strait Islands enjoying: a well-resourced school with good teachers, a 
medical centre networked to the wider Australian health system, sufficient clean 
water throughout the year. Most powerfully, desire centres upon Centrelink 
payments and the ability to get money out of the cash machine each fortnight to pay 
for food and daily needs. ‘We live on money now,’ one interviewee in Tureture 
village said indignantly. ‘[Torres Strait] Islanders live on social benefit [which is] an 
actual benefit of life we’re not receiving.’27 The ability to get ‘free’ money out of a 
cash machine powerfully embodies the politics of both desire and discontent in the 
Treaty villages. 
Resistance, legibility and ‘dependence’ 
Papuan mainlanders of course take steps to bypass the restrictive border practices 
and the narrow interpretation of Treaty regulations described above. Much of this 
activity is covert: for example there is a flourishing underground trade in illicit 
alcohol supplied across the border from PNG. Boat operators in the South Fly 
villages will receive text messages from friends, family or contacts in Torres Strait 
  
Islands, requesting an alcohol drop. They then land cheap alcohol purchased in Daru 
on remote parts of the island, or just off shore, to be collected later by their 
customers. There is trade too in marijuana grown in Papua and sold on Torres Strait 
Islands, several Papuan mainlanders having been caught and sentenced. One 
interviewee from Sigabaduru described how profitable running bootleg liquor and 
drugs is: ‘They are fast money-making [whereas] with mats and wood carvings we 
just sit and waste our time.’ He also described how some fishermen from the 
mainland go out to find sea cucumber, ‘… but they’re not in our territory. Some 
people go to Australian territorial waters to get them. If they’re caught they’re 
caught; if not they’re lucky.’ Penalties for illegal fishing in Australian waters are 
severe, with Papuan mainlanders recounting stories of their boats being impounded, 
sunk or sold by local island officials. 
These livelihood strategies are deployed by Papuan mainlanders to bypass the 
regulatory controls in place at the border, rather than a form of ‘resistance’ as 
classically understood. I contend that they are secondary to the primary aim of 
mainlanders in the borderlands, which is to be productively connected to the 
Australian state. Papuan mainlanders engage in illegal activities largely because this 
primary aim is constantly being frustrated. Political discourse in the Treaty villages 
expresses frustration with the PNG Government, which is seen as predatory and 
defunct, and with the Australian state, because of the denial of the historically rooted 
moral responsibility they feel the former colonial power bears to them. Their 
recognition of special status under the Treaty validates, in their eyes, their claims of 
connectedness. It is a politics of distribution that has, at its heart, a desire to be 
rendered connected and therefore legible to the Australian state. This desire to be 
rendered legible is a feature of politics prevalent in situations where a powerful state 
is in a position to render substantial assistance to those in need.28 The Australian 
state is recognised by Papuan mainlanders as being both pre-eminent and 
efficacious, and they are engaged in claim-making to assert legibility and thus 
eligibility to the suite of benefits and services that Torres Strait Islanders enjoy. 
Much mainstream political discourse characterises the close connection with 
the state enjoyed by Torres Strait Islanders and aspired to by Papuan mainlanders as 
‘dependence’. This dependency is often viewed pejoratively in development policy 
literature too, with development interventions advocated that are intended to grow 
‘independence’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ for developmental subjects.29 This, however, is 
quite removed from the reality of daily life in the borderlands, where sociality and 
social embeddedness govern all aspects of life. In fact, in the borderland context, it is 
hard to envisage what ‘independence’ would entail. The borderlands are at the 
periphery of the global economy and marginal to the operation of regional and 
global capital. Without the Australian state’s security concerns for border 
management, and its efforts to ‘close the gap’ between its Indigenous and non-
Indigenous populations, the Torres Strait Islands would arguably be in a similar 
situation to the Papuan mainland. The struggle for legibility in which residents of 
the South Fly are engaged is the pre-eminent means of sustaining life in a region 
  
with very few alternatives. In a context where there are so few options, legibility to 
the state can mean quite literally the difference between life and death: it is then a 
biopolitical imperative—a means of sustaining life. 
Distributional labour and a rightful share 
What occurs in the South Fly Treaty villages resonates strongly with James 
Ferguson’s theorisation of what he describes as ‘the new politics of distribution’, and 
particularly with his notion of the ‘rightful share’.30 Ferguson notes that would-be 
beneficiaries of the state are increasingly strident in their claim-making, couching 
claims in a language of entitlement. Demands articulated are not for ‘rights’ in the 
abstract but for a much more tangible ‘rightful share’. Like Li, Ferguson observes 
that in a large number of places in the ‘developing’ world today, there is no access to 
wage labour opportunities, and no prospect of ever having it: it is a context of 
‘jobless growth’ and a corresponding ‘labour surplus’ (global) economy. What is 
occurring, Ferguson holds, is not a ‘strategy of global capital’ to exploit labour but 
rather a demonstration of the very limited relevance of capital at any scale in many 
remote and unconnected places. Remote people are functionally isolated from a 
production system that has no use for them. Claim-making then is not about 
entitlement rooted in labour and a temporary inability to exchange labour in the 
marketplace as the source of purchasing power and consumption. Rather, Ferguson 
believes what is being articulated increasingly across the developing world is a 
wider claim of entitlement to distributive allocations, grounded in democratic 
citizenship. It is not founded on conceptions of charity but of the rightful share. 
Politics, then, is not about people seeking ‘independence’ but about rendering 
legibility to power-holders and nurturing particular forms of dependence: 
dependence upon a patron (the state) to deliver real benefits to them, in order to 
sustain life. Engendering this dependence requires hard work. It is a form of what 
Ferguson describes as ‘distributive labour’, in terms of securing connections to those 
with influence, and is premised on people not as atomised individuals but as 
enmeshed in complex relations of mutuality. Dependence, then, is deeply social. 
Ferguson’s treatise resonates strongly with the situation witnessed in the Torres 
Strait borderlands, where there is a particularly potent set of circumstances at play in 
the claim-making taking place. Papuan Treaty village residents are engaged in 
claim-making that transcends an international border and is directed at a 
neighbouring state. It is strongly influenced by the recent memory of colonialism 
and the rupturing of the colonial state, and is shaped by the imposition of an 
international boundary perceived to be increasingly formal and restrictive, which 
intensifies discontent. 
These features are evident in the recent move by Treaty villagers to establish 
their own separate LLG entity that would bypass what is seen as a predatory central 
and local state system, and connect instead directly with Australian aid earmarked 
for the Treaty villages.31 This is a vivid illustration of the attempt to render legibility 
in a transnational context and demand a ‘rightful share’ from the former colonial 
  
power. As one Treaty village member hoped, through the new Forecoast LLG they 
will be able to ‘make our own laws’ and so stop people illegally harvesting marine 
resources. He envisaged also having their own customs and immigration for border 
villages and that they would ‘employ our own people to run this organisation; that’s 
why we’re sending them to school’. He concluded: ‘Only when we separate will we 
have development.’ 
Conclusion 
What is to be done? This is the question that bedevils national and local policy-
makers, non-government organisations and development aid officials of the 
Australian Government. There appear to be few prospects for large-scale 
agricultural development in the South Fly; little or no manufacturing or industrial 
development opportunities; and concerns over the long-term sustainability of fishing 
resources (chapter 7). In this context, ongoing attempts to ‘develop’ the South Fly 
through business-as-usual development interventions to foster agricultural market 
integration or small business development offer few real prospects of success. 
Similarly, prospects appear bleak for the large-scale absorption of South Fly labour 
into the regional or global capitalist economy, certainly so long as health and 
education provision for young people in the district remains rudimentary. The South 
Fly appears to bear all of the hallmarks of a region peripheral to the needs of global 
capital, with South Fly residents being a ‘surplus population’, in Li and Ferguson’s 
terms.32 
In this context it is not hard to understand the causes behind the rise of the 
potent politics of disaffection and desire that this chapter describes. Perhaps the 
strident claim-making that has resulted offers an opportunity to reframe 
understandings of ‘development’ in the region. James Ferguson’s notion of politics 
today as increasingly drawing upon the notion of a rightful share has explanatory 
value in making sense of politics of the kind taking place in the South Fly. Through 
their narratives of disaffection and desire, Treaty villagers frame notions of rights 
and entitlements in a very material and specific way, through asserting a belief that 
they should receive their rightful share from the former Australian colonial power. 
But what might this mean in concrete terms? In Give a Man a Fish (2015), 
Ferguson discusses the growing movement for universal basic income as being the 
mechanism through which a rightful share of a nation’s wealth is distributed. 
Through a Basic Income Grant (BIG), every citizen of a state receives regular 
payments that guarantee an unconditional minimum income standard for every 
citizen. The payment is made regularly to every citizen with no further eligibility 
conditions, or conditionality on how the money should be spent. The BIG movement 
is growing, and the number of schemes in operation, both in the developed and 
developing worlds, has been steadily increasing.33 The development policy literature 
on unconditional cash transfer schemes increasingly shows that such social 
payments are not only ameliorative but potentially transformative too, in enhancing 
recipients’ long-term life prospects.34 Ferguson documents how cash grants are a 
  
ubiquitous feature of the social landscape in South Africa and increasingly other 
southern African states too. Might an unconditional basic income grant scheme offer 
a new kind of development opportunity for the South Fly? 
In fact residents of the South Fly are already familiar with social cash payment 
schemes. There is an existing cash payment scheme in operation by the Ok Tedi 
sovereign wealth fund, which makes payments twice a year to all individuals 
affected by the operation of the Ok Tedi mine along the Fly River. This scheme has 
faced problems, with money slow to be released by the fund and payments 
remaining small (a few hundred kina each time). Nevertheless the mechanism for 
delivering payments directly to beneficiaries through the bank is established and 
familiar, and appears viable.35 
There is perhaps a unique opportunity to consider a BIG scheme of some sort 
in the South Fly region that is funded either (or dually) through Australia and the 
existing Ok Tedi fund of PNG; is predicated on a recognition of South Fly residents 
as owners and guardians of the borderland; and perhaps recognises their important 
role in environmental stewardship and ‘border protection’. This would give 
credence to local political demands for a fairer post-colonial compact and would 
offer an alternative to moribund orthodox development interventions that have done 
little to improve the well-being or livelihood opportunities of the people of this 
remote region. A transnational BIG offers a tantalising opportunity for a new kind of 
development pact, one that helps meet the desired outcomes of different parties of a 
rightful share to national and regional wealth on one hand, and a secure and 
flourishing border region that safeguards the wider interests of the Australian and 
PNG states on the other. 
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1 The Torres Strait Treaty was signed in December 1978 and came into force in 
February 1985. See DFAT, ‘The Torres Strait Treaty’, 
www.dfat.gov.au/geo/torres-strait/Pages/the-torres-strait-treaty.aspx. 
2 T.M. Li, ‘After development: Surplus population and the politics of entitlement’, 
Development and Change, vol. 48, no. 6, 2017, pp. 1247–61. 
3 J. Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution, Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC, and London, 2015. 
  
 
4 A rhetorical question voiced by a village meeting participant, September 2017. 
5 At the time of fieldwork (October 2017), previous employees of Australian-owned 
and -operated pearl-diving boats were eligible to receive compensation for 
their historical underpayment in the industry. However, many villagers were 
not aware of this entitlement and had not applied for compensation. A small 
number of older village residents were also receiving payments under the 
award wages settlement for time they or their relatives spent working for the 
Department of Aboriginal Island Affairs (DAIA). 
6 During fieldwork in Mabuduan, residents expressed nostalgia for the facilities that 
they had during colonial times: a bank, a trading centre, community hall and a 
boat. All gradually disappeared or broke down through the 1990s and were 
never replaced. 
7 Li, 2017. 
8 T.M. Li, Land’s End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier, Duke University 
Press, Durham, NC, and London, 2014. 
9 Interview, Sui village, October 2017. 
10 Source of the data in all figures and tables is combined data from the household 
surveys conducted in November 2016, September–October 2017 and July 2018. 
The surveys covered both Treaty and non-Treaty villages. 
11 South Fly villages have unofficially designated ‘corners’ in Daru town, where 
village kin and clan groups have settled and where visiting village members 
stay, often in very overcrowded houses. Some village corner populations (e.g. 
Parama, which has three corners in Daru Town) have more residents than the 
origin village itself. Overcrowding is a key contributing factor in the spread of 
MDR-TB and, given the high levels of mobility between South Fly villages and 
Daru, it is highly likely that MDR-TB is a significant problem in South Fly 
villages too. 
12 At the time of fieldwork in October 2017, the Australian Government had spent 
A$44 million on fighting TB in Papua New Guinea since 2011. Australian High 
Commissioner, speech, Ground-breaking ceremony in Mabuduan, 9 October 
2017. 
13 For a revealing examination of the process through which South Fly villages were 
granted Treaty village status, see K. Murphy, ‘The cultural organisation of 
social difference and relatedness at the border between Australia and Papua 
New Guinea’, PhD thesis, ANU, Canberra, 2013, chapter 3. There is long-
standing conflict and antagonism between Kiwai-speaking villages (from 
Mabuduan east) and non-Kiwai villages to the west. This colours local 
perceptions of what constitutes a community with legitimate connections to 
Torres Strait Islands and therefore a claim to Treaty status. In conversation with 
villagers in Parama during fieldwork, they argued that Dorogori (a non-Treaty 
village) should be in the Treaty ‘as they speak Kiwai’ and therefore have a 
  
 
better claim than all the ‘non-Kiwai speaking villages who are in the Treaty’. 
They should be included, they argued, ‘as they have the same lifestyle as us’. 
14 The hospital is provided by the Australian Government to provide care for all 
South Fly villagers, irrespective of their Treaty status. 
15 Buzi villager, October 2017. 
16 This article from the Australian is an example of the positioning by the local MP, 
Warren Entsch, for better security and regulation of the border: S. Elks, ‘Torres–
PNG border checks must be bolstered’, Australian, 26 August 2015, 
www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/torrespng-border-
checks-must-be-bolstered-warren-entsch/news-
story/6bdcf6a5082cdf0561dbef8871172e8e. 
17 Security officials from the PNG Government whom we met in Daru said the 
number of cases of international illegal immigrants crossing into Australia was 
very small, only three or four having been intercepted during the past year (in 
2017). In fact cases are so rare that they are usually accommodated at a resort-
style guest house in Daru Town rather than a security establishment before 
they are returned home. This was the case with a Bangladeshi immigrant who 
had been caught and was being accommodated in Daru in October 2017, before 
being sent to Port Moresby and repatriated. 
18 There is a substantial community of Papuans on Saibai who live in an enclave on 
the island (Western Point) and have close family connections to Mabuduan. 
They are resident and Australian citizens but have no native title rights on the 
islands. They complain of discrimination by Indigenous islanders, and it is 
their mainland relatives who are routinely barred or blocked from spending 
time on the islands. A senior island official acknowledged that relations with 
the Papuans at the Point (who are Kiwai) are ‘complicated’ and that he felt 
closer to the (non-Kiwai) Papuan mainlanders from Sigabaduru, with whom 
there are ‘close blood lines’. 
19 Quoted in M. Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, 
Chatto & Windus, London, 1998, p. 48. In an insightful analysis of the 
structuring of difference in the Balkans following the collapse of the former 
state of Yugoslavia, Ignatieff discusses how the common cultural elements and 
shared history of Serbs and Croats during the Balkan wars became less 
essential to the perceptions of their own identities than the ‘minor’ elements 
that divided them. He argues that this is rooted in a shared narcissism 
generated by conflict so that ‘the smaller these differences may seem to 
outsiders, the larger they may loom in insiders’ mutual self-definitions’ (ibid., 
p. 50). ‘The less substantial the differences between two groups’, Ignatieff 
concludes, ‘the more they both struggle to portray those differences as 
absolute’ (ibid., p. 51). 
20 Interview, September 2017. 
  
 
21 One regular visitor to Torres Strait from Mabuduan remarked: ‘The laws are 
getting tougher—we get moved out by 3–4pm.’ Papuan mainlanders from the 
two largest villages close to Saibai have been allocated days on which they can 
come across to the island. Sigabaduru’s days are Wednesday, Thursday and 
Friday; Mabuduan residents can travel on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. 
No travel is allowed from Saturday to Monday. 
22 The enforcement of tight biosecurity restrictions in Torres Strait Islands is felt 
keenly by Papuan mainlanders, who recall how even relatively recently local 
foodstuffs were freely traded across the waterway. Now, for example, taro 
from Fiji is sold in the stores on Torres Strait Islands, not taro grown only 5 
kilometres away on the mainland. 
23 Tensions over what Buzi villagers see as their historical ill-treatment and being 
looked down upon by Boigu residents came to a head in 2016. A Buzi boat 
approaching the shore of Boigu was stoned by Boigu youth, and Buzi villagers 
subsequently returned in two boats and rampaged through the streets. As a 
result, a number of men received a one-year ban from the island. In Bula, 
residents recounted how Boigu villagers were told to remove their plastic 
water tanks as it was felt they attracted mosquitoes. The Bula villagers begged 
to be able to take the tanks, but the Boigu mayor ordered them to be taken to 
the tip and destroyed. Recycling cast-offs from the Torres Strait Islands is 
important for Papuan mainlanders. At every PNG village meeting discarded, 
broken plastic chairs from Torres Strait Islands are often the only furniture in 
evidence. 
24 Many Papuan mainlanders who work regularly on Saibai or Boigu have some 
family connection to the households they work for. 
25 Mainland LLG member, September 2017. 
26 During fieldwork we would often be approached by older Treaty village residents 
who would recount detailed family genealogies or talk about past colonial-era 
service and show detailed collections of documents, which they believed 
established their right to Australian citizenship. These conversations would be 
accompanied by collections of yellowing official documents relating back to the 
colonial era, indexed and carefully preserved in faded manila files or plastic 
sleeves. 
27 Village meeting in Tureture village, October 2017. 
28 See A. Walker, Thailand’s Political Peasants: Power in the Modern Rural Economy: 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2012; P. Chaudhry, ‘The struggle to be 
poor in Vietnam’s northern borderlands: Political metis and biopower in the 
local state arena’, in Connected and Disconnected in Viet Nam: Remaking Social 
Relations in a Post-Socialist Nation, ed. P. Taylor, ANU Press, Canberra, 2016. 
29 This is an extension of neoliberal conceptions of the self as being an atomised 
individual, somehow separate from any social and communal bonds, the 
‘responsibilised’ individual. See S. Trnka and C. Trundle, ‘Competing 
  
 
responsibilities: Moving beyond neoliberal responsibilisation’, Anthropological 
Forum, vol. 24, no. 2, 2014, pp. 136–53. 
30 Ferguson, 2015. 
31 Treaty village leaders are seeking to replicate the Torres Strait Regional Authority 
(TSRA) structure operating on the Australian side of the border. 
32 T.M. Li, ‘To make live or let die? Rural dispossession and the protection of surplus 
populations’, Antipode, vol. 41, no. S1, 2009, pp. 66–93. 
33 Comprehensive information about the Basic Income Grant movement can be 
found through the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) (www.basicincome.org) 
and the UK’s Citizens’ Basic Income Trust (www.citizensincome.org). P. Parijs 
and Y. Vanderborght’s Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a 
Sane Economy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017) is a good 
recent overview of the issues and arguments and a review of the available 
evidence. But for a powerful critique of the concept of basic income, see D. 
Zamora, ‘The case against a basic income’, Jacobin Magazine, trans. J.B. Boerop, 
28 December 2017, www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/universal-basic-income-
inequality-work. 
34 Although there is general agreement among advocates over the core principles of 
universal basic income, there is no consensus over how UBI schemes should be 
structured, administered and paid for, and consequently what the impact will 
be. UBI pilot schemes to date have all been slightly different. Some of the more 
rigorous and long-standing schemes, such as Alaska’s Permanent Fund 
Dividend and the ‘Mincome’ Guaranteed Annual Income Experiment in 
Manitoba, Canada, show significant benefits to new mothers and young 
people, for example, with better educational completion rates and reduced 
hospital visits, and improved mental health for participants (see 
www.basicincome.org/research/research-depository). Finland’s two-year Basic 
Income Grant pilot project, which finished at the end of 2018, has been 
rigorously evaluated, and findings will appear on the Kela website 
(www.kela.fi/web/en/basic-income-experiment). 
35 During fieldwork in Daru, we witnessed the long lines of beneficiaries waiting to 
withdraw their payments from the two ATMs in the centre of Daru Town. 
  
5 
Governance 
Mark Moran and Jodie Curth-Bibb 
I am now into my second week of travelling across the Torres Strait, 
staying at Boigu Island. I have just awkwardly greeted the people from 
Buzi village, a mere 7 kilometres by dingy across the border into PNG. It 
has only been a few months since they had shared their food and houses 
with us. I know I owe them something, but I’m not sure what. They were 
so generous, sharing what they had. I give them an electronic keyboard 
for their church that I have carried up from Brisbane but seeing them 
now, I know it’s too little. 
They’ve lined up their handicrafts, wares and produce for sale, 
including live mud crabs allowed in by Customs [figure 5.1 and figure 
5.2]. There was no natural shade, tarps, shelters or market stalls, just a 
thin shade cast from the wall of a concrete block building. Other 
boatloads of people sat in the full sun, floating slightly offshore, waiting 
to be processed by their not-so-distant relatives, now working for Border 
Force and Biosecurity. There were no potential buyers around, other than 
me. We talked about the news, people, politics and struggles over on the 
PNG side, their wares spread on the ground between us. There was 
nothing that I wanted or needed to buy. I debated handing them some 
cash. I wasn’t sure if that was permitted as a traditional activity under the 
treaty, and I was in plain sight of the Boigu people who were my hosts on 
this trip. I could always send something later by electronic transfer, I 
thought. I said my goodbyes and wandered off back into the heat. 
Later in the afternoon as I dallied in the Boigu store enjoying the air-
conditioning, I observed a Papuan man as he slowly wandered the aisles, 
studying the prices, deliberating on what to buy with the five dollars in 
his hand. As I waited in the line, two local Torres Strait Islander women 
held up the line at the checkout, as they raced around the store gathering 
pizzas and other packaged foods. I tried to be patient. When they were 
done, I found a chair outside to enjoy my now melting ice-cream. The 
Buzi people were still there. They had moved their wares with the shade 
to the other side of the block building, now facing the store. It was going 
to be another long hot day for them, with little or no payoff, but despite 
this they show up every day that they were granted entry. 
  
Mark Moran, fieldwork notebook, 2018 
<figure 5.1 near here> 
A woman from the South Fly selling crafts in the Torres Strait Islands (Research team, 2017) 
<figure 5.2 near here> 
A customs warning sign on display on the PNG side of the border (Research team, 2018) 
The people of the South Fly District of PNG endure a near-total failure of governance 
and service delivery. At the heart of it people do not feel represented, they do not 
feel heard and they are living with an extreme level of deprivation that is not being 
addressed. Although problems of governance occur across PNG, the situation in the 
South Fly is made all the more stark by the social and economic inequalities of the 
borderland. The existence of the border with Australia creates a distinctly uneven 
effect that emphasises the relative disadvantage on the PNG side of the border. This 
is heightened by the recent history, familial relationships and shared culture in the 
region, which extend beyond PNG into Torres Strait and Australia. People in their 
fifties remember a time when these inequalities were not so marked. 
The problem in PNG of failed service delivery is frequently characterised as a 
governance failure. It is generally understood as a failure of leaders to be held 
accountable for the spending of significant national resources and a failure of the 
citizens to hold those leaders to account. The solution therefore often offered by 
international aid agencies is to make the PNG state more like a liberal democratic 
state and to replicate the technologies of governance so as to guard against 
corruption and promote good governance. The favoured aid modality quickly 
resorts to capacity-building programs in the hotel function rooms of the nearest 
regional centre. But complexities of the South Fly are not well understood when 
viewed through a traditional development lens, as they ignore its location on an 
international border with two neighbouring nation states. The people living in the 
South Fly have a range of existing capabilities and potentialities that they struggle to 
realise due to a complex array of structural constraints, which have institutional, 
political and social dimensions. 
Academics have in the past described rural life in PNG in terms of its 
‘subsistence affluence’.1 There can indeed be high levels of social capital in some 
South Fly villages (e.g. community cohesion, informal committees, strong 
leadership) and natural capital (e.g. available land, marine resources). Unlike the 
Tok Pisin (Pidgin English) common to most of PNG, spoken English is the lingua 
franca in the South Fly stemming from the high levels of formal education provided 
by Australian teachers in the lead-up to independence. Some people have in the past 
also benefited from the proximity to Australia, establishing themselves as 
middlemen of cross-border trade. But people living in the South Fly also remain 
vulnerable, due to unreliable rainfall, drought, infectious disease, and domestic and 
factional violence, leaving people in living conditions that are difficult to survive. 
The absence of physical capital (e.g. transportation, water supply) and financial 
capital (e.g. savings, assets, loans), means that livelihood opportunities for enterprise 
  
and employment remain very low. Everyone, it seems, is searching for markets for 
their produce and crafts, so they can get cash to buy consumables, health services 
and school charges. 
In this chapter we question the assumptions that underpin how governments 
approach development in PNG—and the South Fly in particular. We suggest an 
understanding of governance that is mindful of local forms of decision-making and 
focused on the unique circumstances that arise in a borderland. 
Conceptualising governance in the borderland 
Governance in the borderland is best described as institutional layering of 
governance technologies over the top of existing informal institutions without 
regard for how they operate. Many of these existing informal institutions have 
evolved through both formal colonial and post-colonial influences. This institutional 
layering of governance is consistent with the concept of hybridity, which describes 
how Western notions of liberal democratic governance and bureaucracy operate 
alongside, over the top of and in conflict with what is often described as informal 
institutions.2 We look to a body of literature known collectively as the areas of 
limited statehood and the concept of differently governed spaces. We argue that this 
theoretical framing relates strongly to the institutional bricolage described in the 
borderlands literature, whereby governance actors cobble together solutions 
depending on what is available to them (see the Introduction to this book). 
Throughout the chapter we illustrate what research participants highlighted as 
being the three forms of governance failure: (1) the PNG Government’s inability to 
get resources to the ground associated with high levels of perceived corruption; (2) 
the current inability of aid interventions to reach the people on the ground and their 
feelings of being disconnected from aid decisions and being powerless to hold aid to 
account; and (3) the deleterious effects of the policy and associated governance 
surrounding Australia’s enforcement of the border. 
What is understood by the term ‘governance’? According to Plumptre and 
Graham, 
Governance involves the interactions among structures, processes and 
traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken 
and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say. Fundamentally, it 
is about power, relationships and accountability: who has influence, who 
decides, and how decision-makers are held accountable.3 
The concept has since been used to both describe and prescribe. As noted by Offe, 
‘the concept of governance is used to grasp, on the one hand, institutions (a structure 
of rules), and on the other hand, a process (that of steering)’.4 He goes on to contend: 
‘The success of its dissemination is in contrast with the informational value of the 
term, when one refers to something as an instance of “governance”, one has not yet 
expressed much—exactly because of the multitude of possible meanings.’5 
  
We suggest that its appeal is essentially a vague perception of what is ‘good’, 
made up of collaboration, coordination, processes, accountability, transparency, 
legitimacy, authority and, importantly, control and management that will somehow 
‘steer’ us (in our boats of multiple rowers) away from an ill-defined ‘badness’. 
Thankfully the governance solution helps us to avoid specifically defining what the 
problem is, as we cannot quite agree and it tends be political. What we pursue then 
are the technologies of governance that act as proxies. 
As Craig and Porter describe, the formulaic prescription of state-building, with 
its use of ‘travelling rationalities’, requires us to claim ‘general applicability that 
asserts the technical over the political, the formal over the substantive, and the 
categorical over the relational’.6 The operationalisation of ‘good governance’ as a 
form of aid assistance severs its political, substantive and relational core. It allows 
donor intervention in the technologies of governance while ostensibly avoiding the 
politics. It fools people into thinking that they can ‘fix’ broken systems with technical 
governance solutions. 
Governance interventions are imbued with meaning in a Western context 
because these mechanisms are a product of the cultural histories of the West. The 
history in PNG is very different. If local origins and known trajectories for 
governance are ignored, the technical façade of governance becomes a blunt 
instrument in application of the development remedy. This matters because it is easy 
to appear to go through the motions of governance and spend significant resources 
establishing the institutions that do not ultimately benefit people. 
The ‘areas of limited statehood’ literature (see the Introduction to this book) 
describes how those living on the periphery of states cobble together what is 
available to them into a unique bricolage of governance institutions and actors. 
Taking a spatial lens we can see that place, including places that span borders, 
should be taken as a unit of analysis. This lens helps us to understand how best we 
can draw on the bricolage of governance institutions working on the edge of the 
PNG state to better maximise service delivery and to realise improvements in the 
quality of life informed by the priorities and views of those living it. We then 
understand governance and service delivery as spanning multiple state influences, 
with the borderland at the centre, rather than at the periphery. 
PNG’s services and decentralised financing 
Service delivery deficit 
Daily life in the South Fly is hard as people struggle for water, food and basic 
housing. The typical house is made of a hand-hewn timber frame with leaves or bark 
roof and walls; only 41 per cent of respondents (49 out of 119) reporting having an 
iron roof (figure 5.3). The houses are small, usually comprising four small rooms and 
with a floor area of less than 40 square metres. Crowding was also a problem; out of 
271 respondents, 118 indicated that 5–7 people live in these small spaces, with 55 
respondents reporting 8–9 and 46 in excess of 10. These conditions are markedly 
  
different from housing in the Torres Strait, where the average household size is 3.8 
people,7 living in 3 to 4 bedrooms, across 150–200 square metres of social housing. 
<figure 5.3 near here> 
Researchers found that 70 of 119 households in the South Fly had roofs comprising mostly 
leaves or bark, while 49 had iron sheets for roofing. These iron sheets are distributed 
sporadically and sparingly, and are often in varying states of disrepair. (Research data) 
The size of the villages we visited in the South Fly varied, from a few 
households to more than a thousand people, but the majority of village populations 
ranged from 100 to 400. Despite these numbers, in three villages there were no pit 
toilets, and five villages had less than ten toilets in total. Respondents also reported 
problems with access to clean water for hygienic purposes and the necessity of 
bathing in areas that are home to crocodiles. Only 19 of the 36 villages reported 
having mobile phone coverage, and most villages did not have access to two-way 
radio (21 of 34 villages). Only 15 of 35 villages reported having any village roads, 
and only 8 of 33 villages had a health aid post. 
According to the Principal Education Advisor of the Western Province 
Department of Education,8 most children attend school to at least year 7, but their 
schooling can be significantly interrupted: ‘When the parents travel to other villages, 
or to work in the gardens, they take their children with them.’ In the course of our 
household survey, the primary reasons given by people for not attending school 
were children being engaged in livelihood activities and teacher absenteeism. 
Transport difficulties were also a significant barrier, because many villages only had 
an elementary school. The challenges to improving access to, and quality of, 
education are enormous. The increase of student numbers due to increased 
population and the Tuition Fee Free (TFF) policy of universal access has resulted in 
problems with the quality of education. Shortages of qualified staff are endemic. 
When policy changes occur, particularly in the area of curriculum, there is little or no 
capacity or resources to roll out reforms. Although there are 60 primary schools in 
the South Fly, there is only one secondary school to grade 12 located in Daru and one 
to grade 10 in Morehead, which only a few villages can reach by a daily commute. 
The Western Provincial Administration acknowledges that the provision of 
secondary schooling is beyond the budgetary capacity of the province.9 Despite these 
challenges, parents and communities place education as one of their highest 
priorities. Since the introduction of the TFF policy in 2012, schools are not allowed to 
charge fees, but during the survey from 2016 to 2018, the vast majority (79 per cent, 
or 23 of 29) villages still reported paying a range of charges to make up shortfalls. 
From 2018 to 2019, the PNG Sustainable Development Program (SDP) made 
special payments to all school boards in the province, which should have reduced 
the need for any payments. Yet finding funds to pay for school-related charges 
remained a strong priority for subsistence households. Whatever the subsidies for 
education, obtaining ‘money for school charges’ was the morally most-upstanding 
use of money, and is deployed rhetorically as a reason for needing and asking others 
  
for money, when it is actually needed for a much wider use. When the school is in 
another village, there are also accommodation, food and often transport costs. 
Compared to education, the situation with health services was much worse. As 
outlined by Miller (chapter 6), even when villages had access to health centres they 
were generally in a derelict state. Respondents from 16 of 22 villages indicated that 
their health facility was neither open nor staffed. Of the 38 villages surveyed, four 
indicated that no health providers of any sort had ever visited the village, while 15 
villages indicated visits from a health team member from Daru, and another 16 
indicated they received visits from other health-related personnel. When asked 
about the frequency of such visits, seven villages indicated that they had not seen a 
health provider for more than a year, two reported seeing one sometime in the 
previous year; the remainder receiving more frequent visits (nine had received a 
visit in the last week). The frequency of visits correlated with the proximity to Daru. 
The survey supported the widespread view among stakeholders that the public 
health system in the South Fly had largely collapsed. 
Barriers to effective service delivery include recruitment and retention of public 
servants with the right mix of qualifications and competencies. There have also been 
significant funding shortages recently in PNG due to a downturn in revenues and 
budget priorities of the national government, including substantial spending on 
international events.10 While staff costs have been prioritised, cuts have especially 
affected travel within districts. This creates the perverse situation of fully staffed 
offices in Daru but with insufficient financial capacity to travel to villages. 
Teacher and health worker absenteeism in villages is often explained by the 
cost and time involved in travelling to Daru, to receive their pay and to do shopping. 
Health workers give many reasons why they are delayed in returning, but often it 
includes dealing with administrative problems with their pay. This can take so long 
that when the time comes to return to their village, they decide to wait for the next 
pay period. The PNG Government typically does not provide support for travel, so 
public servants are left to their own devices; some just run out money and do not 
have sufficient funds to pay for fuel for the return travel. There are many other 
reasons why public servants become trapped in Daru. Although living conditions in 
Daru are substandard, there are shops, a market, alcohol and satellite TV. If there are 
no teachers to cover for them, the school is closed. The impact on a village clinic is 
immediate, as there is only one health worker. Teachers who are absent from their 
school can be cut off the payroll and face the scrutiny of their school board and head 
teacher, but health workers can be absent for extended periods, with no punitive 
action or consequences. 
Decentralised governance structures 
Governance in PNG operates across five different levels: national, provincial, 
district, local and ward. The South Fly (Western) Provincial Government consist of 
three districts: South Fly, Middle Fly and North Fly. The South Fly District is 
composed of five local-level governments (LLGs): Daru Urban, Kiwai Rural, 
  
Morehead Rural, Oriomo-Bituri Rural and the newly formed Forecoast Rural.11 Each 
LLG is composed of a number of wards, which are made up of one or more villages 
in rural areas, or neighbourhoods in urban centres. Each ward elects their member to 
sit on the LLG, and they in turn elect their LLG president. In the case of the recently 
formed Forecoast LLG, they also elect their Treaty village chairman to represent 
them in Treaty-related negotiations. 
As set out in the Local-level Governments Administration 1997, each ward should 
have a Ward Development Committee (WDC), made up of up to five associate 
members, two of whom should be women. The function of a Ward Development 
Committee is to be ‘the principal community advisory unit for the ward to the LLG, 
and to determine the needs of the ward in relation to services, programmes and 
infrastructure’. The effectiveness and activity of the WDCs through the South Fly 
was highly variable from village to village. Even in the villages where a WDC was 
active, their deliberations were typically disconnected from the LLG level. A stated 
priority of the South Fly District Administration was to strengthen capabilities 
through a through a Ward Development Plan. 
In addition to these formal structures, there are range of complex and fluid 
informal governance structures at a village level, representing a diversity of local 
interests, including land-owning, church(es), justice, youth, women and school 
groups. This local milieu of leadership and governance is highly fluid and tends to 
reorientate itself around external opportunities. Local stakeholders, including 
churches, aid organisations and schools, often play a critical role in supporting 
informal organisations. 
Before 2014, the Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities Committee 
(JPBPC) was responsible for selection, prioritisation and approval of district funds. 
This changed with the District Development Authority Act 2014 and the establishment 
and training of DDAs (District Development Authorities) across PNG through 2015. 
The purpose of a DDA includes the development of a regional development plan, 
disbursement of district support grants and other grants, and the provision of 
infrastructure and municipal services.12 They report quarterly and annually to the 
Minister of Intergovernmental Relations. The existing DDAs vary in terms of their 
organisation, the governance mechanisms around them, the internal processes they 
use, the level of resources they have at their disposal, the roles they play and the 
capabilities they bring to bear.13 
Although DDAs assume many of the responsibilities of the provincial 
government, they are not intended to replace them. The Act clearly states that the 
DDA must work constructively with provincial government and not contradict or be 
inconsistent with its standards, regulations, plans and other policies.14 Anecdotally, 
however, DDAs in practice routinely lack knowledge of—or ignore—provincial 
policy frameworks within which they ought to be operating.15 How a DDA works 
with the new Provincial Health Authorities (PHAs), for example, remains 
unspecified and unclear. 
  
The South Fly DDA is chaired by the district member, and consists of the five 
elected LLG presidents, as well as the District Administrator, a women’s 
representative and a church representative. The latter two are appointees of the 
member. It deliberates on project proposals that come to it from the LLGs. The South 
Fly DDA was initially described by the Acting Secretary of the Department of 
Implementation and Rural Development as being chaotic with acquittals ‘submitted 
late or never’. But following training, the DDA was then celebrated for its turn-
around. In 2017 the South Fly DDA was applauded in the media for being the first in 
the country to submit its 2016 spending reports.16 
DDAs have certainly experienced some problems with their implementation, 
but there is nonetheless the potential for these authorities to promote locally owned 
development and service provision, and increased civil society scrutiny of public 
expenditure. Interestingly, the legislation notes: 
… if an authority failed to properly publicise its meeting and has 
repeatedly prevented public attendance the Minister can direct that 
minutes of the last two meetings are made available at the district 
administration office, the next meeting is open to the public and the 
agenda for the next meeting is broadcast on the local radio.17 
Decentralised finances and political accountability 
According to a study conducted by the National Research Institute and 
Development Policy Centre, PNG Members of Parliament have received funding to 
spend in their electorate (known as constituency funds) since the 1980s, but the 
amount increased significantly from the mid-2000s through the Service 
Improvement Programs (SIPs). They concluded that PNG now relies on this type of 
‘constituency’ funding to disburse its budget more than any other government in the 
world. The allocation of these funds is heavily influenced by Members of Parliament 
and the different committees they convene, with questionable accountability to their 
constituents.18 
SIPs are available at the provincial, district and local government levels, known 
as PSIP, DSIP and LLGSIP respectively. The purpose of the SIPs is to fund specific 
development projects, rather than the recurrent expenditure much needed by 
government departments. Expenditure is limited to the following sectors 
infrastructure, health, education, economic, administration, and law and justice. The 
Department of Implementation and Rural Development provided a guideline for the 
breakdown of funding allocations.19 Allocation per province for the PSIP should be 
K5 million per district per year. In addition, each district should receive K10 million 
of DSIP funds with a breakdown of K3 million for infrastructure, 2K million for 
health; K2 million for education; K1 million for law and justice, K1 million for 
economic development; and K1 million for administration. In 2016, these divisions 
were relaxed to allow district development authorities more discretion.20 A further 
  
K500 000 should be allocated per LLG. As the South Fly District is now made up of 
five LLGs, this should total K2.5 million. 
The actual allocations can vary wildly from these figures, and there can be 
great disagreement between different stakeholders as to what funds actually reach 
the ground. Looking into the fiscal financial flows in PNG requires an intensity of 
effort and insider knowledge that is often only shared among powerful coalitions. 
The District Administrator in 2016 reported that the policy of having a figure higher 
than K500 000 per LLG ceased in 2013, and even then only about 75 per cent of it was 
actually released. Thereafter it was reduced to K100 000 when the district MPs and 
provincial governors broadly sought to curtail the power of LLG presidents. No 
money was released in 2016, allegedly due to financial freeze during corruption 
proceedings against the Western Provincial Governor.21 
In 2017, as part of a launch of an economic stimulus plan, the Treasurer 
announced a cut-back to both PSIP and DSIP, noting that this reduction was just a 
temporary measure, due to problems with GDP downturns and an over-reliance on 
extractives for revenue.22 However, shortages and problems in funding are not the 
only problems. The SIP is also widely criticised for corruption and misappropriation, 
and for the limited impact it has on rural villages. Accusations of financial 
mismanagement made headlines when bishops of the Catholic Church called for the 
abolition of the SIP altogether.23 They are also accused of enabling systems of 
patronage and perverting electoral outcomes through a kind of ‘slush fund’ for vote-
buying.24 
The political dynamics at play between a Member of Parliament and his 
constituency were observed in the course of the fieldwork. The villages in the 
proximity of the Pahoturi river benefited when the late Aide Ganasi was elected in 
2013 as the Member for South Fly (before rising within the ranks of the ruling 
People’s National Congress to the position of Deputy Speaker). Until his untimely 
death in late 2016, he held considerable influence at the national level. The villages 
along the Pahoturi were grateful for the plentiful supply of iron sheets that the 
Member supplied. While the use of iron sheets for roofing was already somewhat 
widespread across the South Fly, the houses in the Pahoturi installed the sheets for 
walling, rainwater harvesting, sheds and fire pit shelters, or stored them for new 
houses they were planning. Although in a relative sense these villages were 
favoured, in an absolute sense the actual quantum of funding was small, considering 
that the total amount of DSIP funding for the South Fly District was reported to be 
almost K27 million over the four-year period 2013–16.25 It did does not take much of 
this allocation for them to be privileged relative to other villages, and any upper 
hand gained can be jealously guarded (chapter 2). 
People across the South Fly took whatever support they could get, but they 
were well aware of how little money they actually received. There was widespread 
scepticism in the ability of their elected members and existing governance 
mechanisms to deliver funding or services. Despite a range of formal and informal 
governance capabilities at their village level, the extent of their influence seemed to 
  
stop with their LLG member. They talked about having little influence, being 
forgotten, left behind and disconnected from the centre of government. With limited 
telecommunications and lack of money for transport, people relied on their political 
representatives coming to them. As the survey data revealed, this contact was 
infrequent at best. 
When we questioned community leaders from 25 villages about the frequency 
of visits by their current or prior South Fly District member, 18 responded ‘a long 
time ago’ (more than 6 months) and 7 responded ‘never’. Typically, once elected the 
district member relocates to Port Moresby, the capital, often leaving his (none has 
ever been female) wife and children at home. We also enquired about the local-level 
government (LLG) member, given that they are typically long-term residents of one 
of the villages within their ward. The LLG member visits were more frequent, yet 
the results were also mixed. Of the 25 villages surveyed, six reported that the LLG 
member lived there. Four villages reported a visit within the last week, five reported 
a visit within the last month, five reported within the last 6 months, with the 
remaining 5 reporting more than 6 months ago (figure 5.4). This result partly reflects 
that LLG members are elected according to wards that can span more than one 
village, but these villages are generally not far away. 
<figure 5.4 near here> 
Although the frequency of visits Local Level Government members make to South Fly 
villages varies widely, reportedly, South Fly members rarely or never visit these 
communities. (Research data) 
The SIP gives the district MP and the LLG president and LLG members great 
influence over the allocation process, and their deliberation and committee business 
is largely transacted in Daru. The research participants observed that the degree of 
disconnect tends to correlate with the amount of time that the LLG member is away 
from his village. The more time a member spends in Daru or Port Moresby, the more 
he is socialised into a dysfunctional public finance system. The more time the 
member lives in his village, the more he remains socialised to village life, where a 
form of social accountability operates. There are LLG members who go to lengths to 
consult with their community, with public meetings and discussions about the 
selection and development of projects, and ways to maximise the use of local labour 
and other resources. In other villages, the Ward Development Committee is active, 
and it selects projects for LLGSIP funding. These LLG members then take these local 
deliberations forward to the DDA for funding allocations. 
Once an allocation is secured, LLG members can then face considerable 
challenges in actually receiving the funds. The practical difficulties involved were 
observed with a village road project in Bula. The LLG member had overseen village 
labour in the execution of this project and kept careful records, but despite the 
approval and the funds being ‘available’, the money did not follow. The member 
then had to spend several months in Daru, repeatedly petitioning the District 
Administrator and Treasurer to release the funds. While there was money in the 
district’s paper ledgers, there was no money in the district’s bank account. It took 
  
three months for the funds finally to arrive. Many LLG members spend equally 
extended periods in Daru, engaged in the protracted work of securing public 
finances. A significant portion of the budget is then consumed on administration 
costs, largely for accommodation and living expenses in Daru. 
Whatever the problems of public finances, it does not appear to be due to any 
lack of public scrutiny over allocation of public finances. People are generally well 
informed and hold strong opinions on national and local politics. There is a very 
active Facebook page on anything to do with the Western Province, with a recurring 
focus on the accountability of public finances and elected officials.26 As evidenced 
elsewhere,27 social accountability mechanisms to an electoral constituency are a 
necessary but not a sufficient control on public expenditure. Structural mechanisms 
are also needed, including public finance instruments to administer effective 
distributions across jurisdictions, with locally derived indicators to measure 
effectiveness.28 So there is no simple correlation between decentralisation and 
improved decision-making and accountability. 
There are positive outliers to draw on. With Australian government support, 
the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) attempted to raise 
awareness and understanding of public budgets and expenditure at the local level,29 
through what it called the Budget Tracking Initiative.30 The initiative worked with 
LLGs as well as local-level representatives and community leaders, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), church and women’s groups to promote citizen-led 
monitoring. Unfortunately, the initiative was defunded from 2016, but before it ran 
out of resources, CIMIC conducted training in Daru that resulted in the setting up of 
the DAKMO Watch Group,31 comprising members from the four South Fly LLGs. 
There was strong interest among the participants. CIMC reported the following 
account from a female participant involved in the training in an adjoining district. 
This training has opened our eyes and made us more aware of how we 
can better access our development grants … we have been fooled enough 
by our leaders. Now we know how to get them to fast track development 
in our area. They cannot hide any more because we know if they are lying 
or not.32 
Another positive account is the operation of school boards made possible 
through direct funding allocations, via the TFF since 2012, and via PNG SDP since 
2018. This occurs with the involvement of the Provincial Office of the Department of 
Education, where there is a dedicated TFF coordinator. The department employs 
standards officers, other departmental staff monitor school expenditure and quality 
of education, but monitoring visits to villages are infrequent if they occur at all. 
School boards are locally elected for a three-year term, but the department approves 
them. There is a school bank account, with the school chair and the head teacher as 
joint signatories. The board prepares a plan and budget. After receiving the funds 
against the budget, the board must produce an acquittal of the expended funds 
  
before they can be released. Although there were reports of problems, with quality 
of teaching, teacher absenteeism and attendance, it was clear that the schools were at 
least operating, compared to the lack of other services, including abandoned health 
posts.33 
There are significant challenges in overcoming the entrenched dysfunction of 
PNG’s public finance system. Prior attempts at decentralisation reforms have all 
struggled, as has aid assistance in this area. People have little trust in the ability of 
their government to deliver public resources, which extends to governance of 
Australian aid assistance. As one interviewee said, ‘If Australian government gives 
ten onions in a bag, there is a rat here who will eat them all one by one … We should 
be living in permanent houses because there is enough money coming in, but it’s 
being eaten by the rats.’34 
Too little of current PNG government and aid funding is currently reaching 
rural villages. A marked disconnect has emerged between South Fly villages and 
LLG and district headquarters in Daru, where the ‘business’ of public finances is 
transacted. People in the South Fly want increased oversight over public finance 
expenditure. The limited success of the CIMC, TFF and the LLGSIP (in some 
villages) suggests that there are opportunities to work through local organisations 
that enable local accountabilities. But structural reforms are also needed. It is 
unlikely that the SIP will change any time soon, as any reforms will threaten the 
privileges that elected MPs enjoy from it. The Department of Provincial and Local 
Government Affairs has plans to give village-level Ward Development Committee 
(WDC) more powers, including a ward SIP allocation disbursed via a Ward 
Development Plan.35 The South Fly Administration is also supporting the 
development of Ward Development Plans. A number of village leaders in one 
village supported the idea of direct funding to the WDC via a community bank 
account.36 Leaders in another village argued for ‘deeds of agreements’, which ensure 
that funding reached ‘where the mouth is’.37 Balanced with existing systems of 
political and social accountability, these structural reforms are worth exploring. 
Australia’s extrajurisdictional influence in PNG 
Joint management 
A distinct feature of governance in the border area is how the influence of the 
Australian state (whether intended or inadvertent) extends beyond its border. The 
large number of agencies active in the Torres Strait, and the level of resourcing that 
they enjoy, sit in stark contrast to the lack of resources on the PNG side. On the 
Torres Strait, at a local government level, Torres Strait Island Regional Council 
covers all of the land and sea territory in the Protected Zone under the treaty. At 
regional level, the Torres Strait Regional Authority is a statutory authority under the 
Australian legislation. At the state level, there is the full range of Queensland 
government departments that are active in regional areas, including health, police, 
education, justice and housing. At the Commonwealth level, there are four key 
  
Australian government border authorities: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), which administers the treaty; Department of Agriculture and Water 
Resources (DAWA) with responsibility for biosecurity; Australian Border Force 
(ABF; within the Department of Home Affairs) for border enforcement; and 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). In addition, the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) plays an intelligence role, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
assists with reconnaissance; and the Australian Marine Safety Authority (ASMA) 
oversees boating safety. The Maritime Border Control in Canberra controls both 
ADF and ABF vessels and aircraft, including a ‘cutter’ vessel, two ‘fast response 
boats’ and two helicopters.38 
A bewildering number of cross-border committees oversees the administration 
of the treaty. The central body is the Joint Advisory Committee (JAC), comprising 
senior representatives from the Australian and PNG governments and the 
Queensland and Western Provincial governments, and traditional inhabitants from 
the Torres Strait Islands and PNG Treaty villages. It is in turn supported by four 
bilateral committees that meet annually or biannually: the Traditional Inhabitants 
Meeting (TIM), Fisheries Bilateral Meeting, the Environmental Management 
Committee, and the Health Issues Committee (HIC). DFAT then coordinates the 
Torres Strait Interdepartmental Meeting, which aims to progress the action items 
arising from the JAC and these four committees. 
The JAC reports to the Senior Officials Meeting and Bilateral Security Dialogue 
(co-chaired by the DFAT Secretary and their PNG counterpart) with representatives 
from a range of Australian and PNG governments’ law enforcement, immigration, 
customs, biosecurity and health entities. Its recommendations then go to the PNG–
Australia Ministerial Forum (with the Foreign Affairs ministers of PNG and 
Australia attending), at the highest level of bilateral relations between the two states, 
where highly political issues like refugee processing on Manus Island are also 
discussed.39 
There are few, if any, opportunities for external observers and academic 
researchers to observe what occurs in the JAC and at these higher-level bilateral 
meetings, and documents were not available to the research team. An investigation 
in 2019 by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) found that JAC and 
subcommittee meetings were held regularly and were well attended, outcomes 
being documented and actions followed up. But it noted the lack of transparency, 
calling for DFAT to keep a register of JAC decisions and to share it with government 
stakeholders.40 
Elected PNG members who sat on JAC and TIM expressed their frustration at 
how these meetings unfolded. A long-standing member of JAC lamented how little 
influence the PNG members actually had in these meetings and how the Australian 
authorities and Torres Strait members ‘pushed things through’. The member also 
expressed his view on how the real decision-making powers lay with the ‘final 
meetings’ that followed the JAC, including the Senior Officers Meeting and 
  
Ministerial Forum, at which there was no local representation, or communication to 
the JAC of the discussion.41 
The lopsided nature of the ‘joint management arrangements’ is also evident in 
the cross-border travel of Australian government officials, using Australian 
government patrol boats and helicopters. DFAT coordinates biannual Treaty 
Awareness Visits focused on explaining the rules embodied in the ‘Guidelines for 
Traditional Visitors’, and responding to issues raised by traditional inhabitants. A 
range of Australian and PNG government entities participate in these visits, 
representing traditional inhabitants, immigration, law enforcement, environment, 
biosecurity, health and fisheries. 
More frequently, the Australian Border Force also organises bilateral joint 
cross-border patrols three and six times a year, for collaborative intelligence 
exercises, which includes ABF, Queensland Police, PNG Immigration, PNG Customs 
and the PNG Constabulary.42 The patrols take place over three to eight days and 
include visits to both PNG Treaty villages and Torres Strait Islands within the 
Protected Zone.43 There are additional joint operations if a policing and enforcement 
threat emerges. During the course of fieldwork in 2016, a helicopter landed in a 
village we had just left by boat, responding to reports of alleged foreign asylum 
seekers travelling overland and wanting to hire a boat. These operations proceed 
largely at the instigation of the Australian border authorities, and the considerable 
transportation costs involved are paid by Australia. The Australian border 
authorities are accompanied by their PNG counterparts, and for the many villages 
along the South Fly, these extraordinary visits are the only visits they receive from 
these PNG agencies. 
Australian government ministers have also travelled directly across the border 
from the Torres Strait, bypassing the normal protocols with the PNG Government 
and the High Commission in Port Moresby. During the study period, Indigenous 
Affairs Minister Senator Nigel Scullion, accompanied by the Member for Leichhardt 
electorate (which encompasses the Torres Strait), Warren Entsch, travelled by boat 
from the Torres Strait to Mabuduan.44 Immigration officials travelled from Daru to 
process his entry. Their crossing qualified as a ‘facilitated cross-border movement’, 
whereby nominated health and other officials are allowed to enter or exit Australia 
and/or PNG conveniently via non-proclaimed ports, within the area covered by the 
treaty.45 
There is a massive imbalance in the scale of governance structures, resources, 
staffing and transportation vessels between the Australian and the PNG sides of the 
border. The power differential is so great that the current arrangements are better 
described as being consultative—or at best negotiated—rather than jointly managed 
in any equitable sense. Although they follow correct and due process, the Australian 
border authorities are largely able to operate extrajurisdictionally in the PNG state, 
and their resource-strapped PNG counterparts happily accommodate them. 
  
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs 
The policies and practice of the many departments and programs that collectively 
constitute Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs also have a pervasive 
influence on the governance of the borderland. Torres Strait Islanders bear the 
consequences of cross-border visitation under the treaty more than any other 
Australians, given the limited water resources, social housing, fuel stocks and other 
services available to Island communities remote from mainland Australia. As one of 
Australia’s First Peoples, Torres Strait Islanders assert their own sovereignty 
independent of the Australian state, including calls to separate from Queensland by 
establishing a self-governing territory.46 
They are entitled to play a leading role in the management of the border, 
including filling public sector jobs in the different border authorities. Job readiness 
and employment are also a major focus of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs policies. Government jobs are well paid and stable, in places where private 
sector employment is extremely low. All of the 27 biosecurity jobs in DAWA in are 
locally filled, as are the 10 Border Management Officer (BMOs) employed by the 
ADF.47 Most identify as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, and the remainder 
are former PNG nationals who are now Australian citizens. 
There are instances where programs borne from Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs have crossed over and hybridised across the border into PNG. The 
BRTV ranger program (discussed below) was originally modelled on a successful 
ranger program common to Indigenous communities in Australia, including the 
Torres Strait. In the course of discussions with LLG members, it was clear that they 
looked to their counterpart councillors in the Torres Strait for advice, especially with 
governance structures and processes, and ways to acquire Australian government 
funding. 
On the Torres Strait side of the border, the public administration of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander affairs affords considerable powers to elected local 
government (represented by the councillor of the Torres Strait Island Regional 
Council or TSIRC) and native title holders (represented by the chair of the Prescribed 
Body Corporate or PBC), as well as the Torres Strait Regional Authority, which is a 
Commonwealth statutory authority with a board of elected Torres Strait Islander 
representatives. These elected officials hold important powers over ‘visitation’, 
under both local government legislation and the terms of their native title 
determination. They are also charged with powers to self-govern their Island 
communities, including impacts on their limited natural resources (e.g. water supply 
and fish stocks), available social housing, social services (health and schooling) and 
social well-being (disputes and relationships). This includes the negative impact on 
their communities that arise from cross-border visits by PNG nationals, including 
overstayers, and unlawful activity. 
DFAT looks to these individual island councillors to approve visitor permits 
and to set the rules of visitation, including the particular days of the week and the 
  
numbers of people who can cross. This includes the issuing of bans on individuals, 
and even blanket bans for whole PNG villages (see chapter 2). The rules of visitation 
vary between different Torres Strait Islands, as the pressures arising from PNG 
visitors, and the extent that they break the rules, vary between different Islands, with 
the outer islands of Saibai and Boigu being the worst affected. 
Although there is always a rationale, these decisions can also become 
politicised locally, in keeping with the stance taken by individual councillors and 
their local constituency and deliberations. The cross-border movements of PNG 
nationals is a contentious matter within the Torres Strait Island population, and it is 
not dissimilar to the way the rest of Australia views immigration and refugees. 
Incumbent councillors take different stances into local government elections on issue 
of border security and visitor control. 
Although locally led decision-making on visitation aligns with a principle of 
Indigenous self-governance, it does not necessarily align with the ‘spirit of mutual 
friendship and good neighbourliness’, as set out in the treaty. Some councillors 
continue to operate in accordance with ‘tradition’, including cross-border dispute 
resolution processes (see chapter 3), but other councillors are taking an increasingly 
hard line when rules are broken. In 2019, the Saibai councillor placed a ban on all 
visits from Mabuduan village, punishing the entire village for the acts of a number 
of individuals who have broken the rules, largely by overstaying. The legal positon 
regarding who has the power to limit and place such blanket bans, and what 
constitutes a valid ban under the treaty, is not clear. 
A complex blurring is emerging between the two administrative arrangements 
under Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and border management. The 
powers of individual councillors intersect in unknown ways with the international 
and Australian domestic laws that govern the treaty and the powers vested in 
federal government agencies and the governance bodies set up to administer the 
treaty, including JAC and TIM. It appears as though a ‘soft’ compact has emerged 
between the border authorities’ increasing efforts at ‘border protection’, with some 
Torres Strait Islander leaders increasing efforts to ensure ‘self-governance’ of 
visitation. 
Building Resilience in Treaty Villages program 
An interesting case of Australia’s influence across the border is that of the Building 
Resilience in Treaty Villages (BRTV) program—also commonly referred to as the 
ranger program—funded under the Australian Aid Program.48 In establishing its 
rationale, the program sought to reduce the number of inward visits to Australia 
(more than 27 000 during 2018–19) by targeting development programs in the Treaty 
villages.49 
BRTV began by adapting a successful model from Indigenous programming in 
Australia of Indigenous Land and Sea Management Centres (LSMCs) and the work 
of local Indigenous rangers.50 This model operates in a large number of remote 
Indigenous communities across Australia, including the Torres Strait, through the 
  
Land and Sea Management Unit of the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), 
with funding from the Australian Government’s Department of Agriculture and 
Water Resources. In the Torres Strait, in addition to the normal role of natural and 
cultural resource management, the rangers are funded to undertake a range of 
biosecurity surveillance activities, including sharing information on the movement 
of people and goods across the border.51 
<Figure 5.5 near here> 
Rangers in the South Fly (Research team, 2016) 
The focus of BRTV’s operation is the employment, training and logistical 
support of their rangers, including the operation and maintenance of a small fleet of 
boats (figure 5.5). The rangers wear a uniform of khaki shirts and blue pants. They 
are paid 25 Kina on a casual basis for each day of training or village project work, 
injecting much-needed cash into the Treaty villages. Given the lack of comparable 
employment or sources of income, these positions are highly sought after, which can 
lead to an uneven benefit to the ranger’s households and their relatives. The scope of 
services they provide differs from that of their Torres Strait counterparts. BRTV 
effectively operate a rural development program across a range of livelihood areas, 
including community resilience, improved food security, clean water and sanitation, 
disaster response, disease prevention, health promotion, leadership and governance. 
The BRTV began as a pilot, with six Treaty villages under a $1.7 million 
program from September 2014 to June 2017. The second stage of the program was 
rolled out in July 2017 with a scheduled completion date of June 2019, which 
expanded to all 14 Treaty villages and received $2.4 million. The program is funded 
by the Australian Aid Program, under the Decentralisation and Citizen Participation 
Partnership (formerly the PNG Governance Facility), which is managed on behalf of 
DFAT by the multinational consultancy company Abt Associates. The program is 
implemented by the Reef and Rainforest Research Cooperative Research Centre 
(RRRC) based in Cairns, which subcontracted its operation to the INLOC Group. 
With its head office in Cairns, INLOC is a private company that provides a range of 
services, including first aid training, boating safety, ranger training and personal 
security services for people travelling to risky destinations overseas (including 
PNG). Many of its staff have prior experience with the Australian Army, including 
the elite Special Air Service Regiment (SAS). In advertising its capabilities in 
international development, INLOC publicises that it delivers integrated projects, 
water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), natural disaster relief, disease mitigation and 
community well-being services.52 
The stated objectives for Stage 2 of the BRTV seek a comprehensive set of 
outcomes and KRAs (key result areas) across the diverse sectors of economic 
enterprise, fisheries management, governance, gender, infrastructure, water supply, 
disease prevention, disaster response, food security and heath. The range of 
proposed activities is very broad and, being inclusive of different options, seems as 
important as strategic prioritisation. The KRAs range from being broad in scope, 
  
such as ‘increased women’s inclusion in leadership and decision-making’, to highly 
specific, such as ‘improve first respondent capacity for trauma and obstetrics in the 
villages’. While the broad aims potentially allow local prioritisation and articulation, 
the more specific ones appear to be offering predetermined solutions. 
The program success has largely been sold on its ability to achieve results, by 
overcoming the logistical challenges in the South Fly, in comparison to alternative 
providers. Not surprisingly, then, it has tended to focus on tangible outputs. The 
prior military experience of INLOC workers gave them the skills to set up a remote 
camp and to manage the workplace health and safety of operating small dinghies in 
the open coastal waters. Their mere arrival in the Treaty villages, and their ability to 
perform repairs to some basic water supply infrastructure systems, won them early 
support. Often, this was the first time in some years that anyone from an external 
organisation had provided any material assistance. Its support only grew as the 
program expanded its activities into toilets, waste management, emergency first aid 
and assistance with birthing and transport. BRTV clearly stood apart compared to 
the development activities of the few international NGOs in the district, who tended 
to focus their effort on villages within a few hours travel from Daru. Establishing 
their base at Paho Island just offshore of Mabuduan village, itself a two-hour dinghy 
ride west of Daru, immediately set the BRTV apart from the Daru ‘aid scene’. 
The program has overreached itself in some areas. Spacem Pikini, a PNG 
family planning organisation, conducted a week-long deployment to Paho Island 
and selected Treaty villages in November 2017. They trained female rangers to insert 
Long Acting Reversible Contraception (LARC) implants,53 but not the more 
complicated procedure of how to remove them. Women were asked if they were 
pregnant before insertion, but they were not tested. After concerns were raised about 
the standard of service, the practice was stopped. Marie Stopes now provides a 
range of contraception and family planning services, in collaboration with BRTV.54 
BRTV also failed in some of its efforts. The program experimented with Urine 
Diversion Dry Toilets (UDDTs) in public places like schoolyards. The thinking was 
to not contaminate the high water table in coastal villages (where people still rely on 
wells) and to compost the waste. Although UDDT is a proven toilet design in other 
parts of the world, in PNG cultural barriers related to sorcery object to the 
composting and reuse of human faeces. Social barriers to the installation of toilets in 
public places also exist, as well as a lack of clarity about whose responsibility it was 
to maintain them. Few of these toilets are used. 
The BRTV program is well connected politically at the highest levels in both 
Australia and PNG. It is closely allied to government ministers in Canberra, to 
prominent leaders in the Torres Strait and to elected members in PNG, including the 
former South Fly District member. The District Administrator in Daru was well 
informed of its activities, as was the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby, 
due in part to the domestic political stakes involved in Australia. 
At a Ranger graduation ceremony in 2018 in Daru, we witnessed the level of 
commitment with the attendance of the Australian High Commissioner as well as 
  
the Australian Member of Parliament for Leichhardt, the Honourable Warren 
Entsch. 
Entsch has been a vocal publicist of the plight of South Fly and a strong 
advocate for funding support for the Daru General Hospital and for the BRTV 
ranger program. He is on the public record describing himself as the ‘member for 
South Fly in the Australian Parliament’.55 At the graduation ceremony, Entsch 
addressed the crowd, announcing: ‘I pride myself as being acknowledged as the 
member in the Australian national parliament representing all of those Western 
Province and all of those Treaty villages.’56 
In Entsch’s speech on the day, he addressed the rangers directly to congratulate 
them on their achievement and praise them for being leaders in their communities. 
He said that they will go on to be trainers themselves. He spoke with conviction of 
the future of the program in a way that suggests significant continuous Australian 
government commitment. He encouraged the ‘little kids’ present to be rangers 
themselves one day. 
Entsch went on to explain the absence of the Treaty village chairman, who had 
been bitten by a snake a couple of days before the event:57 
If it hadn’t have been for the ranger program he [the chair] may well have 
lost an arm or a leg or he might have lost his life … but that didn’t happen 
because the rangers applied a snake bandage to him. He was taken to 
Saibai clinic. I spoke to the nurses at the Saibai clinic only an a hour or so 
ago. He was treated so well he didn’t even have to go further south to 
Thursday Island [applause] … He’s recovering now on Saibai and they 
said to me an hour ago that they were waiting on the last blood test before 
he was able to go back … and he was wanting to get in the dinghy and 
come up here for the ceremony and I’ve told him … ‘That’s not going to 
happen, you need to recover’, but at the end of day … it’s what’s been 
happening with the ranger programs and this is one example, one very 
current example. This is what’s happening every day in these 
communities … where each and every one of you, and this is why it’s 
important that I talk to the rangers. [Addressing rangers] Each and every 
one of you are [sic] making such a difference in the lives of the 
communities you serve, and I say thank you for it! 
The cross-border movement of elected members, with the support of the BRTV 
rangers, for a medical emergency is understandable. But Entsch’s well-intentioned 
words show how the border can be a formality to those entitled to cross it while for 
others it remains illusively inaccessible. Neither the people from non-Treaty villages 
nor the people of Daru where the ceremony was conducted enjoy this privilege. 
Community leaders in non-Treaty villages complained about their arbitrary 
exclusion from the development programs offered by the BRTV, in the absence of 
any alternative providers. Selecting only Treaty villages inescapably associates BRTV 
  
with Australia’s border management. It also fuels tensions between Treaty and non-
Treaty villages. 
As funding for the program shifted to the Australian Aid Program, with 
funding earmarked for governance and citizen participation, it reoriented its 
outcome areas accordingly. BRTV seeks a community-driven approach at the village 
level, as a means to build governance. Through local consultative decision-making 
processes, villages can prioritise their development goals from a menu of offerings 
from the program. Village perceptions of this process varied. Some villagers 
described a democratic process whereby community priorities were debated and 
consensus was built. Others were resentful of a seemingly arbitrary process in which 
outcomes were predetermined. 
BTRV also seeks to be a catalyst for building leadership and local governance 
capacity, with the rangers acting as role models. From its start, it has worked closely 
with the LLG members and the Kiwai (now Forecoast) LLG president. There have 
been tensions at some villages due to the LLG members favouring their own families 
with allocations. In 2019, BTRV was working more deliberately with the village 
Ward Development Committee (WDC). They successfully inserted the senior ranger 
into each village to become one of the five associate members of WDC. They also 
introduced a rule whereby they will not start a project without a WDC meeting first 
posting the decision on the ranger community noticeboard. While clearly a positive 
step towards supporting local governance capabilities, there are also existing 
informal governance structures representing a diversity of local interests, which are 
typically complex and reorient according to different external opportunities. It is 
questionable how the rangers fit within this governance system as leaders 
themselves and the extent to which their leadership will diffuse as a model, 
especially beyond the grant period. 
The BRTV is a complex hybrid organisation that reflects the elements of the 
three different Australian policy fields that dominate the border: Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander affairs, border management and international aid assistance. It 
is quite uniquely a borderland organisation. As a result, it is easily misunderstood 
by other stakeholders. By overcoming the logistical challenges, BRTV is clearly 
helping to bring much needed improvements and cash injections into the Treaty 
villages. 
As the success of the program largely relies on demonstrating results on the 
ground, the BRTV rangers and trainers have tended to maintain control over 
delivery. This expediency has, not surprisingly, led to the development of parallel 
structures. Whatever their weaknesses, there are LLGs, service providers and 
government departments that operate in the South Fly, and the mechanisms 
introduced by the BRTV have tended to override or be in tension with them. 
Principles of aid effectiveness and alignment requires interveners to draw on and 
strengthen existing systems rather than replace or compete with them.58 In 2019, the 
BRTV was working towards a more collaborative approach and increasing its efforts 
at building capability in local governance and leadership. 
  
Australian patronage of Treaty villages 
A distinct feature of Australia’s influence in PNG is the creation of ‘haves’, who then 
protect their privileges from the ‘have nots’. The nomination of 14 Treaty villages in 
2000 created a category of non-Treaty villages, whose inhabitants are no longer 
entitled to cross the border under a traditional visitor pass. Treaty villages now enjoy 
a range of privileges relative to neighbouring non-Treaty villages. Given their more 
frequent crossings, they are now better placed to maintain relations with Torres 
Strait Islanders and therefore reap the benefits of their connections, for labour, 
market trade and other financial transactions. They can then act as intermediaries or 
resellers in crafts sales and other commercial transactions across the border. For 
example, considerable trade now occurs in Mabuduan village, including a small 
market on the beach, for non-Treaty villages up the Pahoturi River.59 
The BRTV ranger program is limited to Treaty villages, so they now also enjoy 
privileged access under the Australian Aid Program. Even more remarkably, in 2015, 
they were also privileged by a special-purpose grant from Prime Minister O’Neill’s 
office. The exact details of how this came about are not clear, but we did find the 
following factual pieces to the puzzle. The source was an allocation of K16 million 
(some sources say K19 million) earmarked for flood and other disaster relief, of 
which K9 million was allocated elsewhere, including K3 million to the Daru School. 
Prime Minister O’Neill travelled to Daru in mid-2012 to present the cheque.60 At a 
graduation ceremony for rangers in 2015 in Mabuduan, attended by both the 
Honourable Warren Entsch and Nigel Scullion (federal Minister of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs), the late South Fly District member announced that K7 
million of the original grant would be allocated to infrastructure projects in Treaty 
villages.61 Of what was now called the Treaty Village Improvement Program, K1 
million was set aside as counterpart funding for BTRV, which was never received. 
According to accounting ledgers from the South Fly District Administration, about 
K1 million was spent on mostly travel-related and other administrative expenses 
over the two-year period 2105–16, with some irregularities such as funeral 
expenses.62 Members from the Treaty villages went on a shopping trip to Port 
Moresby, to purchase sawmills, iron sheets, laptops, whipper snippers, dinghies and 
outboards. Judging by our observations during fieldwork in 2019, the value of goods 
delivered to villages was less than K2 million, about a quarter of the original K7 
million. An unknown amount of remaining funds were frozen and subject to a PNG 
Fraud Squad investigation. 
Leaders in Treaty villages have long sought a governance structure that the 
Australian state could recognise and enter into agreements with, and formalising 
their distinction from non-Treaty villages was also seen as critical to achieving this. 
Initially, there was a proposal to establish a statutory authority, which then shifted 
to the establishment a new LLG. This was formalised with the creation of the 
Forecoast LLG, at the local-level government elections in mid-2019. The geography 
  
of the new LLG is not contiguous, as there are some non-Treaty villages situated 
along the coastline. 
Seeking preferential treatment is in part justified by claims of maintaining a 
human and geographical buffer zone made up of the borderland and its people—
whoever claims this title and role can then be entitled to seek privileges and rewards 
from the Australian state (or at least this is a well-founded perception). In June 2018, 
at the graduation ceremony of the BRTV rangers, the Western Provincial Governor 
announced to the gathered crowd that the entirety of the Western Province served as 
Australia’s buffer zone. The leaders of the Treaty villages also assert their role in 
monitoring the border and reporting when people break the rules, including when 
illegal immigrants attempt to cross (see chapter 4). 
While these efforts are locally driven, they reflect distortions in opportunities 
from the Australia state bordering the region. The selective privileging of some 
villages over others does not derive from a perspective of sustainable development 
or public health of the South Fly people, which can only operate at a population 
level. Rather, it clearly accords with a logic of border control. 
Cross-border health 
Although access to health services is excluded under the terms of the Treaty, people 
are still able to find their way into the health system. People from Treaty villages 
entering on traditional inhabitant passes can be granted entry by the Australian 
Border Force for a purpose other than health, then subsequently present themselves 
to the health facility. According to a 2019 ANAO report, Queensland Health 
estimated that 2000 PNG nationals attend their Torres Strait Island clinics every year. 
The Queensland Government successfully argued that the treatment of these foreign 
citizens under an international treaty is a federal government responsibility and 
therefore receive an annual subsidy of more than $5 million from the 
Commonwealth Department of Health.63 
In addition to whatever treatment they provide to PNG nationals who walk 
into the clinic, Queensland Health also adopts a humanitarian position and 
medevacs patients who are medical emergencies, every case being treated on its 
clinical merit. They adopt this position regardless of whether or not the patient is 
from a Treaty village, although non-Treaty villagers face more rigorous scrutiny by 
the ABF before being granted entry. If assessed by frontline nurses as a genuine 
emergency, PNG nationals then access the full entitlements of Australia’s universal 
health-care system. Queensland Health estimates that approximately a hundred 
PNG patients are admitted to Thursday Island and other hospitals on the mainland 
each year.64 This includes free treatment, medevacs and accommodation for the 
patient and an accompanying family member. They can find themselves detained by 
the ABF, however, as they are not legally allowed to travel outside the protected 
zone covered by the treaty.65 
Given the lack of health services in the South Fly, it is not surprising that 
people will seek treatment across the border. People know that they can avail 
  
themselves of services at Daru General Hospital, but they must pay and the standard 
of the treatment is much lower. Even if they were to get to Daru, most stay in the 
crowded ‘corners’ of Daru and are susceptible to further disease transmission. As 
Miller outlines (chapter 6), Daru essentially acts a vector for disease transmission, 
and when people visit seeking health care, they are vulnerable and can then transmit 
new diseases from Daru to their villages upon their return. 
Frontline health workers from Queensland Health have long realised the 
necessity of treating PNG nationals in order to control TB, which through the 2000s 
included the provision of services by Queensland Health through specialised TB 
clinics on Saibai and Boigu. As also illustrated by Miller, the decision to close these 
clinics by Queensland Health and to otherwise harden the border to health care, and 
to instead focus Australian aid on the development of TB services in PNG, resulted 
in a myopic focus on Daru to the detriment of many South Fly villages. 
Many PNG nationals continue to try to use health services in Australia but now 
do so with a greater expectation of being rejected. Many are then referred back to 
PNG for treatment, but Queensland Health staff do so in the knowledge that there 
are few health facilities operating in the villages and very limited transport available 
for people to get to Daru. The frustration of local people regarding the level of care 
they receive in the villages and the restrictions placed on using Australian services is 
palpable. There is also some confusion and perceptions of buck-passing as to where 
else people should go, as one respondent explained it: 
[They] tells us to go to Daru, medicine there. When I went there they said 
no medicine, go back to Saibai. They tell lies that we are getting good 
services, but it is bullshit. 
Cross-border health provision has historically taken a Band Aid approach, which has 
in recent years focused on TB. In order to slow down disease transmission, a broader 
health systems strengthening approach is needed instead, which incorporates service 
delivery, public health, environmental health and development interventions to 
improve livelihoods and well-being; that is, to treat the borderland as a ‘health zone’ 
where public finances are allocated to provide a safer environment for those living 
on both sides of the border. Such an approach can not only reduce the push-and-pull 
factors at play with health-seeking behaviour but also protect the broader Australian 
population (chapter 10). 
Limiting cross-border development 
Limiting labour mobility 
The people living in the South Fly once enjoyed marked labour mobility across the 
border into the Torres Strait, working in the pearling and fishing industries.66 
Although the location of the border was finalised with the signing of the treaty in 
1978, it did not fully come into effect until 1985 when the treaty was ratified. During 
this transition, many of the PNG nationals who had been living in the Torres Strait 
  
Islands made their way back to PNG, but locally significant numbers also remained 
in Australia.67 Today they hold either Australian citizenship or permanent residency, 
and are referred to collectively by the Torres Strait Islanders as the ‘citizens’. 
Although Australian, they remain distinct from the Torres Strait Islanders, who 
retain their separate identity as a sovereign Indigenous people or First Nation of 
Australia. The households the ‘citizens’ occupy are disproportionately burdened by 
visitation by PNG nationals, leading often to overcrowding and risk of 
communicable diseases like TB (chapter 6). 
Cross-border labour mobility is today tightly prescribed. The bilateral 
‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ explicitly ‘bans commercial activity, business 
dealings and working for money during traditional visits (e.g. cray-fishing from a 
licensed Australian cray boat, selling artefacts to commercial operators, paid 
domestic assistance)’. This is a significant departure from the days when residents of 
the South Fly worked alongside Torres Strait Islanders on similar wages. 
Labour mobility, however, continues informally and irregularly. Out of 244 
respondent on the PNG side, about 30 per cent indicated that they sometimes work 
in the Torres Strait, only two indicated that they did so regularly. Similarly, of the 23 
respondents from the Torres Strait, 38 per cent indicated that they employed people 
sometimes, and four indicated that they did so regularly. The scope of employment 
includes domestic chores (e.g. cleaning, housekeeping), food-gathering (e.g. fishing, 
hunting), supporting events (e.g. tombstone openings) and cultural activity (e.g. 
making mats). Most of this employment occurs on the outer islands. Some Torres 
Strait Islanders interviewed expressed their disdain with the practice, with some 
even emotively describing it as ‘slave labour’. When payment is made in cash, the 
rate can be as little as $10 a day, which is widely affordable to Torres Strait Islander 
households, including those that are limited to welfare payments. Some Torres Strait 
Islanders take advantage of the ‘traditional’ provisions of the treaty and limit 
reimbursement to ‘trade and barter’, effecting payment through such commodities 
as groceries or petrol. Despite the low payment, many PNG nationals seek the work, 
given the poverty that they face (chapter 4). As one Torres Strait Islander indicated, 
They keep approaching me. Feel sorry for them. They’re allowed to 
garden and fish if with locals. Couple of times a year I employ them, 
mostly with yard work, to rake up leaves. 
The inability of people to work across the border curtails one of the most 
successful forms of economic development occurring across other borders globally. 
The only ‘official’ form of labour mobility open to people living on the South Fly, 
then, is via formal migration. To achieve this, people must apply through normal 
immigration channels, travel to Port Moresby, then enter Australia through a legal 
port such as Cairns in North Queensland (chapter 4). A number of Torres Strait 
Islanders and Papuan Australian ‘citizens’ were sponsoring their Papuan partners or 
children to emigrate to Australia, although they struggled with the expense and the 
  
convoluted process involved. Informants reported that the direct cost involved was 
about $7000, but if travel and other costs are included, the total cost involved was 
closer to $10 000. 
There is an opportunity for people from the South Fly to gain temporary 
‘seasonal’ work in Australia through labour mobility programs under the Australian 
Aid Program run by DFAT (see chapter 10). 
Limiting remittance flows 
In the course of the household survey, a quarter of respondents (25 per cent; 99 of 
392) indicated remittances from family and friends as being an important source of 
income. The amounts received were sporadic and small in value (median K100). The 
ability of people living in the South Fly to receive such remittances is, however, 
extremely limited. On the PNG side, there are only two ATMs in the South Fly 
District, and both are located side by side at the sole branch of Bank South Pacific 
(BSP) in Daru. Other mobile money agents, including Post PNG, Western Union and 
trade stores, are also limited to Daru. 
Not surprisingly given the distance involved, for the villages further to the 
west, the ATMs on the Torres Strait islands of Boigu and Saibai are an obvious place 
to receive remittances, especially from relatives and friends living in the Torres Strait 
or elsewhere in Australia. PNG citizens can withdraw money from an ATM using an 
international credit card, but Border Force officers were reported as preventing 
people from doing so, regarding this not to be a traditional activity under the treaty. 
Indeed the bilateral ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’, explicitly excludes 
‘accessing money from the ATM’. 
Another channel involves deposits via electronic transfer into the bank account 
of a Torres Strait Islander or a former PNG now Australian ‘citizen’, who then 
withdraws the cash and hands it to the PNG national. Only Australian citizens are 
allowed to have a bank account, requiring ‘100 points’ of identity documentation. 
The PNG national makes the arrangements with the Torres Strait Islander, who then 
texts the bank account details to their ‘southern’ friend or relative. This practice 
obviously relies on the honesty of the recipient, with people choosing only close 
relatives or trusted friends. There have nonetheless been instances when the money 
reportedly never arrived. 
Outside the formal banking system, the Islanders Board of Industry and Service 
(IBIS) store supports financial flows and remittances across the Torres Strait. IBIS is 
registered as an Independent Remittance Dealer with AusTrac, under the Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cwlth). Holders of IBIS 
accounts can in effect use them as deposit accounts, as opposed to credit or book-up 
(informal credit extended by shopkeepers to their customers). Relatives with an IBIS 
account can deposit an amount of (say) $100, then notify their relatives on another 
IBIS store in the Torres Strait to withdraw it. Before anti-terrorism and money-
laundering laws came into effect, some obliging IBIS store managers reportedly 
adjudicated over transfers to PNG nationals, via a verification phone call between 
  
both parties. But this is now tightly prescribed and carries heavy penalties. IBIS 
stores require all transactions to be limited to Australian citizens who have an 
account, on proof of Australian identity documentation.68 As for using the ATMs, a 
PNG national can still ask a trusted relative or friend with an IBIS account to access 
the facility on their behalf. 
Another way to transfer remittances is to use commodities rather than cash, 
including generators, dinghies and outboard motors. Many people in the Torres 
Strait also donate used clothing, toys, kitchen utensils, garden tools and mechanical 
equipment for general distribution among the villages to which they are related. 
The difficulty and obstruction in accessing what are essentially private family 
funds is a clear example of border protection trumping the development needs of 
South Fly residents. While DFAT’s aid program actively promulgates the success of 
remittances as an outcome of regional aid assistance through labour mobility 
programs,69 it actively participates in efforts to limit remittances from flowing across 
the border. Efforts to prevent money-laundering could be limited to large sums of 
money, not amounts of $100–$200, which are the typical sum remitted. Clamping 
down on remittance flows is yet another example of hardening of the border and 
thereby undermining the potential for development in the South Fly. 
Beyond the remit of the treaty and border protection, there is the potential for 
aid assistance to be provided on the PNG side, to facilitate remittances and other 
financial flows, through the use of mobile phone telecommunication facilities and 
mobile money (chapter 10). 
Limiting cross-border trade 
The ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ limits crossings to traditional exchange and 
barter, explicitly excluding anything that is not traditional. 
Traditional visits do not include activities that are not traditional. Visits for 
health treatment, attending court cases, shopping at the store, picking up deliveries 
from the barge, baby-sitting, working or accessing money from the ATM are not 
considered traditional activities. 
Along with other developing countries, rural PNG is transitioning to the global 
cash economy. People now use cash to purchase a range of commodities, including 
staple foods and fuel. This is particularly the case for villages like Mabuduan, which 
has limited access to land and gardens. Limiting people’s access to shopping at the 
community store on the basis of shopping not being a traditional activity is 
particularly outdated. While the Australian authorities do at times enforce this 
restriction, visitors are mostly able to find a way around it. 
The restriction can also be one-sided, as Torres Strait Islanders also travel into 
PNG for shopping, taking advantage of their traditional inhabitant status. The 
estimated number of Torres Strait Islanders to cross in 2018–19 was estimated to be a 
thousand, compared to 27 000 PNG nationals coming the other way.70 This 
particularly applies to the outer islands (e.g. Saibai) and the eastern islands (e.g. 
Darnley). Although a total ban was in effect on Mabuduan in 2019, people from 
  
Saibai still travelled to Mabuduan, including a woman employed by the Australian 
Border Force.71 
Torres Strait Islanders have travelled to Daru for shopping, despite the fact that 
it is not a nominated Treaty village. There is a variety of goods available on Daru, 
and they are much cheaper than what can be purchased on Thursday Island. One 
informant on Darnley Island advised that the cost of a fishing net was five times 
cheaper than on Thursday Island.72 As observed by the research team, Torres Strait 
Islanders use their Australian credit and debit cards on Daru to withdraw funds 
from the ATMs there, or they use them for store purchases and hotel 
accommodation. Other Torres Strait Islanders travel to the South Fly villages, to buy 
in bulk woven pandanus leaf mats and other traditional ornaments for major events 
such as tombstone openings. Torres Strait Islanders can also face similar travel 
restrictions to those living in the South Fly, with their councillors sometimes 
reluctant to issue passes or refusing to issue passes to them. 
The guidelines do not explicitly prohibit the selling of goods between 
traditional inhabitants, so sales from Treaty villages to Torres Strait Islanders do 
frequently take place for cash. More than two-thirds (94 of 147) of respondents in 
PNG reported cross-border trade as being one their top sources of income in 2016 
and 2017. In 2018, more than a third (34 per cent; 41 of 77) of respondents indicated 
that they sold things in the Torres Strait Islands that they had made or grown. The 
guidelines state that ‘selling goods to non-traditional inhabitants is not permitted 
under the Treaty’, but sales to non-Indigenous contractors working on the Torres 
Strait Islands do occur, and the returns to PNG people from these sales are the most 
lucrative and sought after. 
The guidelines also state that ‘selling goods in the knowledge that they may 
[be] on-sold is also not permitted under the Treaty’. On-selling for people who are 
not recognised as ‘traditional inhabitants’ is difficult to monitor, but we were able to 
collect limited qualitative data on these activities. On the PNG side, middlemen from 
the Treaty villages purchased goods from non-Treaty villages and then sold them 
into the Torres Strait, either buying the goods outright or selling them on 
consignment. Many informants complained that they receive poor prices and feel 
cheated in the process. From the survey data collected in 2018, more than two-thirds 
of respondents (71 per cent; 32 of 45) indicated their dissatisfaction due to the losses 
they incurred to the middlemen. Some Torres Strait Islanders also on-sell down the 
supply chain of traditional arts and crafts into Australia. 
Some Torres Strait Islanders and ‘citizens’ also trade in the other direction, 
selling commodities like fuel and soft drinks to PNG nationals, including 
transporting these goods across to South Fly villages for their relatives to sell. One 
household on Saibai took cordial ice blocks across, which sold very well, given the 
heat and lack of refrigeration on the PNG side. Another used packaged cake mixes to 
bake cakes for sale.73 One woman was actively travelling across into PNG to Buzi 
village to sell a range of goods, to raise the money needed for her partner to emigrate 
to Australia:74 
  
I buy clothes from Australia and sell them in Buzi, and flour and sugar 
and tea bags. Sell them from a little table. Told we can’t sell it here [on 
Boigu to visiting PNG nationals]. People follow the rules. 
Clearly an alternative to the current Treaty arrangements would be to establish a 
regulated arts and craft market, complete with shades and stalls. It might even 
attract some tourists to visit the outer Torres Strait Islands, which would have spin-
offs for their local economies. People remembered from the past a weekly market 
day at Saibai, which did attract day-trippers from Thursday Island. Establishing 
such a market would bring economic benefits to both the South Fly and the Torres 
Strait, but it is unlikely to be entertained by the Australian authorities if it was seen 
to be making border crossings more attractive. 
The growth of unregulated and often illegal trade in the South Fly of marine 
products, including fish maw and mud crabs, represent potentially massive 
international markets that could have been exploited by Torres Strait Islanders, 
which have instead been exploited by travelling Indonesian traders or Chinese 
merchants based in Daru. 
Limiting marine livelihoods 
Much of the nutritional needs of people in the South Fly is met through subsistence 
fishing activity. Selling marine resources is also one of the most important means of 
generating income. It is also critically important that people fish sustainably, within 
a regulated environment, in order to preserve their valuable fish stocks for 
themselves and future generations. 
Under the treaty, the Protected Zone comes very close to the PNG border. The 
situation is most difficult for Buzi, Ber, Sigabaduru (Siga) and Mabuduan, as they 
border the Fisheries Jurisdiction line that is enforced by Australia.75 Not surprisingly 
under these conditions, border incursions by PNG fishers fishing in Australian 
waters are resulting in prosecutions. Although PNG nationals are prosecuted 
through the PNG court system,76 Australian fisheries officers assist by sending 
paperwork, including photographs taken by aerial drones. According to a PNG 
fisheries officer, offenders usually have no legal representation and just plead guilty. 
In the officer’s view, the fishermen known where the jurisdiction lines are so ‘they 
can’t plead ignorance’. The fines were reportedly K500 per fisherman and K1000 for 
the boat operator. On the occasions when they do not plead guilty, Australian 
fisheries officers will travel to Daru to give evidence.77 
At the time of apprehension and before offenders are handed over to the PNG 
authorities, the Australian border authorities confiscate the boats and fishing 
equipment. When a boat is judged unseaworthy, it is allegedly sunk and even 
burned. If it is in a reasonable condition, the boat is sold by public tender on 
Thursday Island, and Torres Strait Islanders then commonly buy them. The offender 
then has the potential added humiliation of seeing their boat skippered on the Torres 
Strait Side. 
  
Although less frequent, a similar arrangement exists when Torres Strait 
Islanders commit an offence in PNG waters. Following arrest of the offender, 
Australian fisheries officers cross the border to collect them for prosecution in 
Australia. 
These controls are justified by the Australian border authorities, in terms of 
managing marine resources, and in interpreting commercial trade as not being a 
traditional activity under the Treaty, but their ability to regulate fishing is limited to 
the part of the part of the Protected Zone within the Australian jurisdiction. The 
dysfunctional dynamics at play can be illustrated by the trade in mud crabs, given 
that the crab habitat is mostly on the PNG mainland. The Torres Strait Protected 
Zone Joint Authority (PZJA) does not classify crabbing as commercial fishing, so it is 
limited to traditional inhabitants only.78 Cross-border trade of live mud crabs 
between traditional inhabitants has long occurred across the border, and Torres 
Strait Islanders have acted as middlemen for sales to other islands and further south. 
There is no data on the extent of this trade, but anecdotally, the numbers were not 
large, and they have been reducing in recent years as border management has 
hardened.79 Meanwhile on the PNG side, a large and unregulated market has 
developed unchecked, through Indonesian traders travelling from Merauke and 
buyers operating for Chinese trade stores in Daru. Both undersized and female crabs 
(‘jennies’) are bought. Once local stocks are cleaned out, the buyers move further up 
the rivers. The PNG National Fisheries Authority (NFA) has been slow to release a 
management plan,80 but there has been nearly two years of unregulated trade in the 
interim. 
Controversially, the ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ have interpreted 
‘barter and market trade’ in the treaty to mean a ban on ‘commercial activity’. 
Looking to what might have been possible beyond such dictates, a regulated 
sustainable trade could have developed across the border into Australia between 
traditional inhabitants, with biosecurity officers enforcing quotas and male and 
correctly sized crabs. The trade could have been potentially branded as sustainable 
seafood, then exported live to Australian restaurants. The outer Torres Strait islands 
have frequent flights, so mud crabs could arrive in southern Australian cities on the 
same day. Suitable branding could have promoted traditional collection practices, as 
still commonly practised by women in the South Fly villages. Torres Strait Islander 
businesses could have profited, consistent with current efforts across Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander affairs to facilitate enterprise development. Instead PNG 
villages have received low prices from travelling traders who sell into the Asian 
market, and they have depleted their limited resources, which could take years to 
recover. 
Local PNG fishers are also finding international markets for shark fin, bêche-
de-mer and fish maw (bladders; chapter 7).81 Considerable profits are possible from 
selling fish maw, primarily from barramundi and jewfish, which commercial 
fishermen in other parts of Australia are also exploiting.82 The main buyers in the 
South Fly are Indonesian traders, operating illegally in PNG waters, who then on-
  
sell into Asian markets. The Indonesian traders take risks and pay bribes, so they 
look for higher profits. The low payments that PNG fishers receive fuel the need for 
greater exploitation of resources, and so the cycle continues. 
Research by CSIRO has indicated that shark fins are sold by exporters in 
Surabaya and Jakarta at prices almost a hundred times higher than their initial 
prices, while bêche-de-mer and fish maw have final prices 32 and 18 times higher 
respectively.83 If PNG fishers were able to access these Asian markets directly, or at 
least to reduce the number of middlemen in the supply chain, they would clearly 
receive higher prices. A good start would be to have legal border posts with 
Indonesia, with customs and market facilities. Developing a direct export business 
from Daru would also significantly improve prices. If higher prices could be 
obtained through a more regulated legal market, it is reasonable to expect a 
reduction in overexploitation. Furthermore, this would provide the moral authority 
for NFA to undertake more enforcement. 
Conclusion 
As a way of drawing together the notion of being ‘differently governed’ at the ‘limits 
of statehood’, and the institutional hybridity and bricolage that can be observed in 
the borderland, we draw on the notion of place-based governance. A governance 
analysis that is ‘situated in place’ helps us to gain ‘a view of governance from the 
perspective of those who are living it’,84 to observe their ‘throwntogetherness’.85 This 
allows us to sidestep the state as the ‘methodological unit of analysis’,86 and to 
choose the borderland as the centre in which to observe the governance relationships 
that weave in and out of it. By doing so, we can see that relationships can and do 
cross boundaries and interface through nodes of governance at many different 
levels, be it formal or informal or a combination of both. Importantly, governance 
relationships—and service delivery relationships, for that matter—cross state 
borders. 
From the perspective of place, we can see that the Australian Government as 
well as the Government of PNG and various other governance actors make up the 
governance landscape, which is unevenly affected by interventions and differently 
governed by local informal governance actors. While it rejects the notion of 
providing services to the South Fly population, the Australian state exerts its 
influence across the border through the creation of a special category of people who 
have certain cross-border rights as Treaty villagers. Australian politicians and 
departmental officers also enjoy facilitated border crossings and joint patrols and 
have the upper hand in joint management arrangements, due to resources being 
overwhelmingly in their favour. Both Australia and PNG strongly maintain their 
independent sovereignty, but the influence of the Australian Government clearly 
extends inside the PNG state. 
From an Australian policy perspective, the borderland is a highly complex 
intersection of three different policy fields: Indigenous affairs, border management 
and international development assistance. The influence of all three of these fields 
  
can be seen in the BRTV ranger program, which emerges as a unique hybrid 
borderland organisation. In terms of their relative influence, border management 
clearly trumps development assistance. This particularly applies to the limits placed 
on trade, remittance flows and marine livelihoods. 
There is an opportunity to deliver more assistance through participatory 
decision-making and existing local governance systems, formal and informal. This 
approach—commonly called community-driven development—also presents the 
opportunity to sidestep corrupt and dysfunctional layers of government. Its allure 
has driven much of the policy reform in decentralised governance in PNG. But social 
and political accountability alone will not succeed without structural reforms, 
including public finance reforms and changes to governance systems. This requires a 
careful analysis of the political economy of the public finance system and privileges 
that the status quo affords to politicians and the coalitions that they form. Within 
these constraints, aid assistance to strengthen local-level governance can be a catalyst 
for changing the behaviour of these elites. 
In this chapter we have summarised the institutional layering to illustrate the 
complex governance bricolage of the borderland. We suggest that a place-based 
approach to governance offers the possibility of the taking pressure off the border, 
but this is more than a governance problem—the broader solution is multifaceted, as 
addressed in other chapters. There are, however, place-based governance elements 
to all these different policy spaces. For instance, the public health challenge most 
certainly requires a place-based approach and would be best dealt with as a health 
zone that spans the borderlands. Likewise, the ecological, environmental and marine 
resource management and sustainability issues addressed in other chapters also 
present challenges that require place-based governance to wrap around them. 
Most obviously, there is a dire need for a place-based approach to trade and 
associated governance of the border to allow movement of goods over the border in 
a manner that can stimulate economic growth and slow down the massive rate of 
exploitation of these waters, which is primarily driven by South Fly people being 
shut out from a possibility of legal trade through Australian ports. 
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6 
Health at the margin 
Geoffrey Miller 
For most Australians, if they have heard of the borderlands region at all, it is most 
likely through sensational reporting in the Australian media about the threat posed 
by an ‘epidemic’ of tuberculosis (TB) in the remote Western Province of Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), just a short boat ride to the north. The presence of TB on Australia’s 
doorstep stoked a shrill political debate, rich with predictions of impending doom. 
The reaction to this threat from the north was a mix of fear and sympathy: sympathy 
for the plight of those living in poverty in PNG and facing the scourge of TB, but 
mainly fear of the danger TB posed to the Australian population—in the Torres 
Strait and beyond to the mainland. This fear fuelled by the perception of yet another 
menace encroaching on the border, in an era when the threat of border incursion 
looms large in the contemporary Australian narrative. 
The complex intersection of geography, politics and public health provide the 
context to examine the realities of health in the borderland. With TB as a central 
narrative theme, and exploring its links to health system performance, poverty and 
risk, this chapter advocates an approach that posits the borderland as a ‘health zone’ 
where resources are allocated, not towards programs that satisfy the illusion of 
safety, but towards building systems that can most efficiently and sustainably 
ameliorate rather than exacerbate the health risks facing the people living in the 
borderland. 
A brief history of the TB response 
Queensland Health’s Cairns-based Regional TB Control Unit began running TB 
clinics on Saibai and Boigu islands in 2000 in response to TB being diagnosed in 
PNG nationals who had crossed the border seeking health care at the Primary 
Health Care Centres on the northern Torres Strait islands (see figure 1.1). Although 
the Torres Strait Treaty ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ do not recognise health 
treatment as a traditional activity under the treaty,1 PNG people seeking health care 
frequently present to the Queensland Health clinics just a few kilometres from PNG 
mainland villages.2 Stemming the flow of PNG patients into the Queensland health-
care system, while maintaining Australia’s international humanitarian obligations to 
provide assistance, remains perhaps the most challenging, complex and emotionally 
charged element of the Torres Strait Treaty. 
In early 2006, clinicians from TB Control Unit reported a rising incidence of TB, 
including drug resistant TB (DR-TB),3 in the Torres Strait, particularly among people 
from PNG.4 Evidence of the primary transmission of drug-resistant strains among 
  
these people was first published in 2008,5 attracting the attention of the global public 
health community to the South Fly region as an emerging global hotspot for DR-TB. 
Concern about TB in the region then leapt to prominence in the wider community 
when Queensland Health announced in early 2011 that it would close the TB clinics 
in the Torres Strait and discontinue the treatment of PNG patients. The sudden 
decision to close the clinics was widely reported as the result of a funding dispute 
between the Queensland and Commonwealth governments over the cost of treating 
PNG patients.6 
The subsequent outcry by Australian clinicians and politicians about the dire 
consequences for vulnerable patients and threats to Australia’s health security posed 
by incomplete TB treatment delayed clinic closures while a staged program for the 
return of PNG patients to the PNG health system was developed. The program 
included a significant investment by the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) to upgrade health infrastructure, patient transport, 
diagnostic capability, medical supplies and clinical expertise at the Daru General 
Hospital to support TB patients and establish the foundation for the ongoing 
emergency TB response in the South Fly. Despite the moral outrage and forecasts of 
doom, all of the 92 patients who returned to PNG,7 including nearly a third with 
MDR-TB, successfully completed their TB treatment. 
The long treatment period required to cure TB (up to two years for MDR-TB) 
makes treatment adherence difficult in any setting. The Queensland clinicians found 
providing treatment across an international border to people living without 
resources and a limited understanding of their illness to be highly problematic. Their 
efforts to support cross-border patients included the provision of travel vouchers to 
PNG patients to pay for fuel for return trips to the clinics on Saibai and Boigu islands 
and dispensing of drugs in blister packs to improve treatment adherence. However, 
the lack of effective engagement with the PNG health system and inability to harness 
treatment support within PNG communities—using the Directly Observed 
Treatment Schedule (DOTS) approach—made uninterrupted treatment difficult to 
achieve and resulted in some patients not completing their course of treatment and 
being lost to follow-up. As observed by TB risk assessments conducted by an 
independent infectious disease specialist8 and a WHO TB review team,9 and 
acknowledged by the Queensland Health Minister in the reasoning for clinic 
closures,10 despite its best intentions, the Queensland program contributed to the 
development of drug-resistant TB strains in the region. The cross-border TB program 
provides an illustration of how the restrictions imposed by the border prohibit the 
optimum distribution of essential services and increases the public health risk for 
populations living on both sides. 
Policy and referrals 
In 2009 Queensland Health enacted a policy for treating PNG nationals presenting to 
Torres Strait health facilities.11 The policy supports, on humanitarian grounds, the 
treatment and care of PNG people presenting to Torres Strait clinics requiring acute 
  
or emergency care or who present a public health risk. The policy makes no 
differentiation between Treaty and non-Treaty villagers,12 recognising that the 
proximity of PNG villages and the paucity of health services in the South Fly will 
drive PNG people,13 irrespective of their treaty inhabitant status, to seek treatment in 
Australia. 
The Queensland Health policy aligns to the COAG agreement, which 
supports … the provision of health services to PNG nationals who travel 
through the Torres Strait and present at Queensland Health facilities, 
including providing support for the transition of PNG nationals 
presenting with TB to the care of the PNG health system …14 
The Queensland Health policy is enacted by frontline health staff who clinically 
assess each patient before treating, arranging medical evacuation to Thursday 
Island, Cairns or Brisbane, or referring patients back to PNG. Whenever there is 
uncertainty about triaging patients, frontline staff call on clinical support from 
doctors on Thursday Island in making decisions about treatment and referral. 
Patients with simple conditions are provided treatment and referred to their nearest 
PNG health facility for follow-up. Those with non-emergent, major (but stable) 
health conditions and chronic health conditions are referred to Daru hospital for 
treatment. (This includes people provisionally diagnosed with TB.) These patients 
are informed that transport will be arranged with Daru and are sent back to their 
home village to wait. 
Queensland Health employs a Cross-border Communications Officer (CBCO), 
a PNG doctor based in Cairns who acts as an intermediary between the Queensland 
Health and PNG systems. The CBCO does not play a part in clinical decision-
making. The officer’s principal role is to liaise with clinicians and managers in Daru 
regarding patient referrals back to PNG. The officer informs Daru hospital via email 
of the referral and organises patient transport to Daru with the Provincial Health 
Office. The office then mobilises transport, if available, to collect the patient from 
their home village and transport them to Daru. An assessment conducted by the 
CBCO found that patients wait on average seven days before being transported to 
Daru. This wait often results in suboptimal outcomes for patients and sees 
significant numbers of patients re-presenting to Torres Strait clinics in that period.15 
A system that refers patients for treatment in the full knowledge that they will 
experience significant delays in accessing that treatment fails to support continuity 
of care and must surely be questioned as morally and ethically unacceptable. 
Timely patient transport along the remote South Fly coast presents a significant 
challenge. Australian Aid funded a purpose-designed ambulance vessel, the Medics 
Queen, in 2012 to support patient transport in the South Fly (figure 6.1). The vessel 
has greater carrying capacity and capability for travelling in rough seas than the 
dinghies commonly used along the coast. However, the Medics Queen has been 
plagued by mechanical problems, massive running costs and misadventure, and has 
  
spent more time out of service than in the water. Treaty provisions prohibit the 
Medics Queen from retrieving patients directly from Torres Strait islands unless it 
complies with the facilitated cross-border movement requirements (see chapter 5), 
which require up to two weeks for approval and are therefore unhelpful in 
supporting day-to-day operations. This is inconsistent, as other vessels carrying 
people from non-Treaty villages seeking health care are permitted to enter Torres 
Strait communities to be assessed by health staff. 
<figure 6.1 near here> 
The Medics Queen (Research team, 2019) 
Clearly, there are gross inefficiencies in the current patient referral and retrieval 
system stemming from inadequate cross-border communications and the limited 
transport options for PNG patients requiring higher levels of care at Daru hospital. 
These system failures have resulted in preventable deaths and provide a further 
example of how the enactment of restrictive, cross-border health policy increases risk 
both to individuals and potentially to the population of the borderland. 
Why people cross 
A range of push-and-pull factors cause people to cross the border seeking health 
care. The people of the South Fly have access—albeit increasingly restricted access—
to a range of health services the rest of PNG can only dream of. For many, the closest 
service is a Queensland facility just a short dinghy ride away, and most people know 
what those services look like either from first-hand experience as patients or by 
accompanying sick or injured relatives. Our survey findings reflect this, revealing 
that 86 per cent of participants from Treaty villages and 35 per cent from non-Treaty 
villages had received treatment in Australian facilities and cited access to health 
facilities as a common reason for going to the Torres Strait.16 
In stark contrast to the world-class services provided over the border, most 
PNG people have access only to a health system in crisis. The recent outbreak of 
polio, the resurgence of malaria and HIV, rising rates of leprosy and an emerging 
epidemic of tuberculosis are indicators that the PNG health system is unable to 
protect or treat its population. All elements of the system are struggling as a result of 
gross inadequacies in key enablers, particularly finance, human resources and 
governance. 
PNG’s national health budget was cut by about 30 per cent over the three-year 
period 2015–17, due to reduced government revenue resulting from a drop in 
commodity prices, and national expenditure prioritisation for high-cost activities, in 
particular the South Pacific Games (2015), PNG’s national elections (2017) and the 
APEC Summit (2018). Although the budget recovered slightly over the 2018–19 
period, the five-year budget cut of 17 per cent has severely compromised health 
services throughout PNG.17 
PNG’s Western Province Government (known as the Fly River Provincial 
Government) is primarily responsible for the provision of rural services in the 
province and relies on an annual health function grant from the national government 
  
to mobilise health services.18 The Provincial Health Office in Daru provides oversight 
and support for rural health services, which are delivered by nurses and community 
health workers based in the network of health facilities across the province. 
The Provincial Health Office has an annual operational budget of about A$1.4 
million. These are the funds required to provide fuel and transport to mobilise 
teams, distribute medical supplies, transport patients and maintain essential 
equipment—the fundamental requirements of a rural health service. These funds are 
appropriated in the annual budget. However, they are not what is actually received. 
During 2015, only 25 per cent of these funds (about A$350 000) were released in 
reality, while in 2016 and 2017 the funding available for services reduced to a mere 6 
per cent of the operational budget (about A$80 000).19 
As the majority of funding for health comes from PNG’s national government, 
these funding cuts paralysed health services resulting in a decline in key health 
indicators.20 Expenditure on health highlights the marked disparity in public 
finances on each side of the border. Australia’s response to the poor health of the 
Indigenous Torres Strait Islanders results in a combined government expenditure on 
health services per Indigenous Australian of A$8000, twice that spent per non-
Indigenous Australian21 and about 70 times the Intl$109 per capita spent by the PNG 
Government.22 
The shortage of health workers (including physicians, midwives, nurses, allied 
health staff and community health workers) is contributing to the PNG crisis and is 
likely to worsen due to an ageing workforce and insufficient output of new 
graduates from training institutions to support workforce growth. Currently, PNG 
has workforce numbers less than a third of the 44 skilled workers per 10 000 
population recommended by the World Health Organization23 to provide universal 
health coverage and meet Sustainable Development Goals.24 At present, an estimated 
50 per cent off all government health positions in Western Province are vacant, 
leaving many facilities understaffed or closed.25 There is currently a government 
freeze on recruiting to vacant positions, a further indication of national budget 
constraints. Our field surveys (2016, 2017 and 2018) revealed that most facilities 
along the South Fly coast were closed and that the district’s health system outside 
Daru had largely collapsed. 
Health workforce comparisons further emphasise the stark differences between 
health services. There are currently five community health workers providing basic 
services from six health facilities along the coast west of Daru at Masingara, 
Mabuduan, Sigabaduru, Buzi, Mari and Bula. If they are present in their 
communities,26 they serve a population of more than 3000 people in villages 
scattered along 200 kilometres of remote coast.27 This equates to one health worker 
for every 600 people. By comparison, the three adjacent Torres Strait Island 
communities of Saibai, Boigu and Dauan (the periphery of Australia’s health system) 
have a combined population about 900 people confined to three small island 
communities. In total they have a resident health staff of 12 (6 remote area nurses 
and 6 health workers). This provides one health worker for every 75 people.28 
  
Additionally, the Torres Strait services regularly host up to 15 different medical 
specialist and allied health clinics and have unlimited access to aeromedical retrieval 
services, medical support and telemedicine facilities from the regional hospital on 
Thursday Island.29 
A further impediment to services has been the paralysis of the Western 
Province administration during the 2015–17 period resulting from the arrest and 
conviction of senior government officials for the misappropriation of funds.30 This 
situation resulted in delayed and erratic disbursement of already limited funds, 
adding to the difficulties in delivering services.31 
Aid posts 
While inadequate funding, staff shortages and poor governance are at the core of the 
health system’s problems, decaying infrastructure, lack of basic equipment and 
inconsistent medical supplies further contribute to the decline in services. Aid posts 
and the community health workers who staff them are the mainstay of PNG’s health 
system. Scattered throughout rural and remote PNG, they provide the entry point 
and, in most of the country, the only access to health services for the majority of the 
population. They are usually staffed by a single community health worker who is 
trained to provide basic, frontline health care. More than three-quarters of the health 
facilities in Western Province are aid posts, nearly half of which are closed due 
mainly to a lack of staff, lack of medicine and supplies, run-down infrastructure and 
limited support (figure 6.2).32 
<figure 6.2 near here> 
Empty medical packaging litters the ground beneath this abandoned aid post in the South 
Fly (Research team, 2018) 
Infrastructure, equipment and supplies 
The majority health facilities and health staff houses across Western Province require 
maintenance and repairs. Many are derelict. It is not uncommon to find leaking 
roofs, missing stairs and large sections of walls and floors consumed by termites. An 
infrastructure survey in 2010 found that 70 per cent of facilities did not have a 
reliable water supply, 69 per cent had no lighting and 90 per cent had no way of 
sterilising clinical utensils. Basic equipment was in short supply. Two-thirds of the 
facilities surveyed had no stethoscope, half had no thermometer, and three-quarters 
had no mop and bucket.33 These basic tools are issued to clinics, but replacing them 
through the medical supply system can take months or years. 
Aid posts are supplied with simple medications and supplies (antibiotics, 
antimalarials, antiseptic, dressings and so on) from the provincial medical store. 
Being at the end of the medical supply chain often means that they are last to receive 
(often limited) supplies. In Western Province the provision of routine medical 
supplies has declined by nearly a third in recent years. In 2017 there were shortages 
of essential supplies for nearly five months in the year,34 resulting in basic 
medications such as antibiotics being unavailable, driving people to purchase and 
  
procure these drugs from uninformed and unregulated sources and potentially 
contributing to the problem of growing antimicrobial resistance.35 This provides 
another example of the importance of developing the PNG system—a key element of 
which is an uninterrupted supply of essential medicines—to minimise cross-border 
population health risks. Despite the system’s gross inadequacies (including very 
limited support and supervision), the majority of PNG’s rural and remote health 
workers remain committed to serving their communities and operate as best they 
can within a highly constrained context. 
Access to services 
The limitations of access to their failing health system are reflected in the responses 
from South Fly survey respondents. While most respondents (73 per cent) to the 
2016–18 survey preferred to go to their nearest community health service (either an 
aid post or a health centre), the most common problems they identified were no 
medicines (24 per cent), the cost of transport (23 per cent) and the absence of health 
staff (15 per cent). 
These inadequacies result in people bypassing local facilities and seeking 
health care either at the Saibai and Boigu clinics just across the border—for many a 
mere 15-minute boat ride away—or making the long sea journey to the province’s 
referral hospital at Daru.36 For those living out near the Indonesian border, this 
means up to eight hours in an open dinghy along a weather coast—hard going even 
if you are well. The limited availability of transport and the high cost of fuel make 
the journey expensive and hazardous in rough weather;37 however, for many 
villagers, it is the only PNG service available. 
Improving access to affordable transport through a public ferry system 
(chapter 10) and initiatives such as a village transport scheme would greatly assist 
travel not only for health care but also for markets, education and other services 
available only in Daru. Village transport schemes support the provision of village-
level transport using locally available transport resources subsidised by government 
or other funders. They operate using vouchers and other mechanisms to provide 
transport for access to essential services (supervised births, referrals for specialist 
care and so on). Resources are controlled by a village-level committee. PNG’s 
Tuition Fee Free (TFF) policy is an example of how government funds can be 
dispersed at village level through a local governance mechanism (school boards), 
which manages and acquits the funds and sets priorities for how funds are spent 
locally to support education. A similar mechanism could operate to support health, 
whereby a village health committee would utilise funds from government or donor 
sources to provide transport for those requiring medical services outside the 
village.38 
PNG patients in the Torres Strait 
With various push-and-pull factors in effect, it is worth considering the changing 
patterns of health-seeking behaviour in the borderland. However, the picture of 
  
presentation trends over time by PNG nationals to Torres Strait Primary Health Care 
Centres clinics is unclear.39 Data collection related to PNG presentations to 
Queensland Health services has been inconsistent over the past two decades, during 
which time a number of methods and databases have been used. In the early 2000s 
no specific data related to PNG patients (including ethnicity) were collected by 
Queensland Health. The collection of a patient’s demographic information is reliant 
on frontline health facility staff, and there is variability in application of this task. 
Hence answering key questions about the impact of PNG presentations on 
clinic workloads and the cost of services is difficult. Such information is critical for 
budgeting, staff and resource allocation in the outer island clinics, and to provide 
evidence to support Queensland Health funding requirements from the 
Commonwealth. Importantly, these data would also indicate whether current 
strategies to reduce PNG patient flows are effective, and data detailing the reasons 
for presentation, health conditions and village of origin would also inform strategies 
for strengthening health systems in the South Fly. 
The limited data available indicate that the vast majority PNG nationals 
seeking health care in the Torres Strait present to Saibai and Boigu Island primary 
health-care centres, with Saibai accounting for three-quarters of all presentations. In 
2011–12, 977 PNG nationals crossed the border and presented as outpatients to a 
Torres Strait primary health care clinic in Queensland, and more than a thousand 
PNG people presented in 2012–13.40 During the two-year period 2017–18, 
presentations appear to average about 600 per year.41 At the Saibai clinic, this 
equates to 15–20 per cent of patients seen each day. However, frontline staff indicate 
that occasions of service (i.e. the number of tests and procedures conducted for each 
patient during a single visit) is generally higher; thus the proportion of the daily 
workload taken up by PNG patients may be greater than their numbers indicate, as 
staff often spend more time with a PNG patient. This in part may explain the large 
discrepancy in PNG patient numbers reported by the Australian National Audit 
Office. In 2017 Queensland Health reported treating 1995 PNG patients, more than 
three times the 555 recorded by the Australian Border Force presenting at the border 
seeking health care and refused immigration clearance for a health reason but 
allowed entry.42 
There were reports from the PNG side of visitors seeking health care being 
refused entry or delayed by Australian Border Force officials before being assessed 
by Queensland Health staff. It is not possible to verify the frequency with which this 
occurs, but it is unlikely to be common practice. Once granted entry, people are 
escorted or make their own way to the Saibai and Boigu clinics, where they are 
assessed by frontline Queensland Health staff, some of whom have worked in these 
clinics for a decade or more. They are experienced in managing the tricky balance of 
assessing all PNG people who present to the clinics, providing treatment, referrals 
and medical evacuations in accordance with the Queensland Health policy, while 
ensuring that local residents are not disadvantaged in their access to services. In 
practical terms, this means that local people are given priority over visitors unless 
  
the severity of a patient’s condition demands otherwise. It is common to see 
prospective PNG patients waiting patiently for long periods outside Torres Strait 
clinics. 
Despite our survey findings that health service access is a principal reason for 
cross-border visits by South Fly people, in relative terms, the number of health-care 
seekers is small. Those accessing health care in the Torres Strait account for less than 
3 per cent of all visits by PNG people.43 
While health services along the South Fly coast have continued to decline, 
services at Daru General Hospital have been strengthened substantially since 2012 
due mainly to the Australian Aid support for the emergency TB response. In 2018 
there were 14 doctors based at the hospital, supporting a range of specialist services; 
in 2012 there was just one.44 Community confidence in the facility has increased 
significantly, which is reflected in the doubling of outpatient presentations from 
15 500 in 2015 to 33 500 in 2017.45 This increase also reflects the increasing numbers 
of patients bypassing non-functional rural health services and presenting to the 
hospital. However, despite the improvements in medical staff numbers, the 
province’s major health facility still has a clinical staff vacancy rate of 50 per cent and 
faces continuing funding and medical supply shortages. The hospital was closed 
twice in 2018 due to lack of operational funds,46 and some medical positions were 
vacated in 2019. 
A crude analysis of health expenditure further highlights cross-border 
disparity. The total operational budget at Daru hospital in 2017 was around A$1.2 
million. During that year 33 500 outpatients presented to Daru hospital. In 2017 the 
Commonwealth Government alone provided about A$3.6 million to treat less than a 
thousand PNG people presenting to Queensland Health facilities.47 
Daru and the corners 
Notwithstanding the improvements at Daru General Hospital, visiting Daru, even 
short term, carries inherent health risks. There are very limited formal support 
mechanisms for patients who present at Daru hospital,48 leaving most patients and 
their carers reliant on the support of the community during their Daru stay. Most 
visitors are accommodated in the fringe settlements (known locally as ‘corners’), and 
often stay for extended periods. Here they are exposed to the public health threats 
created by overcrowding, inadequate clean water and no sanitation. 
Daru, the eponymous town on the island of Daru, is the capital of Western 
Province and the commercial and service centre for the South Fly District. Located 
just a couple of kilometres from the PNG mainland, it was originally established as a 
colonial administrative centre. Today Daru houses the provincial referral hospital, 
the South Fly’s only high school,49 its only banking facility, several large retail stores 
owned and operated by Chinese families, the South Fly District administration and 
the offices of most of Western Province’s government departments, including health, 
education and agriculture. However, Daru is not the seat of Western provincial 
government, nor the residence of the government leadership, which in part might 
  
explain its neglect and underdevelopment. The Western provincial government and 
the provincial treasury are located in Kiunga, 400 kilometres north-west of Daru, 
close to the Ok Tedi mining town of Tabubil and where Ok Tedi mining exports the 
mine’s product via the Fly River.50 
Daru was originally established as a settlement for a population of a couple of 
thousand people, and today is home to 16 500 people.51 The population swells to 
more than 20 000 during the periods when recipients of Ok Tedi mine royalties 
stream into Daru to collect their biannual payments.52 This influx exacerbates the 
already overcrowded ‘corners’ where household populations average 13 residents, 
who sleep in shifts, and population densities rival those of vertical cities such as 
New York, exceeding 44 000 per square kilometre.53 It also places increased pressure 
on Daru’s ageing and increasingly dysfunctional infrastructure. The electricity 
supply is unreliable, and the few roads on the island are pot-holed tracks, which 
permit four-wheel-drive access only in the wet season. The town water supply, 
pumped from the Binaturi River on the adjacent mainland through an undersea pipe 
to the island, is frequently interrupted, and constant water rationing, often for just a 
couple of hours per day, is the norm. 
Water rationing on Daru epitomises the complex challenges facing the 
provision of essential services in PNG. Water PNG is a state-owned enterprise 
responsible for managing water supply and sanitation in the urban areas of the 
country. Despite compensation being paid to the identified landowners 30 years ago, 
land ownership of the extraction site for Daru water remains in dispute, and rival 
land claimants regularly sabotage the water pumps on the river to leverage their 
claims for compensation. The pumps are diesel driven, and the inconsistent supply 
of fuel will often result in pumps sitting idle. The undersea pipeline is leaking and 
unstable, reportedly due to it losing a critical anchor point when a concrete 
foundation securing the line was stolen. In addition, there is an intermittent shortage 
of chemicals to treat water at the Daru treatment facility, and the increased demand 
from a resident population has overstretched a system that is already failing. The 
picture is one of a utility provider in permanent damage control and which has little 
likelihood of getting its ‘head above water’ in the foreseeable future. Daru has no 
sewerage treatment facilities. Septic toilets are present in just a few households and 
commercial premises, leaving the majority of the population to practise open 
defecation—using the mudflats and mangrove forests that fringe the island. 
With the structural elements of disease propagation (overcrowding, inadequate 
clean water and limited sanitation) in abundance, Daru is an ideal environment for 
the diseases of poverty to flourish. Malaria, typhoid, leprosy and tuberculosis are 
endemic on the island, its TB rates, including rates of drug-resistant TB, rivalling 
those found anywhere in the world.54 Daru is a risky location for residents and 
visitors alike. 
Equally, sick people coming to Daru can unknowingly introduce diseases into 
the community, which can spread rapidly through the crowded ‘corners’. The 
cholera outbreak of 2011 epitomised this situation. As part of the general influx of 
  
Ok Tedi royalty recipients to the island in October 2011, a person from the south-east 
of the province who had contracted cholera became symptomatic en route to Daru 
and was accommodated by family on the island. The disease spread quickly and 
infected locals and visitors, some of whom took the bacteria back to their villages. A 
regional outbreak ensued with Western Province (mostly in South and lower Middle 
Fly districts) recording nearly 4000 cholera cases and 350 deaths,55 the highest case 
fatality rate of any region in PNG during the epidemic.56 
TB, the environment and the response 
TB is more common in countries where people live in absolute poverty; in poorly 
ventilated and overcrowded conditions, without adequate nutrition and have 
limited access to clean water and sanitation. These conditions epitomise life for most 
people on Daru and, not surprisingly, Daru is the epicentre of the region’s 
tuberculosis epidemic and the base for the TB emergency response in the South Fly. 
The response to TB has been a multi-stakeholder partnership of PNG 
government, non-government organisations and development partners convened in 
2014. Built on the foundation established during the TB patient handover period, the 
program provides diagnostic and treatment services on Daru, with a focus on 
capacity development at Daru hospital, which has increased the number of medical 
staff, strengthened diagnostic capability, added a TB isolation ward and provided 
transport (the medical outreach and retrieval vessel, Medics Queen). 
The Australian Government through its aid and domestic programs is the 
major contributor to the provision of health services for PNG nationals in the South 
Fly and Torres Strait. The investment, driven mainly by the political imperative of 
preventing the incursion of drug-resistant TB into the Torres Strait and beyond to 
the Australian mainland,57 contributed an estimated 82 per cent of the total health 
operational budget in the region during 2017, mostly for TB management in Daru.58 
During the period 2011–17, AusAid (now DFAT) invested A$44.7 million to control 
TB in Western Province.59 
Actions already taken include the provision of travel vouchers to PNG patients 
to pay for fuel for return trips to the clinics on Saibai and Boigu islands; dispensing 
of drugs in blister packs to improve adherence; and stockpiling of second-line anti-
TB drugs in Cairns and on Thursday Island to ensure continuity of supply. Increased 
communication with health centres in PNG has been established to improve 
management of TB patients across the border and to involve PNG health centre staff 
in management. 
Nearly half of the TB patients returning to PNG for treatment when the 
Queensland Health clinics closed in 2011–12 were from Daru, and this group 
comprised more than three-quarters of the MDR-TB cases in the group. More recent 
data confirm Daru as the hotspot: more than three-quarters of the 1485 people who 
commenced TB treatment at Daru hospital in the period 2015–17 are Daru 
residents.60 The TB program continues to diagnose 40 new TB patients each month, 
22 per cent of whom have drug-resistant TB.61 Better services have resulted in earlier 
  
diagnosis and more accessible treatment via community-located treatment centres 
supported by community-based TB treatment supporters (providing DOTS) and 
peer counsellors—incentivised by a free daily meal for patients. Treatment 
completion and success rates now exceed 80 per cent; contact tracing62 has been 
strengthened, facilitating the diagnosis of both active and latent TB, and prophylactic 
therapy has commenced for at-risk groups. 
The technical response to TB, driven principally by Australia’s security 
interests, has stabilised the epidemic on Daru. Unless the enabling conditions that 
ensure TB continues to thrive on the island (and across the region) are addressed, 
however, the program runs the risk of being little more than a continuous and 
expensive Band Aid measure. 
NCDs and the double burden of disease 
Rapid development in the Torres Strait since the 1980s has resulted in significant 
improvements in living standards, which have brought with them attendant lifestyle 
risks. The introduction of processed foods through a network of retail outlets on the 
islands has enabled a rapid transition away from traditional diets to a Western diet 
of processed foods high in sugar and fat. The availability of packaged food and 
welfare money to purchase it has seen island populations abandon their gardens for 
the ease and convenience of the local store. This dietary change, coupled with 
reduced physical activity due to such changes as ready access to motorised transport 
and the reduction of activities associated with food production, has fuelled an 
obesity epidemic in the Torres Strait and consequent non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) with rates many times that of the non-Indigenous Australian population. 
Two-thirds (67.2 per cent) of Torres Strait Islanders are overweight or obese, and 1 in 
14 (7.2 per cent) have diabetes.63 Consequently, a Torres Strait Islander man has a life 
expectancy 14 years shorter than his non-Indigenous counterparts; the figure for 
women is 10 years shorter.64 
Adding to the challenge of controlling communicable diseases in PNG is the 
emergence of NCDs, thus creating a double burden of disease and placing further 
pressure on a struggling health system. The growth of NCDs in PNG is also well 
advanced. More than 50 per cent of males smoke tobacco, obesity rates are rising 
(due mainly to changing diet) and cardiovascular disease, cancer and diabetes are 
now responsible for 56 per cent of all deaths (compared to 36 per cent for 
communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions).65 
We found evidence of dietary transition across the South Fly. More than 90 per 
cent of the villages we visited had rice, flour and sugar for sale locally, and 76 per 
cent of people surveyed had eaten these foods within the past 2 weeks (100 per cent 
within the past month). These foods have become part of the staple diet in village 
households, and demand drives a local trade in rice, flour and sugar. Bundles of 
these products are purchased from trade stores in Daru and on-sold locally through 
village ‘canteens’—small stalls set up outside people’s homes. This model assists in 
  
fostering the cash economy at village level as the need for cash to pay school 
charges,66 transport and other costs grows. 
Household gardens remain the principal food source for families; however, the 
annual cycles of drought and flood in the South Fly regularly result in crop failure 
and food insecurity. Relief, when it arrives, comes in the form of rice, flour and 
sugar, all highly valued not only as convenient alternatives to garden foods but also 
as a sign of status within PNG society. 
The growing availability of processed foods, sugary drinks and tobacco at 
village level are fuelling unhealthy habits and the rise of NCDs. Men in PNG are 
increasingly dying from preventable lifestyle diseases and have a 10-year shorter 
lifespan (6 years for women) than their traditional counterparts in the Torres Strait.67 
The impact of the growing burden that NCDs place on the PNG health system 
cannot be underestimated. As the calls for renal dialysis, heart surgery and 
radiotherapy grow, particularly among the PNG elite, whose ‘Western’ lifestyles 
make them more vulnerable to chronic illness and who either mistakenly (or driven 
by self-interest) see these facilities as priority elements of the nation’s health system. 
More resources towards high-end NCD interventions reduce the already constrained 
capacity in the PNG system to control existing threats (malaria, TB, HIV, leprosy). 
Widespread outbreaks of infectious diseases such as cholera (in 2010) and vaccine 
preventable diseases such as measles (in 2014) and polio (in 2018) are testament to a 
health system already struggling to cope with endemic communicable disease. 
NCD risk factors such as diabetes and tobacco-smoking weaken the immune 
system and increase the risk of a person developing active TB.68 The prevalence of 
NCDs in the Torres Strait and the rise of NCDs in PNG amplify the health security 
risk in the borderland and highlight the need to understand the complex threat of TB 
in a way that recognises all of the disease’s enablers and risk factors. 
Health security 
All cross-border movement carries an inherent risk of disease transmission, and the 
movement of people through the Torres Strait enhances the risk of the spread of 
disease between Papua New Guinea and Australia. Horwood and colleagues note 
the potential for disease movement through the ‘Indo-Papuan conduit’.69 They 
highlight the imperative that disease control measures extend beyond Australia’s 
borders and that effective cross-border communications are essential for effective 
surveillance and response to public health threats. Australian health agencies 
maintain surveillance of diseases of public health significance that could potentially 
cause outbreaks, risk lives and place pressure on the Australian health system. 
Border closure has been used as a measure to minimise public health and other 
threats, including during the 2011 cholera outbreak in PNG. 
Disease risk remains a constant in the political narrative about protecting 
Australia’s border, headlined by drug-resistant TB as the ever-present danger on 
Australia’s doorstep. However, perceived risk—referred to in some analyses as 
community outrage70—often overinflates actual risk. An independent risk 
  
assessment of TB spreading across the border found that the risk to Australians of 
acquiring TB from PNG residents remains low as long as contact is confined to 
trading, fishing and other outdoor activity.71 Risk increases if activity involves 
extended cohabitation or sharing schoolrooms or homes without appropriate 
isolation and ventilation. The majority of Torres Strait Islanders diagnosed with TB 
in the Torres Strait have a history of extended stays in PNG or sharing crowded 
housing in Torres Strait communities with PNG families. 
The risk assessment noted that managing TB services within a PNG national 
program is likely to reduce the risk of TB (including DR-TB) transmission to 
Australian residents in the short term, by reducing the number of PNG nationals 
seeking health care in Australia. As noted above, this approach has been adopted 
with some success, the TB program now well established at Daru and suspected TB 
cases presenting to Torres Strait clinics being referred to Daru to commence their 
treatment. 
The data confirm this. Twenty cases of TB were diagnosed in the Torres Strait 
in 2014–15,72 while in 2017, the Torres and Cape Hospital and Health Service 
recorded four cases of TB for the year: two in the Torres Strait region and two on 
Cape York. Across Queensland as a whole, 201 cases of TB were notified in 2017.73 
As noted, the TB program on Daru alone diagnoses 40 new TB patients each month. 
A communicable disease risk assessment conducted by Queensland Health’s 
Tropical Regional Services echoes the findings that the risk of TB (including MDR-
TB) incursion into Torres Strait communities to be relatively low whereas the 
perceived risk (described in the analysis as ‘community outrage’) is high.74 The 
findings were similar for other emotively charged diseases, in particular HIV and 
cholera.75 
Discussion 
Social determinants 
In February 2010 the Western Province Government tabled a proposal for a cross-
border regional study between Australia and Papua New Guinea under the Torres 
Strait Treaty at the bilateral Health Issues Committee (HIC) in Cairns.76 The proposal 
recognised that since HIC was established in 2003 as a subcommittee of the 
intergovernmental Joint Advisory Committee, it had sought to address the demand 
on Queensland Health services imposed by PNG citizens and the risk of 
communicable diseases such as TB infiltrating northern Australia. 
The proposal suggested that in addition to a narrow, unisectoral focus of 
providing better, more accessible health services for PNG citizens in PNG to stem 
cross-border health-seeking behaviour, HIC should consider how cross-border 
health issues might be addressed through a broader community development 
approach. Such an approach recognises that while quality, accessible heath care is a 
key element of what are described as the social determinants of health,77 equally 
important are the economic and social conditions in which people live. Education, 
  
economic stability, income and employment, physical environments and healthy 
behaviour all contribute to well-being and influence the social factors at the root of 
the inequalities of health relevant to communicable and non-communicable diseases 
alike. 
HIC supported the proposal but were unable to allocate resources to a cross-
border regional study. This borderlands research became that study and provided 
the mechanism for understanding how people live and work in this region and how 
the borders affect their lives. Treating existing disease, particularly infectious disease 
(such as TB), often requires an urgent, targeted response and will always receive 
high priority. However, this should not be to the exclusion of taking action on the 
underlying social determinants of health or, indeed, broader health system 
strengthening. 
Although the programmatic approach taken to addressing TB has stabilised the 
epidemic on Daru, it has had limited reach beyond the island. TB is endemic across 
the South Fly and was identified as a health problem in more than a third of the 
communities we surveyed. Encouragingly, there were signs in 2019 of the program 
extending its reach beyond Daru through a network of trained TB treatment 
supporters located in villages across the district.78 
Equally, while the TB program has built capacity at Daru hospital, it has had 
little influence on strengthening the broader health system. Systems thinking79 
recognises the interdependency of all of the key components of a health system80 and 
the necessity to build and maintain capacity across all components if a stronger, 
sustainable system is to be achieved. 
South Fly District is a low performer when comparing health outcomes 
nationally, with key indicators such as childhood immunisation, antenatal care and 
supervised births being stagnant or declining over the past decade. There remain 
unrealised opportunities to use the TB program as a vehicle for broader health 
system support. Australia and other donors will continue to support the TB response 
in Western Province, and as the program extends its reach, there would 
unquestionably be benefit in using the significant resources TB brings to the region 
to support an integrated primary health-care model. Equally, and perhaps more 
importantly, is the need to address the inadequacies of public health infrastructure 
that fuel endemic communicable disease in the region. At any one time up to 30 per 
cent of the South Fly District’s population resides on Daru. Unless and until living 
conditions in the provincial capital and trading centre are improved by addressing 
the critical issues of water supply, sanitation and housing, Daru town will continue 
to propagate disease locally and act as a vector for disease transmission, thereby 
putting the regional population at risk and impeding development. Fixing Daru will 
require development at scale,81 which must be led by the PNG Government and will 
require substantial development partner support. 
  
Borderland health zone 
The inefficiencies created by the border in delivering health care might best be 
addressed by treating the border region as a health zone, in contrast to its current 
status as a buffer zone, and allowing the distribution of resources—including human 
resources—with a focus on efficiency rather than sovereignty. This will require 
rethinking the allocation made by the Australian state through the Queensland and 
national health systems, and Australian aid to the South Fly, to achieve greater 
efficiencies. The continued focus on addressing TB in the region provides the vehicle 
for strengthening the health system, promoting increased aid in the region and 
advocacy for addressing the underlying determinants of health. Aid support has 
increased in recent years with DFAT funding a major new health facility at 
Mabuduan (scheduled for opening in 2020), World Vision’s ongoing WASH 
program in the South Fly and the Building Resilience in Treaty Villages program 
(albeit confined to Treaty villages). Also, a number of other development agencies 
are commencing activity in the South Fly.82 
An option for consideration would be reducing the constraints on cross-border 
movement of health professionals utilising the facilitated border-crossing 
provisions.83 Australian clinicians would have access to Daru, Mabuduan and other 
coastal health facilities via the Torres Strait for the purposes of clinical support, 
mentorship and training while PNG clinicians would have access to health facilities 
in the Torres Strait (and beyond) with the intent of building relationships, improving 
communication and retrieving patients. The precedent for this approach was set 
during the TB patient handover clinics on Saibai and Boigu during 2010–11 when 
PNG and Australian clinicians worked together to return PNG patients safely to the 
PNG system. 
Some medical outreach to Mabuduan has been occurring through the TB 
program, but it is infrequent, irregular and focused on TB patients. 
The availability of health staff from Australia, potentially managed by 
Queensland Health, could also help alleviate the critical staff shortages in the South 
Fly in the short term. The soon to be opened new health centre at Mabuduan 
provides an opportunity to test this approach, as it is unlikely that key clinical 
positions in the new facility will be filled by PNG staff, given the existence of 
widespread staff shortages and the relative remoteness of the facility.84 Facilitating 
regular medical clinics by a doctor (and possibly other clinical staff) in Mabuduan 
and Sigabaduru, on rotation from the Torres Strait Health Service, would eliminate 
most of the cross-border movement for health care.85 A similar approach might also 
be considered for Buzi, adjacent to Boigu, which also receives a high proportion of 
health visits. Any arrangements for cross-border clinical support would be made 
collaboratively between Commonwealth Health, Queensland Health and the 
Western Provincial Health Authority and retain a focus on developing the capacity 
of South Fly health services. 
  
Conclusion 
The borderlands region of PNG has generated significant political turmoil over the 
past decade. TB and particularly DR-TB has been at the forefront of discussion 
around local governance, health services and health security. Australia’s approach to 
handling what has been frequently described in media commentary, political 
discourse and medical journals as a crisis on Australia’s northern border, has been to 
harden the border and to provide support for health services on the PNG side with a 
narrow focus on TB. The response has been driven by the politics of fear. 
Some real gains have been made in containing the TB epidemic at its epicentre 
on Daru and building capacity at Daru hospital. The response has been costly, 
however, and has done little to strengthen the wider health system or address the 
underlying causes of the epidemic. 
What is required is a strategic, long-term approach led by the PNG 
Government and supported by donor partners, which has two interrelated goals: 
strengthening of health systems in accordance with the Western Provincial Health 
Authority’s strategic and operational plans86 linked to a broader community 
development approach, aligned to the Western Province Government’s 
Development Plan to address the underlying determinants of poverty.87 This 
approach would incorporate strategies to ameliorate emerging lifestyle risk factors—
including lessons learned from the Torres Strait—as PNG continues its transition 
from subsistence to a cash economy. Such approaches would be greatly assisted by 
positioning the borderland as a health zone within which the cross-border mobility 
of health staff is facilitated, communication and transport gaps are addressed, and 
inclusive population health approaches that strengthen rather than deplete health 
security are adopted. 
Addressing the health asymmetries in the borderland requires a long-term 
view and might never be fully realised. Working towards reducing the current 
disparities, however, undoubtedly serves both the health security and, indeed, 
broader security interests of all borderland states. 
Notes 
<Setter: take in notes here, numbered from 1 to end> 
 
 
1 DFAT, ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors Travelling Under the Torres Strait 
Treaty’, www.dfat.gov.au/geo/torres-strait/Pages/guidelines-for-traditional-
visitors-travelling-under-the-torres-strait-treaty.aspx. 
2 The only reference to health in the Torres Strait Treaty is the statement that health 
procedures should not prevent free movement. The treaty does not require the 
automatic provision of health services to visitors; however, free movement 
often results in PNG nationals presenting at health facilities within the Torres 
Strait Protected Zone while in the course of conducting traditional activities. 
  
 
The ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors under the Torres Strait Treaty’ set the 
rules for what can and cannot be done under the provisions of the treaty. 
3 Drug resistant tuberculosis (DR-TB) includes both multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis 
(MDR-TB) and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB). MDR-TB is a form of 
tuberculosis (TB) infection caused by bacteria that are resistant to treatment 
with at least two of the most powerful first-line anti-TB medications, isoniazid 
and rifampin. XDR-TB is a form of TB resistant to second-line medications. 
4 G. Simpson, P. Clark and T. Knight, ‘Changing patterns of tuberculosis in Far North 
Queensland’ (letter to the Editor), Medical Journal of Australia, vol. 184, no. 5, 
2006, p. 252. 
5 C. Gilpin, G. Simpson, S. Vincent, T. O’Brien, T. Knight, M. Globan, C. Coulter and 
A. Konstantinos, ‘Evidence of primary transmission of multidrug‐resistant 
tuberculosis in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea’, Medical Journal of 
Australia, vol. 188, no. 3, 2008, pp. 148–52. 
6 S. Elks, ‘End of TB lifeline a cruel blow’, Australian, 2 July 2011. K. Burns, ‘TB crisis 
strikes in lawless PNG town’, Cairns Post, 22 September 2011. ‘Australian Govt 
under pressure to fund TB clinics’, National, 28 August 2012. 
7 Five handover clinics were conducted on Saibai and Boigu between October 2011 
and June 2012. Twenty-eight of the 92 patients (30 per cent) completed their 
treatment in Queensland before handover for monitoring by the PNG team. 
8 E. McBryde, Evaluation of Risks of Tuberculosis in Western Province Papua New Guinea 
(report), Burnet Institute, Melbourne, 2012. 
9 WHO, Government of Papua New Guinea National Tuberculosis Program 
Technical Assistance Mission, 15–21 October 2011 (to evaluate the TB services 
in the South Fly District in Western Province, Papua New Guinea). 
10 In 2013 the then Queensland Health Minister, Lawrence Springborg, claimed that 
the decision to close the TB clinics on Saibai and Boigu was made on the basis 
of advice provided by WHO. In a statement to the media, Springborg explained 
that the clinics were seen to be contributing to the development of MDR-TB 
because the clinics were not in a position to treat and monitor TB patients in an 
effective way. This had reportedly resulted in patients taking incomplete 
treatment and sharing drugs with their families. In the lead-up to the 2013 
federal election, Springborg used the issue to link the Queensland government 
rhetoric to the ‘stop the boats’ mantra of Tony Abbott’s election strategy. In a 
politically motivated attack, the Queensland Health Minister’s office released a 
media statement claiming that the compensation payments to the Queensland 
Government from the federal government was acknowledgement from a 
Labour federal government that they were unable to secure our borders: ‘[T]he 
Federal Government approved an $18 million compensation package to 
Queensland in recognition that the Commonwealth Government cannot secure 
the Queensland–Papua New Guinea border … The $18 million compensation 
deal, signed on 30th June by Federal Health Minister Tanya Plibersek, confirms 
  
 
the Labor Government is fully aware that more than 1000 Papua New Guinea 
nationals freely cross the Queensland border each year to access health services 
without any passport or visa requirements, and no requirement to carry 
identification.’ See R. Wilson, ‘PNG nationals stream through “colander” Qld 
border for care’, Chronicle (Toowoomba), 24 July 2013, 
www.thechronicle.com.au/news/png-nationals-stream-through-colander-qld-
border-c/1957078. 
11 Queensland Health, ‘Management of Papua New Guinea nationals presenting to 
Queensland Health facilities in the Torres Strait’, 2009, 
www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs
_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/2010-13/torresstrait/qon/index, 
attachment 4. 
12 See chapter 2 for details of the process used to select PNG Treaty villages. 
13 The South Fly District borders the Torres Strait and is the southernmost of Western 
Province’s three districts: North, Middle and South Fly. 
14 Council of Australian Governments, Project Agreement for the Management of Torres 
Strait/Papua New Guinea Cross Border Health Issues, Commonwealth of Australia 
and Queensland and Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial 
Relations. A stated Commonwealth role in the agreement is to ‘provide a 
consequent financial contribution to Queensland to support the 
implementation of this agreement’. 
15 Cross-border communication officer, personal communication. 
16 By contrast, only 3 per cent of survey participants had been treated in an 
Indonesian health facility, and less than 6 per cent cited this as a reason for 
going to Indonesia. However, due to the paucity of government and other 
services in the western part of the South Fly, PNG residents of this region are 
increasingly looking west for trade and other opportunities, including 
education, banking and health. See chapter 2. 
17 PNGECO5_WP [sic], ‘PNG 2019 budget—health cut despite polio and drug 
shortages, administration big winner but political’, PNG Economics, 14 
November 2018, www.pngeconomics.org/2018/11/png-2019-budget. 
18 Funding for Daru General Hospital, wages for government health service staff 
(both hospital and rural) and for drugs and supplies is provided at the national 
level through the National Department of Health (hospitals and drugs) and 
Department of Finance (public service wages). 
19 A. Honjepari, ‘Report to the Health Issues Committee meeting’, Cairns, Qld, 2016; 
based on interviews on 4 November 2016 and 29 May 2018 at the Provincial 
Health Office, Daru, Western Province. 
20 For example, pentavalent vaccine coverage of children under 1 year fell from 62 
per cent to 29 per cent over the three-year period (SPAR). 
21 Productivity Commission, ‘2017 Indigenous Expenditure Report’, Steering 
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2017, 
  
 
www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/indigenous-expenditure-report. Productivity 
Commission, Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision, ‘Report on Government Services 2018’, 23 January 2017, 
www.apo.org.au/node/129126. 
22 WHO, ‘Papua New Guinea’, www.who.int/countries/png/en. International dollars 
are used by WHO to compare expenditure between countries. ‘An international 
dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable amount of goods and 
services a US dollar would buy in the United States’ 
(datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114944-what-is-an-
international-dollar). 
23 WHO defines skilled health workers as doctors, midwives and nurses. PNG’s 
Community Health Workers (CHWs) are not recognised as skilled health 
workers. Because CHWs are the only health staff providing services throughout 
most of the South Fly, they are included for the purpose of workforce 
comparisons. The total South Fly health worker to population ratio is 
16.5:10 000. 
24 WHO, ‘Health workforce requirements for universal health coverage and the 
Sustainable Development Goals’, Human Resources for Health Observer Series, 
no. 17, 2016. 
25 P. Barren, ‘PNG Workforce Statistics’, unpublished report for PNG National 
Department of Health, 2017. 
26 Survey respondents in one coastal village estimate that their sole community 
health worker is absent approximately 75 per cent of the time. During the 
research team’s August 2019 visit, only two of these six facilities had a CHW 
present, which is indicative of the absence of staff across the district. 
27 PNG National Department of Health, ‘Projected populations by Health Facility 
Catchment’, unpublished report, 2018. 
28 The outer Torres Strait Islands health worker to population ratio is 133:10 000. 
29 Queensland Health, ‘Torres and Cape Hospital and Health Service’, 
www.health.qld.gov.au/services/torres-cape. 
30 ‘Western Governor Ati Wabiro and two others sentenced to 10 years in prison’, 
Post-Courier, 18 November 2016, postcourier.com.pg/western-governor-ati-
wabiro-and-two-others-sentenced-to-10-years-in-prison. 
31 Various officials and councillors interviewed spoke of the lack of adequate 
recurrent funding to support the health system and its outreach to rural 
communities in the Western Province. 
32 Western Province has four hospitals, 42 health centres and subhealth centres and 
154 aid posts. Nearly half of all health facilities in the province are operated by 
church health services using church health service grants provided by the 
Government of PNG. However, there are only two church-run health facilities 
in the South Fly. 
  
 
33 G. Miller, ‘Exploring fundamental issues underpinning health service functionality 
in Western Province’, unpublished report, 2010. 
34 PNG National Department of Health, ‘National Report, 2018 Sector Performance 
Annual Review: Assessment of Performance 2014–2018’, 
www.health.gov.pg/subindex.php?acts=1 
35 Antimicrobial resistance, resulting from incomplete treatment of TB, has been a 
major contributor to the development drug resistant strains of TB in the region. 
36 By dinghy, Daru is 2 hours from Mabuduan, 4 hours from Buzi and 8 hours from 
Bula (see figure 1.1). 
37 The standard fare by dinghy from Mabuduan to Daru is K200 (approximately 
A$80) one way. 
38 PNG National Department of Health, ‘PNG Maternal and Newborn Health 
Strategy’ (draft), 2019. 
39 Due mainly to a lack of available data. See chapter 5. 
40 Queensland Parliament, Estimates Committee, L. Springborg, ‘Media statements: 
PNG–Queensland border unsecured’, Queensland Government, 24 July 2013, 
www.statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2013/7/24/pngqueensland-border-
unsecured. 
41 Cross-border communication officer, Queensland Health, personal 
communication. 
42 Australian National Audit Office [ANAO], Auditor-General et al., ‘Coordination 
arrangements of Australian government entities operating in Torres Strait’, 
Auditor-General Report, no. 41, ANAO, 2019, p. 61. Performance Audit, 
www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/coordination-arrangements-
australian-government-entities-operating-torres-strait. They might find 
themselves being detained by ABF, however, as they are not legally allowed to 
travel outside the Protected Zone covered by the treaty. 
43 PNG nationals made more than 34 000 visits to the Torres Strait in 2015–16, 95 per 
cent to the top western islands of Saibai, Boigu and Dauan (personal 
communication, Superintendent Area Command North Queensland, 
Australian Border Force). 
44 Daru General Hospital is the only health facility in the South Fly with resident 
doctors. 
45 Daru General Hospital, Western Province Health Stakeholders Meeting, Port 
Moresby, updated presentation, 10 May 2018. 
46 CEO of Daru General Hospital, personal communication. 
47 This does not include the additional funding Queensland Health claimed to 
provide to treat PNG people. Queensland Health quotes the total cost to treat 
about a thousand PNG people in 2013 as A$13 million. The 2017 total figure is 
unavailable. 
48 There is a 10-bed accommodation facility at Daru Hospital for TB patients’ 
families. 
  
 
49 Daru High School is the only school in the South Fly where students can complete 
their secondary education. 
50 Ok Tedi Mine has contributed on average about 25 per cent of PNG’s GDP 
annually since the mine opened in 1985. 
51 Population census conducted before the WHO TB screening program in 2017–18: 
‘Daru: 2017 corner population density’, unpublished report, Burnet Institute, 
Melbourne. 
52 Ok Tedi Mining Limited provides biannual compensation payments to the mine 
affected villages along the Fly River under the Community Mine Continuation 
Agreement (CMCA). 
53 ‘Daru: 2017 corner population density’. 
54 J. Furin and H. Cox, ‘Outbreak of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis on Daru 
Island’, Lancet Respiratory Medicine, vol. 4, no. 5, 2016, pp. 347–9. 
55 Western Provincial Administration, ‘Details of the Cholera Response: Western 
Province Cholera Outbreak’, unpublished report, 2011. 
56 P. Horwood and A. Greenhill, ‘Cholera in Papua New Guinea and the importance 
of safe water sources and sanitation’, Western Pacific Surveillance and Response 
Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, 2012, p. 13. 
57 Warren Entsch MP, Appropriation Bill 2012–13, 
www.warrenentsch.com.au/appropriation-bill-2012-2013. A. Katelaris, ‘Short-
sightedness puts Australia at risk’ (editorial), Medical Journal Australia, vol. 195, 
no. 9, 2011, p. 487. 
58 Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Government National Partnership 
Agreement—Management of Torres Strait–Papua New Guinea health issues—
Extension, 2016. Expenditure figures do not include management fees paid to 
agencies and contractors delivering services (i.e. approximately 20 per cent). 
59 Australian High Commission, Papua New Guinea, ‘TB factsheet update, 28 
February 2017’, www.png.embassy.gov.au. 
60 Over this period, 9.3 per cent of all Daru residents commenced treatment. 
61 K. Chani, updated presentation, Western Province Health Stakeholders Meeting, 
Burnet Institute, Port Moresby, 9 May 2018. 
62 Contact tracing is the process of identifying and testing people who have had 
sustained contact with confirmed TB cases—principally members of the 
patient’s extended household. 
63 Northern Queensland Primary Health Network, ‘Health snapshot Torres Shire’, 
Health Needs Assessment: Description of Health Service Use, Workforce and 
Consumer Need, NQPHN, 2016, p. 132. 
64 Australian Institute of Health and Well-being, ‘Australia’s Health 2018’, AIHW, 
2018, www.aihw.gov.au/reports. 
65 ‘Papua New Guinea’, WHO, 2016, www.who.int/nmh/countries/png_en.pdf. 
66 Although PNG has a free education policy known as the Tuition Fee Free policy, 
students are still required to pay project charges to support the basic functions 
  
 
of their school. In most instances, students who are unable to pay their charges 
are eventually barred from attending school. 
67 ‘Papua New Guinea’, WHO, 2016, www.who.int/nmh/countries/png_en.pdf. 
68 ‘WHO Global Coordination Mechanism on the prevention and control of NCDs’, 
WHO, www.who.int/global-coordination-mechanism/working-groups. 
69 P.F. Horwood, E.S. McBryde, D. Peniyamina and S.A. Ritchie, ‘The Indo-Papuan 
conduit: A biosecurity challenge for northern Australia’, Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health, vol. 42, no. 5, 2018, pp. 434–6. The term ‘Indo-
Papuan conduit’ refers to ‘the land and waterways directly to the north of 
Australia, connecting south-eastern Indonesia and New Guinea (including the 
West Papuan province of Indonesia [Papua Province] and Papua New Guinea 
(PNG)) to the Torres Strait and Cape York Peninsula of Australia’. 
70 The many approaches to disease risk assessment all include the three key elements 
of probability (of a disease occurring), impact (on the population if the disease 
does occur) and perception (how a particular disease is perceived by a 
population group; in some instances expressed as outrage). Community 
perception often determines government responsiveness to public health 
threats; that is, governments are often spurred to respond to disease threats 
that might affect only a small (often influential) proportion of the population 
but are perceived (often irrationally) to have dire, population-wide 
consequences. 
71 McBryde, 2012. 
72 Queensland Health, ‘Tuberculosis in Queensland 2015’, State Government of 
Queensland, Brisbane, 2016, www.health.qld.gov.au. 
73 ‘TB case in the Torres Strait’, Queensland Health, 2018, 
www.health.qld.gov.au/torres-cape. 
74 Queensland Health, ‘Risk management of communicable diseases in the Torres 
Strait and Northern Peninsula’, unpublished report, 2012. 
75 Recording about 1 per cent of HIV infections in PNG, Western Province has a 
relatively low prevalence of HIV compared to other PNG provinces (STI, HIV 
and AIDS Annual Surveillance Report, 2010, National Department of Health, 
PNG). 
76 Office of the Provincial Administrator, Western Province Administration, 
‘Proposal for a cross-border regional study between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea under the Torres Strait Treaty’, tabled at the health issues committee, 
February 2010, Cairns. 
77 M. Marmot, ‘Social determinants of health inequalities’, Lancet, vol. 365, 2005, pp. 
1099–104. The social determinants of health are the economic and social 
conditions that influence individual and group differences in health status. 
They are the health-promoting factors found in one’s living and working 
conditions (such as the distribution of income, wealth, influence and power), 
rather than individual risk factors (such as behavioural risk factors or genetics) 
  
 
that influence the risk for a disease, or vulnerability to disease or injury 
(Wikipedia). 
78 TB treatment supporters are trained to deliver DOTS and to be alert to the early 
symptoms of TB. 
79 ‘Publications and other resources’, WHO, www.who.int/alliance-
hpsr/resources/en. 
80 The WHO framework of health system building blocks describes six subsystems of 
an overall health system architecture: leadership and governance; finance; 
health workforce; service delivery; access to essential medical supplies; and 
health information systems. 
81 This will need to occur both on and off the island, because relocation of much of 
the population will be part of Daru’s redevelopment. 
82 Marie Stopes has an effective family planning program operating in the South Fly, 
UNICEF and ADRA are planning programs, the Digicel Foundation is building 
school classrooms and the World Bank has built community centres in a few 
villages. 
83 Australian Government, ‘User requirements: Facilitated cross-border movement 
for certain government officials’, unpublished document, 15 October 2010. 
Facilitated cross-border movement provisions permit certain nominated health 
and other government officials to conveniently enter or exit Australia and/or 
PNG via non-proclaimed ports within the area covered by the Torres Strait 
Treaty, at minimum cost and with minimal bureaucratic process. 
84 Mabuduan Health Centre is a Level 3 health facility with 18 inpatient beds. 
According to PNG National Health Service Standards, Mabuduan will require 
20 staff (including 13 clinical staff). Currently, the old Health Centre at 
Mabuduan has only two staff—both community health workers. 
85 The majority of PNG presentations for health care are at Saibai, and most of these 
people come from Mabuduan, Sigabaduru and surrounding villages. 
86 The Western Provincial Health Authority was established and gazetted in August 
2019. 
87 Western Provincial Government, The New Way Forward: Western Province 
Development Plan 2018–2022, Office of the Governor, Western Province, Papua 
New Guinea, 2018. 
  
7 
Fisheries 
Sara Busilacchi, Kevin Murphy and James Butler 
The borderland of the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly encompasses the borders of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), Indonesia and Australia (figure 1.1), and is characterised today 
by profound political and socioeconomic asymmetries.1 The waters surrounding 
these countries are defined by the highly biodiverse Torres Strait, with its islands, 
reefs, seagrass meadows and mangroves. For centuries, Melanesian populations 
living along the coast of what is now the South Fly District in PNG and on the 
islands scattered in Australia’s Torres Strait have traversed these waters and 
maintained trade connections, kinship and cultural ties through intermarriage and 
warfare. These ties also extended to the Marind-Anim people in what is now the 
south-eastern corner of Papua Province in Indonesia. 
The rich marine resources in the Torres Strait have long provided a major 
source of sustenance and livelihoods to populations in this borderland region. 
However, the skewed development of the neighbouring areas is driving divergent 
patterns of utilisation of marine resources. Due to their geographical and political 
isolation, communities along the coast of the South Fly today rely heavily on marine 
resources for food security and earning cash. On the Australian side of the border, 
fishing plays an important role in meeting and maintaining cultural needs and 
obligations for the Torres Strait communities, but this has declined over the years 
with the shift towards a cash economy supported by welfare payments from the 
Australian Government, characterised by Altman as a ‘hybrid economy’.2 
Until the establishment of colonial borders, Papuan and Torres Strait 
populations shared waters and their resources according to customary accords, and 
moved freely in the region. However, the free movement of people, resources and 
goods has become increasingly regulated since European colonisation with the 
arrival in the Torres Strait of the London Missionary Society and the administration 
of the Queensland Government in the 1870s. Following PNG’s independence in 
1975, the ratification of the Torres Strait Treaty between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia in 1985 increased the restrictions on the movement and trade of these 
borderland populations.3 
When the Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and PNG was eventually 
signed in 1978, after six years of negotiations, it was welcomed by politicians, 
academics and the international community as an innovative cross-jurisdictional 
institutional framework. One academic concluded that ‘direct negotiation can 
successfully resolve complex maritime boundary disputes’, and ‘it also contains 
  
several novel and significant features that may point the way to solutions 
elsewhere’.4 
The Torres Strait Treaty has a cross-jurisdictional framework to regulate the 
management of shared marine resources in the Torres Strait. The framework 
includes stakeholders from local to national levels, although PNG representation is 
outnumbered by Australian representatives.5 The existence of these cross-
jurisdictional institutional frameworks has not, however, always led to effective 
decision-making processes. Despite the presence of community representatives 
during the treaty’s negotiation and later as regular stakeholders, the ever-evolving 
transboundary social and political dynamics in the South Fly have often been 
overlooked, creating a mismatch between the state-driven institutional framework 
governing the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly region and the everyday local livelihood 
realities, especially for Papua New Guineans. On the ground, this mismatch results 
in ambiguities which, due to limited livelihood activities, local people take 
advantage of to earn cash. Many of these small-scale economic opportunities involve 
cross-border trade, as often occurs in borderlands. However, when viewed from a 
state-centred and regulatory perspective, such cross-border trade overlaps 
definitions of informal, licit and illegal.6 
Mismatches between scales (e.g. temporal, spatial, institutional, networks) in 
social–ecological systems are known to undermine their resilience.7 Overlooked and 
unresolved mismatches have a long history of resulting in the failed management of 
cross-border resources, as in the management of transboundary pollution and 
migratory species. In the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly region, these unregulated activities 
could have negative cascading effects on the sustainability of shared marine 
resources, and consequently on the well-being and livelihoods of South Fly and 
Torres Strait communities. Some of the fisheries resources may already be 
overexploited.8 This has been reported by South Fly villagers when discussing the 
declining status of sea cucumbers (bêche-de-mer) on the PNG side of the Torres 
Strait, despite a fishing moratorium that ran from October 2009 to April 2017:9 
Today you can go [illegally] to the other side [Australia] and you can take 
50/60 kg [of sea cucumber], but not on our side.10 If you go on our areas 
you can get one, half a bag. There is a big difference. 
In this chapter we examine the challenge of mismatches between the state-
centred institutions, the social and political realities at the community level, and the 
transboundary marine resources of the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly region. We apply 
Horstman and Wadley’s political economy perspective, which they describe as 
‘centering the margins’,11 and involves understanding the social forces originating in 
borderlands. Using their framework, we give an overview of how states deal with 
the borderlands, then shift the focus to the perspective of the borders, wherein 
people ‘negotiate border crossing in their everyday activities and extend the 
borderland into the central spaces through their movements’.12 
  
To do this, we first describe the institutional context within which shared 
fisheries resources in the Torres Strait are currently managed. We then analyse the 
local, social and political dynamics in the South Fly. In this regard, we look at 
embedded power relations, how people adapt to the border and its institutions, and 
how borderlanders re-appropriate and use shared marine resources. We go further 
by including the environmental context of the region, and briefly discuss how 
changing social dynamics are generating unintended consequences for exploited 
marine resources. Important in this discussion is the role that globalisation13 and its 
driving economic forces are playing in transforming the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly 
region, and how they are changing the roles of people in the South Fly from 
peripheral actors in their own country to active participants in the global economy. 
The discussion of this chapter is based on data and information from the 
CSIRO’s research projects, supplemented by information and quotes recorded 
during interviews for the ARC-funded project (chapter 1: Introduction). 
Institutional framework for marine resources 
The Torres Strait Treaty was designed and negotiated with the intention of 
managing the newly-formed border by giving priority to the long-standing 
dependence of borderland populations on the marine ecosystems in the Torres Strait, 
and acknowledging the importance of these resources for their livelihoods, well-
being and cultural identity. As such, the Treaty established a Torres Strait Protected 
Zone (TSPZ), which includes PNG and Australian territorial waters, with the stated 
aim of protecting the ‘traditional way of life and livelihood’ of ‘traditional 
inhabitants’ in both PNG and Australia, including their development through the 
sustainable commercial exploitation of marine resources. Several years after 
ratification of the treaty, members of 14 Australian island communities and 14 
coastal PNG villages (‘Treaty villages’) were formally recognised by agreement 
between the two governments as meeting the definition of ‘traditional inhabitants’.14 
Under Part 5 (Art. 20 to 28) of the Torres Strait Treaty, PNG and Australia have 
sovereign rights to commercially exploit the fishery resources within the TSPZ while 
giving priority to the protection of traditional rights and the environment. 
Commercial fisheries in TSPZ are allowed and promoted for the economic 
development of traditional inhabitants. Art. 1(h) defines commercial fisheries as ‘the 
fisheries resources of present or potential commercial significance’. Under the 
present interpretation of the provision, eight fisheries are designated ‘commercial’, 
and of these, four are included under Art. 22 and 23 of the Treaty (see table 7.1 for 
details), whereby Australia is entitled to 75 per cent of the catch in the Australian 
jurisdiction of the TSPZ and PNG is entitled to 25 per cent, and vice versa in the 
PNG jurisdiction. Annual quotas and catch-sharing for the Art. 22 fisheries are 
negotiated annually by the Fisheries Bilateral Meeting.15 
<table 7.1 near here> 
  
  
Table 7.1: Designations given to fisheries in the Torres Strait Protected Zone under the 
Torres Strait Treaty, their stock status in 2016, and the relative participation in the fisheries 
by Australian and PNG fishers 
 
Fishery and species   
Co-
managed 
Article 22 
 
Stock statusa 
Australia and PNG 
participation in the 
fisheries 
(a) Commercial    
Tropical rock lobster Yes Not overfishedb Australia and PNG 
Prawn:  
Blue endeavour 
Brown tiger 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Not overfished 
Not overfished 
 
Australia only 
Australia only 
Spanish mackerel Yes Not overfished Australia only 
Reefline:  
Coral trout 
Mixed reef fish 
Barramundi 
 
No 
No 
No 
 
Not overfished 
Not overfished 
Uncertain 
 
Australia and PNG 
Australia and PNG 
Mainly PNG 
Beche-de-mer: 
Sandfish 
Other spp. 
 
No 
No 
 
Overfished 
Not 
overfished/uncertain 
 
Australia and PNG 
Australia and PNG 
Trochus No Uncertain Australia only 
Pearl shell Yes Uncertain None 
Mud crab No Uncertain Mainly PNG 
Blue swimmer crab No Uncertain None 
(b) Traditional 
Dugong 
 
Yes 
 
Not overfished 
 
Australia and PNG 
Turtle:  
Green turtle 
Hawksbill turtle 
Flatback turtle 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Declining 
Declining 
Uncertain 
 
Australia and PNG 
Australia and PNG 
Australia and PNG 
Reef fishery: 
Mixed finfish 
Invertebrates 
 
No 
No 
 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
 
Australia and PNG 
Australia and PNG 
 
 
a Monitoring of exploited stocks is carried out using various techniques at a 
frequency ranging from annually (lobster) to decadal (Spanish mackerel). Data 
are compiled from D.T. Wilson, R. Curtotti and G.A. Begg (eds), Fishery Status 
Reports 2009: Status of Fish Stocks and Fisheries Managed by the Australian 
Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resources—Bureau of Rural Sciences, Canberra, 
2010; S. Busilacchi, J. Butler, T. Skewes, J. Posu, T. Shimada, W. Rochester and 
D. Milton, Characterization of the Traditional Fisheries in the Treaty Communities of 
  
Torres Strait (Papua New Guinea), CSIRO, Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, 2015; H. Marsh, J. Grayson, A. Grech, R. Hagihara and S. Sobtzick, 
‘Re-evaluation of the sustainability of a marine mammal harvest by indigenous 
people using several lines of evidence’, Biological Conservation, vol. 192, 2015, 
pp. 324–30; Protected Zone Joint Authority, Torres Strait Protected Zone Joint 
Authority Annual Report 2014–15, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, 
Canberra, 2015; Department of the Environment and Energy, ‘Recovery Plan 
for Marine Turtles in Australian Waters’, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2017; and H. Patterson, R. Noriega, L. Georgeson, J. Larcombe and R. 
Curtotti, Fishery Status Reports 2017, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics and Sciences, Canberra, 2017. 
b Not overfished = healthy stocks; Uncertain = not enough information/no 
monitoring; Overfished = stocks in decline. 
Source: adapted from Butler et al. 2019, from CSIRO projects 
<table ends> 
  
  
In 1984 the Protected Zone Joint Authority (PZJA) was established under 
Australian law to implement its fishery management responsibilities under the 
Treaty and is led by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). It is 
advised by seven committees focused on the most economically important fisheries. 
These include multilevel stakeholders drawn from government fisheries agencies, 
the fishing industry and Australian traditional inhabitants. PNG is represented on 
only three of the seven advisory committees by the PNG National Fisheries 
Authority (NFA) and fishers (figure 7.1).16 The NFA implements AFMA fishery 
management plans within the PNG jurisdiction of the TSPZ, and its own 
management plans in PNG territorial waters. 
<figure 7.1 near here> 
The fisheries governance framework in the Torres Strait Protected Zone. Grey shading 
denotes the relative PNG interest or representation, and white denotes the equivalent for 
Australia. Abbreviations are Protected Zone Joint Authority (PZJA); Torres Strait Regional 
Authority (TSRA); PNG National Fisheries Authority (NFA); Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority (AFMA); Queensland Boating and Fisheries Patrol (QBFP) (J.R.A. Butler, S. 
Busilacchi and T. Skewes, ‘How resilient is the Torres Strait Treaty (Australia and Papua New 
Guinea) to global change? A fisheries governance perspective’, Environmental Science and 
Policy, vol. 91, 2019, pp. 17–26) 
While the AFMA has well-established and enforced management plans for the 
main commercial fisheries in the Torres Strait, PNG NFA has only recently 
developed management plans for the fisheries important for the livelihoods of 
people in the South Fly. Following a collapse of the sea cucumber fisheries in early 
2000 throughout PNG waters, PNG NFA introduced a moratorium in October 2009, 
which was lifted in April 2017, when the new National Bêche-de-mer Fishery 
Management Plan 201617 was implemented and successively amended in 2018.18 A 
Barramundi Fisheries Management Plan, which imposes size limits and other spatial 
and temporal measures in PNG territorial waters, was also gazetted following a 
crash of the South Fly fishery in the late 1980s.19 A Fisheries Management Plan for 
the Tropical Rock Lobster—one of the most economically valuable fisheries in the 
South Fly—has also been in place since 2002.20 
The Queensland Boating and Fisheries Patrol (QBFP) service undertakes 
fisheries surveillance within the TSPZ, supported by the Queensland Police and the 
Royal Australian Navy.21 The Treaty enables cross-jurisdictional enforcement and 
prosecution of infringements by Australian and PNG authorities. The QBFP also 
carries out community visits in the Torres Strait Islands to raise awareness and 
encourage voluntary compliance.22 Treaty Liaison Officers from Australia and PNG 
also conduct Treaty Awareness Visits, providing information on fisheries and other 
treaty matters such as health and biosecurity. 
Since 2006 there has been increased Australian surveillance effort, which has 
significantly reduced incidents of illegal fishing by unlicensed PNG and Indonesian 
vessels.23 Compliance issues and future priorities focus on the curtailment of illegal 
and unlicensed fishing, mainly for sea cucumber and crayfish in Australian waters 
by PNG small-scale fishers.24 There is some collaboration between Australian and 
  
PNG enforcement officers, but wider cooperation is limited by the lack of capacity 
among PNG agencies. 
Along with the increased fisheries surveillance effort, other Australian 
authorities have been taking a stricter approach to the management of the border, by 
increasing controls and restrictions on cross-border transactions. An example is 
Australia’s stance on biosecurity and environmental protection. Australian officials 
routinely monitor PNG and Australian villages along the border for signs of 
infectious diseases and also conduct risk mitigation and outbreak eradications where 
necessary. Unverified recounts in 2017 from respondents reported that extreme 
measures have occurred in the past, such as the extermination of pigs and chickens 
in the South Fly communities close to the Australian border, are sporadically 
adopted to control the spread of diseases such as Japanese encephalitis and avian 
influenza into Torres Strait. Under Art. 16(3) of the Treaty, biosecurity restrictions of 
certain goods and animals are also imposed on PNG traditional inhabitants visiting 
Torres Strait Treaty villages. 
The growing emphasis on protection and border management is accentuating 
the ‘hard line’ between the two countries and their populations. External pressures 
are intensifying due to the fast-changing local, regional and global context, and 
Australia is moulding and interpreting the Treaty provisions to strengthen the 
border and mitigate the impacts of international security threats. Being far from state 
centres, local social dynamics are also evolving to adapt to regional and global 
change, with people utilising the opaque terms of the Treaty to alter their fishing and 
trading patterns, and to gain access to better services provided by Australia that are 
available on the Torres Strait Islands. 
How local social dynamics adapt to the state-centred 
institutional framework 
Since the creation of the border and its institutional framework, new power relations 
have been shaped among local PNG, Australian and Indonesian actors in what 
Herzog calls ‘transboundary social formation’.25 
Torres Strait Islanders 
While the Treaty promotes the sustainable use of marine resources in the Torres 
Strait to support the economic development of borderlanders through access to the 
TSPZ commercial fisheries (Treaty Part 5), the reality is very different. This is 
because access for South Fly fishers to two of the three most economically valuable 
fisheries26 is difficult due to the resources—both capital and human—required to 
exploit these fisheries. Both the assets and skills that are required to operate are 
generally unavailable in PNG. Local people also lack the skills, knowledge and 
financial capital to apply for cross-border fishing licences, which would allow PNG 
traditional inhabitants to take advantage of the 25 per cent share of the catch in 
Australian waters of the TSPZ. 
  
Despite these barriers, people in PNG Treaty villages adjacent to the Torres 
Strait Islands (i.e. Mabuduan, Sigabaduru, Buzi and Ber) use the Treaty’s provisions 
to take advantage of their proximity and kinship relationships and access the 
Australian markets, both local and on the mainland. Recent marriages between 
South Fly people and Torres Strait Islanders, especially from Boigu and Saibai, have 
further strengthened these kinship relations. As a villager in Mabuduan explained in 
2016: 
We don’t go to Daru. It’s too expensive to travel and to purchase goods. 
Less travel to Saibai … 
The villager also reported movement of goods from Daru to Saibai, with products 
sold including spears, tobacco, traditional clothes, cordial and ice blocks. Although 
the informant noted a trend that ‘only whites buy crafts’, Torres Strait Islanders are 
also known to rely on South Fly-made crafts for cultural events. 
Conditions granted to the traditional inhabitants of PNG Treaty villages are 
often unlawfully extended to people from non-Treaty villages (commonly referred to 
as ‘third-party people’), as a respondent from Mabuduan reported in 2016: 
Some people bribing to get a pass here and other villages, Parama and 
Kadawa especially. They take third-party people to Darnley,27 Stephen 
and Murray Islands. Usually they don’t get caught, covered by Treaty 
people use surname from Treaty village. 
The main products sold to Torres Strait villagers are handcrafts, kundu drums, mats, 
baskets and sago, along with marine products such as plate-size barramundi, mud 
crabs and shellfish. 
As is common in borderlands elsewhere,28 traditional trading and fishing 
activities constitute informal cross-border activities. When speaking about the 
harvest and trade of lobsters by PNG traditional inhabitants exceeding the quota 
allowed as traditional catch in TSPZ waters,29 a villager reported: 
In our hearts we are trying our best to make it a legal way that we just 
have access to Australia … it is your [Australian] product that we are 
taking, because the boundary has already taken it over, but there is 
nobody to catch it and give it back to you. Now we are doing traditional 
fishing under Treaty arrangement, catching for our income living. We 
give the product back [to Torres Strait Islanders], they pay us, and we do 
our shopping in Saibai [Torres Strait Island]. 
The legal grey area created by the loose definition of ‘tradition’ in the Treaty is 
the avenue by which traditional inhabitants engage in activities not always 
recognised by Australia and PNG. The distinction between what is informal and 
what is licit becomes unclear in many cases. For example, selling marine products 
  
locally is considered a ‘traditional activity’, but the practice becomes essentially 
commercial because they progress down value chains to distant markets on 
mainland Australia through value chains beyond the borderland. In these value 
chains, Torres Strait Islander buyers are uniquely placed as middlemen. As one PNG 
villager explained: 
We try to sell straight to the buyers in Australia, but they [Torres Strait 
Islanders] did not allow us to make commercial, we cannot sell it straight 
to the buyer. What they tell us is that we have to have a middleman there 
at the island [Boigu]. So, I take it there, give it to you and sell it for me and 
then when the money comes [from mainland] we are sharing the money. 
Often buyers in the Treaty villages buy products from non-Treaty villagers and sell 
them as traditional products, as reported by a non-Treaty villager: 
Sometimes don’t get the money expected for sales at Boigu by Buzi 
people, but sometimes we do. Haven’t given up selling through Buzi, still 
doing it. One of the only ways to get money. 
Indonesian Papuans 
Due to the hardening of the border between Australia and PNG, people in the South 
Fly are looking to Indonesia for cross-border trading opportunities, in particular 
from Papua Province’s economic hub of Merauke. People from Treaty villages as far 
away as Daru reported visiting Indonesia and Merauke several times. In 2018, three 
of seven respondents from one village visited by researchers for the ARC 
Borderlands project reported going to Indonesia multiple times, and all went to 
Merauke. New economic networks have also been emerging based on kinship and 
traditional trading relations between South Fly people and Indonesian Papuans—
mainly from the Marind-Anim ethnic group—who are historically related. Groups of 
Indonesian Papuans regularly visit communities in the South Fly, mainly along the 
coast, for trading purposes. Borderlands researchers (chapter 1: Introduction) found 
that 55 per cent of survey respondents said they sold items they had made, grown or 
hunted to Indonesian traders (2 per cent said they sold things that were made, 
grown or hunted by others). One local official in Daru summarised the situation as 
follows: 
Because Australian markets are very strange [sic], you know, the 
quarantine are very strict and nearly impossible to bring things to 
Australia, that is why they all head to Indonesia. But our concern is that 
Indonesia has so many diseases that we do not have and it will eventually 
end up here one day and then to Australia, so if Australia is concerned 
about … they should relax a bit, you have to be ready for the impact. 
  
What was until recently an informal cross-border trade between PNG and 
Indonesia, in which neighbouring villagers exchanged goods and money as part of 
their tradition,30 has now evolved into a well-organised international—and mainly 
illegal31—trade driven by demand in Asia for high-value marine and wildlife 
products. Products leaving the South Fly transit through Merauke to the export ports 
of Surabaya and Jakarta in Indonesia, ultimately ending up in Asian markets, 
especially Hong Kong and Singapore. These external drivers, which are fuelling a 
lucrative illegal economy,32 have transformed the once-peripheral borderland actors 
of the South Fly into unintentional key participants in transnational economic 
networks. 
As a result of these new trade activities, South Fly inhabitants and Indonesian 
Papuans have forged new social and economic relationships based on their 
traditional relationships. Relationships strengthened in the 1980s due to the 
Indonesian Papuans’ migration to PNG as political refugees escaping persecution by 
the Indonesian Government. Recent marriages between Papuans and women in the 
South Fly have further reinforced their presence in the PNG communities. While 
PNG fishers provide the highly sought-after marine commodities, Indonesian 
Papuans act as middlemen in this cross-border trade. Papuan traders visiting the 
South Fly, especially those who have established themselves in the communities, 
have also become financial agents (e.g. providing fishing gear, lending money) and a 
supplement to the limited government services (e.g. helping students to gain 
education in Merauke, providing medicine, building a church). 
People in the communities and local authorities mentioned the importance that 
these Indonesian traders have acquired for people’s livelihoods in the South Fly. 
Villagers rely on the traders’ visits in order to acquire goods and services that 
otherwise would not be available. As one woman in a village reported, 
[W]hen they come from Indonesia, they live with us in our home, and 
what they bring they share with us. They become part of the family … 
They pay the grounds and they pay the accommodation. They are very 
friendly, they are good people. They are very open, and they also help us 
with some of the situations, like if we want to go to Daru, or some other 
cases, if we want to go to meetings and all this. So, when we house them 
they help us with transport and other things here in the community. 
Accounts in the villages suggest that officers at the border posts between PNG 
and Indonesia understand the struggle of the people and try to facilitate their 
everyday borderland activities and help when they are in need. Accounts 
nonetheless also suggest that collusion and corruption between local Indonesians, 
PNG authorities and the traders might be enabling the trade to flourish. Of the 73 
respondents who reportedly crossed the Indonesian border, 89 per cent said that 
border police/customs officers were always present when they crossed the 
Indonesian border.33 One respondent explained that when crossing the border there 
  
is ‘always border control, give them deer horn or bribe. Sometimes they turn you 
back.’ 
Contrary to the border between Australia and PNG, management of the PNG–
Indonesia border is taking a more permissive approach, which is creating a bridge 
that sustains a constant flow of people and resources. As one government official 
explained, 
Military people in Indonesia facilitate the illegal activity. They just let 
their citizens coming, going, doing their illegal poaching, come do illegal 
trade as far as Daru, because they get the cut. So it is like more organised 
type of trade, it is not like us [Papua New Guineans], just because our 
people are suffering when they see a feeding hand they capitalise that 
opportunity, it is an opportunity because of our lack of form of 
government, so people tend to look west for their survival, that’s why I 
emphasise: we say it is illegal, but it is their survival … and Indonesia is a 
gateway to Asia. Everything, every resource taken out of PNG is not PNG 
product, it is gonna get into Indonesia branded Indonesian product and 
then exported overseas. The big finances will finance these traders, they 
are not small people, they are big big business men. Indonesian, Javanese. 
And they are hooked up with the military. 
The ambiguous and outdated terms and provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty, 
plus the relatively open conditions governing the PNG–Indonesian border, have 
allowed local livelihoods and social dynamics to adjust to rapid external drivers of 
change. These new relationships are characterised by a hierarchy,34 in which power 
is distributed among the groups with respect to the amount of resources that they 
control.35 In terms of the growing trade with Indonesia, power is exerted variably 
among different groups across the border. South Fly villagers have the least power, 
since they are completely dependent on the resources (especially finances and 
market knowledge) possessed by the Chinese end-buyers/financers, without which 
basic livelihood needs would not be met. They are also highly dependent on other 
value chain actors, such as the Indonesian traders, who allow them access to the 
international wildlife trade networks36 and provide essential services such as access 
to education and health services in Merauke or Sota. Although the PNG villagers 
have primary access to marine resources, the other value chain actors have multiple 
alternative sources and therefore are not dependent on the South Fly fishers. The 
villagers are therefore replaceable and are consequently left largely powerless. 
Consequences for shared marine resources 
Fish ‘maws’ (dried fish bladders), bêche-de-mer (i.e. dried sea cucumber), shark fins 
and mud crabs are the primary marine products traded by PNG fishers in the South 
Fly (figure 7.2). Targeted species for the fish maws are black jewfish, barramundi 
and catfish. Both black jewfish and barramundi are highly vulnerable to 
  
overexploitation. According to fishers, sandfish is the most targeted species of sea 
cucumber, although low-value deep-water species such as lollyfish and curryfish are 
also taken. Among the shark species regularly caught by fishers are several species, 
such as the endemic northern river shark and the green sawfish,37 which are listed as 
endangered or critically endangered in the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) Red List. Stocks of these resources are shared between Australia 
and PNG in the TSPZ and have high ecological, cultural and economic value for 
traditional inhabitants. Equally, the products derived from these resources have high 
value in Asia as a status symbol and for traditional medicine and food preparation. 
<figure 7.2 near here> 
Marine products traded with Indonesian middlemen by fishers in the South Fly. Clockwise 
from top left: live mud crab kept in a pen (S. Busilacchi, 2017); women and children drying 
sea cucumber to trade as bêche-de-mer (T. Greenwood, 2014); swim bladder (fish maw) 
from a black jewfish (T. Greenwood, 2014); dorsal fin removed from a shark to be sold dried 
(S. Busilacchi, 2014) 
The current status of the sea cucumber stocks on the PNG side of the TSPZ is 
unknown due to the lack of reliable surveys, but reports suggest they have not 
recovered from the overexploitation that prompted the moratorium in 2009. Fishers 
in the South Fly agree that larger sea cucumbers have vanished, especially among 
the most valuable species such as sandfish. No formal assessment of the barramundi 
stock in the South Fly has been carried out recently,38 but there is concern that fishing 
might be reaching unsustainable levels.39 Recently recorded quantities of 
barramundi caught along the South Fly coast are similar to those in the mid-1990s 
immediately before a stock collapse. Similar concerns exist for some of the shark 
stocks,40 black jewfish and mud crab stocks,41 which have never been assessed in the 
South Fly or the Torres Strait more broadly. 
Some of the unsustainable fishing practices, such as the illegal exploitation of 
sea cucumbers during closed seasons, the catching of over- and under-sized 
barramundi, and the targeting of barramundi and black jewfish spawning 
aggregations, are threatening the long-term sustainability of these species. The 
overfishing is in part due to a combined lack of PNG and Indonesian capacity for the 
monitoring and enforcement of fishing and trading activities and the increasing 
global demand for these products as well as limited alternative livelihood 
opportunities. This trend reflects global patterns, with alarming overexploitation and 
extinction risks to many animal and plant species.42 In the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly 
region, the species being exploited for trade are among the most ecologically 
vulnerable, and some shark species are already listed as endangered or critically 
endangered by the IUCN Red List.43 
Addressing governance mismatches in the borderland 
Clearly the governance of shared marine resources under the Treaty needs to 
address the mismatch between the state-centred institutional framework and the 
social and political realities at the community level, and account for the growing 
  
evidence that several critical shared fisheries are overexploited (i.e. sea cucumbers, 
barramundi) or inadequately managed (e.g. mud crabs, black jewfish and sharks). 
Adaptive governance has long been promoted as a mechanism that can build the 
capacity of actors and ecosystems to be flexible and dynamically respond to 
unanticipated change.44 The Torres Strait fisheries management structure has the 
advantage of allowing representation by Australian and PNG stakeholders and 
enabling regular meetings. However, PNG representation is generally poor due to 
capacity and resource constraints, which further enables Australian interests and 
policies to take precedence, thereby exacerbating the mismatch. 
Clearly the governance of shared marine resources and their exploitation and 
trade needs to be re-examined in the context of rapid change and the growing social 
and political asymmetries between Australia and PNG, and PNG and Indonesia. 
This is paramount if the overexploitation and collapse of key fisheries is to be 
avoided and rectified and, with it, the prospects for sustainable livelihoods in the 
South Fly improved. Key interventions have been identified by Butler et al.45 Treaty 
fisheries management processes should include all relevant stakeholders from across 
levels and borders, and their knowledge and perspectives should be accommodated 
equally. Current arrangements are dominated by Australian authorities and their 
resourcing, which limits the opportunity for PNG involvement. Higher-powered 
actors in the burgeoning cross-border value chains into Indonesia should also be 
included to provide potential solutions to the issues of overexploitation and poor 
terms of trade for local fishers. These measures could solve the cross-scale mismatch 
between the state-led institutional and governance arrangements, and the social and 
economic realities at the local level. However, the practicalities of providing 
sufficient resources and incentives for the effective participation by these 
stakeholders in such a remote and pan-national context are daunting. From a 
borderland perspective, the lack of development for Papua New Guineans and the 
ecological decline at the local level could potentially have a catastrophic impact on 
the region, unless governance arrangements can adapt. 
As agreed during multi-stakeholder workshops organised in Daru to discuss 
solutions to the current unsustainable livelihoods in the South Fly, any interventions 
proposed to improve existing governance arrangements of shared marine resources, 
their exploitation and trade should take a systems approach. This means addressing 
concomitantly the multiple root causes of current unsustainable livelihoods, while 
also taking into consideration the needs of people in the South Fly. Improving the 
sustainability, transparency and legality of existing livelihoods and trade networks 
while ensuring greater returns to fishers and local actors through alternative 
culturally appropriate enterprise models was one of the solutions proposed during 
the workshop. Business models such as cooperatives46 or ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
arrangements could enable fishers to enter new markets, thereby gaining greater 
market power, combined with improved product quality and value-adding. 
Enhancing market information for fishers and other local actors through 
  
communications infrastructure would also be necessary to support these business 
models. 
Alternative livelihood activities, which could diversify income and reduce 
pressure on marine resources, should also be trialled. Any proposed livelihood 
activities should incorporate learning from previous attempts to develop 
community-based development projects in the South Fly, such as the community-
based barramundi farming developed under the Western Province Sustainable 
Aquaculture program supported by the PNG Sustainable Development Program, 
which included a hatchery in Daru. Local communities in the South Fly and national 
government agencies have started exploring potential alternative livelihoods, 
including the possible reintroduction of small-scale barramundi farming using 
locally sourced feed and equipment, small-scale sea cucumber ranching, crocodile 
farming using tilapia, climbing perch or snakehead fish as feed (all of which are 
invasives and regarded as pests), and farming of livestock (e.g. chickens). 
During the above-mentioned workshops, participants also suggested 
implementing agreements that would permit free trade of resources in the border 
region, especially to meet the demand for other natural resources from the growing 
market in eastern Indonesia. The same interest was shown during interviews with 
cross-border middlemen, traders and local Indonesian authorities. As a local 
authority officer in Merauke explained, 
[S]oon there will be the border licence meeting. I expect that this border 
trade [issue] will be brought up. The security approach is no longer 
applicable [enough] at the border. The GoI [Government of Indonesia] has 
been afraid of the trade of the guns and narcotic, drugs. [But] opening the 
trade [of natural resources] is better to support the communities at both 
sides of the border. 
Merauke, and Indonesia at large, have developing economies and growing 
populations which concomitantly drive demand for marine, terrestrial and 
agricultural products. The population has been growing rapidly in the province of 
Papua, at an average rate of 5.39 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2010.47 This 
rapid population growth is mostly attributable to the transmigrasi program of the 
1970s.48 Demand is burgeoning for meat from fish, deer, wild pigs and crocodiles, 
plus products such as crocodile skins, deer horns, penises and tendons, and 
cultivated or wild-harvested crops such as ginger, vegetables, sago and cassava. 
New forms of cross-border economic cooperation should be investigated and 
implemented that would enable people in the South Fly to reach markets in 
neighbouring countries, not only for local consumption but also to meet demand 
from further afield. In the long term, integrated economic zones in transboundary 
areas with economic complementarity, such as the Growth Triangles in Asia and 
Africa, have been successful in reducing poverty of borderland populations.49 As for 
the Zambia–Malawi–Mozambique Growth Triangle, the foundation for economic 
  
cooperation in the borderland is each country’s geopolitical proximity and their 
similar cultures and kinship networks, which are prerequisites for successful 
implementation of this concept.50 
In the short term, one feasible option is to implement a free trade zone 
following the PNG Free Trade Zones Act 2000 in the PNG–Indonesia border area. A 
trade post in Bula would provide PNG border communities with legal and 
monitored access to the Indonesian market. The existing free trade post on the 
northern part of the PNG–Indonesian border, which connects Vanimo in the West 
Sepik Province to Jayapura, the capital of Papua Province, is often reported as a 
successful example, which could be adapted to the particular conditions of the 
southern coast.51 Mechanisms to account for the international nature of most of the 
existing cross-border trade could be investigated and implemented within the free 
trade agreements. 
Similarly, a free trade zone could be implemented in the PNG–Australia border 
area. Community members expressed interest in agreements to permit cross-border 
trade of natural resources, as also expressed by a respondent in the South Fly: 
[We] need to open a market venue within the area [TSPZ] to share the 
products between Torres Strait Islanders and us. Maybe we should look at 
the free trade arrangement within the TSPZ. We should provide a report 
at the bilateral meetings to discuss this issue. We need to open the market 
into the Torres Strait Islands. [For some villages] Indonesia is too far. Not 
only fish, but also products, maybe garden produces. 
Such a zone is likely to take pressure off fish stocks and immediately improve 
economic outcomes for local fishers. If a free trade zone were created, PNG fishers 
could have direct access to lucrative Asian and Australian markets, which could 
possibly offer higher prices and ultimately reduce overfishing. If PNG fishers were 
receiving significantly higher prices for marine products, it would be reasonable to 
expect a reduction in exploitation. Furthermore, this move would provide the moral 
authority and legitimacy for greater enforcement.52 This is particularly the case if 
such a zone were accompanied by more inclusive and adaptive approaches to cross-
border governance that take people’s lived realities into account. 
Conclusion 
From a state-centred perspective, the interpretation and execution of the treaty 
provisions are currently mismatched with the fast-evolving social dynamics at the 
local level—as communities adapt to the externally generated pressures and 
opportunities presented by globalisation and climate change, while dealing with 
local issues such as population growth and local governance failures. The 
increasingly strict interpretation of the treaty by Australia is neglecting the local 
socioeconomic dynamics in the borderland, and the declining level of human 
development on the PNG side. Australia’s stance has been to harden the border 
  
between the two countries, which has had the effect of alienating and 
disempowering South Fly communities, restricting their livelihood opportunities 
and access to cash-earning activities. 
Rapid change is evident in the borderland region, exhibited by escalating 
poverty, rapidly growing demand for marine products in the Asian economy, and 
resultant over-fishing and ecological collapse. In parallel, traditional kinship and 
trading relationships have been evolving across the PNG–Indonesia border, and 
consequently fishing and trading practices among PNG traditional inhabitants have 
changed significantly since the ratification of the treaty. 
To address this mismatch, solutions based on systems understanding are 
proposed that address the root causes and symptoms of the problem. New forms of 
adaptive governance of shared marine resources and their exploitation and trade 
should be explored in combination with innovations aimed at empowering people in 
the villages, who experience and understand the issues first-hand.53 Solutions should 
aim to improve the sustainability of livelihoods in the South Fly and decrease their 
dependence on exploitative relationships, especially with the end-buyers/financers 
in Asia. Ideas should be co-developed with the people of the South Fly. Options that 
should be explored include alternative livelihood activities based on less exploited 
natural resources, alternative enterprise models and implementation of agreements 
that would permit free trade across the border region, such as integrated economic 
zones or free trade zones. 
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Ok Tedi Mine 
Sara Busilacchi, Jodie Curth-Bibb and James Butler 
Early morning on Daru Island in the South Fly, overlooking the mainland coast and 
the mouth of the Fly River—life goes on as usual. Myriads of canoes with blue 
canvas sails dot the shores (figure 8.1). People from the fertile land along the Fly 
River visit Daru, as they have for centuries, to sell their goods in a gradual 
transformation of their traditional travel and barter system with coastal inhabitants. 
<figure 8.1 near here> 
Traditional outrigger canoes on the shore of the mainland coast. These are the traditional 
boats used by Fly River inhabitants to sail up and down the river (left). Women from the Fly 
River selling their produce at the local market in Daru (right). (S. Busilacchi, 2012) 
Fly River [people] brought sago, coconut and banana. They used to sell it 
here [Daru], [then] they went back. Our people here [Daru], we had barter 
system at the time. From here we go out to the reef, we got dugong, we 
got turtle and then we get into the outrigger canoes, the sailing canoes, 
and then the people from here would go to sell it. Particularly turtle, in 
exchange for sago, coconut, banana.1 
The bountiful marine resources of the reefs and mangroves in the PNG waters 
of the Torres Strait are subject to the system of customary land and sea tenure of the 
populations of the South Fly. While there is some degree of contestation over rights 
of ownership,2 the marine resources of the area have been used by the traditional 
owners, and are subject to proprietary claims, as expressed by a coastal Kiwai 
inhabitant: 
What we are saying here is that all the coastal villagers, even if they live 
here in Daru, they have all their traditional fishing grounds. For Daru 
they use Bobo Maza,3 the traditional reef. But for Auwo Maza,4 we 
[coastal villagers] use it together. That is the biggest habitat for dugongs. 
Now the main fishing area is Auwo Maza; most of the people are going to 
Auwo Maza.5 
Coastal Kiwai communities’ livelihoods heavily depend on goods and services 
provided by these marine and other aquatic ecosystems due to the limited land 
available and poor quality of the soil. Fishing is still the main direct and indirect 
contributor to the local economy of coastal communities, as it provides food, income 
and employment. 
  
The web of movements, trading and intermarriage between coastal Kiwai 
people and populations along the Fly River dates back to ancestral times, as reported 
in oral tales. These movements persisted during the colonial times, when PNG was 
first a British colony, then an Australian protectorate, and it is still continuing today. 
The recent movements and migration to Daru are, however, motivated by different 
reasons than in the past. Today the traditional bartering system has evolved to 
include money exchange in the transactions, with the transition to a cash-based 
economy among rural communities in Papua New Guinea.6 Money is important for 
the most basic needs such as medical costs, school charges and store goods. 
Recently people from the Fly River have been settling in Daru more frequently 
during their visits to the town, often creating settlements on scarce public land.7 
Among the main causes of this pattern of migration to Daru are the social and 
ecological impacts of the Ok Tedi Mine, not only in the operating sites but also along 
the 500-kilometre length of the Ok Tedi and Fly River systems downstream, since its 
opening in 1985 (figure 8.2).8 
<figure 8.2 near here> 
The Fly River–Torres Strait system (Tim Skewes, 2019) 
Mining operations are often accompanied by what is defined as mining-
induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR). This kind of displacement—which 
can be planned and forced—is prevalent internationally, especially when mineral 
deposits occur in areas with politically weak and powerless populations.9 The 
impact of resettlement in terms of development-induced displacement and 
resettlement (DIDR), or more specifically MIDR, is well understood in terms of the 
planned and forced movement of people away from the operating site for the 
‘benefit of development’.10 The resettlement effect11 following planned displacement 
is well known to have created widespread social, economic and ecological changes 
with risks of joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, loss of 
common lands and resources, increased health risks, social disarticulation, the 
disruption of formal educational activities and the loss of civil and human rights. 
Seldom considered is the unplanned slow internal migration—as in this case—
due to the subsequent environmental impacts outside the originally planned mine-
affected area of the operating site. This migration produces another layer of 
complexity and destitution to an already complex problem, which is difficult to 
predict and address in the planning phases. While this migration is at least in part 
caused by mining-induced environmental and natural resource degradation, the 
migration itself is also contributing to significant environmental impacts 
downstream and along the coast. In this case, resettlement is unplanned and, as in 
similar cases, failure to address these risks during the planning phase is known to 
generate ‘new poverty’, with poor people becoming even poorer, resulting in 
devastating consequences for long-term sustainable development.12 The resettlement 
effects on Melanesian populations, as in other culturally similar places affected by 
mining operations, is amplified by the cultural notion that traditional ‘land is life’ 
  
and that land is the basis for sociocultural identity.13 As such, the footprint of mining 
operations goes well beyond material concerns. 
The impact of this recent migration and resettlement in Daru on the marine 
social–ecological system of the borderland is the subject of this chapter. The analysis 
will first discuss how customary movements of people between the coast and the Fly 
River evolved gradually until suddenly changing, in part due to the consequences of 
the Ok Tedi mine and the flow-on resettlement of Fly River inhabitants to Daru 
island in the South Fly District—the main economic and administrative hub of the 
Western Province. We will then explore how the resettlement of the Fly River people 
on Daru has affected the marine system of the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly region. 
Finally, potential solutions are proposed and questions raised about how to solve 
this complex situation, which is affecting the whole borderland system and 
amplifying the instability of a region that is already facing a multitude of other 
complex challenges. The analysis is based on a series of related arguments, which are 
central to our discussion. 
Migration and movement of people in this area is long-standing. In the past, 
however, people travelled along the river to exchange goods and participate in 
bartering markets and returned home. Now increasingly they stay in Daru. The 
resettlement of Fly River people in Daru is partly attributable to the social, economic 
and ecological impacts of the Ok Tedi mine operation on the Fly River system. First, 
the Ok Tedi mine has affected the river systems. As a result, people who were 
previously wealthy in terms of natural resources and subsistence living are now 
impoverished. Second, the continued lack of delivery of basic and essential services 
by the PNG Government along the Fly River, together with the decimation of 
subsistence living, has maintained the region in a state of destitution. As a result, 
people stay in Daru to avail themselves of the meagre services provided, including 
the hospital and schooling. Third, mine-affected people can collect their 
compensation payments at the only bank in the South and Middle Fly districts, 
which is in Daru. Although such cash payments are woefully inadequate, people go 
to Daru to receive the payments and often stay. 
This migration and resettlement in Daru has caused significant ecological 
problems for the marine ecosystems in the Torres Strait and coastal South Fly. 
Impoverished settlers in Daru turn to coastal fishing as a last resort. As a result, fish 
stocks and marine resources are under significant pressure—exacerbated not only by 
the nutritional needs of this migrant population but also by the need for cash, which 
is partly (but poorly) satisfied by illegal trading with Indonesian traders (chapter 7). 
This complex web of factors has significant flow-on effects for the shared waters of 
the borderland. These effects, including migration and resettlement, contribute to 
social problems on Daru island and along the coastal South Fly—with considerable 
risk of exacerbating an already unstable borderlands area. Taking a systems lens to 
understanding the borderlands shines a light on the push-and-pull effects of mining 
alongside the similarly complex push and pull of the border itself. These 
  
interconnections, we argue, are critical for understanding sustainability in terms of 
livelihoods and ecosystems in this borderland region. 
The discussion of this chapter is based on data and information from the 
CSIRO research and is supplemented by information and quotes recorded during 
interviews for the ARC-funded project (chapter 1). 
Customary patterns of movement of Fly River 
inhabitants 
People inhabiting the coastal South Fly and the Torres Strait region are divided into 
seven culturally and linguistically different groups.14 Two groups are today part of 
the Torres Strait: the Meriam-speaking and the Kala Lagaw Ya groups. Among the 
five PNG groups, Kiwai speakers include ‘inland Kiwai’, who inhabit the islands 
and banks of the Fly River estuary, and ‘coastal Kiwai’, who inhabit the narrow 
beach ridges of the coastal plain on PNG mainland bordering the Torres Strait 
(figure 8.2). Coastal Kiwai have been actively engaged in trading and other cultural 
exchanges with inland Kiwai and the other Fly River (South and Middle Fly 
districts) and Torres Strait groups since well before European arrival. Oral stories 
from people of the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly region all tell of interactions among 
coastal Papuans, Fly River Papuans and Torres Strait Islanders through ‘travels of 
historical characters whose journeys established village settlements and clan 
groupings, and recent accounts of settlement patterns and migrations that mirrored 
those journeys’.15 
The traditional system of travel and barter slowly assumed different 
connotations under the British and Australian administrations, as explained by one 
coastal Kiwai respondent in Daru: 
Kiwai people here, the Treaty people—they call them [coastal Kiwai]—we 
were doing this—fishing—going back to 1800, yeah, in the Torres Strait 
fisheries here, in that area Fly people, coming from, people from Fly 
villages and people from inland villages, to work in the Torres fisheries 
here, in 1800s, straight after the first light, so things were going all right.16 
At that time, people in the Western Province provided cheap labour for 
government work projects, the Torres Strait fisheries and other privately owned 
foreign businesses. For this purpose, Daru, as the provincial administrative centre, 
became the main recruitment hub. From the late 1800s, with the establishment of the 
London Mission Society, it also became the centre of church activities. However, it 
was not until recently that people started remaining on the island for no apparent 
reason or existing family connection, as explained by a Fly River Kiwai-speaking 
leader: 
After my father came back from WWII here [in Daru] there were no Kiwai 
islanders [from the mouth of the Fly River], only my father and other few 
  
families. Ten-year time, they started to come here, but when they came 
here they had certain tasks. They could stay one week and then they had 
to go back, well monitored. They could not sleep on Daru and they had to 
go back and they could not eat mangoes and [there was a] 9 o’clock 
curfew. Since 1974 after that, as soon as white people go, people started 
migrating [to Daru] because of … it was like there was no more law. They 
wanted to come here, some for job opportunities, but later, the Ok Tedi 
only started in 1980s, and they gave the compensation. Then they were 
coming here for the compensation, and the promises that they would 
have been given jobs. The influx here, they are from the Fly River. That’s 
why I am always very vocal. The government cannot just tell them to go 
back; the government has to provide services.17 
With the growth of Daru in the 1900s, the main buildings such as churches and 
government houses were established in the area east of what is now the main road, 
while on the west side the ‘corners’ started appearing. Corners are temporary, albeit 
increasingly permanent, settlements of groups of people from the same coastal and 
inland villages. The older, better established corners are closer to the town centre 
while recent immigrants live further from the centre of town in houses made of bush 
or scrap material and built on what until recently was mangrove flats (figure 8.3). 
Housing in the corners is overcrowded and lacking public infrastructure, including 
adequate sanitation and water supply, especially in those newly formed. 
<figure 8.3] 
One of the newly formed corners on Daru Island (left). Everyday life in a newly formed 
corner: men returning from a fishing trip on the background while a woman is cutting 
firewood for the evening meal (right). (T. Greenwood, 2017) 
The Ok Tedi Mine disaster 
The Ok Tedi Mine is located in the Western Province’s Mount Fubilan, at the 
headwaters of the Ok Tedi River, a tributary of the 1050-kilometre-long Fly River 
system (figure 8.2). Since starting operations in 1984, Ok Tedi Mine has contributed 
significant sums to PNG government revenue and has produced 4.75 million tonnes 
of copper, 14.6 million ounces of gold and 31.4 million ounces of silver. In 2017 Ok 
Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) reported a profit of PGK 848 million (US$266 
million).18 The economic benefits of the mine to landowners and affected 
communities includes royalties, compensation and rental payments, employee 
wages, and supply chain opportunities. Added to this are the government revenues. 
For example, the provincial government receives royalties and Special Support 
Grants. Tax Credit Scheme projects are also implemented throughout the province. 
Notwithstanding its economic benefits, Ok Tedi is well known to have caused 
significant environmental harm and associated costs for local communities. Broken 
Hill Pty Co. Ltd (BHP; the original mine owner) has itself acknowledged that the 
mine is an environmental disaster, and internationally it is recognised as one of the 
  
worst ecological disasters ever to be caused by private sector activity—with far-
reaching social and environmental consequences. 
The Fly River, with its estuary, flood plains, lakes and tributaries, supported 
some of the richest fish, aquatic and wetland fauna in the Australasian Pacific.19 
Since its opening, Ok Tedi Mine has discarded quantities of waste rock and tailings 
into the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers.20 From the early 1990s, approximately 90 000 tons of 
waste and tailings poured daily into the river systems. These sediments have been 
gradually filling the bed of the Fly River, resulting in the flooding of the fertile lands 
along the rivers, transforming them into bare, unproductive wastelands. About 1954 
square kilometres of vegetation have died in the Fly River watershed since the 
commencement of the operation.21 A decline in fish species diversity (ranging from 
21 to 80 per cent at various sampling sites) and fish biomass (ranging from 49 to 92 
per cent at various sampling sites) was observed between 1983 and 2008, largely 
caused by habitat loss due to riverbed aggradation from the Ok Tedi operation.22 
Since 2009, when long-term water and silt mitigation programs started, fish biomass 
has further significantly decreased, while the rate of fish species diversity and 
abundance decline has slowed.23 
Damage to the environment has also been caused by the discharge of untreated 
cyanide, copper and cadmium at levels about 10 times higher than the prevailing 
rates in Western countries. The increase in levels of bio-available copper have 
already caused the destruction of much of the phytoplankton that supports the food 
web on which fish depend.24 Downstream from the mine, around 150 square 
kilometres of floodplains could also be potentially affected by acid rock drainage (i.e. 
sulphur-laden mine waste), which can release levels of soluble metals sufficient to 
cause toxicity to aquatic life when exposed to air.25 It is recognised today that the 
lives and livelihoods of around 150 000 inhabitants of 158 villages have been 
disrupted by the Ok Tedi Mine operations.26 These communities will continue to 
suffer the consequences well after the closure of the mine. 
In 1996 BHP Billiton reached an out-of-court settlement with affected 
communities.27 This was the result of a legal challenge by the communities for the 
damage caused by the environmental disaster—the consequence of several 
landslides, including one that dumped 170 million tons of rocks into the river 
system.28 In 2002 BHP Billiton transferred its 52 per cent owner share to the PNG 
Sustainable Development Program (SDP) Ltd, a trust fund registered in Singapore.29 
The agreement allowed for BHP Billiton’s withdrawal and the government-
sponsored process for the continuation of the mine after BHP’s departure. 
The Community Mine Continuation Agreements (CMCAs) were legislated by 
the 2001 PNG National Parliament through the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation 
(Ninth Supplemental) Agreement) Act. Under the Mining Act, Ok Tedi Mine extended 
the mine’s operations to 2010 and signed six separate CMCAs with 149 signatory 
mine-affected villages.30 The agreements sought the communities’ consent for the 
mine to continue, despite its known impact on their environment.31 In return, Ok 
Tedi Mine committed to compensate the signing communities (in addition to the 
  
royalties paid to customary landowners and other compensation and benefit 
packages). All parties agreed not to pursue further legal action against Ok Tedi 
Mine.32 The CMCAs were reviewed in 2007, and the number of signatory villages 
grew from 149 to 156.33 Altogether, these villages received additional payments for 
the period 2007–13. 
In January 2011, Ok Tedi Mine became 100 per cent owned by the PNG 
Government,34 and in 2013, the government legislated to directly assume the 
shareholding of PNG SDP.35 Following the nationalisation of the PNG SDP, the PNG 
Government has been attempting to gain control of the cash assets of the fund worth 
US$1.4 billion and still held in Singapore.36 However, as recently as April 2019 
Singapore’s High Court ruled against the PNG Government. In a 149-page ruling, 
the judge stated that ‘I acknowledge I found the state’s narrative compelling and its 
logic attractive. But the essential problem … is that this narrative stands alone and is 
unsupported by the evidence’,37 and concluded that ‘for all these reasons set out, I 
hold that the state fails entirely in its claim against PNG SDP. It is not entitled to the 
relief sought’.38 
Because the PNG SDP has been put aside until the closure of the mine, it is not 
clear what the implications are for the funds, although it has been reported that they 
should be disbursed in Western Province according to the original intent.39 However, 
this is unclear because CMCA Extension Agreements (CMCAEAs) were negotiated 
in 2012 to extend the mining operations.40 The CMCAEAs provided the 
communities’ consent for Ok Tedi Mine to continue mine operations from 2015 to 
2025.41 As reported by Grice,42 ‘the foundational agreements that now establish the 
compensation and benefits streams for Ok Tedi are the Mine Continuation 
Agreement and an MOA signed on the 21st of January 2017’, which increased the Fly 
River provincial government’s and specific purpose community entities equity 
holding to 33 per cent and reduce the PNG Government’s holding to 67 per cent. The 
33 per cent was split between the Mine Villages (9 per cent), the Fly River provincial 
government (12 per cent) and CMCA communities (12 per cent).43 
There are 26 leases under the Mining Act that provide for the leasing of 
customary land. The arrangements are governed by the Lease Compensation 
Agreements, with a total of K56 million (A$23 million) paid to the relevant villages. 
A trust, known as the Non-Renewal Resources Fund, was established to manage the 
investment component of the compensation for future landowners. The account 
holds K40 million (A$17 million) in trust for six Mine Villages (Migalsimbip, 
Wangbin, Bultem, Finalbin, Atemkit and Kavorabip) and four Okma villages (Ankit, 
Kumguit, Okteditau and Nioksikwi).44 
The current eight CMCA and the Mine Villages (Mine Lease Area) Trust 
Accounts receive development and investment funds, the funds being administered 
by the Ok Tedi Development Foundation (OTDF). OTDF was established and 
funded as part of the Mining Act to implement CMCA projects45 and to provide 
‘tangible results and expected longer-term benefits that are focused on OTDF’s 
vision; “To improve self-sustainability and quality of life of Western Province 
  
communities” [sic]’.46 The CMCA trustees include officers from the state, Ok Tedi 
Mine, churches and communities. 
Despite the significant funding held in trust (or perhaps because it is held in 
trust) and the monies received by governments, landowners and families in mine-
affected areas, the people of this region continue to live in extreme poverty. Life in 
the villages depended, and still depends, mainly on staple food provided by the 
surrounding environment, especially the river systems and the traditional gardens 
on the floodplains. However, the extent of the Ok Tedi Mine’s impact was clear as 
early as the 1990s when a Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment conducted 
by the mine found that ‘the best water management option to determine the best 
technically and economically feasible response to the environmental impacts was the 
immediate closure of the mine’.47 Yet the assessment also noted that ‘the balancing of 
the economic and the environmental needed to be taken into account’ since 
‘immediate closure would appear to carry with it the worst social impact’.48 
Ultimately, both communities and the PNG Government have seen no 
alternative to trading off their environment and associated livelihoods in exchange 
for the promise of long-term development and the economic opportunities offered 
by the mine.49 Today new threats—among which are population growth and 
increased globalisation of exploitation activities—are amplifying the impacts of the 
mine operation on the environment so important to the lives of people. 
The environmental impact has continued, and during the 2007 review people 
from CMCA villages recounted fish declines, gardens being flooded for longer and 
sago harvests that could no longer sustain people’s needs.50 Sullivan, Keleba and 
Tosa reported food shortages in the Manawete CMCA region (South Fly) as result of 
many years of pollution from the Ok Tedi Mine.51 Nonetheless ‘compensation 
payments had mostly been squandered with little to no investment made in the 
social and economic future of the CMCA regions’, as also acknowledged by Ok Tedi 
Mine and OTDF.52 While much is made of the payments to mine-affected families, 
payments have historically been meagre at best. In the period 2011–16 for instance, 
the mean CMCA case payment per capita per year has been US$195, and in 2016 it 
was just US$168.53 
A recent study found minimal impacts from OTDF’s social and economic 
development activities on poverty levels in the four CMCA villages included in the 
Torres Strait Treaty (Sui, Parama, Katatai and Kadawa) compared to the other Treaty 
villages not part of the CMCAs.54 In fact, among the Treaty villages, the ones that 
were also part of the CMCAs had the greatest degree of deprivation in sanitation 
and electricity. This was despite the provision of solar panel electricity to all CMCA 
households in 2010.55 
Similarly, Burton’s studies conducted in Manda village in 1994 and 2004 for the 
purpose of assessing OTDF’s development impact reported very little development 
to show for the significant revenues being generated.56 In Burton’s assessment, it is 
clear that the cost of operating in this region is prohibitive, which makes it very 
difficult for small interventions to have any significant impact, since any benefits are 
  
absorbed by the cost of transport and living. For instance, Burton outlines OTDF 
investments in agricultural production and corresponding transport subsidies to get 
produce to market—and notes that the benefits after costs for the individuals 
involved were very limited. Farmers involved in such interventions were 
experiencing increases in income from zero to a few cents a day.57 
Burton’s conclusion is stark: ‘ Manda people are objectively poor by world 
standards, whether measured by income or by life’s outcomes, and independently of 
the fact that they are also mine impacted.’58 While OTDF’s long-term vision ‘to 
improve self-sustainability and quality of life of [all] Western Province communities’ 
remains a priority, it is evident from the above assessments that the situation is still 
extremely grave. 
The lack of development impact brought about by projects was further 
highlighted in 2010 when a review of the CMCA found that ‘social and economic 
development is lagging and indicators of women’s overall empowerment on such 
issues as maternal mortality continue to be low, especially in the Middle and South 
Fly regions’.59 In this review, Kori Maraga reported:60 
During the 2007 CMCA Review, the women were excited when the 10 per 
cent women and children deal was secured;61 but even to this day as I 
have gone onto facilitating the Mine Life Extension consultation, women 
are still confused on how they would access their 10 per cent or what it all 
means. Life goes on the same as 7 years ago since the securing of the deal. 
Impacts of the 10 per cent funding is [sic] yet to be felt by women in 
general in the mine-impacted communities.62 
Ok Tedi’s role in changing movement patterns 
Impacts of the Ok Tedi Mine operation are far-reaching, well beyond the impacts 
experienced by directly mine-affected areas and populations. With decreased 
availability of their main source of sustenance and lacking the services and 
infrastructure promised, people from CMCA villages along the South and Middle 
Fly River look to Daru, a non-CMCA region, for a basic living.63 
According to the PNG National Statistical Office (NSO) censuses, population in 
Daru more than doubled between 1980 and 2011, with estimates going from 7127 in 
1980 to 15 142 in 2011.64 Informal estimates from provincial government officials in 
Daru suggest that the population might have reached 20 000 (approximately 11 per 
cent of the provincial total), although it is not clear whether this includes immigrants 
from the Fly River and Treaty villages communities, or whether this is only the 
resident population.65 We estimated that, according to the official NSO estimates, the 
highest annual growth rate occurred in the decade between 1990 and 2000, when it 
reached around 5.2 per cent per year. Lower annual growth rates were observed in 
the 1980–90 and 2000–11 periods with estimates of 1.9 per cent and 1.6 per cent 
annually, respectively. A 2009 survey commissioned by PNG SDP to NSO to profile 
the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of urban centres in the Western 
  
Province confirmed that of 12 per cent of the 1318 respondents had migrated to Daru 
from within the province.66 Of these, 61.7 per cent arrived less than 20 years ago 
while 36.7 per cent arrived 20 years ago or more.67 The main places of birth of 
respondents who migrated within the province were Kiwai rural (8 per cent of total 
immigrants), Bamu rural (3.6 per cent), Morehead rural (1.7 per cent) and Gogodala 
rural (1.1 per cent). The areas along the river within these districts are part of the 
Dubi, Manawete and Suki Fly Dodo CMCA Trust Funds. Oriomo-Bituri Rural (3 per 
cent) was another place often cited; however, this is not part of any CMCA Trust 
Funds. 
Two factors seem to be driving migration to Daru, the first being the 
environmental impact on the areas along the river systems, which has disrupted 
subsistence living. An inland Kiwai respondent in Daru told us: 
[Inland Kiwai] saw a decline in barramundi. They say it is because of 
pollution. When we are in the villages [along the Fly River] when we go 
down the beach we collect crabs, before Ok Tedi started. But now you 
cannot see them and also our freshwater turtles. Nothing.68 
The lack of services and infrastructure in the villages along the Fly River 
delivered by the PNG Government, even after all the Ok Tedi Mines projects and 
benefit packages, is the second motivation. Many people reported that they wanted 
to remain in Daru to allow children to attend school or a sick family member to 
access the hospital services. As a government official in Daru said, 
[The Western Province] is depressed because of leadership and their 
mindset. They encourage that ethnic type of relation at the top level, and 
that is when abuse and misuse and financial corruption come in… [for 
example] with the Ok Tedi, nothing has changed, wasted money. Ok Tedi 
has been here. They did not do nothing, just wasted money, millions of 
Kina gone. There is nothing to measure. There is no tangible things [sic] to 
measure. We are still having road problems here.69 
This was reinforced by respondents in Daru, with one respondent reiterating 
the problem on several occasions: 
Everyone here is blaming the government of the region. The services are 
not there [in the affected villages]. If the people are to be kept in their own 
areas, the services should be provided right there … the services, the 
health centre, the schools. At the moment there is nothing there. That is 
why people come down here. 
Migration is also facilitated by the annual travel of CMCA people to receive 
their compensation cash payments in Daru. Over the years, due to the worsening of 
the situation in the mine-affected villages and the chronic lack of services and 
  
employment opportunities, people travelling to Daru have been prolonging their 
stay indefinitely, often becoming permanent residents. 
Today people come here, they come for compo [CMCA payments], and 
the bêche-de-mer are here. See, they do not want to go back; they want to 
do illegal activities. They end up crossing the border [to go into 
Australian waters].70 
Social and environmental impacts of the migration of 
inhabitants from mine-affected areas to Daru 
Similarly to people displaced by planned and forced DIDR, people resettling in Daru 
as a consequence of the migration caused by the unforeseen consequences of the Ok 
Tedi Mine are suffering the well-known resettlement effect, further exacerbating the 
pressure on shared marine resources in the area of the Torres Strait–Trans-Fly 
region. This is even more alarming considering the importance of these marine 
resources for people’s livelihoods in this transboundary area and the multiple global 
and local pressures to which they are concomitantly subjected.71 The steady influx of 
people to Daru is putting the limited resources on the small island under stress and 
increasing the instability of the social–cultural systems. Density on Daru has well 
surpassed the sustainability threshold of 100 persons per square kilometre, 
recommended for many PNG islands under current levels of technology.72 
Increasing scarcity of natural resources and disputes over their governance 
and/or transboundary nature are known to drive conflicts, further amplified by 
weak institutions and societal mechanisms in many developing countries.73 The 
environmental and social impacts of Ok Tedi Mine’s operations and consequent 
migration of Fly River people to Daru have been identified among the main issues 
affecting the livelihoods, environment and well-being of the region’s people.74 The 
unplanned migration of people to Daru from Ok Tedi--affected areas in the South 
and Middle Fly has resulted in overpopulation and unemployment, which are 
known drivers of such problems as overcrowding, associated pressures on water, 
sanitation and hygiene infrastructure and basic essential services, social conflict, 
increased incidence of transmittable diseases such as multi-drug-resistant 
tuberculosis, overfishing and increased illegal fishing. As outlined in chapter 6, this 
overcrowding contributes to Daru acting as an epicentre for communicable disease, 
because infection spreads rapidly through the high-density housing, particularly in 
the corners where there is a lack of basic WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) 
infrastructure. People then return to outer villages, thus acting as vectors for the 
spread of disease across the broader region. 
Social impacts 
As noted during the CSIRO workshop in 2015,75 joblessness,76 marginalisation, food 
insecurity, loss of common lands and resources, increased health risks, social 
  
disarticulation and disruption of formal education77 are chronic issues among 
immigrants to Daru, who find themselves destitute, with no alternative to fishing for 
a living, whether legally or illegally. Fisheries have been long recognised as a last-
resort activity, which offers an economic alternative for otherwise destitute people, 
who do not have financial or institutional access to other activities.78 
The situation was well explained by a respondent in Daru, who said: 
Because the population on the island has increased and there is [sic] many 
people that are jobless and have no way of income, the easiest way to 
survive is by fishing and everyone, whoever is on the island, is the only 
thing they can do, fish. 
The coastal waters and reefs, now regularly visited by the immigrant Fly River 
people, are subject to proprietary claims by coastal Kiwai-speaking people.79 This has 
created social tension on the island between the two groups. Coastal Kiwai people 
we spoke to, however, understand the situation of immigrants, despite the fact that 
they feel their customary resources are being overexploited. With a decrease in 
available resources, social tensions among traditional owners and new settlers are 
likely to increase. As two coastal Kiwai traditional owners in Daru said to us: 
We have these new settlers who came to Daru from the outback villages 
also fishing in the same traditional fishing grounds. The traditional 
owners cannot control it. Everyone is fishing together. 
We have people all around Daru that are from inland; they are the ones 
using our resources. They are jobless, and us resource owners are just 
sitting down and observe. We should be the ones to stand up and say: 
‘No, you cannot sell fish. You go back to your own villages.’ They are 
destroying our reef; they go out every day. 
Confrontation between the haves and the have-nots—between Treaty villages 
and non-Treaty villages, communities compensated by Ok Tedi and those that are 
not—create a situation rife with social tension and conflict. Added to this is the 
overcrowded conditions in Daru and its corners, and the corresponding claims 
regarding the varying legitimacy of occupation—that being the difference between 
long-term residents from the British and Australian administrations, newer settled 
immigrants and recent squatters. These unsettling low-level conflicts all add to the 
stress experienced by those in this area who are struggling for access to resources for 
their very survival. Any social system under this sort of pressure is bound to 
experience higher levels of violence and conflict.80 
Environmental impacts 
The continuous increase in the number of people regularly fishing in the waters of 
the Torres Strait escalates pressure on precious marine resources shared by 
  
borderland populations in the Torres Strait Protected Zone (TSPZ), as explained by a 
traditional owner in Daru: 
There are less fish compared to years ago when we had few fishermen. 
[There are] a lot of people, so [there are] a lot of activities happening at 
one time, and the number of fish decline fast and is shared among much 
more people. 
Also, the way in which marine resources in the transboundary region are used 
has dramatically changed as a result of the migration of people from the CMCA 
areas. This change in fishing activities has resulted in the erosion of customary 
marine tenure practised by coastal Kiwai. Lacking local knowledge about the social 
and ecological systems and the ownership of exploited resources, new settlers have 
little consideration for the future and are driven by their short-term needs.81 
Of the many fisheries present on Daru, there are two main fishing activities on 
which displaced people rely: reef fishing to sell fresh products at the local market in 
Daru, and the illegal fishing of sea cucumber for the trade of high-value marine 
products with Indonesian traders (chapter 7). A coastal Kiwai respondent in Daru 
reported: 
If the authorities try to go down to the market, they do not see us sitting 
and selling those fish [reef fish]; it is the people from the Kiwai Islands. 
Lobster is the coastal people. 
An inland Kiwai respondent told us: 
Coastal villages—they are all divers, they sell crayfish and other things, 
but our boys were not trained to be divers, so they started pulling the 
nets. So bêche-de-mer and reef fishing are the main target fisheries where 
they can get income. 
To better understand the origins of fishers and sellers in Daru, the CSIRO 
researchers asked where they come from. Of the 798 fishers and sellers (sellers are 
always related to fishers) surveyed, 65 per cent identified themselves as inland 
Kiwai, originally from villages along the Fly River banks or the Kiwai Islands (figure 
8.4). This response strongly supports the qualitative information we gathered from 
interviews around Daru. It was also indicates that the movement of fishers and 
sellers is mostly linked to the mining activities. Moreover, mine-affected people 
residing in the villages are given outboard motors and nets as part of their 
compensation packages,82 and they usually capitalise on them during their visits to 
Daru, as explained by an inland Kiwai respondent in Daru: 
Ok Tedi supplies engines and dinghies to people inside the Fly River. 
They supply the ones living there but not us [from the affected areas] 
  
living here. When they come here for compo [compensation] or the 9 
supplement [i.e. the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth 
Supplemental) Agreement) Act] or other issues then while they are here, 
then our people make a living, go out fishing. We go to the reef with low 
tide and with high tide we go to the lagoon. Diving [for sea cucumber]. 
<figure 8.4 near here> 
Villages of origin of fishers and sellers (percentages) at the local market in Daru divided by 
areas (pie chart) and villages (bar graph). Grey denotes fishers from inland Kiwai and other 
Fly River villages while black denotes fishers from forecoast Kiwai, other coastal and inland 
South Fly villages. (S. Busilacchi, J.R.A. Butler, T. Skewes, J. Posu, T. Shimada, W. 
Rochester and D. Milton, Characterization of the Traditional Fisheries in the Torres Strait 
Treaty Communities, Papua New Guinea, Final Report to Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, Canberra, 2014) 
An insight into the impact of these unmonitored and unregulated activities on 
shared reef and reef-associated marine resources was obtained by the temporal 
comparison of the annual quantities of reef and reef-associated fish sold at the 
market in Daru and fishing effort (amount of fishing in person hours) required to 
catch them in 1995 and 2012 (figure 8.5). The comparison showed possible signs of 
overexploitation. A doubling in fishing effort of the artisanal fisheries in the last 20 
years was followed by only a slight and non-significant increase of the catches. 
While catches of reef and reef-associated species had a 30 per cent decrease going 
from 197 tonnes in 1995 to 137 tonnes in 2012–13, fishing effort had an 80 per cent 
increase, with effort going from 151 281 person hours to 272 108 person hours.83 
<figure 8.5 near here> 
Distribution of the total annual catch of the artisanal fisheries in Daru in 1995 (grey bar) and 
2012–13 (black bar). Catch from unidentified reefs in 1995 amounted to 1 tonne while in 
2012–13 it amounted to 19 tonnes; catch with ‘not’ answers amounted to 0.6 tonne in 1995 
and 1 tonne in 2012–13. (S. Busilacchi, J.R.A. Butler, T. Skewes, J. Posu, T. Shimada, W. 
Rochester and D. Milton, Characterization of the Traditional Fisheries in the Torres Strait 
Treaty Communities, Papua New Guinea, Final Report to Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, Canberra, 2014) 
On Ibu Maza and Kor Kopi, the two most fished reefs of Auwo Maza observed 
increases in annual fishing effort allowed to maintain constant annual catches of fish 
caught. On the home reefs of Daru and Bobo islands, increases in annual fishing 
effort were followed by decreases in catches (figure 8.6). Respondents in Daru 
confirmed that some resources such as dugongs, turtles and bêche-de-mer had 
disappeared from the home reefs. On Auwo Maza, the constant quantities of reef 
and reef-associated species caught are most likely sustained by increased fishing 
effort and probably by a shift in visited reefs within Auwo Maza. Visits to areas 
south in Australian waters is common practice today, as often reported by 
respondents. 
<figure 8.6 near here> 
Total annual amount of reef fish sold at the Daru market, and caught on (a) Auwo Maza, (b) 
Daru and Bobo home-reefs, in tonnes (bars) and total annual fishing effort in person hours 
  
(dots) in 1995 and 2012–13. (S. Busilacchi, J.R.A. Butler, T. Skewes, J. Posu, T. Shimada, 
W. Rochester and D. Milton, Characterization of the Traditional Fisheries in the Torres Strait 
Treaty Communities, Papua New Guinea, Final Report to Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, Canberra, 2014) 
Another sign of possible overexploitation of shared reef and reef-associated 
species on the PNG side of the Torres Strait was shown by the comparison of the 
average sizes of reef fish families in the PNG and Australian catch. All four selected 
reef fish families showed significant differences in sizes, with PNG sizes significantly 
smaller than Torres Strait for all selected families (figure 8.7). Growth overfishing 
occurs when sizes of caught fish decrease with time, which is recognised as an 
increasing problem for the sustainability and economic viability of fisheries.84 
<figure 8.7 near here> 
Median length (centimetres) and interquartile for the four selected families of longtom 
(Belonidae), garfish (Hemiramphidae), mullets (Mugilidae) and Blackfish (Siganidae) in the 
TS and PNG reef catches (S. Busilacchi, J.R.A. Butler, T. Skewes, J. Posu, T. Shimada, W. 
Rochester and D. Milton, Characterization of the Traditional Fisheries in the Torres Strait 
Treaty Communities, Papua New Guinea, Final Report to Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, Canberra, 2014) 
Similarly, as discussed in chapter 7, valuable sea cucumber species have been 
overexploited to provide bêche-de-mer for the Indonesian cross-border trade. 
Respondents perceived a decline in sea cucumbers, which are now absent on the 
reefs closest to the villages. Today, sea cucumbers are caught only on Auwo Maza 
and often on the Australian side of the TSPZ, where densities are higher since ‘on 
our reefs you cannot get sea cucumbers of the right size; they are too small. Now in 
these days people go out to the other side, the Australian side’, as a respondent in 
Daru told us. 
Over the years, decreases in the abundance of harvested species on the PNG 
side of the TSPZ have being pushing the ever-increasing number of fishers further 
from the coast and into distant waters, including Australian waters, to secure their 
daily catch (see chapter 7), as explained by a respondent in Daru: 
When we were little we went down here [Daru home reef] and there were 
plenty [sea cucumbers], but since we started harvesting in 1989, it went a 
bit further, but we never go to the Australian side to fish. Maybe 10 or 15 
years we never went far to fish and then we started going further [to reefs 
around Daru and along the coast], then Auwo Maza areas [Warrior Reef 
on the PNG side], and then later we have to pass down to Silver Reef 
[close to the border with Australia] and further down, and then right to 
the border, moon passage, and now today they are going on to the other 
side of the border, fishing. 
Increases in the incidence of illegal trespassing into the Australian side of the 
TSPZ puts pressure on shared marine resources and Australian government 
services. As a consequence, an increase in Australian surveillance effort within the 
  
TSPZ has been observed in the last 10 years (chapter 7), with the implementation of 
strong enforcement measures, such as destruction of the apprehended boats and 
prosecution and imprisonment of fishers. 
Fishing in distant waters with overcrowded boats that lack basic safety gear 
also poses safety risks to PNG fishers, who ‘know that this [illegal trespassing] is 
wrong but still go and get accidents and some die’, as a respondent in Daru told us. 
Recently Fly River people, especially the younger generations and newly 
formed families living on Daru, have also started moving out of Daru to the South 
Fly coast, building new fishing camps, which with time become well-established 
settlements. People in these camps are turning to coastal fishing for such species as 
barramundi and jewfish, which provide fish maw, and sharks providing fins and 
mud crabs, all for the trade with Indonesian traders (chapter 7). 
Finding a way out 
As this chapter demonstrates, the migration and movement of people in this area is 
long-standing. In the past, people travelled up and down the Fly River to exchange 
goods and participate in bartering markets before returning home. Now that their 
subsistence livelihoods have been disrupted by the Ok Tedi Mine operation and the 
government has failed to provide necessary services despite the substantial benefit 
packages, people have no reason to go home, and they stay in Daru. They stay for 
access to the limited services and to fishing grounds and local markets, and because 
there is no reason to go back. Ok Tedi Mine compensation payments draw people to 
Daru and they stay in the corners, which are susceptible to social tensions and 
consequent interpersonal violence, and create an epicentre for communicable 
diseases. 
People who were once resource rich are now gravely impoverished. The 
consequent unplanned movement of people and permanent migration has 
transformed people from river fishers and subsistence agriculturists to coastal 
fishers. As a consequence, shared marine stocks in the Torres Strait are under huge 
pressure, driven by the nutritional needs of this immigrant population as well as the 
need for cash, which is partly (but poorly) satisfied through illegal trading with 
Indonesian traders (chapter 7). This has significant flow-on effects for the shared 
waters of the borderlands, which are already under considerable pressure as a result 
of the rapidly growing demand for marine products in the Asian economy and a 
lack of PNG fisheries management capacity (chapter 7). 
If we follow the water, we can literally see the flow-on effects of the Ok Tedi 
Mine through to, and past, the border. The pressure on marine resources 
exacerbated by this migration creates an urgent need to review approaches to 
governing not only natural resources but also wider services. As such we argue that 
the approach to dealing with these interconnected issues needs to incorporate the 
broader region in a wider understanding of social and ecological systems. This must 
begin by taking the unit of analysis as the borderland, including those affected by 
  
the Ok Tedi Mine, and must integrate resource management, poverty alleviation and 
service delivery across the whole region. 
The Torres Strait Treaty (chapter 3) could provide an institutional framework 
whereby such an approach can be implemented if its adaptive mechanisms are 
strengthened through the introduction of formal review and renegotiation 
provisions.85 The inclusion of all relevant stakeholders from all levels and borders—
even those outside the Treaty region such as the Indonesian stakeholders (chapter 7) 
and the Ok Tedi Mine representatives—would better account for the rapid change 
occurring in the region. Ok Tedi Mine stakeholders’ knowledge and perspective on 
issues such as the Fly River immigrants’ settlement in Daru and the effectiveness of 
compensation arrangements and development programs could contribute solutions 
to improved resource management, health systems and poverty alleviation. 
Taking a systems approach to poverty alleviation, food security, resource 
management and sustainability, and service provision will require a reassessment of 
the distribution of funding—including public finances flowing from Australia as 
well as from PNG governments, together with development funding that emanates 
from Ok Tedi. If such a connected approach was taken, it might be possible to slow 
down the depletion of renewable resources such as marine fish, while 
simultaneously improving the quality of life of local residents. Currently, 
interventions are disjointed and compartmentalised, and consequently transaction 
costs tend to absorb many of the potential benefits. 
Furthermore, when one factor or one group of people is being targeted in 
isolation from other factors and groups, the broader system is not addressed—
meaning that the enabling environment for poverty, malnutrition, disease and 
resource depletion remains largely unchanged and patterns of deprivation and 
environmental damage are uninterrupted. If we could change the approach to a 
system-informed approach, there could be an opportunity to generate multiplier 
effects, creating positive feedback loops that affect the system as a whole. 
In chapter 7, we address governance issues around marine resource 
management on the border and make a number of recommendations that take a 
systems approach to tackle the multiple root causes of unsustainable livelihoods, 
while considering the needs of people in the South Fly. New forms of adaptive 
governance of shared marine resources should be explored in combination with 
interventions aimed at empowering people in the villages. Interventions should be 
developed around the needs and aspirations of people in the villages with the aim of 
improving the sustainability of their livelihoods. If the logic of these 
recommendations could be expanded to include the mine-affected area, there is the 
potential to generate meaningful change across the region (chapters 5 and 6). 
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WWF in the south New Guinea 
borderland 
Garrick Hitchcock 
In 1996 the conservation organisation World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) launched 
its Tri-National Wetlands Program, an ambitious transboundary conservation, 
development and capacity-building initiative that aimed to support and enhance 
indigenous management of Wasur National Park in south-east Papua Province, 
Indonesia, the Tonda Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in south-west Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and Kakadu National Park in Australia’s Northern Territory. 
In succeeding years, WWF’s program in the south New Guinea borderland 
grew exponentially, with attempts to assist Maza WMA, a marine protected area 
near the Western Provincial capital Daru, create several new PNG WMAs 
contiguous to Tonda and the PNG–Indonesian border, and establish the Trans-Fly 
Ecoregion Program, stretching right across the southern lowlands of New Guinea, an 
area of more than 10 million hectares. 
These initiatives were undertaken at a time when a range of global 
conservation organisations in Melanesia were attempting to implement Integrated 
Conservation and Development (ICAD) experiments, aimed at encouraging 
landowners to eschew unsustainable forms of ‘development’, such as logging and 
exploitation of marine resources, through (1) encouraging them to recognise the 
biodiversity values of their ancestral domains and (2) offering alternative, 
environmentally and economically sustainable, community-based pathways to 
development, such as ecotourism and other small-scale ventures. It was also 
coterminous with increased attention in the environmentalist community to the 
potential of transboundary protected areas to improve conservation effectiveness 
and deliver other ecological, social and political benefits.1 
This chapter examines these conservation efforts in the southern borderland of 
PNG, with reference to the experience of the peoples inhabiting the Tonda Wildlife 
Management Area (TWMA). WWF effectively ceased operating in south-west PNG 
in 2010. Today, local people express disappointment that there is very little to show 
for WWF’s activities in the area over a decade or more, in terms of conservation or 
development outcomes. The area is plagued by a lack of services and development, 
and cross-border threats to local ecosystems and natural resources are as pervasive 
as ever, and include introduced pest species and cross-border wildlife trade and 
poaching. The latter has also been a factor in the recent militarisation of the border 
  
area, in the form of PNG and Indonesian bases, with concomitant negative 
consequences for local communities. 
Tonda Wildlife Management Area 
The environment of south-west Papua New Guinea is unique in the country: it is 
low-lying and flat—most areas are less than 30 metres above sea level—and the 
landscape strongly resembles that of coastal and adjacent areas of tropical northern 
Australia. This, and the many species of shared flora and fauna, evidences the 
geologically recent land connection that linked these areas, last broken by rising sea 
levels, which created the Torres Strait some 9000 years ago. 
The area experiences a monsoonal or tropical savanna climate, with around 75 
per cent of annual rainfall (approximately 1700 millilitres) falling during a wet 
season between December and May. The strongly seasonal climate results in an 
environment where grassland, savanna and monsoon forest are the dominant 
vegetation types, and sees many areas inundated during the wet season, creating 
vast wetlands, followed by parched, drought-like conditions in the dry season. Of 
particular note is a large expanse of seasonally flooded open grassland—probably 
the largest such area in New Guinea—known as the Bula Plains, which stretches 
between the Bensbach and Morehead rivers. The mouth of the former watercourse 
marks the southernmost part of the international border between PNG and 
Indonesia (at 141˚1’10’ E longitude). 
In the colonial period, this area of New Guinea was viewed in highly negative 
terms by European visitors. Some examples: 
A hot and godless place to be in, in the dry season. It is absolutely without 
water except perhaps for some slimy mud in a swamp here and there, 
wherein wild pigs wallow.2 
One of the most unpleasant areas of the habitable globe … A vast swamp 
in the wet season and for the most part parched waterless land in the dry.3 
There is nothing to induce settlement, nor would I ever advise anyone to 
go there.4 
A country of few attractions … from the European’s point of view its 
economic prospects would seem to be practically nil.5 
These landscape imaginaries would give way, in the post-war period, to more 
positive views as the Australian administration devoted attention to the possibilities 
of economic development in this remote, borderland environment. There was 
consideration of the possibility of establishing a cattle industry on the open 
floodplains along the Bensbach River, and the Fisheries Department conducted tests 
in the river, netting the abundant and commercially valuable barramundi. 
Recognition of the extreme seasonality of the area, isolation from markets, and 
  
potential disease risks and biosecurity problems emanating from the proximity of 
the border quashed these plans. A more comprehensive CSIRO study of the land 
resources of south-west PNG in the 1960s finally identified the area as having little 
or no agricultural, forestry or mineralogical potential.6 
Tonda, PNG’s first WMA, evolved out of the Australian colonial 
administration’s fascination, in the late 1960s, with the wildlife of the area. In 1968 
ground and aerial surveys had highlighted the unique nature of the Bula Plains. 
Home to thousands of introduced Rusa deer and teeming with many other native 
species, the area’s wildlife was described as being ‘unparalleled in diversity and 
density elsewhere in Papua New Guinea’.7 In light of earlier disappointments, the 
administration’s focus turned to the possibilities of exploiting these natural 
resources, in particular, ways to commoditise deer, such as culling for meat and 
jerky production. The spectacular image of huge herds of deer and vast flocks of 
waterbirds on the plains also suggested the idea of establishing some sort of 
protected area, based on the great African game reserves, to promote safari-style 
tourism.8 In 1970, a government Wildlife Station was established at Balamuk on the 
middle Bensbach, from where a research program commenced on deer and other 
wildlife resources with commercial possibilities, such as crocodiles.9 
The administration also believed that local people should have some control 
over, and benefit from, any future development of these natural resources by 
outsiders. This appears to have stemmed from the unsatisfactory experience of deer 
shooters associated with an expatriate company operating in the area between 1965 
and 1967; local people were particularly unhappy with the wastage of this operation. 
Bensbach villagers were being consulted in 1966 about plans by another company, 
Morehead Pty Ltd, to commence culling and fishing operations in the same area. 
That proposal included royalty payments for the exploitation of deer and 
barramundi, which would go into a trust fund for development and welfare in the 
district.10 Although this venture did not proceed, this concept was later incorporated 
into the TWMA rules. 
In 1969 initial suggestions to villagers that they sell the land for a reserve were 
rejected outright. Their desire for local control and benefits, and protection of 
traditional hunting and land rights, resulted in the Wildlife Management Area 
concept. In this model the people were to remain the owners of the land and 
establish a committee, comprising village representatives, to draw up rules for the 
conservation, protection or regulated harvest of wildlife resources, with support 
from the Department of Conservation and Environment (DEC).11 
The administration noted that the concept of local people being involved in the 
management of wildlife resources in this way was ‘unique’.12 It seems, then, that the 
early refusal by villagers to alienate their lands resulted in the final form of the 
WMA system for the entire country: 
The establishment of a protected areas system has proved to be extremely 
difficult because of the complex traditional land tenure system. New 
  
legislation and novel approaches to environmental management are 
proving necessary. The Wildlife Management Area approach, whereby 
areas are reserved for conservation and controlled utilisation purposes at 
the request of land-owners, was designed to overcome this.13 
The WMA program might be identified, then, as a form of Integrated 
Conservation and Development (ICAD), existing long before it became a fashionable 
conservation philosophy. Following continuous consultations with villagers through 
the early 1970s, and amendments to legislation to enable the declaration of WMAs, 
Tonda was finally gazetted in 1975 under the Fauna (Protection and Control) Act 
1966.14 The TWMA Committee (TWMAC), consisting of 14 representatives from 
villages with traditional land and resource rights in the area, was established at the 
same time.15 Tonda was the first WMA in the country and, with an area of 
approximately 5900 square kilometres (figure 9.1), it remains the largest. A number 
of other WMAs have subsequently been established throughout PNG. However, 
Tonda is the ‘flagship’ of the system, and often featured prominently in government 
publicity about these voluntary areas.16 
<Figure 9.1 near here> 
The Tonda Wildlife Management Area (Garrick Hitchcock) 
The creation of TWMA, on the eve of PNG’s independence, although 
participatory, was still largely a top-down approach, emplaced within colonial 
ideologies of protected areas and safari-park aesthetics. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
local people were keen to protect their land and resources, and welcomed the 
administration’s initiative—on their own terms as much as possible. Their 
motivation was not conservation for conservation’s sake but a desire to benefit 
materially from the exploitation of their resources, through controls on their use by 
outsiders: 
[T]he people in Tonda wanted development and to participate in the cash 
economy … Tonda is an outstanding area of particular importance for 
wildlife conservation as it carries heavy populations of deer, wallaby, pig, 
duck, cassowary and many other forms of wildlife which previously were 
used for subsistence purposes only—food, ornamentation and for 
exchange ceremonies. The people were now aware that their wildlife held 
additional values.17 
Indeed, in later years, conscious of their peripheral, borderland position, and the 
apparent lack of oil, gas and mineral resources that might otherwise provide a 
pathway to development, local people have described their wildlife as ‘our gold’, 
and the transboundary sale of commoditised flora and fauna to buyers in Indonesia 
has long been a key source of income, particularly for the inhabitants of the western 
part of the WMA, along the Bensbach River.18 
  
The creation of TWMA also coincided with the establishment of the Bensbach 
Wildlife Lodge, a tourist venture offering fishing, hunting and birdwatching tours. 
Interest in establishing such an operation on the Bensbach began with a flight over 
the area by several PNG-based, expatriate Australian businessmen in mid-1971. In 
1972 the administration, keen to promote development in the area, assisted the 
proponents to present their proposal to local villagers, who agreed to the project 
going ahead. Construction commenced the following year, and the lodge opened in 
late 1974, just before the establishment of the TWMA. Most of the Tonda rules 
gazetted in 1975 relate to the hunting of deer, ducks and fish taken by visitors to the 
lodge. Fifty per cent of such royalties were paid to the owner of the land (or river 
section) where the resources were taken; the other half was paid into a trust fund, 
designed to provide development and welfare to the communities of the TWMA, 
and to support the operation of the TWMA Committee (e.g. through financing 
annual meetings). Today, in large part due to firearms restrictions and its proximity 
to the Indonesian border, hunting of deer no longer takes place. The Bensbach is 
known as the ‘Barra Capital of the World’,19 a reference to the abundance of 
barramundi (Lates calcraifer), a popular sportsfish, and most visitors to the BWL 
come for the fishing. It also attracts numbers of birdwatchers on account of the large 
and diverse range of species found there. 
During the early years of its operation, management of the WMA was 
apparently very much directed by staff of DEC. Most local people were subsistence 
gardeners and hunters, with little education or awareness of land and resource 
management, let alone business development or tourism. As the manager of the 
Bensbach Wildlife Lodge reported, in the early years of the TWMA, the driving force 
was a particular (expatriate) DEC staff member; with regard to the committee, ‘What 
he said went. He ran the show.’20 
From the early 1980s, the financial difficulties of the PNG Government led to a 
reduction in funding for conservation and development programs in the country.21 
The resulting lack of state support for the TWMAC adversely affected its ability to 
operate effectively.22 
In 1983 a consultant was engaged by the DEC to assess the status of WMAs 
throughout the country. Following his visit to TWMA in September of that year, he 
reported: 
The Wildlife Branch was once very active in the area; they assisted the 
development of the management area, initiated the deer farming project 
and encouraged crocodile and butterfly farming. Cuts in public 
expenditure and restructuring of government departments have led to a 
complete run-down of all these activities. There is now only one wildlife 
officer in the area and he is unaware of his position, role and functions. 
He received little funding, supervision or guidance; he is unable to make 
patrols or do much extension work. In his own words, ‘Normal yearly 
operations have entirely arrived at a stop.’23 
  
In 1993 the TWMA was nominated as a Wetland of International Importance 
under the Ramsar Convention, an intergovernmental treaty that promotes the 
conservation of wetlands and wise use of their resources.24 Although this did little to 
improve the on-ground management of Tonda, it did force recognition of the need to 
improve DEC’s commitment to the TWMA in order to meet its obligations under the 
convention.25 In 2006 the PNG Government also nominated the Trans-Fly Complex, 
centred on Tonda WMA, for Tentative Listing as a World Heritage Site under the 
World Heritage Convention. To date, no further work has been done to further this 
nomination.26 
WWF: Wasur National Park, Indonesia 
WWF established a presence in Wasur National Park, in 1991, the year after its 
declaration, working with indigenous Papuans to help protect wildlife and 
traditional resource rights, and to create sustainable development initiatives.27 
Wasur, comprising 413 810 hectares of wetland and woodland habitats, was 
established in 1990 by the WWF Indonesia Program in partnership with the 
Indonesian Department of Forests (PHPA). The park has achieved greater 
recognition of adat (customary) rights than almost any other conservation area in 
Indonesia, with indigenous communities being permitted to hunt and collect certain 
animals and plants; they also contribute traditional knowledge and advice to the 
park’s management. 
WWF staff based in Merauke soon turned their attention to the neighbouring 
Tonda WMA. In 1995 a visit was made to Tonda to gauge support for its assistance, 
seeking to address what it identified as the core problems precluding effective 
management of the area, namely a lack of funds, which prevented regular committee 
meetings from taking place, as well as ‘a general lack of understanding about the 
role of the committee and a lack of awareness of some of the more pressing 
ecological problems’.28 There was also recognition of a range of threats to Tonda. 
These included the introduction of pest species from across the border in Indonesia, 
such as weeds and invasive fishes, and an increase in transboundary poaching, 
carried out by residents of Papua Province netting for fish and sharks across the 
mouth and lower reaches of the Bensbach, and shooting crocodiles and deer. The 
environmental impact of deer on the wetlands, expansion of Melaleuca forest into 
open grasslands, and changing fire regimes were also areas of concern, as they were 
in Wasur. WWF attempted to tackle all of these issues, through several different 
projects, in order to make TWMA more than just a ‘paper park’. 
Tonda’s problems 
For WWF then, Tonda’s main problems were ecological and anthropogenic to its 
environment, as well as the limited capacity of the local people to manage these 
through the TWMAC. These limitations were understood to be due to a lack of 
awareness of the threats and the responsibilities of the committee and local people, 
and exacerbated by years of insufficient government funding and support. 
  
Tonda’s problems were actually far more complex. Villages are scattered across 
a large area, and hence it is has always proved difficult for the TWMA committee 
members to meet, on account of distance and travelling times, and lack of vehicles 
(and high costs of those few available for hire). 
A long-standing source of local tension has been the payment of 50 per cent of 
all royalties to this body’s trust fund. Many local landowners have never been happy 
about ‘losing’ what they consider to be half of ‘their money’, derived from the use of 
the resources of their lands and waters by tourists staying at the Lodge. This relates 
more generally to a problem of representation; Torassi people have sometimes 
expressed unease at the decision-making role of committee members from the 
eastern part of the TWMA, given that they are culturally and linguistically more 
distant and from areas that do not generate royalties. Some people consequently feel 
that they should not have a say in TWMA decisions that affect Torassi events. This 
would seem to be the rationale behind a move by some committee members in 1990 
to divide the TWMA into two submanagement areas, east and west of the Morehead 
River, although these plans were later shelved. 
The issue of representation has often made the committee less authoritative 
and hence less effective. Each village had its own member on the committee. 
However, this does not reflect the social system. The important units of society with 
respect to land and resource ownership are local clan groups, each with its own 
leader, and of which there are several in each village. There have often been tensions 
associated with the authority of committee members to speak for other landowners, 
and accusations that they have acted unilaterally in the past, making decisions 
without community consultation, and rarely report the results of their deliberations 
to villagers. Further, it is often the case that clan leaders and members see no benefit 
in adhering to the rules of the WMA, feeling they are entitled to use their lands and 
resources as they see fit. 
Enforcement of WMA rules developed by the committee has also long been a 
problem. One commentator suggested that it was a lack of education and scientific 
understanding of conservation biology that was responsible for the committee being 
unable to enforce rules.29 Rather, it is close ties of kinship throughout the area that 
make the application of sanction difficult, as the wrongdoer is very likely to be kin, 
or a member of a neighbouring, traditionally allied group. In fact, many local people 
supported the appointment of ‘outside’ officials to enforce the rules of the TWMA, to 
overcome the problem of not being able to fine close and extended family 
members—to do so would likely exacerbate existing disputes or create new ones. 
In Bensbach, many of these representatives had been embroiled in a protracted 
land dispute over compensation for land on which the Bensbach Wildlife Lodge 
airstrip was built, which had forced its closure to tourists on a number of occasions. 
Land disputes between clans, exacerbated by the distribution of royalties, have also 
affected Lodge operations. Together, these problems led to local disillusionment, 
social unrest and a reduction in income for the TWMA committee, further 
weakening its ability to be an effective manager of the WMA. 
  
WWF programs in south New Guinea, 1996–2010 
Community Land Care Project and Trans-Fly Conservation Areas 
Project 
In 1996 there was further community consultation with the people of the TWMA, to 
develop the Community Land Care Project and Trans-Fly Conservation Areas 
Project, which sought ‘to address the declining management framework for Tonda 
Wildlife Management Area through capacity-building in conservation and eco-
enterprises, and to link it more solidly to regional development planning’.30 
Specifically, this involved assistance to hold committee meetings, progress the 
gazettal of new rules and the appointment of rangers, and convening workshops on 
pest species and environmental changes.31 
Following a delay in funding, WWF’s activities began in earnest in 1998. 
Attempts were made to increase local recognition and support for the Maza WMA 
and to strengthen the functioning of its committee. Maza is a marine protected area 
of more than 1886 square kilometres established in 1978 to protect dugong (Dugong 
dugon). These plans were soon abandoned, due in large part to the local politics of 
marine resource use and ownership in Daru and the nearby coastal villages. They 
were compounded by lack of government agency capabilities by and considerable 
in-migration to Daru from adjacent areas of mainland Western Province, which have 
placed huge pressure on local marine resources and led to significant and seemingly 
intractable conflict between traditional owners and newcomers. 
Tri-National Wetlands of Oceania Program 
At around the same time, WWF initiated the Tri-National Wetlands Program (also 
known as the Tropical Wetlands of Oceania Program), which aimed to establish links 
between Tonda and its borderland neighbour, Wasur National Park in Papua 
Province, Indonesia, and Kakadu National Park in Australia’s Northern Territory. It 
was hoped that this would enable the transfer of information and lessons learned on 
wetland management between these ‘sister parks’, which share similar ecosystems, 
species and threats but have very different management systems.32 With respect to 
the contiguous Wasur and TWMA, there was recognition that threats could not 
necessarily be addressed entirely within political boundaries. In-principle approval 
was given to this project by the PNG and Indonesian governments in 1996 at the 
Ramsar Conference in Brisbane,33 and in June 2002 the three governments signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding in Bali, Indonesia, agreeing to cooperative action 
between the three states, including their indigenous people, to manage more than 3 
million hectares of wetlands ‘to provide sustainable livelihoods … and conserve 
significant biodiversity’.34 
The program involved cross-border visits by rangers and committee members 
from each park to the others, for training and education.35 There was an especially 
strong focus on documenting and learning about changing vegetation patterns, such 
  
as the expansion of Melaleuca forests into open grasslands, and the link between this 
and Rusa deer and traditional fire regimes on both sides of the border.36 
Community Development and Resource Conservation Program 
In 2004 funding for five years was obtained from the European Union to develop a 
Community Development and Resource Conservation Program (CDRCP). This 
sought to transform local livelihoods in the Trans-Fly radically through integrated 
conservation and development projects. In addition to encompassing the Tonda 
WMA, it also included two other sites in Western Province: the Oriomo River area to 
the east, and Suki area to the north. 
<Figure 9.2 near here> 
WWF created several new Wildlife Management Areas in the border area of south-west 
Western Province: an extension to the TWMA to the north, and two adjacent WMAs, 
Wariaver–Baro and Aramba–Suki. The total area stretched for almost 700 000 hectares. 
Wasur National Park comprises 413 810 hectares of wetland and woodland habitats. (Garrick 
Hitchcock) 
As part of this program, WWF worked to create several new Wildlife 
Management Areas in the border area of south-west Western Province. These were 
an extension of the TWMA, to the north, as well as two new, adjacent WMAs, named 
Wariaver-Baro and Aramba-Suki, a total area of almost 700 000 hectares (figure 9.2). 
Considerable effort went into community consultation, liaison with local and 
provincial governments, and the DEC, which is responsible for endorsing and 
declaring WMAs. In September 2007, WWF launched these new areas at a ceremony 
in Bensbach, attended by PNG and Indonesian dignitaries, media and ‘conservation 
celebrity’ Jared Diamond. However, declarations of the three new areas apparently 
never went to the Legislative Council for gazettal as planned, and as such, the new 
areas do not exist. This was said to be the result of a directive within the DEC, 
related to plans to review its existing WMA policy. Whatever the reason, these 
delays frustrated many local people, some of whom blamed WWF for the lack of 
progress. 
Trans-Fly Ecoregion Program 
WWF became increasingly ambitious in New Guinea, establishing the Trans-Fly 
Ecoregion Program, which sought to protect grasslands, savanna, wetlands and 
forest stretching right across the southern lowlands of New Guinea, an areas of some 
10 million hectares, or approximately 12 per cent of the island of New Guinea. 
According to WWF, the project was a ‘plan to fill a major gap in conservation 
planning. To provide a conservation blueprint based on this crucial ecosystem, 
rather than on political boundaries.’37 This stemmed from changes made by WWF in 
the late 1990s to the way it sought to implement conservation globally, to ‘planning 
and implementing conservation and development programs on a larger scale than 
has been attempted so far’. The Trans-Fly was identified as a globally significant 
region encompassing outstanding examples of terrestrial, freshwater and marine 
  
ecoregions, one that would also require a deep time commitment, with WWF calling 
for the development of long-term (50-year) goals for the region’s conservation.38 
Successes and failures 
WWF initiated a number of evaluations of their projects in south New Guinea. These 
found that the effectiveness of their programs had been compromised by a range of 
internal and external factors and that they were often far too complex in design and 
overly ambitious in scope. Among the identified ‘in-house’ problems were high staff 
turnover and poor morale, poor communications, failure to budget for the extremely 
high costs of aircraft, boat and car hire in this remote area, and failure to allow for 
cost increases over time. The delivery of social development and poverty alleviation 
initiatives by one of the world’s leading conservation organisations was also 
questioned. Other issues included the fact that some communities saw no apparent 
threats to local biodiversity. Conversely others recognised the threats but reported a 
complete absence of any realistic remedies in the face of enormous environmental 
challenges, such as the eradication of pest fish species and the colonisation of 
grasslands by Melaleuca forests. These and other problems were all exacerbated by 
the extremely difficult political and institutional challenges of dealing with a largely 
absent and dysfunctional state, at all levels of government (national, provincial and 
local), and the area’s borderland status, as a remote periphery and an 
underdeveloped backwater. They also found that the focus on transboundary 
management was premature, given the lack of capacity of the TWMAC, and the 
PNG state more generally, together with the vast differences between PNG and 
Indonesia in terms of governance regimes, the language barrier and the status of 
their Indigenous people. 
WWF narratives of TWMA and south New Guinea 
WWF narratives of Tonda celebrated its remarkable biodiversity and beauty, and 
stand in stark contrast to earlier colonial perceptions of a monotonous landscape, 
alternating between swampy morass and dry, waterless plain. One WWF 
publication went as far to describe the area as the ‘last natural frontier of the World’, 
and that ‘to date, the Tonda WMA is still unmapped and the biodiversity is yet to be 
discovered. There is a need to conduct scientific studies—there could be plants and 
wildlife that is [sic] yet to be discovered’;39 a representation that obscured decades of 
research in the area, to present a picture of an exciting, unknown wilderness. More 
recently, a former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea noted that a visitor had 
called it the ‘last remaining fragment of the Garden of Eden’.40 WWF brochures and 
websites detailing their activities in Tonda, Wasur and Kakadu were replete with 
images of smiling children in traditional costume; colourful waterbirds; and idyllic 
scenes of dugout canoes gliding past water lilies, which were no doubt calculated to 
appeal to the international donor community. 
In 2002 support from the governments of Australia, PNG and Indonesia for the 
sister parks, in the form of the Tri-National Wetlands Initiative (which appears to be 
  
the WWF Tri-National Wetlands Program with significant government funding) was 
bestowed the title of ‘Gift to the Earth’. This is WWF’s highest accolade for the good 
conservation work of others: ‘a public celebration by WWF, the international 
conservation organization, of a conservation action by a government, a company, or 
an individual which is both a demonstration of environmental leadership and a 
globally significant contribution to the protection of the living world’.41 In fact, this 
status was self-awarded to their own project, which ‘enables WWF to draw 
worldwide attention to the conservation achievement among media, funding 
agencies, and other international organisations, as well as the larger public’.42 
While these celebratory narratives are understandable in the context of 
attempts to secure funding vital to the initiation and continuation of such projects, 
given competition from other non-government organisations (NGOs) and ‘donor 
fatigue’, they obscured the political context of these protected areas. For Tonda, an 
exceedingly complex range of factors impinged on the ability of outsiders and locals 
alike to manage lands and resources effectively. 
WWF relationship with local people 
WWF and local people had very different expectations about the relationship they 
were establishing with each other. Local people couch relations with outsiders, in 
particular those that are continuous, in the idiom of kinship. From this flows an 
expectation of equality, partnership and reciprocity, part of their ‘moral economy’. 
It is clear from the letter of invitation that the TWMA committee sent to WWF 
in 1996 that local people expected more ‘development’ than ‘conservation’ to result 
from those interactions: the first of three areas of assistance sought from WWF was 
‘identifying areas of commerce (development incentives)’.43 A PNG WWF officer 
noted this with respect to their operations in Tonda: ‘Sometimes the expectations 
from the community is [sic] different; they see an outside body like WWF as being a 
provider of services.’44 
For many of the landowners who live in the TWMA, there is a sense of 
disappointment about WWF’s activities. Despite WWF’s having operated in the area 
for more than a decade, there is no evidence of ‘development’. There is also a feeling 
that WWF exploited the Tonda ‘brand’ to develop multiple and ever-increasing 
programs. As one local man complained, ‘they used our name’ to obtain funding 
from international donors, which is claimed to have then been used elsewhere in the 
Trans-Fly or PNG. 
Another complaint is that the results of research by WWF and the various 
scientists they contracted were never shared with local people; some also reported 
that researchers would show up in their communities unannounced, and others 
were unclear about the nature of the scientists’ work. Although in a minority of cases 
researchers did publish their work, it appears that this was not communicated to 
villagers.45 
Nonetheless there is also appreciation for some of their efforts, including the 
delivery of technical assistance such as training and educational modules, and 
  
exchange visits to Wasur and Kakadu National Park in Australia are fondly 
remembered by the participants. 
Discussion 
A number of studies, mostly written by anthropologists, have documented similar 
engagements between Melanesians and conservation NGOs. As with the TWMA, 
they have found that there was a disconnect between the goals of both actors: 
‘scientists and local people’s different ways of perceiving, valuing, and using the 
natural world often conflict’.46 These include Conservation International’s disastrous 
experiment in Milne Bay Province, with its attempt to trade ‘cargo’ (Western 
development) for conservation.47 Similarly, West has documented the profound 
disconnect between conservationists and the Gimi people of the Crater Mountain 
WMA in the 1990s, in terms of goals and expectations, leading to disappointment for 
both groups. Like the people of Tonda, the Gimi expected that in exchange for their 
engagement with ‘conservation’, the NGO would deliver development.48 Another 
ICAD project, in the Bismarck–Ramu area of Madang, was beset with similar 
issues.49 There, local communities were initially positive about establishing long-
term reciprocal partnerships with NGOs because they believed participation in 
conservation activities would result in tangible benefits, including improved 
livelihoods and access to resources and services, such as boats and health-care 
centres or schools.50 
WWF is an environmental NGO, which, like all other Western conservationists, 
primarily seeks ‘to address “the needs of nature” rather than the aspirations of its 
local guardians’.51 When WWF and local people spoke of conservation and 
development, they were speaking of different projects and orientations. In the case 
of Tonda, while WWF might have presented their work to locals as an Integrated 
Conservation and Development (ICAD) program, there was no observable 
contribution to ‘development’. Both groups were talking past each other, and local 
aspirations were not met. More attention by WWF to the ‘D’ in ICAD might have 
done more to establish and build relationships than any number of workshops on 
deer grazing or fire regimes. 
The attempts by WWF to engage with the TWMA committee and inhabitants of 
the area were not successful in the long term. This was partly due to dependency. 
NGO engagements are determined by cyclical donor funding, which is very difficult 
to maintain for years on end.52 This makes them, in a sense, as dependent as local 
people are on outside others and accounts, in part, for their essentialised 
representations of the people and landscape of the TWMA. Indeed the activities of 
WWF arguably promoted dependency, as they controlled the purse strings. Despite 
the efforts to include local people in decision-making, the structures largely 
replicated externally derived processes—ultimately this was an attempt to inculcate 
outsider (i.e. both regional and global hegemonic practices) management and 
conservation agendas. While WWF does acknowledge the importance of traditional 
knowledge in areas such as fire management, their failure to engage with local 
  
politics means that they can never hope to understand the nature of local control 
over lands and resources and the source and nature of disputes. Attention to these 
details might suggest appropriate methods of dealing with conflicts, which so often 
affect the operation of Bensbach Wildlife Lodge, and hence royalty generation for the 
WMA committee. 
Although there has been increased awareness of environmental issues among 
local people as a result of WWF activities, this did not translate into any meaningful 
ecological action on the ground, such as the elimination of the known pests in the 
area, e.g. the destruction of weeds. Unlike Kakadu in Australia, and even Wasur in 
Indonesia, the PNG Government is totally incapable of responding to such 
developments. The problems of the Tonda WMA are not local; on a borderland, 
adjoining the frontier of a large Asian state, they are subject to much wider global 
social, political and environmental forces. Life on a remote and underdeveloped 
borderland presents formidable obstacles to the implementation of conservation and 
development in the area. 
The attempts by WWF to reinvigorate TWMA were dependent on continuous 
appeals to a fickle international donor community for large amounts of cyclical 
funding. This dependency accounts, in part, for their deployment of essentialised 
representations of the people and landscape of the Tonda WMA. However, this does 
not excuse it, nor the lack of attention paid to power in this intervention, which 
ultimately undermined it. WWF’s models of ‘capacity-building’ were as much top-
down as those of the DEC in the early years of TWMA’s operations; they sought to 
inculcate the management and decision-making processes of outsider, largely 
Western NGOs, to local people. 
Their attempts to develop new rules for the TWMA to govern resource 
commoditisation and the presentation of capacity-building exercises, such as 
‘conflict resolution’ workshops, was not informed by any detailed knowledge of 
local society and culture. There was a failure to tackle sociocultural issues that would 
come to undermine the artificially imposed structure of the program and its 
governing mechanisms, resulting in disputes over what constitutes fair 
representation. Such notions of fairness and authority to speak for another 
associated with representation are inherently cultural. There was little point making 
new rules if there was no capitalist activity in the area and if management structures 
are not congruent with local kinship systems. 
Many of the key outcomes sought by WWF in PNG, in terms of invigorating 
Tonda, and expanding conservation initiatives in south-west Western Province, 
appear to have been thwarted by DEC, with its gatekeeper role in terms of 
processing the gazettal of new rules and new WMAs. Whether through bureaucratic 
ineptitude or deliberate intent, it was able to stymie initiatives that WWF had spent 
many years working on with local communities, as well as enormous amounts of 
donor funds. 
  
WWF staff themselves acknowledged that faced with a lack of state capacity—
in the form of DEC—local solutions must be found to support the management of 
the Tonda WMA: 
In reality, unless the committee can develop a system of self-funding to 
tackle the range of threats to Tonda and the services required to do this in 
the absence of government funding, Tonda is unlikely to function as a 
conservation area in more than name. Without a strong locally funded 
community institution to manage even local level management, there is 
never going to be an effective means of operating more broadly at the 
cross-border level.53 
They also understood that Tonda communities have few alternative ways to 
generation cash income other than the sale of natural resources (i.e. wildlife) and 
therefore suggested that supporting this trade, to the fast-growing Merauke 
borderland, was the best funding solution in terms of providing support for the 
Tonda WMA committee to undertake its management responsibilities. This is 
perhaps a strange suggestion from a conservation NGO dedicated to protecting 
wildlife, and one with no real answer to the exploitation that PNG borderland 
dwellers face when engaging in cross-border trade in wildlife species on the 
Indonesian side of the border.54 
International NGO ideas about relationships sit in stark contrast with 
Melanesian ethos, with the former establishing stakeholder relations based on short-
term utility and the latter assuming longer-term reciprocal relations. This is 
particularly problematic, as noted in chapter 5, in places beyond the state’s reach (in 
terms of capacity and authority) where organisations come to operate in a manner 
that assumes a public role to fill the gap of public services and authority. Not 
dissimilar to observations made in chapter 8 regarding OK Tedi’s role as a quasi-
state actor, international NGOs are used to fill gaps but might not be aligned with 
local priorities and are in no way accountable to local populations. Ultimately 
conservation NGOs routinely prioritise goals that might not be in the interest of local 
landowners, who are not merely ‘stakeholders’. Conservation NGOs are particularly 
inclined to take on the responsibility of the state in areas of limited statehood as 
governments tend not to prioritise these elements of public policy and are happy to 
allow donor-funded bodies with the scientific expertise to fill the gap. Unfortunately, 
this reliance on gap-filling NGOs undermines transparency and accountability as 
NGOs are ultimately accountable to donors. 
Conclusion 
WWF’s cross-jurisdictional conservation intervention in south New Guinea was not 
successful. Although many of its aims and activities were laudable, numerous 
factors conspired to undermine the potential of their programs—including the vast 
difficulties of working in the remote peripheries of two states, local cultural 
  
orientations and expectations—which were often ignored—together with the 
funding modalities that prevail in the NGO sector. Ultimately this program was 
determined by the interests and imaginings of outsiders, and local desires and 
aspirations were unsurprisingly not met. 
The experience of the international conservation establishment in Melanesia 
shows that there is a need to engage more directly with local social worlds. There is a 
need to engage in a respectful and pragmatic way, understanding that in most cases 
local communities see the relationship as potentially delivering services that the state 
should provide, and development more generally. In Tonda, the people want what 
conservationists themselves have; they what people in the First World have. They 
want wealth, housing, health care, technology. Although they recognise the 
biodiversity values of their ancestral domains, they also see them as ‘their gold’, 
their pathway to development. 
As Filer notes with regard to WMAs:55 
[E]xperience has shown that the different levels of government have 
almost no capacity to support the management of these areas, let alone to 
influence the activities of their resident customary owners … Custody of 
PNG’s protected area network has thus devolved to a collection of 
national and international NGOs whose managers sometimes collaborate, 
but often compete, in bids to secure the foreign money required to sustain 
their own engagement with local communities. The net result has been a 
mixture of donor-funded conservation projects that normally last for a 
limited period of time and rarely have any long-term impact on local 
livelihoods. 
In Tonda, wildlife resources are the basis of these livelihoods, but these are 
under increasing pressure from the Papuan (Indonesian) borderland. Wasur 
National Park is located next to Merauke, which has a population approaching a 
hundred thousand; it is the second largest Indonesian city on the island. Wasur is 
reported to have been degraded by years of poaching (both by locals and outsiders, 
including the military) and threatened by nearby agribusiness developments. This 
has in turn led to increased poaching in Tonda. 
Following incidents along the southern PNG border area, including reports of 
activity by OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka; Free Papua Movement), 
transboundary trade in firearms, and increased poaching, in the mid-2000s the PNG 
Defence Force constructed a forward patrol post in Weam, on the upper Bensbach 
River, and based a platoon of army soldiers there. This may be seen as part of the 
increased securitisation of the Indonesian–PNG–Australian borderland discussed in 
other chapters in this volume. This development has had negative consequences, 
with local people reporting intimidation and robberies by Defence Force personnel.56 
Around the same time, the Indonesian navy established a patrol post at the mouth of 
the Bensbach. There have also been reports of similar intimidation, threats and 
  
demands by personnel stationed there, by Bensbach people travelling in and out of 
the river, while travelling to and from Merauke and Daru. 
In a 2015 coffee-table book on the TWMA, Peter O’Neill, then Prime Minister of 
PNG, stated that the area must become a national park, presumably under the 
National Parks Act 1982, after which World Heritage listing will be sought.57 Local 
people know nothing about this proposal, and ask what it might in fact mean for 
both the TWMA and for themselves. Under the National Parks Act 1986, such areas 
can only be established on government land (i.e. alienated from the customary 
owners) or land that is the subject of a state lease, and most aspects of park 
management are under the control of the Director of National Parks. The Wildlife 
Management Area concept was founded on the premise of landowner recognition 
and control, and recognition of their right to benefit from their wildlife resources. 
They are unlikely ever to accept the imposition of a top-down, national park scheme 
for Tonda. 
A 2017 assessment of PNG’s protected areas found that Tonda was ‘only in fair 
condition, and declining, due to multiple threats and lack of law enforcement 
capacity’.58 Much of these threats to its biodiversity stem from its borderland 
location, where the PNG state is largely absent and does almost nothing to support, 
protect and manage this flagship area. Many villagers look to another NGO to fill 
this void. External assistance of this kind does not seem a likely future, given the 
failure of one of the world’s largest conservation organisations to deliver meaningful 
conservation and development in this challenging environment. 
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10 
Conclusion 
Mark Moran 
Review of the ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ 
The original architects of the Torres Strait Treaty drew on shared tradition, culture 
and mobility in pursuit of a two-way win, in the ‘spirit of mutual friendship and 
good neighbourliness’. Its lack of prescription permits considerable interpretation in 
how it is administered. This openness sits at odds with border protection, with its 
preoccupation with security and highly prescribed procedures. According to its 
logics, border protection does not need to consider how to alleviate the 
underdevelopment of the South Fly, especially if any measure like commercial trade 
makes border crossings more attractive. But neither does it consider its adverse 
effects and, perversely, the risks that underdevelopment creates for border 
protection. 
The consensus among government stakeholders that seemed to emerge from 
the 2010 Senate Inquiry was that the treaty and border management were working, 
along the lines of ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. Since that time, border management 
has hardened, so there does seem to be an unstated policy of correcting a prior 
laissez-faire approach. DFAT in its flagship 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
reaffirmed its commitment to preserving the integrity of the treaty as a foundation 
for border management.1 If the realpolitik is to preserve the status quo, albeit with 
more enforcement, then consideration must sensibly include the adverse counter-
effects that additional enforcement is having on the status quo. Staying with the 
‘Australia’s security’ lens, there are three clear risks that can arise from enduring 
poverty and lack of services in the South Fly. The first concerns the lack of a health 
systems approach to population health and infectious disease, including the rise of 
anti-microbial resistant TB. The second is the people of South Fly turning to trading 
with Indonesia, including the rise of resource exploitation and transnational crime 
(viz, the existing trade routes of Indonesian traders in fishery products). 
The third is risks arising from the further disenfranchisement of people from 
the South Fly villages, leading to avoidance, resistance or conflict whereby PNG 
nationals start to disregard the treaty. The border and the treaty provisions act to 
produce a hierarchy of identities and associated opportunities and privileges. At the 
top is Torres Strait Islanders, followed by Papuan Australian citizens, Treaty 
villagers next and, at the bottom of the pile, non-Treaty villagers. This pecking order 
is clear in living conditions, access to markets and freedom of movement in the 
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borderland area. What is most striking, however, is the power relations exhibited 
through the enforcement of the border regime—where policies and regulations are 
often performed by local officials in the Torres Strait (figure 10.1). Here a host of 
petty rules and bureaucratic relationships come to define and control interactions 
across the border in ways that permeate daily life. These rules govern travel, access 
to health services, conditions of trade, opportunities for work, ability to earn money 
and even the conditions of romantic and marital relationships. Feelings of injustice 
and jealously fuel resentment and instability, which is the last thing that anyone 
wants on Australia’s doorstep. 
<figure 10.1 near here> 
A sign for arriving Treaty villagers in the outer Torres Strait islands (Research team, 2017) 
The provisions in the treaty that define the international border and different 
jurisdictional boundaries are now deeply enshrined in the history of Torres Strait 
struggle for self-governance. As discussed by Kevin Murphy (chapter 2), the current 
location of the border was a major tactical victory for focal Torres Strait leaders, 
given the then proposal to exclude the outer Torres Strait Islands. The treaty 
enshrines a shared history and governance, which remains fundamental to culture 
and livelihoods in the borderland. Its original objective of protecting the way of life 
of traditional inhabitants remains sound. Improvements to the wording of the treaty 
might be considered, through removing the vagueness of what constitutes 
‘tradition’. Clearly what is ‘traditional’ has evolved since the time of the treaty 
signing, as it will continue to do. But any amendments would also open the door to 
changing other important aspects of the treaty that should be preserved. 
Restricting the selling of goods and providing paid labour appears particularly 
mean-spirited, and would appear to be at odds with treaty provisions that allow 
‘barter and market trade’. Limiting access to ATMs shuts down an important means 
for some families to get remittances from relative and friends. Overstayers and other 
rule-breakers deserve to be penalised, but this should not lead to bans on entire 
villages, as those who do follow the rules make a crucial contribution to the fledgling 
economy in the South Fly. From our analysis, the problem is not with the Treaty 
itself but rather the way it has been interpreted through the administrative 
arrangements embedded in the ‘Guidelines for Traditional Inhabitants’.2 
The treaty guidelines should be subjected to a bilateral review, with equal 
input from representatives of all the people affected by it. While the guidelines could 
be renegotiated through the various bilateral committees set up under the treaty, the 
power imbalances between the Australian and PNG sides must be addressed. The 
people in the South Fly, including their elected members who sit on the treaty 
committees, do not have access to legal representation or policy advice. An 
environment of unequal power and resources is prone to injustice. The Australian 
Government could insist that the PNG Government provide this advice, or fund 
such arrangements, as it does before native title negotiations are allowed to proceed 
within Australia. 
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As discussed by Jennifer Corrin (chapter 3), the guidelines could constitute 
grounds for judicial review. This is an administrative law remedy to allow breaches 
of natural justice and errors of fact or reasoning taken by public decision-makers to 
be challenged. In PNG, such applications can be heard by the Supreme Court or the 
National Court. A less controversial, cheaper and less effective alternative would be 
to make a complaint to the PNG Ombudsman. While the likelihood of success is 
unknown, an application would have the benefit of airing these concerns and 
creating a more level playing field to remedy any unfair interpretations. It would 
also provide an opportunity to involve a broader number of stakeholders than 
currently involved on the Australian side, to ensure that Australia’s security 
concerns are indeed properly managed. 
Increasing aid assistance 
Given Australia’s preoccupation with its border management to protect national 
security interests, an obvious solution is to look to aid assistance that it provides to 
PNG and to ensure that it is better targeted and more effective in the South Fly. 
Before 2010, Australia provided surprisingly limited aid assistance to South Fly, the 
notable exception being the delivery and construction of rainwater tanks to coastal 
villages in 2002. Interestingly, these tanks were not limited to Treaty villages. There 
was also an Australian Provincial Health Adviser based in Daru under the Health 
and HIV Implementation Services Provider from the mid-2000s.3 Support ramped up 
significantly from 2010 with the outbreak of MDR TB and the handover of patients 
from Queensland Health, which had previously received treatment at TB clinics on 
the outer Torres Strait Islands. DFAT funded the construction of a TB ward and 
other infrastructure at Daru General Hospital, then clinical support via the 
Melbourne-based Burnet Institute and treatment support through World Vision. 
As discussed in chapter 6, DFAT’s assistance in health has largely since focused 
on Daru, on controlling the disease of most threat to the health security of Australia, 
rather than strengthening the Western Province health system. The other focus of 
DFAT’s aid assistance has been its support to the BRTV ranger program operated by 
the Reef and Rainforest Cooperative Research Centre. Notwithstanding the 
achievements of BRTV, limiting it to the Treaty villages closely associates it with 
Australia’s border management (chapter 5). There is a need to normalise aid 
assistance to the South Fly, with a priority on development outcomes rather than 
border management. 
A positive development has been the recent arrival of international non-
government organisations (NGOs) in the district. From 2015, World Vision has 
operated a WASH program in selected villages with funding from DFAT, initially up 
the river systems near Daru, before moving further west. Since 2017, Marie Stopes 
International has undertaken an outreach service from Daru, providing family 
planning services. In 2019, UNICEF started a capacity-building project with village 
midwifes, along the Pahoturi River. Similarly, the National Agriculture Research 
Institute (NARI) was working with funding from the European Union to ensure food 
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security in Kibuli, a PNG Government’s nominated ‘growth centre’. Two 
multilateral aid programs have built infrastructure in some villages, both of which 
were funded in part by DFAT: the World Bank’s Rural Service Delivery Program 
(RSDP), which has built school classrooms, resource centres and other facilities using 
a community-driven approach;4 and the Asian Development Bank’s Health Sector 
Services Development Program (HSSDP), which has built a health centre at 
Mabuduan through a special allocation of DFAT funds.5 These efforts are largely 
uncoordinated and appear scatter-gunned. 
It is also interesting to contrast the South Fly with the other two districts in 
Western Province. The Middle Fly and North Fly districts of the Western Province 
face similar transportation and logistical challenges, yet they benefit from a range of 
church-based organisations, particularly supporting health. According to the 
Western Provincial Health Authority, more than half of the health facilities in the 
Middle Fly and North Fly are run by churches, including Catholic Health Services 
and the Evangelical Church of PNG (ECPNG). Funding from Ok Tedi has also 
facilitated health-system strengthening services, particularly through North Fly 
Health Services Development Program, run by an Australian company (formerly 
JTA, now Abt & Associates).6 Similarly, when BHP divested its ownership of Ok 
Tedi in 2002, it created the PNG Sustainable Development Program (SDP) to invest 
the substantial profits of the mine. PNG SDP has in the past funded a range of 
projects across the Western Province, as well as other parts of PNG, but 
comparatively little of this funding has benefited the villages along the South Fly 
coast.7 After a period of hiatus due to court proceedings, it has recently relaunched a 
number of development programs, which included upgrades to mobile phone 
towers and grants to school boards.8 
Despite the strategic importance of this region for Australia’s border security, 
the South Fly appears to have been a blind spot for aid agencies active in PNG. To 
understand why this was the case, we consulted a number of international aid 
workers. Some perceived that people living in the South Fly were already benefiting 
from accessing services in Australia, which is far from straightforwardly the case. 
Others had the view that the accounts of the Western provincial government were 
flush with income from the Ok Tedi mine and that the royalties and projects that it 
funded, so there was no need of any aid assistance. But little of this mining money 
reaches beyond the Fly River corridor to the coastal and western villages of South 
Fly District. This perception also extended to some PNG Government officials, 
where its fiscal equalisation formula reduces central funding to the Western 
Province in line with internal mining revenues.9 Others took a more punitive stance, 
pointing to the history of corruption and misappropriation in the Western Province. 
They argued that aid assistance would be better directed elsewhere, until a 
generation of leaders emerged who were of the calibre found in other provinces. 
Others took a more economic rationalist perspective, judging that a small, dispersed 
and remote population does not provide a sufficient return on investment.10 
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Other aid workers described how BRTV was already working there, so they 
should focus their efforts elsewhere. Again, BRTV provides only a limited range of 
services and only to a select number of Treaty villages. It is interesting to note how 
aid workers in Daru and Port Moresby held misconceptions about the BRTV, 
describing how it differed from the standard development practice they followed. 
This is consistent with our analysis in chapter 5, which found BTRV to be a unique 
hybrid organisation that spans the Australian policy fields of Indigenous affairs, 
border protection and international development. How it is perceived by 
mainstream aid agencies reinforces a finding from our research: that the borderland 
is a unique development context, which development agencies and their workers 
struggle to understand. 
PNG does not receive high levels of aid, as measured on a percentage of its 
Gross National Income (less than 3 per cent in 2016),11 which is considerably less 
than to other Pacific countries, but the quantity of the aid that it receives is 
disproportionately dominated by Australia (58 per cent of total overseas 
development aid [ODA] in 2016).12 As a consequence, Australian aid is 
disproportionately influential. The Australian Government also struggles to 
reconcile three different policy platforms in the borderland, each of which is in 
tension and highly politicised within its domestic constituency: Indigenous affairs, 
border protection and its aid program to PNG. In approaching development in the 
South Fly, the Australian Government might encourage and partner with bilateral 
aid agencies from other countries (e.g. New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Japan’s International Cooperation Agency), given that they do not have 
the same complex mix of national security and other domestic interests at play. 
There could also be partnering more with multilateral aid agencies (e.g. United 
Nations Development Program, UNICEF, multilateral development banks), given 
their experience of working multilaterally across other borders. 
As the Australian border tightens—reducing access to trade, banking, shopping 
and health services—there is a corresponding need for international aid assistance to 
increase. This aid should be normalised with other parts of PNG, but in such a way 
that treats the borderland as a unique development context. This aid assistance 
should follow the logics of regional development and population health, and not 
limit itself to certain villages privileged under a border management regime. 
Water supply 
A high priority should be afforded to improved water supply. From the survey data, 
it was the mostly commonly listed improvement that people wanted in their 
community. Water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) is a relatively 
uncomplicated, inexpensive and proven intervention, which could make an 
enormous difference to the environmental health, incidence of communicable 
diseases and general vulnerability of South Fly villages. Time saved in walking long 
distances to springs and swamps during the dry season would free people (usually 
women) for subsistence and other livelihood activities. A reliable water supply 
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would also take pressure off the border and the limited water resources of the outer 
Torres Strait Islands. 
World Vision is actively and successfully undertaking a WASH program in the 
South Fly. It builds VIPs (Ventilated Improved Pit) latrines, and ensures that there is 
a hand-washing stand nearby. It is clearly making important improvements with 
sanitation and hygiene, but it seems to afford this a higher priority than an adequate 
water supply. It relies solely on rainwater tanks, which alone are not sufficient, given 
the unreliability and seasonality of the rainfall. Site selection is also conditional on 
villagers demonstrating behavioural changes in hygiene, including redeveloping 
their village layouts according to a Healthy Islands Concept.13 Without detracting 
from the success of the program and the significance of behavioural change, their 
practices seemed at times to overreach, with some villages being pressured to 
relocate houses to straighten and widen streets and to improve drainage. 
There were major droughts in 1997and 2015, and the emergencies that followed 
resulted in scarcity of both food and water. Emergency rice supplies were 
transported to the Morehead LLG, with the assistance of Ok Tedi Development Fund 
(OTDF) and DFAT.14 Rainwater tanks obviously fail early in a drought, and people 
then resort to walking to springs and swamps, at an ever-increasing distance as they 
dry up. With future droughts, it is possible that people would turn to the Australian 
border in desperation for water and food. Although this has not in the past involved 
large numbers, the risk is real. The Joint Advisory Council (JAC) that oversees the 
treaty has repeatedly raised the strategic importance of ensuring a reliable supply of 
drinking water in villages on the PNG side.15 
Good supplies of underground water have been found in mainland coastal 
villages, including hand-dug wells at Buzi and a borehole in Kadawa village 
opposite Daru. The church-based Baptist Drillers in Daru, who are experienced in 
drilling boreholes, can be contracted subject to funding. Combining a solar pump 
and elevated tank would ensure a reliable supply. 
Transportation 
From the survey data, people ranked improving transportation among their highest 
priorities, after water supply, housing and economic opportunities. Compared to 
WASH, tackling the transportation problems of the South Fly is much more difficult 
and expensive (figure 10.2). There are substantial challenges in building roads across 
the flood-prone savannah, including multiple stream crossings, saturated alluvial 
soils, limited drainage and the need to import gravel over long distances. 
Nonetheless, the Indonesian authorities are building roads in similar terrain across 
the border in Merauke Regency, so it must be possible. There is an existing inland 
track, optimistically called the Trans-Fly Highway, which travels almost the entire 
length of the South Fly District, from east to west from Weam through Morehead 
and Wipim to Oriomo. The road is impassable for much of the year, and there are 
few, if any, working vehicles. 
<figure 10.2 near here> 
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A hand-painted sign in South Fly, advertising fuel for K7 (A$3) per litre. 
The South Fly has a long history of water transportation, as evident in the 
comparative lack of airstrips along the coast. Most villages visited still had a 
seaworthy outrigger wooden canoe, or the remains of one (figure 10.3). During the 
colonial period, different departmental boats travelled from Daru, along the coast 
and up the river systems. Dimiri village had its own boat during the 1980s and 
1990s, which was used to ship copra and pineapples to Daru until the motor failed. 
Today the only transportation available is via fibreglass banana boats with typically 
40-horsepower outboard engines, which are owned either by the community or 
privately. With the cost of fuel as high as K10 ($5) per litre in some villages, there is 
little opportunity for farmers and fishers to get their produce to market. The high 
costs, difficulty and (at times) danger of water transportation stymies most 
development efforts, whether internally or externally organised. 
<figure 10.3 near here> 
An outrigger sailing canoe beached at low tide on Daru Island. (Research team, 2019) 
Other Pacific Island nations face similar transportation problems, with small 
remote island populations and similarly high fuel costs, which have required 
substantial ongoing transportation subsidies.16 OK Tedi Development Foundation 
(OTDF) subsidises the operation of a ferry boat service down the Fly River, from 
Kiunga to Daru. There is every reason for a similar subsidy of a ferry the South Fly 
coast. A weekly ferry service that plied its away along the coast from Daru to Bula 
and back would be an enormous improvement, enabling people to get their goods to 
market. It would also take pressure off Australian services on the outer Torres Strait 
Islands, especially with health referrals to Daru hospital. It would also be enable 
traders to travel to the villages and even to buy and sell off the barge. 
The subsidy could work via a voucher system. Each household or Ward 
Development Committee could be issued a number of vouchers for travel to Daru or 
Bula, for trade, shopping and service. Vouchers could also be used to target aid 
assistance: for example, vouchers to pregnant women for pre- and post-natal care to 
travel to Daru hospital. When Queensland Health refers patients across the border, 
they could supply them with a voucher to get them to Daru hospital. If a commercial 
ferry is not possible, this system could support a small fleet of registered operators 
using privately or community-owned banana boats. 
There are three obvious places for the ferry to port: Mabuduan, Buzi and Bula, 
at the mouths of the Pahoturi, Mai Kussa and Morehead rivers respectively. The 
ferry would need a shoal draft in order to navigate the shallow waters. The 
economic viability of this ferry, including economic returns to the Western Province, 
would be greatly enhanced if the ferry was to continue to Merauke, opening up 
international trade between Indonesia and PNG, as described above (figure 1.1). 
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Village economic development 
From the household survey, people indicated economic development as being one of 
their top four priorities. Prior attempts at economic development projects in the 
borderland have largely failed. There are complex local issues surrounding 
communal ownership of land and other assets that can frustrate efforts towards 
enterprise and infrastructure development. Land ownership issues along the South 
Fly are exacerbated by prior migrations (chapter 2). Landowners strongly assert their 
rights, and reject the authority of elected members or community leaders to speak on 
their behalf. As the experience of WWF demonstrated, they are much more than 
stakeholders in a community development project (chapter 9). 
Kevin Murphy observed an Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR) project that ran from the year 2000, based on extracting the oil 
from waria waria trees, using stills supplied to villages on the western side of South 
Fly District. Disputes arose over the ownership of the stills and access to the trees. In 
2005, PNG SDP took over the project, investing into a joint venture with an 
Australian company, but by 2011 they had concluded that the business was not 
sustainable.17 
There is also a history of landowners obtaining royalties and compensation 
from mining (chapter 8), which sets expectations of personal gain from development 
projects, regardless of the potential benefits that might accrue to their broader 
community. People may view the efforts of development agencies in a transactional 
sense, in terms of obtaining the services or public finances they do not receive from 
their government, rather than via a developmental lens of having their capacity 
built. 
Smallholder developments in the South Fly have little chance of success, due to 
their isolation and disconnection from market supply chains. While high-value niche 
markets exist that are well suited to villager farmers and fishers, including organic 
foods and sustainable fisheries, the lack of transport infrastructure and exorbitant 
fuel costs for dinghies seriously inhibit the opportunities for market integration. This 
aligns with John Burton’s research on the impact of small-scale agricultural projects 
in the Fly Delta, which showed that, even with a transport subsidy by the OTDF, any 
profits were largely absorbed by the costs of getting to market.18 
PNG has a history of operating nucleus estates for commercial crops, typically 
as a joint venture between the PNG Government and an international corporation, 
surrounded by a number of smallholders. At the centre of each estate is an 
agricultural station, which acts as the commercial hub and demonstration farm. 
Participating outgrowers are then integrated into the estate’s supply chains for 
agricultural inputs and outputs. PNG SDP is planning such a development at the 
Oriomo (Mer Lagoon). Its location on the Oriomo River, just north of Daru, is well 
suited for sea transportation, and the area has already been a site for commercial 
logging. Other parts of the Western Province are growing rubber, and there are 
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recent moves to grow rice. These efforts are laudable, but considerable obstacles 
remain in establishing and sustaining their economic viability. 
Cross-border trade and Indonesia 
In considering economic development, there are unrealised opportunities to take 
advantage of the South Fly as a borderland, with international trade across the 
borders into Australia and Indonesia. One of the most effective forms of 
development in other borderlands globally is the production of goods (e.g. fishing, 
agriculture, manufacturing) on the lower-income side, then selling those goods into 
the higher-income side. Economic zones can allow access to lucrative international 
markets, similar to the way that Free Trade Areas and Spatial Development 
Initiatives have been conceptualised elsewhere for borderlands.19 The foundations 
for economic cooperation in a borderland is each country’s geopolitical proximity 
and their similar cultures and kinship networks. 
Instead, current approaches to border management by Australia strive to limit 
any commercial trade with PNG. The ‘Guidelines for Traditional Visitors’ interpret 
‘barter and market’ trade to exclude commercial activity, which leaves South Fly 
people hostage to low payments in cash, processed food or fuel. Significant 
opportunities for commercial trade that could have brought economic benefits to 
both the South Fly and the Torres Strait Islanders (see discussion on the trade of live 
mud crabs in chapter 5) have been overlooked. And while the Australian border has 
hardened, the Indonesian border has beckoned, as discussed further below. 
There is a legal a way to bypass the treaty border management arrangements, 
by exporting goods through an approved Australian ‘port’, the closest of which are 
Horn Island or Cairns. In terms of connecting to southern markets, Cairns is the far 
better option. A local businessman on Daru Island, Mereme Maina, who owns Maru 
Marine, has been exporting live lobster to Cairns since 2013.20 The scale of the 
operation in terms of processing and gaining the necessary permits is extensive, 
consistent in size with what is widely classified as ‘medium’ enterprise.21 
The BRTV ranger program has explored more village-level micro- and small-
enterprises, for export into Australia. Taro is grown in plentiful quantities in the 
South Fly. Fresh, frozen and packages of powdered taro, which comes from as far 
away as Fiji, is sold in Torres Strait Island stores. The BRTV investigated the 
processing required to produce taro to reach Australian biosecurity standards, 
concluding that this would be feasible. They have also explored direct arts and crafts 
sales to Cairns arts and crafts dealers. Although their efforts might still reach 
fruition, they require intense logistical and administrative support brokered through 
a third party, compared to the obvious alternative of smallholders trading across the 
border. 
Cash is now essential for survival, so if people are unable to trade with 
Australia, they will look elsewhere. There is a vibrant market in Daru, but access is 
largely limited to the villages nearby. Most villages rely instead on the Indonesian 
traders who visit their villages illegally from Merauke. Some traders also visit from 
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Daru to supply Chinese PNG businesses there. These travelling traders service a 
lucrative Asian market, again with low-cash payments for locals for what are 
extremely high-value products. The Indonesian traders take considerable risks and 
pay bribes, which they cover through high profits. The low payments that PNG 
fishers receive fuel greater exploitation of their limited resources, and so the cycle 
continues. 
Fisheries and marine ecosystems management in the Protected Zone along the 
Australian border have also suffered from a logic that fails to respond to 
underdevelopment on the PNG side. The marine resources across the borderland are 
critical not only to their food security but also for earning much-needed cash. 
Problems of overfishing are exacerbated by environmental damage to the Fly River 
from the OK Tedi mine and the consequent internal migration to Daru. The 
management of marine resources is starkly divided, with little management 
occurring on the PNG side, and seemingly boundless resources and state-of-the-art 
surveillance technology on the Australian side. South Fly residents face fines and 
confiscation of their boats if caught, but some still run the risk in order to exploit the 
valuable and now more abundant marine resources on the Australian side. 
The present situation requires an innovative governance response that 
reimagines the borderland in terms of local livelihoods, in ways that take pressure 
off the border and marine resources. Busilacchi and her colleagues (chapter 7) 
concluded the need for a trade agreement, starting first with the PNG–Indonesia 
border, and possibly extending it into Australia in the future. In their view, such a 
trade zone could both improve regulation and the prices that local fishers receive, 
opening up lucrative Asian markets, as well as ultimately reducing overfishing. 
Indonesia and PNG authorities are activity working to facilitate and legalise 
cross-border trade, including discussions for a trade agreement.22 On the north coast 
side of PNG, where the Indonesian border intersects the Vanimo–Jayapura 
Highway, both government have invested into developing the Wutung border post, 
which includes immigration and customs buildings and market facilities. The Fly 
River (Western) provincial government is already planning to build a smaller but 
similar border post at Weam (west of Morehead), to connect to the already sealed, 
two-lane road that runs from Merauke to the Indonesian border town of Sota. Near 
where the Indonesian border meets the south coast, they also plan to develop a 
border post at Bula village. There is already a small immigration office and staff 
house there. Bula is perfectly positioned for boats that travel along the coast, as well 
as connecting to villages inland via the Morehead River. 
There is population of almost 90 000 people living in Merauke Township, and 
almost 200 000 people living in the surrounding Merauke Regency (chapter 3). The 
Indonesian Government is considering a proposal to establish a new province there 
to be called South Papua.23 In terms of its proximity, this market eclipses anything 
available to the people of South Fly District, whether within its boundaries or any 
centre to its north or east. As discussed above, a coastal vessel that regularly 
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travelled from Daru and Merauke and back, stopping at Bula, Buzi and Mabuduan, 
would open up many export and import opportunities. 
Labour mobility 
The guidelines that are used to administer the treaty explicitly limit people crossing 
over to work. Where this still occurs informally, payments are quite low. There is 
little opportunity for improvement, give the general lack of employment 
opportunities in the Torres Strait. The people of South Fly’s proficiency in English 
and prior history of working in the Torres Strait would nonetheless make them 
excellent candidates for seasonal work in Australia. People would not cross into the 
Torres Strait as traditional inhabitants but rather travel through normal immigration 
ports, via Daru or Port Moresby. 
DFAT’s Seasonal Worker Program and Pacific Labour Scheme facilitates the 
training, recruitment and placement of temporary overseas workers with Australian 
employers, primarily in the agricultural sector. A World Bank study found that the 
average worker remitted $2200 during their period of employment, then returned 
with a further $6650 in savings, or $8850 in total.24 This would be a huge boost to the 
livelihoods of a PNG household. Should 120 workers be recruited, this would return 
in excess of $1 million into the district, which would have a marked influence on the 
local economy. A key consideration for recruitment is the job-readiness of the 
overseas workers, including their English literacy and familiarity with Australia 
culture. Many South Fly residents would be excellent candidates, given that English 
is their lingua franca and they have a prior history and familiarity of working in 
Australia. 
Australia has recently extended its Pacific Labour Program to PNG. In 2019, a 
household in one South Fly village had themselves worked out how to apply via the 
immigration office in Daru. It is unlikely, however, that people from the South Fly 
will overcome the difficulty and cost of travel to Port Moresby, to locate the nearest 
registered recruiter and certified health centre.25 But a special area intervention could 
be designed, with an office established in Daru to facilitate applications. The 
challenges of obtaining the necessary passports, documentation and health checks 
could be overcome with a targeted recruitment program. 
Connectivity and mobile money 
There is also unrealised potential from improved energy supply, most likely via 
solar power, but also small wind turbines. Forty-two per cent of village households 
(111 of 164) had a solar panel of some description, which they used for charging 
mobile phones or lighting at night. Improved energy access can also improve 
education, by extending the hours that children can do homework, and learning 
apps on tablets (figure 10.4). According to the value chain for agricultural and 
fishing markets, there can also be financial gains through local processing, drying or 
refrigeration. Transitioning from traditional bio-fuels used for cooking to more 
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efficient energy stoves can reduce air pollution and respiratory disease and the time 
needed to collect firewood. 
<take in figure 10.4 near here> 
A boy in a South Fly village uses a small solar panel to charge a mobile phone (Research 
team, 2018) 
Combining energy access with connectivity could serve as a catalyst for 
improved livelihood outcomes. There is an existing network of mobile phone towers 
across the South Fly, but poor maintenance and coastal corrosion means that 
coverage can be unreliable. Compared to the costs of building roads over flood-
prone savannah, building and maintaining mobile phone towers is within the 
financial reach of governments, aid agencies and mining companies. In 2018 work 
was completed to upgrade the Digicel system to 3G internet with financial support 
from PNG SDP. The upkeep of this infrastructure will ultimately depend on the 
adoption of mobile phones by users and by the economic returns to Digicel. 
In many South Fly villages, the shared mobile phone is often suspended from a 
tree or a window, in the one place where reception appears intermittently. These 
‘spots’ of signal could be strengthened by building boosters or repeaters, powered 
by solar panels. A range of appropriate technology products are available.26 If no 
signal is available, there are low-bandwidth satellite receivers that work in 
combination with wi-fi. Low-cost smart phones can be programmed to communicate 
with each other, or cache data, with apps designed for low bandwidth.27 Solar power 
arrangements can be combined with telecommunications towers and repeaters, to 
facilitate a localised power supply/charging station with internet access.28 
Villagers receive remittances from relatives living in urban centres like Port 
Moresby or in Australia, through Post PNG or BSP branches in Daru. Households 
affected by the Ok Tedi mine receive royalty and compensation payments, and 
government workers receive wages, or pensions if retired. These recipients then face 
high transportation costs to travel to Daru to collect these payments, which can 
exceed K100, consuming much, if not all, of the payment received.29 
Villagers are already transferring money between bank accounts through their 
mobile devices, reducing the need for expensive and risky travel to Daru. In most of 
the 20 villages visited in 2019, there was someone who had a mobile banking 
account, usually a school teacher, LLG member or entrepreneur. In Mari village, the 
member’s family needed to get money to him in Daru. They took K100 to the school 
teacher, who immediately transferred the funds from money he had in his mobile 
bank where his pay is deposited. This had the bonus of giving the school teacher 
cash, allowing him to buy more produce locally, and reducing the need for him to 
travel to Daru. 
The next step would be ‘mobile money’, which facilitates in-situ cashless 
buying and selling, and is starting to occur in urban centres in PNG. In comparison 
to carrying around cash, people enjoy the added security needed to avoid theft and 
harassment, especially women.30 Digicel subscribers in the South Fly already 
exchange airtime (mobile top-up) via the ‘Credit U Credit Me’ system, a known 
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precursor to mobile money.31 Currently in the South Fly, most people were only 
transferring phone credits to their family and close friends, and not yet for trade. 
People were aware of this potential, and should they progress to it, mobile money 
could stimulate more local village market activity and trade. 
There is also a range of e-services that could be provided, including health 
advice to village midwives. Extension services can be provided to smallholders, 
including market information, input and output transactions, and new seeds and 
other technology. It could limit absenteeism of village school teachers and health 
workers, who can get stuck in Daru waiting for their salary to arrive, for the weather 
to clear, or the myriad of other reasons that keep people in town. And it could 
reduce the influx of people travelling from the Fly River Corridor to withdraw their 
royalty payments, as described by Busilacchi and colleagues (chapter 8). 
Direct payments 
Too little of PNG government and aid funding is reaching rural villages. Our 
investigation into one PNG funding program targeting development of the Treaty 
villages revealed that only a quarter of the grant actually reached the ground 
(chapter 5). Too much public administration is transacted in Daru and too little in 
remote villages. In addition to the services and infrastructure that they fund, public 
finance payments inject much-needed cash to stimulate local market activity. 
Mobile money would also offer an alternative funding modality for PNG 
government and aid assistance to reach remote dwellers, bypassing the endemic 
problems of leakage and misappropriation in the PNG public finance system. 
International aid agencies can facilitate direct-giving and crowd-sourcing, including 
micro-grants and cash transfers. Payments could also support targeted community 
development activities, including women, youth, aged or community groups. A 
local community group could have its own phone and mobile banking account, 
permitting direct payments to resource their plans. PNG’s Tuition Fee Free (TFF) 
policy is an example of how government funds can be dispersed at village level 
through a local governance mechanism (school boards), which manage and acquit 
the funds and set priorities for how funds are spent locally to support education. A 
similar mechanism could operate to support health, whereby a village health 
committee would utilise funds from government or donor sources to provide 
transport for those requiring medical services outside the village. The same could 
apply to local government funding to the Ward Development Committee in 
accordance with their Ward Development Plan. 
In chapter 4, Peter Chaudhry argues the case for a Basic Income Grant (BIG), 
guaranteeing an unconditional minimum income to all citizens. Social safety nets are 
cash transfers targeted at the poor and vulnerable and are increasingly recognised as 
effective tools to reach the most vulnerable.32 PNG’s New Ireland province 
successfully tested social payments for aged and disability pensions, but struggled to 
move large volumes of cash through the LLGs and village ward structures, resulting 
in cash payments through hand-delivered envelopes. The administrative 
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requirements and security risk were considerable. Beneficiaries did not know in 
advance when payments would be received, so they were unable to plan their use of 
the funds. A World Bank assessment came to the obvious conclusion that an 
electronic payment system was needed instead.33 This also applies to payments to 
village workers on labour-intensive community projects, as commonly used when 
disbursing LLG SIP funds. Payment could be made directly to the worker’s mobile 
bank account on proof of time worked. 
As with any intervention, there are risks. Making payments directly to people 
and organisations—where previously it was funnelled through government 
agencies—will fundamentally shift the politics between citizens, leaders, bureaucrats 
and international actors. People who are benefiting from the current status quo 
might oppose any changes to protect their privileges. Any attempts should be 
trialled on a small scale, and closely evaluated.34 
Shared governance 
While both Australia and PNG strongly maintain their sovereignty, the governance 
of the South Fly is clearly shared between the Australian and PNG states. Our place-
based analysis reveals a complex institutional layering, with the extrajurisdictional 
influence of Australia reaching into PNG. The number of visits is overwhelmingly 
dominated by PNG nationals crossing south into Australia, compared to the number 
of Torres Strait Islanders travelling north into PNG. The very opposite direction 
applies when it comes to the extrajurisdictional influence of each state. The PNG 
state does not reach into Australia in any measure, but the Australian state reaches 
well into PNG (figure 10.5). Whether because of its sheer distance from the capital, or 
the incorrect perception that the area is serviced by Australia, the PNG Government 
and aid agencies tend to stay away. What remains is a unique development context 
quite unlike anywhere else in the region and possibly the world. 
<figure 10.5 near here> 
An exterior wall of a house in a South Fly village patched up with an Australian Government 
Nation Building Project sign (Research team, 2016) 
Understanding the development context of the South Fly requires an 
acceptance of this shared governance. The most compelling case is health, which 
clearly requires a health systems approach to the entire borderland population. 
Instead of Queensland Health drawing a line at the border, there is an opportunity 
for it to be working developmentally as a part of the PNG aid program, building the 
capability of the health system in PNG’s Western Province. Real gains have been 
achieved in tackling TB on Daru, yet the response has been costly and at the expense 
of strengthening the health system and the underlying cause of the epidemic. Instead 
of treating the South Fly population as a ‘buffer zone’, with contingency planning for 
the next infectious disease crisis, a more effective approach would be to treat the 
borderland as a special ‘health zone’. Building on the past precedents of the TB 
clinics that operated on Saibai and Boigu and ‘facilitated border crossings’ for patient 
retrieval, Australian health workers could provide clinical support, mentoring and 
History of MBS ~ Chapter 13 (draft only) Page 282 
Mary Sheehan, Living Histories Confidential ~ not to be copied 
 
 
 
training in South Fly health posts, while PNG health workers could have access to 
health facilities in the Torres Strait. 
A long-standing aid modality in PNG is ‘technical assistance’ provided by 
mostly Australian advisers. There has been a Provincial Health Adviser based in 
Daru since the mid-2000s, and clinicians and managers employed by the Burnet 
Institute now support the TB response at Daru hospital. There are also established 
precedents in PNG, and notably in Solomon Islands and elsewhere, whereby 
Australian public servants also fill similar roles in the host country, by performing 
duties ‘in line’ with the host government while capacity-building local 
‘counterparts’. The risk of this model is that it can displace, rather than build, long-
term sustainable institutional capacity. This approach was used in the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) to establish law and order following 
civil unrest.35 The role of technical advisers in similar capacities in PNG has in the 
past been the subject of considerable political controversy.36 Nonetheless, recent 
shifts in national politics and the health problems and underdevelopment in the 
South Fly could allow for a differently negotiated agreement. 
Drawing on these precedents, officers from Queensland Health could be 
running an international aid program, alongside their PNG counterparts, to 
strengthen the health system of the Western Province. They need not be directly 
involved in frontline service delivery to be effective in supporting others to fulfil this 
role. They would also be very well placed to broker across the two health systems. 
A similar case could be made for other sectors, including policing. An 
alternative to the current practice of running intermittent joint cross-border patrols 
via helicopters would be for police officers to be based in Daru or Mabuduan, 
working to build the capability of their counterpart PNG enforcement agencies. They 
could work in closely with the $13 million policing and border enforcement facility 
under construction in 2019 on Saibai Island in the Torres Strait.37 Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) already has a capacity-building program operating in other parts of 
PNG, called the PNG–Australia Policing Program (PNG–APP). In mid-2019, the AFP 
donated two boats and a vehicle to the Transnational Crime Unit of the PNG 
Constabulary in Daru, but again the focus remained on combating cross-border 
crime.38 Their scope of activities could sensibly extend beyond border management, 
to include general law and order, as it does elsewhere in PNG. The same could be 
said for fisheries monitoring management, with Australian fishery officers based in 
Daru. 
Sharing security 
The notion that this area is a borderland, with its own people, is of great 
consequence to how the people on the PNG side of the border think about their 
circumstances. Measures of absolute poverty indicate that people on the South Fly 
live in a state of acute poverty (as per the MPI measures in chapter 1). But from a 
social science perspective, relative poverty is also a significant concern, if not more 
so. It is not only how well off we are that matters but also how well off we are 
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relative to our neighbours.39 A child can expect to live for 82 years if they are born in 
Australia, compared to 66 years in Papua New Guinea.40 But these national figures 
mask differences within internal populations. In Australia, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people live on average for 8 years less than their non-Indigenous 
counterparts. At even smaller scales, the disparities can become acute. One just has 
to reflect on differences between the suburbs of Alice Springs and the Aboriginal 
town camps on its fringe, or the tourism hub of Ayers Rock Resort and the nearby 
Aboriginal community of Mutitjula. A World Health Organization (WHO) report 
showed how children inherit vastly different life chances depending on where they 
are born, even in the same city. The life expectancy in the Glasgow suburb of Calton 
is 28 years less than the affluent suburb of Lenzie nearby.41 There are great 
differences in life expectancy both between and within nations, which tells us that 
the opportunities are determined not only by day-to-day conditions and people’s 
agency but also by the structural arrangements that underpin these conditions. 
Torres Strait Islanders remain disadvantaged relative to the remainder of 
Australia, as evident in ‘Closing the Gap’ measures,42 but in a relative sense, they are 
not disadvantaged relative to people in the South Fly. For people living on the PNG 
side of the border, development is understood in terms of what the Torres Strait 
Islanders have. This relative poverty drives their sense of entitlement and the 
frustration of unmet claim-making (chapter 4). Although the sentiment is complex, 
the consequences are clear. People living in the South Fly claim that in certain—
indeed fundamental—respects, they are the same as the Torres Strait Islanders, and 
their logic follows that the border is arbitrary and they are entitled to make claims on 
the Australian state. Within living memory, they were administered by Australia 
until what they view as an arbitrary line excluded them within the new independent 
state of PNG. Such claims of sameness were almost always followed with claims 
against the Australian state. As one respondent put it in 2017: ‘Government is 
responsible for the lives of the people. If Australia considers the way they live in 
Torres Strait, they should consider the way we live here. We should be treated 
directly on a family–family basis. Social benefit because [Torres Strait] Islanders get 
social benefit.’ 
The Torres Strait Islanders also acknowledge their closeness and their PNG 
relatives: ‘[T]hey are our family too.’ But unlike the PNG nationals, they also point to 
their difference. As a man on Iama Island saw it: ‘[T]heir culture is similar, but 
different … another way of how were doing it.’ As is often the case among groups 
that enjoy a higher socioeconomic status, there can be resentment and prejudice. The 
same informant expressed his disappointment at the way his own people ‘look past 
them, compare themselves higher’. A woman on Iama saw the treatment of visitors 
on the outer islands of Saibai and Boigu as being harsh, pointing to things like the 
lack of public toilet facilities compared to their islands, and the low payments that 
received for domestic help. Those on these outer islands counter that it is they who 
must carry the burden of more than 90 per cent of visitors, on behalf of the other 
islands. There are many examples of compassion: of Torres Strait Islanders hosting 
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visitors and sending money, clothes, equipment and other support. There was 
widespread empathy among Torres Strait Islander informants for the poor living 
conditions of people in the South Fly, and a lament at the lack of PNG government 
services. Even the harshest critics of ‘lax’ border management who argue for tighter 
border controls express their concern for the plight of PNG people on the other side. 
The Torres Strait Treaty was an innovative design to accommodate traditional 
culture and mobility shared across the borderland. In the 1970s, Torres Strait 
Islanders and the people of South Fly were in much closer contact. They lived in 
similar conditions, as the differences between Australia’s colonial administration of 
PNG and its ‘colonial’ administration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
in the 1970s were not far apart.43 Staffed by expatriate Australian teachers during the 
colonial period, Kodoro Primary School on the Pahoturi River in the South Fly was 
well regarded for the standard of its schooling. Some successful PNG leaders, 
including several sitting judges of the PNG Supreme Court, were schooled here in 
the 1960s. During an informal discussion with two of the judges,44 they remembered 
that most of the Kodoro class mates went onto Daru High School, then to study at 
different universities in PNG. Their view was that the standard of education in 
Kodoro was higher than what was available on Saibai Island in Torres Strait. In the 
1970s, schools in Torres Strait were not yet run by the Queensland Education 
Department, but instead by the notoriously paternalistic Queensland Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Advancement. Island schools were staffed by local teachers 
whom Singe described as ‘undertrained and underpaid’.45 
While living conditions were then comparable fifty years ago, a great deal has 
changed since. The PNG Government’s investment in the South Fly has declined, 
whereas the Australian Government’s investment in Torres Strait has multiplied. 
Culture is never static, and the rate at which it changes is influenced by exogenous 
structural factors, including the global cash economy and redistributions that 
governments make. Although familial relationships and traditional norms and 
behaviour endure, it is no longer sufficient to characterise the borderland by its 
shared culture and identity. 
A prominent factor that now defines this shared borderland culture instead is 
how security is intertwined. From the Australian side, the border is the focus of a 
range of interventions by the Australian and Queensland governments, including 
border protection, biosecurity, marine resource management and infectious disease 
control. How the border authorities manage these security risks is hardening, and 
‘traditional inhabitants’ from PNG crossing to Australia under the Torres Strait 
Treaty are not able to sell their goods or avail themselves of medical services to the 
extent that they once enjoyed. Torres Strait Islander leaders share the same security 
concerns as the border management authorities, and strongly assert that it is their 
health and livelihood that are most at risk compared to other Australians from PNG 
visitation and migration. They are concerned about the pressure on their limited 
community resources, especially their water supply, fuel stocks and housing. 
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From the PNG side, people living in the South Fly villages have a history of 
protecting the border, despite the fact that they are not at serious risk from border 
incursions themselves.46 In each Treaty village, there are two designated people with 
authority to sign a pass, which includes the LLG member if he or she is from that 
village. They enforce what they see as at times as arbitrary and unreasonable 
regulations imposed by Torres Strait Island councillors, including daily limits on the 
number of people who can cross and on which the days of the week they may do so 
(chapter 2). In 2019 with DFAT’s support, the Torres Strait Islander councillors 
agreed through their Torres Strait Islander Regional Council (TSIRC) to limit visits to 
certain days of the week and to impose a 30-person daily limit. Village leaders in the 
Treaty villages affected established a roster so that everyone could have a turn. They 
are thus effectively volunteer agents who help manage the border, in controlling 
visits by traditional inhabitants from their village. 
Occasionally foreigners from Africa and the Middle East have attempted to 
cross the border illegally into Australia, mostly by walking across from Indonesia. 
Once detected, the illegal immigrants are quickly reported to the PNG and 
Australian authorities. Local people pride themselves in the role they play in 
protecting the border; in the words of one informant: ‘[E]veryone in the community 
is Border Force.’ One senior male leader on Parama Island expressed his concerns 
over the deterioration of relationships with Australia: 
[You] really don’t see the good side of PNG, both sides of the coin … we 
need to be holding each other close … we don’t want to be turning to the 
Chinese or Indonesians! We could be moving into Australia, but the 
Treaty holds us together. 
The Australian National Audit Office recently sounded its concern over the 
‘changing strategic and operational environment’ due to the ‘increasing population 
in the Treaty villages and the ensuing pressure this place on the Torres Strait 
Islander communities who receive theses visits’. According to its 2011 census, the 
population growth rate nationwide in PNG is 3.1 per cent, with most of this increase 
occurring in the Highland Provinces.47 Over the 8 years from 2009–10 to 2017–18, the 
number of visitors annually crossing the border increased from 2400 to 2700, an 
annual increase of 2.8 per cent.48 This suggests that the increase in visitation is 
aligned with national population growth. There is no evidence to suggest that 
people in PNG are internally migrating to the South Fly. PNG has low levels of 
internal migration compared to other countries, due to cultural ties with land, strong 
societal bonds, the customary land ownership system, and lack of education and 
skills needed for employment.49 The inbound migration that is occurring is largely to 
economic growth centres in large cities and areas where there is mining. There are 
no equivalent opportunities in the South Fly. 
From the PNG side, the people of the South Fly endure serious poverty and a 
lack of services, whether via government, NGOs or foreign aid. They too face a range 
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of security issues, but expressed differently in terms of sufficient food, health care, 
climate change, policing and basic environmental health infrastructure, including 
water supplies. Their view is that their security is related to border security. In the 
words of one villager, ‘The border is not secure because I’m not secure. I need to 
survive.’ 
Clearly, it is not in the interest of the Torres Strait Islanders or Australians more 
broadly to have such high levels of underdevelopment on the PNG side of the 
border, as the economic precariousness of such near neighbours exacerbates its task 
of managing security. As people make the transition from subsistence to specialised 
cash crops, and as the effects of climate change, changing rainfall and rising sea 
levels are felt, their vulnerability might well increase. And at times of humanitarian 
crises, desperate people tend to do desperate things. 
The question is whether Australia’s approach to tightening border control is 
having unintended consequences and in fact actually worsening the security risk. 
Certainly the view from the PNG side is that recent advances in maintaining border 
‘security’ are undermining their food ‘security’ and livelihoods. The following 
quotes are from two respondents during a community meeting in 2017: 
We’re fed up with security concerns from Australia. We don’t have good 
standard of living. I must travel there to get money to survive. If we have 
good standard of living, then the security is OK. We’re not sharing the 
border; they’re enforcing it. You must have fairness if you want to be 
good neighbours. Border is not secure because there’s no development on 
this side.50 
Treaty allows us to go for some things, other things, but stop us from 
doing things, especially commercial fishing—not allowed in Australian 
waters. A hundred years ago we were allowed to go there. Today modern 
world—when Australia PNG talk about border they talk about security. 
But security is me and Torres Strait Island[er]s are security on that side.51 
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